China's Emergence as a Superpower (till 2014)

[carl]

I think the Suez is very much the wrong analogy. Historical analogies are only a little bit useful and sometimes less than that if people get wrapped around the axle debating if the analogy is the right one or not; but I think the rise of the rise of the German navy before WWI is more appropriate one as far as real threats are concerned.

If Taiwan were lost it would be a serious naval defeat. Preventing Red China from taking the island means keeping control of the Taiwan Strait and that is a naval task. If we could not help the Taiwanese do it, it would be because our Navy was weak relative to a hostile navy. We would then build it up so it was strong again. Since the start of the 20th century that is what we have always done. I judge we would do it again.

It would be expensive. Navies always are. But it may not be as expensive as feared. We could afford all the contracting fol-der-al in the past. A serious naval defeat tends to concentrate the mind of nations and things tend to get done more better.

But the best way to avoid that expense is to keep the Navy strong enough, and our alliances strong enough so that the Red Chinese aren't tempted to try it. That would be expensive too, but only a tiny fraction of my above listed alternative. Taking, holding, crossing and continued holding of the straits is a pretty tall order and the force needed to frustrate that isn't nearly so big as the alternative listed above.

We wouldn't have to spend anything if we just told the Taiwanese too-da-loo of course; but the long term consequences of abandoning a free nation with whom we are formally allied to an expansionist police state may be rather bad.

The reason for concern here is the nature of Red China. India is a large country and it is strengthening its' navy. We don't mind that a bit. If the Australians decided to build some aircraft carriers and 20 nuke boats we would stand up and cheer. The French could decide they needed a balanced 200 ship fleet and we would be sighing with relief. But Red China is a concern. It won't be forever though. I am optimistic that it will eventually turn into something considerably less scary. So our task, in cooperation with allies, is to keep them from yielding to the temptation to embark upon a glorious naval adventure until they get to that less scary state and they don't want to anymore. We can do this best, in my view, by maintaining a strong Navy and system of alliances; not yielding to angst, throwing up our hands and deciding we are doomed and we'd better get used to it.

That may be viewed as trying to control rather than trying to influence, but I think that is a distinction without a difference in this case. If you want to influence a potentially aggressive nation with a strong navy, you had better have a strong navy too.

[Bob's World]

The real question is "what would be the affect on America the day after a reconciliation between China and Taiwan"?

Answer: Little to none.

The best the US can hope to do in efforts to control this dynamic is to reset the conditions of failure. Worst case we engage in an "Air-Sea Battle" over the matter and lose hundreds or thousands of lives, Billions in hardware, and an unmeasurable amount of regional and global prestiege and influence. We should not play a game that can only at best be tied, but never won.

Britain waited until they got thier nosed rubbed in the Suez issue. I recommend we get in front of that occuring in similar issues that we cling to beyond their expiration date as well.

[carl]

Mr. Jones:

Agreed, a reconciliation would not affect us at all. But the word reconciliation means something peaceful arranged with the consent of both parties. I am not talking about that. I am talking about a Red Chinese conquest of Taiwan, against the will of the Taiwanese. That would be a very different matter.

I read your second paragraph as meaning if the Red Chinese tried to take Taiwan by force, we allow them to do so and abandon the Taiwanese. Is that your position? If it is, I believe we would lose all global prestige and influence.

I don't know exactly what you mean by your third paragraph. It is a bit amorphous. I take it to mean we should find out what Red China wants and give it to them. Is that correct?

[AmericanPride]

carl: My use of 1956 Suez Crisis is not to illustrate the military impotence of a declining imperial power. Instead, its important to acknowledge that the event (1) demonstrated British acknowledgement of its own decline and (2) illustrated the role of economic and political power in undermining military capabilities. I do not think a Taiwan conflict will see the direct engagement of US and PRC forces. Rather, the Chinese would likely deter direct US participation through economic leverage. This would mark the start of a new dynamic in international security as well as demonstrate the utter uselessness of US military power and investments.

Alternatively, Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905 might prove to be another useful analogy in demonstrating how imperial hubris leads to total shock and failure. But, as I said, I believe direct US/PRC conflict to be very unlikely.

[carl]

carl: My use of 1956 Suez Crisis is not to illustrate the military impotence of a declining imperial power. Instead, its important to acknowledge that the event (1) demonstrated British acknowledgement of its own decline and (2) illustrated the role of economic and political power in undermining military capabilities. I do not think a Taiwan conflict will see the direct engagement of US and PRC forces. Rather, the Chinese would likely deter direct US participation through economic leverage. This would mark the start of a new dynamic in international security as well as demonstrate the utter uselessness of US military power and investments.

Alternatively, Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905 might prove to be another useful analogy in demonstrating how imperial hubris leads to total shock and failure. But, as I said, I believe direct US/PRC conflict to be very unlikely.

The economic power and political power that removed the British and French from the Suez was American. We told them to go home and they did. I don't see how that can apply to the thing we are talking about.

I don't think direct conflict between us and the Red Chinese is probable but I don't consider it very unlikely. How would they deter us from defending the Taiwanese if we so chose except by military force? They could refuse to buy bonds and we could counter by refusing to pay them back. In that case they would get hurt as much or even more.

