Agreed. So the logic is to increase the number of machine guns and move them forward, yes?Originally Posted by Fuchs
That is if you always deploy in company strength. If not you should move your firepower down to the level of deployment.
Agreed. So the logic is to increase the number of machine guns and move them forward, yes?
No.
"(1) Carbine/rifle firepower quality is being overestimated and it's still the machine gunners and snipers that do 80% of the job (~Pareto) - just as they did in the age of bolt-action carbines."
There, fixed it.
You cannot turn most riflemen into high firepower soldiers because competent armies select their best infantrymen for the high performance weapons and equip the low performance infantrymen with assault rifles (to suggest to them that they ain't more porters than anything else).
Low performance infantryman + high performance weapon = still low performance
You cannot kick all low performance infantrymen out of the infantry (just some real duds) quickly because that would be inefficient. You'd have too few infantrymen. It's better to choose your small unit leaders, machine gunners and scoped riflemen carefully and assign helper infantrymen to them.
It would take major personnel system improvements to solve this without resorting to a tiny all-SF infantry force.
Btw JMA, I already wrote about this a year ago.
THIS. This is what I was trying to say.
Thank you Fuchs.
The USMC evaluated the Colt Automatic Rifle in 1977 and decided to go with the Minimi instead, correct? So, 30 years later they say "Ooops...got that wrong"? But yet still retain the 3-round burst on the M-16A4? Or hell...still retain the M-16A4 period...
Last edited by Vojnik; 10-26-2011 at 01:41 PM. Reason: Clarification.
The USMC also had a period during which it used a LMG version of the M16A1 with bipod. There's next to no innovation in the current "I"AR, and quite the same concept was afaik found lacking a generation ago.
Vojnik, this is Fuchs' speculation that confirms his hypothesis
Ballistics.
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news...dates-091110w/The Corps has considered a variety of options to improve stopping power in recent years. In 2007, it weighed fielding a 6.8mm weapon after rank-and-file troops assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command designed it with their command’s approval to address deficiencies in standard 5.56mm ammo. Neither SOCOM nor the Corps adopted it, in part because of the logistics and cost required. Gen. James Mattis, now commander of U.S. Central Command, advocated behind the scenes that the Corps consider adopting 6.8mm ammo as recently as last year, but the service adopted SOST ammo instead.
IAR and SAW
http://www.military.com/news/article...tic-rifle.htmlCurrently, the Marines have two battalions of M27s in Afghanistan and another three preparing to deploy. Marine battalions will also keep nine M249s per rifle company to allow commanders to beef up firepower when needed.
Fuchs, how you define sniper in this context? What skills, what gear?Carbine/rifle firepower quality is being overestimated and it's still the machine gunners and snipers that do 80% of the job (~Pareto) - just as they did in the age of bolt-action carbines.
What barrel, how the bipod was attatched to barrel etc? They lost the accuracy (we are talking here about half km) to technical solutions.it used a LMG version of the M16A1 with bipod
Last edited by kaur; 10-26-2011 at 01:50 PM.
I define sniper in the context of an infantry squad or platoon as quite the same as designated marksman.
* an emphasis on camouflage, concealment, cover and deception to the point that he becomes quite invisible even while shooting (including muzzle flash and dust cloud concerns)
* aimed single shots of unusually good accuracy
To me the difference between a sniper and a designated marksman is
* DM is organic to infantry small unit, sniper at most attached to it
* sniper is more extreme; more specialised weapon, more fieldcraft training
* sniper is trained as forward observer and usually better at ranging
* sniper has greater freedom of movement relative to small infantry unit.
* sniper has his own fire discipline
* sniper isn't meant to participate in assaults
So in the context of this discussion they're practically the same and I become occasionally lazy enough to not differentiate between them.
M16A1 LMG.
Multiple targets...
Fuchs:
Heh. No one who ever carried a BAR is the slightest bit nostalgic about that monster...
