Sassaman Interview

[Abu Suleyman]

I don't need two posts to say this: Nathan Sassaman is a professional embarrassment to the officer community and the United States Army because he advocated the murder of the very people he was tasked to secure.

This is my third try at a post, and hopefully my least emotional. Thank goodness for delete keys.

I knew Nate Sassaman, and was in his battalion, although not during the deployment.

He has been unfairly characterized. His quotes, as he conveyed them, have been manipulated by those who opposed the war to portray a man who was full of hatred for Iraqi's, and from there generalize to all soldiers, but nothing could be further from the truth. He was unwittingly complicit in this, aided by his sense of the dramatic (he liked to talk in absolutes), and his personal story. (The quarterback who went on to be the warrior, etc.)

He is probably the most quoted and filmed battalion commander of the whole war, and that bears remembering when passing judgement on the whole battalion. If we filmed any battalion as much as that one, and then parsed it down to a few clips I bet we could make them all out to be a bunch of hate mongers, too. Nate had great relationships with the majority of the Iraqi's he worked with. With a few notable exeptions, when we returned to the same AO a year and a half later, all the leadership asked after him, and some were even writing him in the States. What no report I have ever seen mentions is that in the City of Balad there is a monument that the Iraqi's built to him and his battalion. Another thing no report mentions is that the Samarra incident occured in an out of sector mission, where his relationships with the locals and many of the factors of COIN were not in play. Basically, Sassaman's battalion was called in to help another battalion who had been kicked out of Samarra by the insurgency, and the city was almost completely uncontrolled.

I haven't read his memoirs yet. Time does not permit, and I have already heard the story from his perspective anyway. However, he understood the way that Iraqi's worked better than anyone I knew. He read voraciously about the Middle East, with a fondness for Thomas Friedman. Moreover, as was stated earlier, war is a fundamentally stupid, and basically immoral action, even when waged for a greater higher purpose, and Nate understood that. He tried to make the best of a bad situation for everyone. Indeed, his 'crime' was that he was trying to mitigate the effects of a poor decision on the part of Jack Saville. (Also worth noting, even in Iraq it was widely believed, but especially by Nate and his staff, that neither of the two men died. Also, at the time 'alternate deterence' was preferable to detention in enforcing curfew. So that from Nate's perspective he wasn't covering a crime, he was just trying to keep Jack from being punished for overzealous, and frankly poor, implementation of a division policy.) He equally tried to mitigate the effects on the Iraqi's by instituting expansive reconstruction projects, and, frankly establishing security as quickly as possible. He believed firmly in short term pain for long term gain, which in retrospect, was the right thing to do.

It is popular to read accounts from NYT Magazine and pass judgement. But much as they would like to believe to the contrary NYT is not a reliable, nor neutral arbiter, much less the magazine. Also, knowing the players as I do, I read the account, and percieve it totally differently. The words of friends ring true, and carry different meaning to me, I guess.

My last word is this: Don't hasten to judge. Many have been unfairly tried in the court of public opinion only to be acquited by the halls of justice. If a full and true accounting is ever to be given (which is unlikely) I have no doubt that Nate Sassaman will be remembered not as a villain, but as a tragic figure who overestimated his own abilities and was caught in the machine of war. Not all of the casualties are physical.

I have just read Abu Muquwama's review (I know I should have read it first), and I have to add this bit: It seems that Nate has become a bit more strident in his views. I don't know that I would agree with him. Nevertheless, I agree with Abu Muquwama that this is a tone that one saw a great deal from officers in post-Vietnam, and more so (though less current) in post-U.S. Civil War and Gemany post-WWI. I hope that he hasn't personally engaged on the slide that destroyed Johnstons life.

