Afghanistan's Drug Problem

[JMA]

So you destroy the crop... then what?

Then you will have achieved an important victory by effectively cutting off the Taliban from a significant source of funding.

Then if those who are wringing their hands over the loss of income the farmers will suffer then they can prevail upon the US government to compensate them for their loss of earnings and start programs to assist them to grow alternative crops. (You know what? The US government would probably be dumb enough to shell out a few billion per year over the next few years for just that purpose - if China will lend them the money)

Of course the warlords/druglords would by now be beside themselves over their loss of future income and are likely to become belligerent... so as this had been anticipated and number of carefully targeted night operations or drone strikes would have been carried out to remove these individuals from the scene.

The users are still there, they want the stuff really badly, and they are willing to pat for it. Reduce supply, and the price goes through the roof. That makes production even more attractive, and makes producers all along the supply chain even more willing to take risks. So you have to do it all over again next year,and the year after, ad infinitum, and while you're doing it people in every other potential poppy-growing area on earth fire up to get a piece of the profit.

If we've learned anything from decades of trying to suppress coca production in Latin America, it's that as long as the demand is there and the profits are large, somebody will find a way to meet the demand.

Trying to control the drug problem by focusing only on supply looks to me like wading deeper and deeper into the swamp, and heaping more and more endless responsibilities on the people in the field.

OK, there will be some knock on effect on the global market. So in conjunction with the international agencies they would, one supposes, develop contingency plans to mitigate against an upsurge of poppy cultivation in other areas.

You continue to miss the simple fact that there is an opportunity here to take out 90% of current world opium production.

There has got to be a reason why this opportunity is not being seized. I will money on it that you won't like the answer when it finally comes out in the wash.

This of course is true: fifty years or more of idiotic policy leaves a legacy that is not going to be unraveled quickly or easily. Shouldn't it be easier, though, to unravel our own corruption and our own counterproductive laws and habits than those of Afghanistan, or any number of others? Trying to control our drug problem in Afghanistan, Columbia, Mexico etc has a superficial appeal, in that the most visible impacts, including the worst of the violence, are imposed on people in other places. Ultimately, though, we end up relying on governments that don't share our interests, concerns, or priorities, or else trying to undertake governance functions in other countries on our own, which is the last thing we want to do. At least if we face our own problem on our own soil, we have our own laws to work with, and any resistance is ours to manage. Of course there will be costs and troubles as well, but that's fair enough: it's our problem after all.

Well one has to start somewhere and it could be making the most of the opportunity to reduce opium production by 90%... and again in concert with this one would expect a number of contingency plans to be worked out to cater for both expected and possible un-expected consequences.

[davidbfpo]

The UK has for a long time been the 'lead' nation in Afghanistan for counter-narcotics and at times this role has been lauded in official statements.

What is clear from anecdotes from those who served in Helmand - the centre of the opium (heroin) production - destroying large quantities of the paste has not been the operational policy. I have commented upon this is another thread.

More recently comments have been made in Whitehall-Westminster that indicate counter-narcotics did not feature in the UK decision to act in Helmand.

It was alleged that in the early years of involvement the UK government "watered down" reports on the extent of cultivation and state collusion in the drugs trade.

[Dayuhan]

Then you will have achieved an important victory by effectively cutting off the Taliban from a significant source of funding.

Temporarily, that is. Even in a best case scenario you won't cut off the whole crop, and they'll plant a lot more carefully next year... and the year after that you'll be drawing down. And of course the Als will be fed infinite amounts of footage showing Americans blowing up irrigation systems, spraying herbicides on crops, and generally throwing Afghan farmers into penury. Those claims will be believed, true or not, and the beneficiary of that belief will be AQ.

Of course the warlords/druglords would by now be beside themselves over their loss of future income and are likely to become belligerent... so as this had been anticipated and number of carefully targeted night operations or drone strikes would have been carried out to remove these individuals from the scene.

So instead of fighting the Taliban we'll be fighting the entire Afghan state - nominal government, actual government, and Taliban - ... at a time when we've barely the resources to fight the Taliban.

OK, there will be some knock on effect on the global market. So in conjunction with the international agencies they would, one supposes, develop contingency plans to mitigate against an upsurge of poppy cultivation in other areas.

Hasn't worked terribly well in the past... the track record of crop eradication programs is not good.

You continue to miss the simple fact that there is an opportunity here to take out 90% of current world opium production.

That's assuming you get all of it, which you won't... and again, the reduction will be temporary. Eradication will get harder every year - they won't stop planting, they'll just hide it more effectively - and full production will resume as soon as we draw down, which is clearly in the cards. You're likely to impose a large new burden and significant additional risk on an already overstretched force to achieve a gain that's temporary at best.