This:is just flat wrong. It's a dangerous fallacy created by the Russians who also fielded half trained Soldiers to compensate for that lack of training and one that has been since adopted by people who should know better. Full auto, Shotgun, Rifle, Pistol, Howitzer, Mortar -- whatever -- shot placement is critical. Inaccurate fire is totally worthless and a full auto capability encourages its use and thus the resultant inaccuracy.You better switch to auto if you're close enough to even consider shot placement.That's true but it is not because 'competent' armies HAVE to do it that way, it is simply the way they've always done it -- and it's wrong. Most Armies have too many Infantrymen and the majority of them are only marginally trained.This is partly induced by the myths that Mass is critical; Infantry is 'cheaper' than armored vehicles; and Infantry can do everything. In reverse order, it cannot and should not; proper infantry is more expensive than an armored unit -- there's nothing that's more cost inefficient than an Infantry Battalion in peacetime...Low performance infantryman + high performance weapon = still low performance.
Mass is vastly overrated as an effect simply because we are inheritors of 'tradition' -- and inertia.Yes -- sorely needed, too. I have read and agree with much of your linked Blog post IF Armies intend to continue doing business as they have. I contend a new model is needed and that infantry as levee en mass is woefully outdated -- and a habit. I agree psychological selection is important -- I'd say imperative -- and agree that the 80% exist -- they can be Artillerists and Armor crewmwen, MPs Engineers and so forth which really do -- and should -- vastly outnumber the infantry. Infantry do not need to be trained to high end SOF capability but they need to be more than space fillers...It would take major personnel system improvements to solve this without resorting to a tiny all-SF infantry force.
JMA:Nope. Keep that firepower consolidated for proper training and employment -- which can include detaching pairs of guns with trained crews including Ammo bearers to Platoon or smaller elements as needed.If not you should move your firepower down to the level of deployment.
No armed force IMO should ever always deploy in any set strength; METT-TC and all that...
Vojnik:During peacetime, the Marines are captive to Army procurement. Congress tends to insist that one size fits all (it never does...) and that everyone should use the same equipment. Stupid and shortsighted, nominally based on cost grounds and generally wrong on that but there it is. The Marines tried to resist the M16 altogether back in 1963 -- they did not succeed. They tried to resist the M249 (as did some in the Army). The Army through Barry McCaffrey (then AC at USAIS) was pushed into the M4 based on that fatally flawed 'automatic fire is required for all' mantra though they in a bow to the flaw in that argument insisted on the rather dumb three round burst bit -- yet another attempt to substitute technology no matter how flawed for training. Given the 'Stan and Iraq, the Marines developed some independence in their procurement -- independence they should never have been denied in the first place.The USMC evaluated the Colt Automatic Rifle in 1977 and decided to go with the Minimi instead, correct? So, 30 years later they say "Ooops...got that wrong"? But yet still retain the 3-round burst on the M-16A4? Or hell...still retain the M-16A4 period...
That said, Fuchs is probably right and its a slick way to get rid of the very flawed M16 / M4. More power to 'em.
Ken; statistics on shots fired by policemen (all semi-auto), the range involved and hits 'scored', are disgusting.
I was taught to switch to auto on G3 at 25-30 metres, and I am a fan of that considering that shooting auto with G3 meant to score multiple hits per trigger pull against "kneeling" cardboard targets.
Full auto till mag is empty was not debatable with the G3's recoil, but long bursts (4-6 cartridges) are surely more effective than trusting the quickness of your index finger with semi-auto when a second more or less can decide about life or death.
Btw, about auto fire on the attack in general:
Back in WW2 the German infantry squad was a machine gunner with assistant and escorts/porters. That was changed (at least on paper) to two machine gunners, two assistant machinegunners and escorts/porters. The NCO leading the squad was often armed with a submachinegun (so he didn't participate in most firefights, but was most useful at short range as escort) and he assigned targets/directions to the machinegunner.
Later, in 1944, assault rifles became available and some experiments were done. Assault rifles have a better range than submachineguns (and Soviet all-SMG companies were known to be dangerous on the attack and in urban settings).
One of the experiments ditched the machinegun and equipped all-assault rifle infantry. This infantry was meant for offensive actions, firing full auto on the attack. As far as I've read about it, this approach worked quite well.
Keep in mind that by '44 the German infantry needed all morale boost it could get and the Soviet one wasn't exactly composed of personnel of choice any more (= many infantrymen were older than preferred for infantry).