Unless human nature has changed there will never be a time when military power is utterly useless. If there were a conflict over Taiwan, what would stop them would be military power and what would stop us is the same.

The Russo-Japanese War is a better example of how a really lousy navy is smashed by a good one. The prime lesson I believe is have a good navy rather than a lousy one.

I rather hope all this won't ever come about. Taiwan and the mainland are pretty closely tied economically and as long as everybody is happy with the polite fiction there is no reason to fight. I worry though that all those ships the Reds are building means somebody isn't happy with the polite fiction.

[AmericanPride]

The economic power and political power that removed the British and French from the Suez was American. We told them to go home and they did.

That's the point. The US (and the other NATO allies) did not fire a shot. Yet they managed to repel a combined British, French, and Israeli invasion of Egypt. It marked very clearly the end of European adventurism in the Middle East. And it was the Europeans that were the last to find out that the game was over.

How would they deter us from defending the Taiwanese if we so chose except by military force? They could refuse to buy bonds and we could counter by refusing to pay them back. In that case they would get hurt as much or even more.

As China's economy continues to develop and modernize, its dependence on the US market lessens. The US is significantly more vulnerable and sensitive to economic shocks than China. A combination of economic threats, precision cyber attacks targeting US communications, and sea and space denial weapons could neutralize any credible US response. I do not anticipate a PRC-initiated confrontation, at least not for many more years.

Unless human nature has changed there will never be a time when military power is utterly useless.

Inability to achieve one's desired political outcomes = useless. The current US capabilities and force structure is not suited for a wide range of future threat scenarios; PRC/Taiwan included.

The Russo-Japanese War is a better example of how a really lousy navy is smashed by a good one.

It's also a great example of how misappropriated military power and imperial hubris leads to disaster. The US cannot credibly defend Taiwan from the PRC. This is the mark of America's relative decline in its ability to effectively project power. The US needs to retool its naval and air forces, enhance the security of its networks, and develop protections for its soft infrastructure.

[AmericanPride]

What economic leverage would that be? Economic leverage is a major factor deterring such an invasion.

As China's economy modernizes, the economic leverage will continue to gradually shift in its favor. Time is on the side of the PRC. I do not think the PRC will initiate any confrontation. Most likely, economic integration will eventually lead to political capitulation on the part of the ROC. Or, the PRC may find some provocation in a world of economic turmoil to exploit.

[carl]

Suez involved one ally telling some other allies that they couldn't do something. I don't see how it fits at all. If, God forbid, the Red Chinese and us had a confrontation, it would not be an a disagreement between allies, but one between enemies. That is an entirely different matter.

As China's economy continues to develop and modernize, its dependence on the US market lessens. The US is significantly more vulnerable and sensitive to economic shocks than China. A combination of economic threats, precision cyber attacks targeting US communications, and sea and space denial weapons could neutralize any credible US response. I do not anticipate a PRC-initiated confrontation, at least not for many more years.

Why is the US more vulnerable to economic shocks than Red China? If Red China made economic threats that might result in a trade war. That would be bad for everybody but especially for an export type economy like Red China's. They would really get hurt.

Cyber attacks, sea and space attacks would be acts of war. Then the fight would be on. Maybe those things would neutralize US response, maybe not. The thing is a two way street. Maybe all the sluice gates for the Three Rivers Dam would malfunction.

Inability to achieve one's desired political outcomes = useless. The current US capabilities and force structure is not suited for a wide range of future threat scenarios; PRC/Taiwan included.

If you can't achieve your goals, you failed. That doesn't mean the tools you used were useless, they were useful, but you lost. Perhaps they kept you from losing worse. The current US capabilities relatively speaking are pretty darn great right now, more than enough to deter any Red Chinese adventures. But even if they were not, they are not fixed forever.

It's also a great example of how misappropriated military power and imperial hubris leads to disaster. The US cannot credibly defend Taiwan from the PRC. This is the mark of America's relative decline in its ability to effectively project power. The US needs to retool its naval and air forces, enhance the security of its networks, and develop protections for its soft infrastructure.

We'll have to disagree on that. I think one of the main reasons the Russkis lost was a plain old fashioned Russian type lousy navy. Hubris, yea maybe, in the sense that they may have let race affect their ability to judge military capability. I don't think we would be affected so much by that. We fought them once in Korea and found out they knew what to do; besides many of our people seem to think they are 10 feet tall now.

I think the US can credibly defend Taiwan. I think you are wrong when you say we cannot. If you are wrong your premise is gone and there is not a mark of anything.

[Dayuhan]

As China's economy continues to develop and modernize, its dependence on the US market lessens. The US is significantly more vulnerable and sensitive to economic shocks than China. A combination of economic threats, precision cyber attacks targeting US communications, and sea and space denial weapons could neutralize any credible US response. I do not anticipate a PRC-initiated confrontation, at least not for many more years.