There has got to be a reason why this opportunity is not being seized. I will money on it that you won't like the answer when it finally comes out in the wash.

Those in the field apparently believe that seizing that opportunity would raise a hornet's nest that they don't want to deal with. I don't think either of us is in a position to say that this is not the case, or to anticipate what local reaction would be. Opinions from those who are or recently have been in the field in Afghanistan would be good to hear.

[JMA]

Temporarily, that is. Even in a best case scenario you won't cut off the whole crop, and they'll plant a lot more carefully next year... and the year after that you'll be drawing down. And of course the Als will be fed infinite amounts of footage showing Americans blowing up irrigation systems, spraying herbicides on crops, and generally throwing Afghan farmers into penury. Those claims will be believed, true or not, and the beneficiary of that belief will be AQ.

You may believe that the farmers of Helmand (and other areas) have a right to produce poppies (which as become the chief crop since the Soviet invasion of the 80s). You are entitled to that opinion... but your reasoning is not intelligent. So out with it now what is the real reason you oppose the return to the virtually poppy free status quo of the pre-Soviet invasion period?

Oh yes... and save the AQ scare mongering for a pure USian audience... it does not have the same persuasive effect outside the US. Yes there will be a propaganda campaign started by the druglords and that will have to be countered. I would simply find out what coercion the Taliban used to all but eradicate poppy cultivation in 2001 and suggest to the US's Afghan partners that the same methods be adopted.

So instead of fighting the Taliban we'll be fighting the entire Afghan state - nominal government, actual government, and Taliban - ... at a time when we've barely the resources to fight the Taliban.

That's what I said when I commented on the Marines focus on the Taliban when the entered Helmand in 2010. It of course begs the question why the US insists on remaining in Afghanistan rather than diminishes the need to act against 90% of the worlds opium production.

This quote from Ben Anderson's book 'No Worse Enemy' is apt:

In July (2011), Ghulam Haider Hamidi, mayor of Kandahar, was killed. He and his daughter had returned to Afghanistan from the USA, believing they could help their homeland. A few months later, his daughter left Afghanistan again, saying it was in ‘360 degrees of chaos’ and she had lost all hope: ‘America came to Afghanistan and aligned itself with the very people who destroyed Afghanistan and who continue to destroy Afghanistan: warlords, drug lords, gun lords.’

Hasn't worked terribly well in the past... the track record of crop eradication programs is not good.

US programs you are talking about I believe? Yes it will be important to get another nation to lead on this. The Russians and Iranians are suffering the most from the Afghan opium production so maybe open the door for either/or or both to come in.

That's assuming you get all of it, which you won't... and again, the reduction will be temporary. Eradication will get harder every year - they won't stop planting, they'll just hide it more effectively - and full production will resume as soon as we draw down, which is clearly in the cards. You're likely to impose a large new burden and significant additional risk on an already overstretched force to achieve a gain that's temporary at best.

Again I am interested why you to almost want the opium production in Afghanistan to continue. Kind of like the 'hippie' arguments of the 60s. Are you perhaps pro drug legalisation across the board or just supportive of the Afghan poppy growers?

Those in the field apparently believe that seizing that opportunity would raise a hornet's nest that they don't want to deal with. I don't think either of us is in a position to say that this is not the case, or to anticipate what local reaction would be. Opinions from those who are or recently have been in the field in Afghanistan would be good to hear.

You remind me of Bertrand Russel's quotation and you will (I guess) be hoping that someone will come up with a contribution to support your position. Holding thumbs for you

If a man is offered a fact which goes against his instincts, he will scrutinize it closely, and unless the evidence is overwhelming, he will refuse to believe it. If, on the other hand, he is offered something which affords a reason for acting in accordance to his instincts, he will accept it even on the slightest evidence. The origin of myths is explained in this way. – Bertrand Russell

It is of course not that there is no effort against opium production. There is... it is just that the Brit efforts there are just as inept as US efforts elsewhere.

'Britain's war against Afghan opium production is failing'

[bourbon]

So out with it now what is the real reason you oppose the return to the virtually poppy free status quo of the pre-Soviet invasion period?

The destabilizing effect that the increasing traffic of Afghan heroin into China brings.

[tequila]

I would simply find out what coercion the Taliban used to all but eradicate poppy cultivation in 2001 and suggest to the US's Afghan partners that the same methods be adopted.

The Taliban did not try to suppress opium production until they were in full control, and appear to have only done so in 2001 as part of their drive to get UN recognition as Afghanistan's legitimate government. Prior to their ban on opium production, they derived enormous revenue from taxing and sale of the crop, and continued to do so after the ban as 2000 had been a bumper crop. Some observers assert that the ban was more to restrict supply and increase profits for opium shippers, avoiding a glut on the market. In 2001, prior to September, they had authorized Afghan farmers to plant opium again (as seen in the record crops after their fall).

