Operationalizing The Jones Model through COG

[marct]

That is some really good coffee you are drinking, because that sums it up rather nicely IMO. in Systems Thinking it's the feedback loop(or lack of one) that will end up controlling the whole damn thing.

Mediocre at best (Folgers). I really need to get my self down to the store and get the good stuff .

Anyway, yes, some of it does come out of systems theory but via some very weird channels (i.e. ritual studies and New Religious Movements). One of the nice things about the Jones Model is that it doesn't require specific end points where the content is pre-defined.

[slapout9]

Mediocre at best (Folgers). I really need to get my self down to the store and get the good stuff .

Mrs. Folgers was a master Propagandist.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=slJebNp9fxw&NR=1

[marct]

Mrs. Folgers was a master Propagandist.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=slJebNp9fxw&NR=1

LOL - too true! Now if the message matched the reality.....

[Bob's World]

Mediocre at best (Folgers). I really need to get my self down to the store and get the good stuff .

Anyway, yes, some of it does come out of systems theory but via some very weird channels (i.e. ritual studies and New Religious Movements). One of the nice things about the Jones Model is that it doesn't require specific end points where the content is pre-defined.

Recently MG Carter looked his commanders and staff in the eye and told them during a planning meeting for Kandahar: "The key to Hamkari is the creation of representative governance and representative opportunity."

Now, this is very much in line with what is proposed in the Jones Model, and I knew immediately what he was getting at, and more importantly, why it was so critical. To create these two conditions would strike at the heart of the causal perceptions of poor governance in Kandahar Provence.

Afterwords several of the commanders were discusing the meeting. One of them said: "I understand what the General wants, I just don't know what he wants me to do." This drew several nods and grunts of agreement.

This is complex stuff. Many well intentioned and very smart and experienced operators in the military, governance and development business are all doing their best to do what they think will bring stability to Afghanistan. All are operating within the guidance provided to them by their leadership. Many, however, know very little about insurgency.

Many military people want to simply defeat insurgent formations and disrupt their ability to generate decisive effects.

Many in the development business believe that if one brings electricty, paves roads, builds schools, etc stability will occur.

Many in the governance business believe that if they conduct elections and attack corruption stability will occur.

The Jones Model says that while all of those beliefs are reasonable, none are targeted directily at the perceptions of poor governance that give rise to the insurgency. They suppress the insurgent or artifically provide the things that good governance allows to occur, or they give semblences of legitimacy based on outsider perspectives.

The COG-based methodology provided here is for those who need a way to turn a fuzzy concept into specific things they can task, manage and execute. If it helps, use it. If it does not help, don't worry about it.

I have, however, made a few tweaks to the chart I provided to begin this thread, that I may post tomorrow.

[William F. Owen]

The Jones Model says that while all of those beliefs are reasonable, none are targeted directily at the perceptions of poor governance that give rise to the insurgency. They suppress the insurgent or artifically provide the things that good governance allows to occur, or they give semblences of legitimacy based on outsider perspectives.

What if the Taliban does not care about good governance? What if wants political power, to gain power over the population. If the population doesn't like it, they will kill them... just like they did before.

There was a civil war going in A'Stan long before NATO got there. What's that got to do with "good governance?" No one is fighting to "bring justice and peace." They are fighting to gain power over the population, to enrich themselves, socially, politically and economically.

[Bob's World]

What if the Taliban does not care about good governance? What if wants political power, to gain power over the population. If the population doesn't like it, they will kill them... just like they did before.

There was a civil war going in A'Stan long before NATO got there. What's that got to do with "good governance?" No one is fighting to "bring justice and peace." They are fighting to gain power over the population, to enrich themselves, socially, politically and economically.

COIN is not about defeating the insurgent, COIN is about out competing the insurgent for the support of the populace. If the populace believes that the insurgent is more likely to provide Good Governance, the insurgent is likely to ultimately prevail regardless of how much he is suppressed militarily, how much development is delivered, or how many elections one conducts.

If, however, the government can succeed in earning the support of the populace and address the perceptions of poor governance that the insurgent exploited, the insurgency will fade away, a death of natural causes.

This is the problem with military led COIN, it tends too often to be focused on defeating the threat. The insurgent is not what threatens the stability of the country, it is the failures of the governance to adequately provide good governance to some key segments of their populace that sowed the seeds of discontent that ultimately becomes insurgency.

[marct]

Hey Wilf,

What if the Taliban does not care about good governance? What if wants political power, to gain power over the population. If the population doesn't like it, they will kill them... just like they did before.

