Air Power, can only be the use of aircraft, manned or un-manned for, for military purposes. That's it. It's hardly even the basis for a theory.Originally Posted by Backwards Observer
It's not half baked quibbling. Debate is a good thing.
This is pretty good for an advanced Air Force Targeting scheme.
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchr...szafranski.pdf
Last edited by slapout9; 12-05-2010 at 08:57 PM. Reason: add link
Air Power, can only be the use of aircraft, manned or un-manned for, for military purposes. That's it. It's hardly even the basis for a theory.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
We need theory on how to employ our various capabilities and arms such as armour, infantry and SF, do we not? I understand your opposition to theory elevated above policy, but surely the question of how we deploy and employ our forces and systems requires a theoretical grounding so that we can get the doctrine, ORBATS and TTPs right.
Air power can be used in a number of ways - fighting for air superiority, reconnaissance, in direct support of tactical forces (CAS), in support of Bde or Corp level manoeuvre (battlefield interdiction) or as a strategic weapon against high value targets (that's off the top of my head and isn't directly linked to any air power doctrine). Dictating how it will be employed and integrated into a campaign plan seems the perfect basis for theory. Trying to say anything less sounds like your taking reductionism to an all new extreme, Wilf!
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
Clausewitz Guy! "Worst theory...ever!!"
Last edited by Backwards Observer; 12-06-2010 at 09:21 AM. Reason: spacing
Operation Jawbreaker And Maneuver Warfare
Clip from National Geographic Channel special on Operation Jawbreaker. It will be on the National Geographic Channel today. Check your local cable listings for correct time.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9DBN-4tn_iQ
Do we?
Theory is essential, but we don't need over-arching theories like "Infantry Theory." We need Infantry Doctrine - what is taught. Within in that you can have various theoretical constructs and ideas, BUT they must be able to be applied in practice.
....and would any air force ever accept that idea that "Air Power" is not actually "strategic" in any way and limited to tactical action, and then almost never decisive?Air power can be used in a number of ways - fighting for air superiority, reconnaissance, in direct support of tactical forces (CAS), in support of Bde or Corp level manoeuvre (battlefield interdiction) or as a strategic weapon against high value targets (that's off the top of my head and isn't directly linked to any air power doctrine).
Good luck in that Theory!
What Air Power ideas that do exist are often (not always) more about driving the emotional and status needs of airmen/pilots, than anything much to do with warfare, and the rational study of Air Warfare is a completely different game.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Which, in my mind, IS theory. We don't need overarching or 'grand narrative' for each arm or capability, but we do need some theory both describing and prescribing how we train, deploy and employ those assets. In other words, I agree with you entirely.
You are preaching to the converted. I'm currently working on a MA Thesis looking at the WW1 era, trying to identify how the British and German services approached the challenges of command in the air war and how successful each approach was. I'm spending a lot of time 'in the weeds' but I am also starting to see how the Germans elevated their attack aviation arm to be an end in itself. The RFC, on the other hand, never lost sight of their operational purpose to provide reconnaissance and direct support to their ground forces regardless of the cost involved. Times, though, have changed and the German-led divorce of air power from campaigning seems to be institutionalised in every air force.....and would any air force ever accept that idea that "Air Power" is not actually "strategic" in any way and limited to tactical action, and then almost never decisive?
Good luck in that Theory!
What Air Power ideas that do exist are often (not always) more about driving the emotional and status needs of airmen/pilots, than anything much to do with warfare, and the rational study of Air Warfare is a completely different game.
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
I am not completely comfortable with slapping the etiquette "theory" on so many things, but how if not "theory" should we call this:
- idea, what to do and how to do it with air power
- not yet tested in wartime
- not part of actual doctrine anywhere
?
Concept? Idea? Proposal? Approach?
IMO, the focus should be doctrine, because if it cannot be taught, then its basically useless. Very little in the military world or in Warfare is causal, and it's study is basically a social science and a very shaky one at that.
EG: "COIN Theory" for example is a pseudo-science, with no rigourous basis.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Doctrine is what is taught, it's not all that can be taught.
You need to accept the legitimacy of alternatives to doctrine, for else there will never be a legitimate proposal for improving doctrine.
Those alternatives are afaik usually understood to be "theory", together with the doctrine itself.
So what do you call "all that can be taught?" Doctrine +?
Improving doctrine comes from improved study. Almost no one studies Warfare. None of that demonstrates a need for "theory" in my eyes.
Especially anything dreamed up by the current crop of thinkers. Look at the current fiascos with "manoeuvre Warfare" "COIN" and EBO.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
There's more than that.
How would you call the Japanese principles of war publication?
http://www.solargeneral.com/library/...e-japanese.pdf
Isn't that theory?
Have a look at its Part III Ch III - that's not what I'd call "doctrine", for I don't know whether any army teaches this at staff colleges or officer courses.