Full auto assaults at that time were quick and had two main advantages;
(1) the noise was impressive and provoked the "flee" panic reaction
(2) the storming troops were impressive and provoked the "take cover and freeze" panic reaction.
There are certainly less dangerous ways of provoking panic reactions, but every discussion of full auto weapons tactics has to take into account the psychological effects (confidence in own troops and fear in the enemy troops). Weapons development, procurement and squad/platoon design (TO&E, tactics) should be in great part about psychology.
(This, of course, damns the rejecting UK Army reactions to the poor SA86 reputation as utterly incompetent.)
If as you end with everything is METT-TC governed then how can it be dogmatically stated that firepower should be consolidated?JMA:Nope. Keep that firepower consolidated for proper training and employment -- which can include detaching pairs of guns with trained crews including Ammo bearers to Platoon or smaller elements as needed.
No armed force IMO should ever always deploy in any set strength; METT-TC and all that...
I would be interested if someone can explain to me why there needs to be ay intermediate weapons between the standard service rifle and the FN MAG 58 (M240).
The troopies in Rhodesia carried the gun and 500 rounds (if more were needed for a particular op the others would share the extras). These were not supermen just your average colonial 18/19/20 year olds. Weight was not a problem.
I can't remember any gunner near me having a stoppage. If they had they would have been in deep sh*t but what the troop sgt would have done to them would have been nothing like the savage ridicule they would have suffered from the other troopies. See photo below... an ops briefing on the go, gunners told to make sure their weapons are 100% will be briefed later. A question of priorities.
An aside. At a recent regimental reunion in the UK I met an old troopie of mine who told me that after 30 years he had finally understood why I had taken his MAG away and given it to someone else back then. He said it was the greatest humiliation he had suffered in his whole life and the other troopies had mocked him for years thereafter.
You put the fire power where you need it and you get more weapons if you need them. In Rhodesia there was one MAG per four-man stick (callsign). To be a MAG gunner was a badge of honour. Then of course there was a hierarchy among the gunners as to who had 'ripped' the most gooks.
Last edited by JMA; 10-26-2011 at 05:04 PM.
Be careful what you invite, it may appear...
Yep. Have a son who's a police department firearms instructor and SWAT sniper -- he'd agree with you -- and tell you, as do I, their training is inadequate.We can disagree on that. I acknowledge that for most marginally trained troops who undertake less than six month initial entry training and / or fire less than ~3K rounds in that training that you are correct. I also know that is the norm today theoretically on cost grounds. I disagree that approach is cost efficient and I know it does not produce affective infantrymen. We need to redefine Infantry...I was taught to switch to auto on G3 at 25-30 metres...but long bursts (4-6 cartridges) are surely more effective than trusting the quickness of your index finger with semi-auto when a second more or less can decide about life or death.I am aware of and agree with all that but point out that by the time in question, the number of trained or experienced troops on both sides was small -- there were a lot of marginal performers who could be so easily impressed or intimidated. That of course happens in major wars of attrition with levee en mass armies that are infantry heavy due to the cost factor or production constraints for vehicles. I simply contend that situation should be avoided. One has to plan for and be prepared to accept that worst case but one IMO should not plan for and accept that as the only certainty.
Btw, about auto fire on the attack in general...
...
Full auto assaults at that time were quick and had two main advantages;
(1) the noise was impressive and provoked the "flee" panic reaction
(2) the storming troops were impressive and provoked the "take cover and freeze" panic reaction.
There are certainly less dangerous ways of provoking panic reactions, but every discussion of full auto weapons tactics has to take into account the psychological effects (confidence in own troops and fear in the enemy troops). Weapons development, procurement and squad/platoon design (TO&E, tactics) should be in great part about psychology.
Wiser strategies and planning can preclude getting to that point in most cases; to plan on it happening -- and to train for it -- is to invite the monster. It becomes a self fulfilling prophecy...
I'm still working on my effort to smarten up the Generals and Policy makers...
Ken, you're in "small wars thinking" mode.
In great wars 6 months training is unheard of for infantry.
In great wars, lavishly trained peacetime infantry melts away and the few still fit survivors are being sent to NCO school.
You may redefine infantry into something that requires more than six months and more than 3k rounds of ammo, but you'd end up with special forces light.