As for the methods? That's pretty simple. The Taliban had Pakistan on their side and had established a government that has a monopoly of force over the Afghan countryside.

So ... we should win the war first?

[JMA]

The Taliban did not try to suppress opium production until they were in full control, and appear to have only done so in 2001 as part of their drive to get UN recognition as Afghanistan's legitimate government. Prior to their ban on opium production, they derived enormous revenue from taxing and sale of the crop, and continued to do so after the ban as 2000 had been a bumper crop. Some observers assert that the ban was more to restrict supply and increase profits for opium shippers, avoiding a glut on the market. In 2001, prior to September, they had authorized Afghan farmers to plant opium again (as seen in the record crops after their fall).

This supports the argument that opium production is an important source of funding for the Taliban.

I draw your attention to this source: How Opium Profits the Taliban

I quote two short extracts from this 2009 paper:

NATO commanders and donor nations have tended to view Afghanistan’s opium trade as a law enforcement issue, often not considering its broader implications for trade, security, and development. The insurgency, meanwhile, is treated as a military matter. This division has stymied efforts to build a comprehensive strategy toward southern Afghanistan, where a more holistic approach could prove more successful.

...

… , this study will demonstrate that insurgent actors in many Afghan villages today behave more like mafiosi than mujahideen. More than 80 percent of those surveyed for this project believe Taliban commanders in the south now fight for profit rather than religion or ideology. And according to recent NATO military intelligence, as few as 5 percent of insurgent commanders now fight for ideological reasons.

This brings us back to 120mm's earlier post and highlights where the problem lies... being if both the generals (and their political masters) and the troops on the ground don't have a clue about what they are dealing with on the ground then quite frankly there is no hope.

So this then links into another thread here: Time to hold the US generals accountable for Afg. and Iraq. I believe that regular purges of the general staff is a good thing - short of (in Stalin style) shooting them out of hand as that is a little extreme - where they certainly lose all pensions and benefits and in deserving cases would face criminal charges.

The criminal negligence of how the US and Brit commanders have approached the opium matter in Afghanistan should be dealt with the military justice system where I'm sure charged framed broadly under 'dereliction of duty' could see a number put away for ten years or more. That would be justice seen to be done.

My comments some time ago that a number of seats on aircraft out of Afghanistan should be reserved for those (across the rank structure) who get (or should get relieved) and need to go were met with derision in some quarters but it certainly needs to be not just be considered but implemented without delay for in theatre commanders who haven't got the smarts to simply connect the dots (when it comes to the integration of the Afghan insurgency and opium production).

As for the methods? That's pretty simple. The Taliban had Pakistan on their side and had established a government that has a monopoly of force over the Afghan countryside.

So ... we should win the war first?

No... the Taliban probably said something like... "if we see poppies growing we will get the farmers to first destroy their crop then we will shoot them." Its all about the KISS principle... keep it simple and unambiguous and let the ANA enforce it. Life is cheap in Afghanistan.

Win first? Does this question indicate that you don't see how inextricably interwoven poppy production and the insurgency are?

[tequila]

No... the Taliban probably said something like... "if we see poppies growing we will get the farmers to first destroy their crop then we will shoot them." Its all about the KISS principle... keep it simple and unambiguous and let the ANA enforce it. Life is cheap in Afghanistan.

Win first? Does this question indicate that you don't see how inextricably interwoven poppy production and the insurgency are?

No. Defeating poppy production is not key to defeating the insurgency in my opinion.

The warlords who the Taliban defeated also profited enormously from opium. Yet the Taliban did not seek to destroy opium (the main source of funds for their enemy - the warlords depended on opium to a far greater extent than the Taliban does) until they were fully in control.

The Taliban are able to profit from opium because they have power in the countryside and over smuggling routes, not the other way around. That power did not come from opium money. It came from ideological commitment, successful organization, backing from the Pakistani military, and most importantly the lack of effective competition from the Afghan government or other Afghan actors.

[JMA]

The destabilizing effect that the increasing traffic of Afghan heroin into China brings.

I would suggest that is a double edged blade given that Afghan opium and derivatives have a significant 'destabilizing' impact on Europe and North American.

[bourbon]

I would suggest that is a double edged blade given that Afghan opium and derivatives have a significant 'destabilizing' impact on Europe and North American.

No doubt it is a double edged sword; but the nations most directly impacted by the the flow of Afghan opium are Iran, Russia, the Central Asian Republics and China.