There was a civil war going in A'Stan long before NATO got there. What's that got to do with "good governance?" No one is fighting to "bring justice and peace." They are fighting to gain power over the population, to enrich themselves, socially, politically and economically.

One of the things that bugs me about a lot of the discussion is the use of extremely fuzzy words - "Good" being a case in point. The Taliban do care about "good governance", but "good" means something totally different from what we would define as "good" (although both Torquemada and Savonarola would probably approve of their actions if not their symbology).

[Bob's World]

Karazai, Mullah Omar and President Obama could all sit in a room and debate why they each think that they have the best answer for what good governance is for the people of Afghanistan; and of course none of their positions would matter. What matters is how the populace perceives its governance.

Currently, for example, surveys show that most Afghans perceive they receive greater justice from the Taliban than they receive from the GIROA. Score one for the Taliban. Do I kill more Taliban because he is out performing me? No, but I do need to understand what he is doing that is better than me, and then work to provide justice better than him. Not rule of law, as rule of law without justice will make the insurgency worse. Just one example.

My advice to Karzai would be to focus on fixing his perceptions of illegitimacy first, and then to address the perceptions of hopelessness second. I believe his Peace Jirga coming up is intended to do just that. Does he get it and will he succeed in that effort? I don't know. I hope so, as that is what will most likely take the head off of the insurgency. The revolutionary insurgency that drive this whole thing.

If that succeeds, then the Coalition can begin to reduce its military presence, which along with the Taliban leadership no longer funding fighters, will begin to make the resistance insurgency to fade as well. This will create maneuver room, so to speak, to be able to begin addressing the justice and repect aspects by spreading opportunity to all to be able to earn a good living regardless of tribal affiliation; or to resolve a land dispute and not lose simply because I am in the wrong tribe as well.

Focus on the right big things, and the rest will follow.

[Fuchs]

Honestly, I have my doubts about the role of good governance as well. Too many states with terrible governance have no civil war and the non-idealistic motives are too strong in the human mind to buy into this "good governance" mantra any more.

You certainly need to stop the fuel supply of the civil war's fire, but many roads lead to Rome.

There are negative influences that can be a disincentive to the population (or merely their relevant decision-makers or multipliers) and there are many positive influences other than good governance that can turn them.


All this "legitimacy" and "good governance" talk assumes quite noble men and chooses a very tough road to success. Maybe we should look at the relevant men as greedy assholes instead.

You can hurt them badly if deemed necessary - without stepping beyond the limits of Western civilization*. Simply conscript their sons (or even the relevant man himself) into an vehicle-less army unit somewhere in a desert or confiscate vehicles or animals for the army and/or set up a temporary army camp on their crop field in order to compel a desired reaction. Keep in mind that there are enough unsympathetic officials available to do this.



*: Let's be honest; this is the critical limitation, for else "we" would have used or tolerated the Hama tactic long ago.

[Ken White]

"These things are rarely black and white, and as Ken White loves to beat me about the head and shoulders with (hey, a guy his age needs the exercise) there are no pat answers. There are, however, some underlying fundamental "truths" that help shape an effective understanding of the suface conditions we observe.

Yes I did, but I've sort of quit that except for an occasional stray round. He's too wedded to the dream to change. Much of what he advocates is worthwhile and it may do some good. Some is less worthwhile. Some is arguable.

One should take care to insure that ones desires do not become "truths."

I have long said that poor governance is not the only cause of insurgency and that good governance is not only solution. Others make the same points but Bob continues to see "truths." S'okay, everyone ought to have ideals and dreams. Maybe the good points will get some traction...

[William F. Owen]

COIN is not about defeating the insurgent, COIN is about out competing the insurgent for the support of the populace. If the populace believes that the insurgent is more likely to provide Good Governance, the insurgent is likely to ultimately prevail regardless of how much he is suppressed militarily, how much development is delivered, or how many elections one conducts.

...and this is our fundamental disagreement. Support flows from power. Not the other way around. The populace support who has the power. Power does not come from the populace. To get power over them, you just have to terrify them. Insurgents can and do do this. They do not need much if any support to wield this kind of power. Thus the Government should seek out and destroy them. Crushing revolts and rebellions is about killing the competition.

The Taliban do care about "good governance", but "good" means something totally different from what we would define as "good" (although both Torquemada and Savonarola would probably approve of their actions if not their symbology).