It's also a great example of how misappropriated military power and imperial hubris leads to disaster. The US cannot credibly defend Taiwan from the PRC. This is the mark of America's relative decline in its ability to effectively project power. The US needs to retool its naval and air forces, enhance the security of its networks, and develop protections for its soft infrastructure.

As China's economy modernizes, the economic leverage will continue to gradually shift in its favor. Time is on the side of the PRC.

Why would economic leverage shift in China's favor? China is not the economic juggernaut it's portrayed as being; they have deep and severe domestic problems. I don't see how time is on the side of the PRC at all; quite the opposite. They're having their economic moment in the sun; they are not managing it particularly well and the chickens will come home to roost. What "economic" threat" can the PRC bring to bear on the US that will not have as great or greater adverse impact on them? The more China modernizes and the more they integrate with the global economy, the higher the cost of a potential dis-integrating action becomes.

All the Taiwanese and allies need to do to defend themselves is to make the cost of aggression higher than the PRC would want to bear. Those costs are potentially very high, from both a military and an economic perspective.

Certainly the PRC could rain missiles on Taiwan until the Taiwanese surrender (if they do). They would then have to face the possibility of oil imports and merchandise exports being cut off. The risk and potential complications of an actual physical invasion would be extremely high.

[Bob's World]

Mr. Jones:

Agreed, a reconciliation would not affect us at all. But the word reconciliation means something peaceful arranged with the consent of both parties. I am not talking about that. I am talking about a Red Chinese conquest of Taiwan, against the will of the Taiwanese. That would be a very different matter.

I read your second paragraph as meaning if the Red Chinese tried to take Taiwan by force, we allow them to do so and abandon the Taiwanese. Is that your position? If it is, I believe we would lose all global prestige and influence.

I don't know exactly what you mean by your third paragraph. It is a bit amorphous. I take it to mean we should find out what Red China wants and give it to them. Is that correct?

Certainly it would be very different for the people of Taiwan, but the end effect for the US is the same. Many also like to play the "we must stay loyal to allies or our other allies will doubt our resolve." Here is a news flash: They already doubt our resolve, and by clinging to positions they all see as largely senseless causes them to doubt our intelligence as well.

We should not fight wars or even battles over things that are not important. If things are important, than we should fight them at any cost.

Any conflict that when it is over and one has not achieved their desired ends, but can walk away from it with a casual "wow, that sucked" attitude to simply continue business as usual, was a largely senseless conflict to begin with.

Vietnam falls in that box, as too likely will Iraq and Afghanistan. A defense of Taiwan would reside there as well. We are too easily led into senseless conflicts by Chickenhawk politicians, bad intel, and poor strategy. All of those factors will always be out there, but we don't have to keep making the same mistakes of following blindly where they lead.

[carl]

Mr. Jones:

Yes, things would be very different for the Taiwanese. They probably wouldn't like it much.

This is just a general observation, intellect without resolve, backbone if you will, only results in a failure, but one that can be rationalized very creatively.

Now near as I can judge, your answer to my question: "...if the Red Chinese tried to take Taiwan by force, we allow them to do so and abandon the Taiwanese. Is that your position?" is, yes we should abandon them.

Also your answer to my second question: "I take it to mean we should find out what Red China wants and give it to them. Is that correct?" has not yet been tendered. What is it?

I have another question, if it came to it, what countries would you defend in the face of Red Chinese aggression? This is only if it came to it. You are ready to give up the Taiwanese, how about the Japanese, or the Philippines or even New Zealand, where would you draw the line?

Oh, I just thought of another question. Does the Korean War fit into the "wow, that sucked" box?

[Dayuhan]

Control is hard to relinquish, but at a certain point many issues long managed through control are better managed by a transition to influence.

What exactly do we control? How do you relinquish something you haven't got?

If Taiwan were lost it would be a serious naval defeat. Preventing Red China from taking the island means keeping control of the Taiwan Strait and that is a naval task.

Control of the strait is not exactly a navy vs navy issue... the US Navy's problem in that area is proximity to the mainland and land-based missiles and aircraft. For that reason, the US response to an imminent invasion - it's not like the preparations could be kept secret - would likely involve interdiction on inbound shipping (oil and other raw materials) and outbound shipping (manufactured goods bound for Europe, Africa, and the Middle East) in the Indian Ocean.

I personally think such an invasion is so unlikely that discussing it is largely a hypothetical exercise... look at China's minimal military sealift capacity. Do you think anyone would seriously want to mount an amphibious invasion on the scale of the Normandy landings in the age of satellite surveillance and guided missiles?

If the Chinese economy crashes (a real possibility), leading to major turmoil and the rise of a militarist government, then it's a possibility. Other than that, not likely.

I do not think a Taiwan conflict will see the direct engagement of US and PRC forces. Rather, the Chinese would likely deter direct US participation through economic leverage.

What economic leverage would that be? Economic leverage is a major factor deterring such an invasion.

[carl]

Dayuhan:

I can't disagree with much of what you say. When I said naval, I meant in the full sense of the word to include land based forces affecting control of a body of water etc., not just ship vs. ship. It would involve all kinds of things, including my favorite, naval mine warfare.