It reminds me of a Russian proverb where a farmer is plowing his field and comes upon a lamp with a magic genie in it. The genie says “you may have one wish, but be warned – whatever you wish for will be granted to your neighbor by 2x.”

The farmer looks at the genie, and says “poke out one eye”.


Anyway, my solution is to pump the opium into China.

[Dayuhan]

Pressed for time at the moment, but re this...

the Taliban probably said something like... "if we see poppies growing we will get the farmers to first destroy their crop then we will shoot them." Its all about the KISS principle... keep it simple and unambiguous and let the ANA enforce it. Life is cheap in Afghanistan.

What makes you think the ANA or the Afghan government have any interest at all in reducing opium production? Aren't they sharing the profits from opium production?

The Taliban were able to eliminate poppy production because they governed the country and there were no limits on the amount or nature of force they were able to apply to do whatever they wanted to do.

The US doesn't want to govern Afghanistan and is not willing to run around shooting people who grow poppies. The Afghan government and army aren't going to shoot people who grow poppies because they get some of the money the poppies bring in. That makes a plan to eradicate poppies by shooting those who grow them a bit fanciful, because neither we nor the Afghan government/army are willing to do the shooting.

[JMA]

Pressed for time at the moment, but re this...

What makes you think the ANA or the Afghan government have any interest at all in reducing opium production? Aren't they sharing the profits from opium production?

I have said a number of times that the Karzai regime is both democratically illegitimate and criminally corrupt.

As I said stated in my previous post an ultimatum should be issued to the Karzai regime on the basis that they clean up their act (not only in terms of drugs) or ISAF and all aid is out of there. It would be a good way to get out.

The Taliban were able to eliminate poppy production because they governed the country and there were no limits on the amount or nature of force they were able to apply to do whatever they wanted to do.

Good that you understand that.

The US doesn't want to govern Afghanistan and is not willing to run around shooting people who grow poppies. The Afghan government and army aren't going to shoot people who grow poppies because they get some of the money the poppies bring in. That makes a plan to eradicate poppies by shooting those who grow them a bit fanciful, because neither we nor the Afghan government/army are willing to do the shooting.

I would suggest that the US government makes it a condition of their (and NATO) continued support and aid that the ANA clear of areas of poppy cultivation (using their own methods). This would be monitored by satellite. If the Karzai regime fails to keep its side of the bargain then its bye-bye.

Remember KISS and that (as difficult as it may be for a USian) not everything is negotiable.

[Dayuhan]

I have said a number of times that the Karzai regime is both democratically illegitimate and criminally corrupt.

I've said similar things many times. I'd add that it is also weak, with very limited ability to impose its will on its nominal subordinates.

As I said stated in my previous post an ultimatum should be issued to the Karzai regime on the basis that they clean up their act (not only in terms of drugs) or ISAF and all aid is out of there. It would be a good way to get out...

...I would suggest that the US government makes it a condition of their (and NATO) continued support and aid that the ANA clear of areas of poppy cultivation (using their own methods). This would be monitored by satellite. If the Karzai regime fails to keep its side of the bargain then its bye-bye.

I agree that this would be an excellent way to get out, but I don't think it would have much influence on opium production. Even in the unlikely event that Karzai wanted to stamp out production, I doubt that he has the ability to persuade or compel his nominal subordinates to tear up one of their largest sources of income. I think he'd make some big promises followed by a very thin charade of compliance, and come back with "we tried". Then it would be up to the US to decide whether they want to follow through on the ultimatum or not.

Remember KISS and that (as difficult as it may be for a USian) not everything is negotiable.

We're talking about the US issuing a non-negotiable ultimatum to Karzai, knowing that he probably hasn't the capacity to comply even if he wants to, which he doesn't. That's all well and good if the US willing to back up the ultimatum with action. If they aren't willing to dump the whole thing and walk away, they shouldn't issue the ultimatum. I personally have no problem with dumping the whole thing and walking away, but my opinion means nothing. The worst thing they could do is issue such an ultimatum if they're not willing to back it up.

That process might provide a good excuse for an exit, but again, I don't think it would have much influence on opium production, unless the Taliban take over and suppress it again. They might not suppress it even if they do take over: drug money is as addictive as drugs, and they've been sucking on that teat for a while now. Obviously we don't know what would happen, but I don't think we can assume that because the Taliban suppressed opium production last time around they will do it again if they get back in.

Again, worth noting that even when the Taliban had reduced Afghan production to minimal levels, heroin remained available on American and European streets. As long as demand and profitability are in place, someone will move in and pick up supply. That suggests to me that if we want to deal with the drug issue we should target demand and profitability, not supply, not that my opinion means anything.