[AlexJohnson]

My principle issue with Sassaman is his role in the Samarra bridge incident. His tactics, strategy, and general approach to COIN has its merits and drawbacks. My admittedly limited knowledge of the intimate details of his BN's operations leads me to believe that his approach was wrong-headed, but I don't think it was egregiously or intentionally immoral.
But I think he was unequivocally wrong in encouraging (or instructing?) his subordinates to lie about the bridge incident. It is bad practice in COIN to not admit openly and fully to mistakes made, and more importantly, it flies in the face of the Army values of honor and integrity. Sassaman should have at bare minimum instructed his men to tell the truth, and really should have protected his subordinates not by lying for them, but by taking more responsibility himself. I think his failure does show a profound lack of morality and ethics and I think he does deserve to be punished for those failings.

[Shek]

Another thing no report mentions is that the Samarra incident occured in an out of sector mission, where his relationships with the locals and many of the factors of COIN were not in play. Basically, Sassaman's battalion was called in to help another battalion who had been kicked out of Samarra by the insurgency, and the city was almost completely uncontrolled.

First, whether it was in sector or out of sector is irrelevant. Being out of sector doesn't permit one to order detainees to walk the plank. However, the fact is that it was in sector, and it was part of a COIN operation. The incident in question happened the day right after my battalion had turned over the eastern half of Samarra back to 4ID, signaling an end to one phase of the operation and transition into the phase where CA was going to institute a whole bunch of "high vis, quick impact" projects. Sounds an awful lot like trying to win hearts and minds to me. Furthermore, there had been very little contact in the preceding two weeks, so it wasn't like the incident occured in the aftermath of an intense action with loads of combat stress.

Moreover, as was stated earlier, war is a fundamentally stupid, and basically immoral action, even when waged for a greater higher purpose, and Nate understood that. He tried to make the best of a bad situation for everyone. Indeed, his 'crime' was that he was trying to mitigate the effects of a poor decision on the part of Jack Saville. (Also worth noting, even in Iraq it was widely believed, but especially by Nate and his staff, that neither of the two men died. Also, at the time 'alternate deterence' was preferable to detention in enforcing curfew. So that from Nate's perspective he wasn't covering a crime, he was just trying to keep Jack from being punished for overzealous, and frankly poor, implementation of a division policy.) He equally tried to mitigate the effects on the Iraqi's by instituting expansive reconstruction projects, and, frankly establishing security as quickly as possible. He believed firmly in short term pain for long term gain, which in retrospect, was the right thing to do.

Actually, there's a long, historical lineage on just war theory, and there are the two separate concepts of both the justness of war and justness in war that serve as the foundation for a moral treatment of just war theory. LTC Sassaman should have studied this as a cadet, just as LT Saville did. The "poor decision" made by Saville was a crime, as indicated by the decision handed down in the halls of Army justice. Whether "alternate deterrence" was really the preferred method or not is a red herring, as the legal orders were to detain, not to walk the plank. The fact that the detainees had to be forced at gunpoint to jump from the bridge indicates that it wasn't their preferred method (it is worth mentioning that the soldiers on the ground made the decision that the two weren't insurgents since they released them until they were ordered by LT Saville to keep them detained).

LTC Sassaman obstructed justice and his statements, both in his CID statement that is quoted in his book and in other statements in the book, provide the proof. Why then MG Odierno pursued non-judicial punishment instead of court-martial proceedings was his call, but LTC Sassaman's statements are pretty clear on the matter: he instructed CPT Cunningham et al not to mention anything about water.

It is popular to read accounts from NYT Magazine and pass judgement. But much as they would like to believe to the contrary NYT is not a reliable, nor neutral arbiter, much less the magazine. Also, knowing the players as I do, I read the account, and percieve it totally differently. The words of friends ring true, and carry different meaning to me, I guess.

What a wide brushstroke there - the NYT is trash? Some of the best reporting out of Iraq has come from NYT reporters (and there has been some poor reporting as well). In this case, Dexter Filkins, the author of "The Fall of the Warrior King" from NYT Magazine back in 2005, is a well respected journalist. At least, LTC Sassaman said in his memoirs that he was happy to have participated in the interviews for the article and was pleased because it was a fair article. I think that that serves as an endorsement to use that particular article to pass judgement.