Air Control Theory
1 – If you are talking this Air Control Theory …and I think you are: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/gagnon.pdf
I do not see the connection between the initial Afghanistan (CIA) invasion and Air Control Theory. There was no control idea in the forehead of the CIA … they were conducting war with the intent of destroying (killing) the enemy and they did that very well (and better than the US military can do it). They got inside the AQ/Taliban OODA loop by organizing the opposition tribes into a single and coordinated unity of effort. When we entered Afghanistan, the AQ/Taliban was basically fighting a second generation war (trench lines, bunkers, caves, etc.). Manning the opposition with SF teams basically allows them to move from 2GW to a very successful mobile 3GW force. (4GW is another debate).
2 – I do not think a lack of WMD lost the moral level of warfare in Iraq. There is plenty of moral justification to take out Hussein … he was a mass murderer who worshiped Stalin (Kurd chemical attacks, environmental swamp Arabs genocide, put down of the Shiite rebellion after Desert Storm). I think that our own US opposition party is what lost the moral high ground with the US military naively, without thought, reinforcing those notions (Murtha and Haditha; Abu Ghraib was a self inflicted wound…the press story and pics were from the Army investigation).
Now wait a minute!
Now wait a minute, I would not include Maneuver Warfare in that little list of yours...COIN and EBO! Oh Ya!
Bear,1 – If you are talking this Air Control Theory …and I think you are: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/gagnon.pdf
I do not see the connection between the initial Afghanistan (CIA) invasion and Air Control Theory. There was no control idea in the forehead of the CIA … they were conducting war with the intent of destroying (killing) the enemy and they did that very well (and better than the US military can do it). They got inside the AQ/Taliban OODA loop by organizing the opposition tribes into a single and coordinated unity of effort. When we entered Afghanistan, the AQ/Taliban was basically fighting a second generation war (trench lines, bunkers, caves, etc.). Manning the opposition with SF teams basically allows them to move from 2GW to a very successful mobile 3GW force. (4GW is another debate).
2 – I do not think a lack of WMD lost the moral level of warfare in Iraq. There is plenty of moral justification to take out Hussein … he was a mass murderer who worshiped Stalin (Kurd chemical attacks, environmental swamp Arabs genocide, put down of the Shiite rebellion after Desert Storm). I think that our own US opposition party is what lost the moral high ground with the US military naively, without thought, reinforcing those notions (Murtha and Haditha; Abu Ghraib was a self inflicted wound…the press story and pics were from the Army investigation).
1-That study is close enough, but I only wanted to point out that the British Air Control theory was the start point(connection to A'satn) to begin using airplanes to do something beside being flown around in the skies by guys wearing scarfs and only trying to shoot down other guys wearing scarfs and usually named the Red baron.
2-If you can find an original copy of USA(project control) that is something very different and closer to 4GW ( there is very little Air Power in it which is why it was called project control) read it if you get the chance.
3-A'stan by the CIA was maneuver warfare IMO because they were given a Mission!!! and they picked the Objectives (just like Colonel Wyly said) then applied the main effort against a gap.
4-Agree 100% about using locals to get inside the enemies OODA loop.
5-SoDamn Insane was indeed a very bad man, but so are a lot of other people that we deal with and we don't invade their countries. And we don't have the President going on National TV saying that we have proof that he has WMD, when we knew he didn't.(General Van Ripper has You tube video stating this) That is where we lost the moral level of war IMO. The instances you mentioned just poured fuel on the fire so to speak IMO.
Bear, here it is. Towrds then he talks about going fishing with General Zinni and says there are know WMD and we knew it.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qybox...eature=related
By the way this is #10 of a ten part series by Van Riper and it id very, very good....he understands SBW!!!!!(PC version =Systems Based Warfare)
Last edited by slapout9; 12-07-2010 at 01:14 AM. Reason: add stuff
Yep!
Couple interesting guys your talking about there. General Zinni gave one of the most interesting examples of maneuver warfare at an officer's call when he was a regimental commander in Okinawa. The example was the 3rd Mar Div operations on Iwo Jima in WWII. Sent us all back to the books at the time.
General Van Riper was at the this year's Boyd conference and gave a good talk there. He is also one of the voices you hear asking questions at the beginning of the Boyd CDs you have.
Yes, he is very recognizable as is Boyd himself.General Van Riper was at the this year's Boyd conference and gave a good talk there. He is also one of the voices you hear asking questions at the beginning of the Boyd CDs you have.
At first glance, this looks extremely useful, so many thanks for that. I'll get back to you
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Sorry, but yes. MW has no rigourously tested basis in fact. It's an arbitrary device designed to teach the USMC. At best it's a doctrine and IMO, a deeply flawed one.Now wait a minute, I would not include Maneuver Warfare in that little list of yours...COIN and EBO! Oh Ya!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Please Explain
I am asking this question as a quest for understanding and not in an effort to upset folks. I have heard those words (or similiar) before but I truely do not understand these words like "rigourously tested basis in fact" and "arbitrary device designed to teach the USMC". Can you explain how you got there or, better, provide some references?
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