Strategy and change over time

[Ken White]

Slapout, as usual, gets to the correct point:

...That is what makes it all so hard and when something goes wrong there is a tendency to blame one part instead of looking at the whole linkage of different processes.

I think that very valid point is the crux of this discussion in some respects -- nobody wants to be wrong; thus if we circle around, the 'strategists' can blame the doctrine folks; the doctrine writers can complain "I can't do this without a decent strategy..." So minor chaos at worst or an incomprehensible melange at best results. No body's at fault...Bob's World said:

Ken worries that I am beating my head on a rock.

Not really, I just know you won't succeed because the method you correctly cite:

We identifiy critical nodes, networks and individuals within the policy strategy community and engage them directly and indirectly, creating trust and rapport...We then use our staff UW network to peddle these concepts, not because of some formal authority to do so, but because the fact is, the people who do craft strategy and policy are for the most part good people, who want to do the right thing, and often simply don't have the background in the specific problem set they are tasked to address; and when approached properly they listen.

has been used for years with some small successes. It has also had some failures. The problem occurs when anyone or any command thinks they have all the answers and are outsmarting everyone else. That is almost never true...

I would in fact suggest that such an approach, common in the community contributes a great deal to the lack of trust others have in the armed forces and of SOF in particular.WMsaid:

I think we must end up giving the nod to doctrine as driving strategy. This follows from claims that our language shapes our reality (or at least how we communication our perceptions of our reality) and that our language is taught to us--unlike the way Athena was born from Zeus, language does not spring from our heads fully-formed. Since it is taught to us, it is a form of doctrine. Thus, doctrine forces how we undertake our strategic approaches since it constrains what we can speak about and how we can say/express it to others.

I agree that what you say is all too common today -- but I am firmly convinced that is true because that lack of innovative thinking and ultra-conservastive group think rules the Army today. The real issue is, I think:

Is that the best way to do it? Should doctrine drive strategy or merely contribute to it?

Operation Overlord is but one excellent example of Strategy driving doctrine; that is, the strategy forced the doctrine (and materiel) to be developed to support it -- as should be the case yet, the basic premise was firmly based on doctrine developed by the Marines in the 30s -- It's a circle, both doctrine and strategy are necessary but neither should drive the other to the exclusion of adaptation and improvement.

On the Strategoi, from your link:

The Athenian people kept a close eye on their strategoi. ...Pericles himself in 430 was removed from office as strategos and fined, and in 406 the eight strategoi who commanded the fleet at Arginusae were removed all from office and condemned to death.

To my mind, that's a perfectly fair penalty for stifling flexibility and innovation. Or being strategically inept due to rigid adherence to doctrine. Or doctrinally incompetent due to a rigid adherence to a strategy...

I think Entropy has it right:

The older I get the more I think that doctrine, as an end product, is much less important that the process of creating new doctrine and challenging existing doctrine. While I agree with Wilf that doctrine is "what is taught," I think it goes beyond that and can become a mindset with a lot of negative effects.

I believe that's where we are now -- though we have not always been there -- and I think that is not good. Very USSR-like...

All in all, as Wilf said:

Well there is the crux of the matter. Most folk here do not challenge the messages they gain from, and stay clear of those who will challenge them.

I have to reluctantly agree. Conformity is in the US Armed Force rated far more highly than innovative ability and acceptance of what is written is mandatory -- even though, as John T. said, it is written by some varied types who may not know all they think they do but who are masters at cutting and pasting.

It's extremely interesting that most of the well known names who post on Journal, stay clear of the discussions on the board.

I'd noticed that as well; just presumed they were entirely too busy with great things...