Sure. Even the Nazis thought they were doing something good. No one ever set forth a policy they believe to be immoral of bad. My point is that "the Talian" seek power - and will use all and any means to get it.

[Dayuhan]

To get power over them, you just have to terrify them. Insurgents can and do do this.

Governments do it too. It doesn't always work, and when it does work it's often only in the short run.

[William F. Owen]

Governments do it too. It doesn't always work, and when it does work it's often only in the short run.

Concur. Governments should not. It's dumb. Not doing dumb things is a given.

[Dayuhan]

You cannot reach for a different tool IF you are the hammer! - that's my point. Military force is a set of hammers. You use them on nails.

Wilf, I understand your point here, and in a sense it’s valid. It’s also largely irrelevant. Look at it this way, continuing your analogy.

We send a bunch of hammers out into the field to drive nails. Fortunately these hammers are not completely dense, and they quickly notice that a lot of the nails are in fact screws. They report back to their Government that a lot of these nails are screws, and they need some screwdrivers. The Government’s reply is along the lines of “we haven’t any screwdrivers, do the best you can”.

You’re right, the functions under discussion are not really military functions and it’s not a great idea to be asking a military force to perform them. Unfortunately that is the position we’re in: the functions need to be performed and there’s nobody else available to perform them. So we have a bunch of hammers talking about how best to drive screws. Saying that they’re hammers and they shouldn’t be driving screws is probably accurate, but it isn’t very helpful: there are screws that need to be driven and there aren’t any screwdrivers. Maybe better to lighten up and try to help them work out how to do what needs to be done.

Great observations that play into my own struggle to define area denial. Reading your points brings home the fact that despite all the collections assets we have at our disposal, that harness military manpower, very few of them (at least that I can tell) are focused on identifying the root causes of why knuckleheads do what they do

One place to start might be to question the knucklehead assumption.

Of course some of them may be exactly that: testosterone-addled young men just looking for a fight. In some cultures young men are expected to prove themselves by fighting, and it’s possible that some of them are fighting us just because we’re there, and if we weren’t there they’d be fighting the tribe on the other side of the hill.

There may be other factors involved also. I’ve said this before, but I think failure of government to deliver services or development is overrated as a cause of insurgency, especially in areas where people have very low expectations of government. People are more likely to fight because of anger or fear: either something has been done to them that they didn’t like, or they expect something to be done that they won’t like.

There’s also the foreigner factor. What would happen if some vastly superior power sent an army to our country, removed our government, installed a new one, and told us that it was henceforth our duty to support that government, and if we failed in that duty we would be called “insurgents”? I may be wrong, but I kind of suspect that a few of the people on this forum might be tempted in such circumstances to do a bit of fighting.

In any event, if we want to get people to stop fighting without having to kill them all, figuring out why they are fighting is a reasonable first step, and it’s also worth looking for divergence between the local narrative of resistance and the insurgent ideology.

Recently MG Carter looked his commanders and staff in the eye and told them during a planning meeting for Kandahar: "The key to Hamkari is the creation of representative governance and representative opportunity."

Now, this is very much in line with what is proposed in the Jones Model, and I knew immediately what he was getting at, and more importantly, why it was so critical. To create these two conditions would strike at the heart of the causal perceptions of poor governance in Kandahar Provence.

Afterwords several of the commanders were discusing the meeting. One of them said: "I understand what the General wants, I just don't know what he wants me to do." This drew several nods and grunts of agreement.

This to me underscores one of the real problems we encounter when we identify governance as the core challenge.

At least MG Carter was proposing to create “representative governance and representative opportunity”, which is one step up from trying to take them out of a box. The problem, to put it bluntly, is that we can’t do that. We cannot create representative governance and representative opportunity in Afghanistan, or anywhere else. The Karzai Government can’t create them either. These things aren’t created, or installed. They grow, and they grow through a long process of adaptation and cultivation.

The belief that we can create or install governments for other people is a monument to hubris, and it’s already gotten us into a world of merde. We need to set that one aside forever, and quickly.

[William F. Owen]

. So we have a bunch of hammers talking about how best to drive screws. Saying that they’re hammers and they shouldn’t be driving screws is probably accurate, but it isn’t very helpful: there are screws that need to be driven and there aren’t any screwdrivers. Maybe better to lighten up and try to help them work out how to do what needs to be done.

I do understand this. Really I do. My constant emphasis is because some believe it is a job the military should do, rather than understanding that the "COIN approach" is deeply flawed - IMO. My point is use armed force against armed force - leave the population out of it!!