The Civilian Shoe Dropping

[Steve the Planner]

Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency

http://search.rand.org/search?v%3Apr...tion&Go=Search

Almost frightening where it is not bewildering.

First, their versoin of COIN extends all the way past econimc development to pure nation-building---no breaks in the cycle, no hand-offs, no cycles.

Clear, hold and build, according to this report, must not be sequential, ie, Clear+Hold+Build= Clear. As a practical matter, they are all one thing, and clearing is not complete until holding and building is complete.

Key finding is that there is abundant resource for COIN execution, but that security prevents implementation. Thus, civilians must become "risk tolerant."

To assure security for major projects like building hospitals (versus quick hits like a soccer field), there needs to be a better system of threat reduction and QRFs.

Excuse me, but opening a hospital is a pretty time consuming and complex development, staffing and resourcing activity. I believe they are actually suggesting that this work should be done under fire, with civilians learning to tolerate greater risk to fire.

In Iraq, even if we could get a clinic built, getting it staffed and supplied was a completely separate challenge all by itself. How does that work in Afghanistan?

Who writes this stuff?

[MikeF]

Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency

http://search.rand.org/search?v%3Apr...tion&Go=Search

Almost frightening where it is not bewildering.

First, their versoin of COIN extends all the way past econimc development to pure nation-building---no breaks in the cycle, no hand-offs, no cycles.

Clear, hold and build, according to this report, must not be sequential, ie, Clear+Hold+Build= Clear. As a practical matter, they are all one thing, and clearing is not complete until holding and building is complete.

Key finding is that there is abundant resource for COIN execution, but that security prevents implementation. Thus, civilians must become "risk tolerant."

To assure security for major projects like building hospitals (versus quick hits like a soccer field), there needs to be a better system of threat reduction and QRFs.

Excuse me, but opening a hospital is a pretty time consuming and complex development, staffing and resourcing activity. I believe they are actually suggesting that this work should be done under fire, with civilians learning to tolerate greater risk to fire.

In Iraq, even if we could get a clinic built, getting it staffed and supplied was a completely separate challenge all by itself. How does that work in Afghanistan?

Who writes this stuff?

I thought some of the points were good, some bad. They're trying to address the security issue- Good on them; however, I dislike many over the overgeneralizations. Anytime one talks about a controversial subject and begins with "it is widely agreed that..," they usually lose my attention. We have a lot of untested theorems circulating right now.

One common element that I find missing in many of these reports is assuming what the local populace needs instead of asking. Here's an example of how I learned this through blunt trauma.

In Zaganiyah back in June 2007, we started seeing great strides in security. I wanted to begin lifting many of the blocking positions, curfews, and other emergency measures to begin transitioning into "hold and build." We started planning and resourcing for project money for clinics ($150,000) and schools ($200,000).

Before we executed my brilliant plan, a local came by to talk to us at the patrol base. He stated that he was a doctor, a clinic already existed, and all he needed was some soldiers to provide security, medical supplies, and a salary to pay him and his nurses. I looked at him dumbfounded. I was like, "that's it?"

The clinic was up and running the next week at a cost of less than $3000. The IA pulled security, our medics ordered extra CL VIII supplies, and some cash got the doctor back in business.

Same answer with the schools. The lesson I learned was to always ask the people that live in the area how best to help them instead of planning up grand schemes in a vacuum.

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

Mike:

Thanks for the positive.

What I love about your posts is that they always seem to focus on identifying the actual folks involved in deciding what is needed, then engaing them in getting it done.

It's like US planning 101, but seems so difficult to get across in the reconstruction game.

Steve

[Ross Wherry]

Steve,

Apologies for seeming prickly. I agree that it's the contract culture. But like honest politicians, good contractors stay bought and get their job done with a minimum of whining.

The UPI article posted recently is dead on, or at least completely consonent with my biases. I was also impressed by Micheal Yon article from 13 Dec on SWJ. He sees clearly. My own experience in Helmand was 2005, flying into Lashkar Gah's pebble runway. I can only be in awe of Marines now operating south of there. The farmers we were trying to help still had dried poppies hung up in barns in case the Americans left (which eventually happened).

On the issue of clearing and holding villages, I hold the position that villages are probably the right level for "clear and hold" security operations since that the bad guys move into the villages first, whether it's Nepal or Colombia. The "build" operations probably are best run out of the equivalent to a county, call it a district or a qada or a municipality. It lends a certain economy of scale, and allows for balancing local rivalries. MikeF had it right with the need to be circumspectly consultative -- if the local folks chose the project, it's less likely to be destroyed by one or another of the armed groups. We saw that in Salvador and Colombia, but not in eastern Zaire.

Lastly, I had the honor of running the RTI project in Iraq for 18 months. Thanks for the kind words.

[Ross Wherry]

Steve.

Who writes that stuff? The authors I recognized spent their tours in Baghdad in the friendly confines of the Republican Palace.

see also Imperial Life in the Emerald City, but don't buy a copy.

Guess my biases are all out on the table now.

[Steve the Planner]

Ross:

That's what it looks like to me.

Lot's of money in them there think tanks afterwards, too.

I think I was in the embassy a few times, usually on the way to somewhere that you could actually see and learn things...

[Steve the Planner]

OK.

Here's a good test.

Press coverage indicates that the battle of Now Zad,second largest town in Helmand is complete and they are just mopping up now.

Clear is done, lots of refugees fled.

Now what comes next?

Steve