You wouldn't get enough infantry to at least keep an eye on the whole battlefield in a great war.
(That's why I distinguish between expert infantry in small numbers, reserve infantry a.k.a. national guard for great numbers and recce/scouting-related infantry for very low force density jobs.)
Fuchs, when was the last "big war" and when will the next one come?
Why, JMA, I'm surprised at you. Old Soldier oughta know better...
I did not say firepower should be consolidated, I said the MGs should be consolidated at Company level to insure better training and therefor increased ability to flexibly support when and where needed in accordance with the factors of METT-TC to include detachment to Platoon and lower as required -- that ain't dogma, that's enhanced effectiveness and flaxibility...
Training is training, Tactical employment is tactical employment. The former facilitate but does not dictate the latter.I can't -- I agree with you on that, only saying that the MAG, good as it unarguably is, is not the only solution to an infantry MG in design or caliber. The PKM/PKP and SS-77 are arguably as good and there better cartridges and calibers available now.I would be interested if someone can explain to me why there needs to be ay intermediate weapons between the standard service rifle and the FN MAG 58 (M240).Yet again you guys designed, trained and worked fairly briefly at one war against one enemy in one place in one existential war. Everyone does not have that impetus (or is that those impetii???). Any military organization has the ability to adjust its peacetime, legislatively driven TOE to METT-TC. The US really does that fairly well considering its extremely bureaucratic nature. Our history from way back to the current fights show (an admittedly decreasing, bureaucratically induced) ability to do that. Were we to face a more significant threat or opponent than we now do, I have no reason at all to believe we would not adapt.The troopies in Rhodesia carried the gun and 500 rounds...an ops briefing on the go, gunners told to make sure their weapons are 100% will be briefed later. A question of priorities.
In the interim, we have to train for world wide service in a variety of terrain types against a variety of potential opponents. Organization and training must be adaptable to METT-TC, not the reverse.
For my country the last big one was 1945, for the U.S. it was about '51.
The next one... hopefully it will keep us waiting for generations.
Meanwhile, all other wars are petty nonsense because only powerful enemies can really threaten us. The others can merely sting us a bit and get happy by watching an overreaction.
Bee stings are a nuisance that's difficult to tolerate, but harmless unless you overreact.
Wrong answer
Au cointraire, you, My Friend are in the WW II thinking mode...As it was in the beginning, is now and forever shall be? Why?In great wars 6 months training is unheard of for infantry. In great wars, lavishly trained peacetime infantry melts away and the few still fit survivors are being sent to NCO school.
Not to mention those lavishly trained peacetime infantry units in the past most often melted away due to flawed employment -- or that they will provide the cadre for your expansive Army...Certainly true -- and a desirable state of affairs.You wouldn't get enough infantry to at least keep an eye on the whole battlefield in a great war.No quarrel with that, we probably are just quibbling over numbers and locations.(That's why I distinguish between expert infantry in small numbers, reserve infantry a.k.a. national guard for great numbers and recce/scouting-related infantry for very low force density jobs.)
WW4 maybe, not WW2.
Early infantry employment in a great war will inevitably be poor. There's no way to avoid that. We are now about as clueless about modern great war warfare as our predecessors were in 1913. We got some clues, got some thinkers - but only actual warfare will sort out the fools and force lessons on us. We simply lack good experiments (I am somewhat in awe of the USN experiments of the early 30's, plan orange and the marines' anticipation of the island hopping - but that kind of foresight is unusual and even the majority of these examples didn't have much impact).
It's unaffordable to have enough personnel trained before the war.As it was in the beginning, is now and forever shall be? Why?
It's highly unlikely that the war begins with a long drle de guerre.
Infantry losses are typically so great and the need for replacements so great that long training is prohibitive.
Training requires the rotation of skilled NCOs from the front to training units, and when you multiply the training effort you end up with a hollow force on the front.
Basic training is meant to be the basis for later unit and formation training - but units and formations on the front don't conduct the later any more. At most they give very green units the opportunity to learn under easy conditions (green battalions doing the job of companies, green companies doing the job of a platoon etc).