My last word is this: Don't hasten to judge. Many have been unfairly tried in the court of public opinion only to be acquited by the halls of justice. If a full and true accounting is ever to be given (which is unlikely) I have no doubt that Nate Sassaman will be remembered not as a villain, but as a tragic figure who overestimated his own abilities and was caught in the machine of war. Not all of the casualties are physical.

He made the decision to compromise moral-ethical decision making by obstructing justice out of a misguided sense of loyalty. It is clear that he was loyal to his soldiers and for this, earned their respect. But loyalty is much more than just loyalty to one's soldiers. It includes loyalty to the Army and to the Constitution. He abdicated his responsibilities on this front, and this is what he will be remembered for - a case study from which to learn.

[Abu Suleyman]

In this case, Dexter Filkins, the author of "The Fall of the Warrior King" from NYT Magazine back in 2005, is a well respected journalist. At least, LTC Sassaman said in his memoirs that he was happy to have participated in the interviews for the article and was pleased because it was a fair article. I think that that serves as an endorsement to use that particular article to pass judgement.

Actually, I would agree that it is a good article. Moreover, I would not equivocate at all that Jack's conduct and judgement was poor, and probably criminal. Insofar as he did go to jail I would have to say that is a big checkmark for the criminal. Additionally, concealing information and hindering an investigation, I am sure is criminal. I am not defending any of that.

All of that notwithstanding, the article is limited in scope, where as the nature of a man, or a woman, is not. The moments in the article are just slices of time out of a mans career, and life. A few bad, and even criminal decisions, do not automatically turn someone into Satan incarnate. I find it amazing that people will advocate "seeing things from the terrorists perspective" but will forget to look through our own soldiers eyes. That is a real shame.

It seems that in an effort to justify ourselves, and our actions, and defend the just war, we are willing to abandon anyone who makes mistakes. I would not try to justify Nate in his decisions, and I was not trying to, but he is not some irredeemable goblin, nor an embarassment to the officer corps. He is just human, like all of us. He made many, many decisions in Iraq, and some people want to condemn him for his bad ones, while forgetting his good ones. You can condemn the decisions without condemning the man. More importantly, I believe we should be willing to forgive mistakes, for someone who did so much good, at least in the long run. I am saying that I believe even with the Samarra incident Nate Sassaman's time in Iraq was a net positive for the Iraqis.

However, I suppose this is a good personal lesson, and one that I have taken to heart. Don't stick a finger in old wounds for no good reason. I highly doubt that we would be here talking about this if Nate hadn't written a book, which I do concur adds nothing to the debate. In the long run, I doubt that this will even rate as a footnote to the history of the Iraq conflict.

[Shek]

All of that notwithstanding, the article is limited in scope, where as the nature of a man, or a woman, is not. The moments in the article are just slices of time out of a mans career, and life. A few bad, and even criminal decisions, do not automatically turn someone into Satan incarnate. I find it amazing that people will advocate "seeing things from the terrorists perspective" but will forget to look through our own soldiers eyes. That is a real shame.

It seems that in an effort to justify ourselves, and our actions, and defend the just war, we are willing to abandon anyone who makes mistakes. I would not try to justify Nate in his decisions, and I was not trying to, but he is not some irredeemable goblin, nor an embarassment to the officer corps. He is just human, like all of us. He made many, many decisions in Iraq, and some people want to condemn him for his bad ones, while forgetting his good ones. You can condemn the decisions without condemning the man. More importantly, I believe we should be willing to forgive mistakes, for someone who did so much good, at least in the long run. I am saying that I believe even with the Samarra incident Nate Sassaman's time in Iraq was a net positive for the Iraqis.

