So thanks to all responding to the initial question which as Ken points out, I likely answered part of myself. I was just trying to find some ground truth.

On the other hand, this debate is worthwhile. As was pointed out we have a few "controlling" documents here -

- the Geneva Convention, which governs the rule of war, and which I would suggest has an outdated definition of soldier in the current unconventional fight.

- Hobbes' definition of a nation - or frankly any definition, which defines it not in the context of borders but rather in the context of associated people, whether tribal, religious, or even more loosely as organizations. The Pashtun tribe of Afghanistan and Pakistan are more united than most countries could hope.

- Our laws - within which I would include the Declaration of Independence, our Constitution, or even our regulations for civil and criminal laws. These govern what is right and wrong and what happens when someone violates our code – and further, as WM points out, should act as our guide in defining to what standard of behavior we should hold ourselves.

- The laws of the HN – Naturally, crimes committed in the HN are under the jurisdiction of the HN, but the spirit of the definitions of nation by Hobbes, and of soldier in the Geneva Convention must be examined in this context to determine whether the act is criminal or simply a “military” response to the force of another’s aggression. Fortunately, in nations like Iraq, where their code of laws is 5-10 times older than our own and where the burden of proof is lower, and punishments higher, mean that criminals are punished more severely.

Unfortunately, any two of the four of the above will naturally conflict, in the context of the counter insurgency. Our laws, the laws of Iraq, or A-stan, the belief that a nation is only made of borders, and the belief that the Geneva Convention is still a representation of warfare after 60 years bring the conclusion that we need to re-look at the governance of the SASO/COIN environment, especially in post-conventional conflict.

Again, this is purely philosophical, because when a war is over, and soldiers are returned to their parent nation, they don’t continue their vendetta – they shake off the dirt and attempt to leave the grudge at home. In the case of the insurgent, this is not the case. Surrender by AQ will only serve to create splinter groups and further inspire more acts of terror.