Short wars are desirable because they are typically less destructive than long ones. To win a war quickly you need to work for it - not prepare for a long one. Now don't counter with the German and Japanese experiences in WW2. Their decisive fault wasn't to prepare for short wars, but to go to war against too great military powers at once and to give up too late after committing that error.
Petty nuisance for all but those on the receiving end - speak to the Brits and yanks facing IEDs everyday.
... and those getting the bee stings.
The problem with Afghanistan is that for the Brits (and probably for the yanks as well) is that they have not taken the war there seriously enough. Yet they have lost through KIA and WIA (unable to return to battle) the equivalent of three battalions. Shocking.
Had they adapted to the war instead of feeding cannon fodder through the theatre on short tours it would have been an intelligent course of action and not an overreaction.
Hardly. 4k men died in Iraq, 1k in AFG.
Almost none would have died if there had been no invasion of Iraq and no occupation of Afghanistan.
The overreaction was waging these small wars. The tiny casualty rates were kinda inevitable and a self-evident minimum of human costs of such small wars.
Military forces should prepare for wars of necessity in which they face opponents who could actually invade and overrun your country or your formal allies' countries.
In regard to small arms choices this means a squad should be able to radio for a mortar strike, not give away its position, when it spots opponents at more than 200-300 m distance. Hence no need for a widespread firepower beyond 300 m.
Let DMs carry a semi-auto rifle that's good for penetration of walls and trees and for hitting targets at 500+ m. Let snipers carry a bolt-action rifle of the same calibre. Have company machineguns and vehicle machineguns of the same calibre. Have mortars for precision and area fires on call.
Meanwhile, almost everybody should have AP and AT value only up to 200-300 m, with high ambush firepower (great lethality during first few seconds).
You spoke of 'firepower' not MGs.I did not say firepower should be consolidated, I said the MGs should be consolidated at Company level to insure better training and therefor increased ability to flexibly support when and where needed in accordance with the factors of METT-TC to include detachment to Platoon and lower as required -- that ain't dogma, that's enhanced effectiveness and flaxibility...
The moment you start to group these weapons centrally you end up having to 'attach' them to callsigns they have not trained with (enough) and this is not good for unit cohesion as they may be 'detached' again the next day. LMG (certainly the FN MAG) weapon handling is not rocket science and should not be considered a specialist weapon. In the hands of the right people it can be devastating but universal training on it should be mandatory. I mean what the hell do these soldiers do between tours?
The tactical employment for a particular war trumps the training and should lead and dictate where the training emphasis should lie.Training is training, Tactical employment is tactical employment. The former facilitate but does not dictate the latter.I can't -- I agree with you on that, only saying that the MAG, good as it unarguably is, is not the only solution to an infantry MG in design or caliber. The PKM/PKP and SS-77 are arguably as good and there better cartridges and calibers available now.
Yes there are probably other good LMGs but my point remains there is no need for an intermediate weapon. I think we agree on this.
We adapted effectively because it was the same people fighting throughout and they were able to draw on experience to know how and where to adapt. Compare this to the bizarre situation in the Brit army where officers with a six month tour under the belt is considered (and indeed probably considers himself) a battle hardened and experienced soldier. Six months experience counts for little over six years of war.Yet again you guys designed, trained and worked fairly briefly at one war against one enemy in one place in one existential war. Everyone does not have that impetus (or is that those impetii???). Any military organization has the ability to adjust its peacetime, legislatively driven TOE to METT-TC. The US really does that fairly well considering its extremely bureaucratic nature. Our history from way back to the current fights show (an admittedly decreasing, bureaucratically induced) ability to do that. Were we to face a more significant threat or opponent than we now do, I have no reason at all to believe we would not adapt.
An army needs focus on a particular war. That does not come from rotation but rather from continuity. Yank soldiers are normally smart but something is preventing them from acting intelligently on this.
Yes BUT... when a war breaks out you allocate units to that war with 100% focus. Yes other units can carry on with preparations for the next mountain war or Arctic war or jungle war or whatever BUT... it is insane to prosecute any war (even the smallest) in a halfhearted manner.In the interim, we have to train for world wide service in a variety of terrain types against a variety of potential opponents. Organization and training must be adaptable to METT-TC, not the reverse.
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