Originally Posted by
RTK
Then based on your last statement it is not a completely false statement. Once the warranties wear out on the vehicles, who is going to maintain those parts? After working with and talking to both 1/25ID and 172nd SBCT in Mosul, the units were having a more difficult time in this arena than they had anticipated.
The RSTA squadron is one battalion sized element in an SBCT. When you build the SBCT around ISR sensor platforms as we've done with the SBCT you become a reconnaissance organization. LRAS3 is a Scout Surveillance System, inherent in which is a reconnaissance mission. They're also pretty standard in even the infantry Stryker companies. I was attempting to highlight that if we're going to have this equipment in infantry units then perhaps we need to start training infantry soldiers on the fundamentals of reconnaissance and ISR planning. I have not seen a competency in this area among infantry units, save for LRS-C, yet.
Additionally, while we're on the Stryker subject, I'm not a big fan of generic mortar systems that have to be dismounted from the vehicle in order to employ. Any mobility gained by the flatform is lost when you have to dismount a 120mm system to fire it.
As for Strykers as a system for destroying the Fedayeen threat; Proper planning, foresight, and some COIN training beforehand would have helped that, whether the units were in tanks, Brads, strykers, M1114s, or dismounted. Prior to us going into OIF I our primary concern was not of insurgent groups but of wandering refugees and other dislocated civilians. That's where our focus before hitting the dirt berm was. 2ACR was responsible for the mission you spoke of following 3IDs push and they were wheeled as well.
As COL(ret) T.X . Hammes would readily tell you, firepower and maneuver won't necessarily win or negate the enemy's strengths in Gen 4 warfare. Knowing your threat and mitigating or neutralizing his effects on the local populace will.
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