I think most folks are fully willing to underwrite mistakes, provided that the person learns from them. However, I think there are two reasons that people don't have much empathy for his actions. First, it involves a moral-ethical choice, not a tactical choice. After 19 years in the Army, one should have inculcated and fully understood the values of the Army - if that's not enough time, then there shouldn't be a place for you in the Army. Secondly, LTC Sassaman appears not to have learned from the mistake - while he accepts responsibility, he appears unapologetic about the decision, even stating at one point in his memoirs that if he had known that there was an ongoing criminal investigation that his actions to cover up the incident would have been different.

"[T]here had been no reason for me to believe there had been an ongoing criminal investigation when I had asked the company commander and platoon leader to not say anything to anyone about the water." -page 269

That's not the statement of someone doing the right thing, essentially, "if I had known that I couldn't have covered it up, I wouldn't have tried."

You can contrast this behavior to LTC West, who allowed his men to beat a detainee and then fired the pistol past his head. Yet, it didn't take a criminal investigation for him to acknowledge his mistake. He called his commander that very same night and then acknowledged his mistake to his leaders the very next day and told them that his behavior (both firing the pistol and allowing the beating of a detainee) was in violation of Army Values, policies, and regulations.

[Abu Suleyman]

I think most folks are fully willing to underwrite mistakes, provided that the person learns from them. However, I think there are two reasons that people don't have much empathy for his actions. First, it involves a moral-ethical choice, not a tactical choice. After 19 years in the Army, one should have inculcated and fully understood the values of the Army - if that's not enough time, then there shouldn't be a place for you in the Army. Secondly, LTC Sassaman appears not to have learned from the mistake - while he accepts responsibility, he appears unapologetic about the decision, even stating at one point in his memoirs that if he had known that there was an ongoing criminal investigation that his actions to cover up the incident would have been different.



That's not the statement of someone doing the right thing, essentially, "if I had known that I couldn't have covered it up, I wouldn't have tried."

You can contrast this behavior to LTC West...

First, I understand the part about his different actions in the part of the coverup to mean that he wouldn't have covered anything up if he thought there was an investigation (i.e. it would have been a crime). I really like the example of LTC West, because I think he owned his mistakes better than anyone else. I also agree that Nate doesn't seem to view his actions as a mistake. I am forced to wonder, though, how much of that is because he is untrainable, and how much of it is because the die is cast.

Nate is not alone in deriving much of his self esteem and personal image from his service in the army, but that is all gone. Not only can he not take back what happened, he only got one shot. He has no chance to redeem himself from the past. His only chance to maintain that self image is to justify his position in the past. As mentioned before we saw a lot of this following WWI, Vietnam, and the Civil War. I think specifically of LTG Johnston, and how he spent the majority of the remainder of his life after the Civil War trying to convince everyone that Lee was a fool who lost Gettysburg.

I realize that debating over tactics is different fundamentally from ethical concerns from a normative perspective, but it is not from a psycological one. Something I often say is that self-awareness is rare. Few people who look around themselves and dislike their situation are willing to admit that wittingly or not, their situation is largely a product of their own choices. The hardass in me wants to say that is tough, and come down on them just the same. But I am self aware enough to know that I too require a little bit of denial to get through the day.

Again, and as a final word, the only way that Nate will ever end up in the 22-100 is as an example of what not to do, or perhaps how a career can go tragically awry. Even that I doubt, given the far more spectacular examples of just that which have arisen throughout the course of this war. I am not even so sure that Nate is the exception, or that he didn't acclimatize perfectly to the military culture has produced given the constant revelations of abuse of detainees. That said, we should always elevate our goals a little, so that we always strive to be better. All I am asking is to cut the guy a little slack, and let him be the tragedy that he so obviously is.

[Shek]

For anyone interested, there's a new book out by the 3/4ID JAG during OIF I which covers the bridge incident and alleged detainee execution incident (no direct link to Sassaman other than it occured within his battalion):

http://www.amazon.com/Drowning-Deser...6431014&sr=8-1