How Operational Art Devoured Strategy

[GI Zhou]

Chris jM - Your views are hoew the originators of it envisaged it, in their writings. They are real turgid read. One view I wa stold by an Australian practicioner/theorist is that the Operational Art is the art of winning wars as opposed to battles.

The Russian originators fought multiple conficts on different fronts juggling forces between several large fronts across the whole of the Soviet Union - eight time zones. It involved both internal and external threats, conventional manoeuvre warafre, counter insurgency operations, indeopendent groups like the Czech Legion, foreign intervention, juggling its forces on separate fronts involving offensives, retreats, withdrawals whiulst rying to secure a working government.

The theories held up in the period 1941 - 1945. The operational arts looks at a series of fronts inside the whole conflict.

[Bob's World]

"Operational Art is the art of winning wars as opposed to battles."

I like that. This is a topic in general that I find more amusing than particularly helpful. When I worked at a 2-star HQ embedded in a 4-Star HQ, the guys down the hall all thought they were "strategists" because their boss wore 4-stars.

Reminds me of when I was an LT, and a lot of Infantry peers thought they were tough because they were infantry, and a lot of artillery peers thought they were smart because they were artillery.

I guess bottom line on that is that I figure the man makes the badge, and not the other way around, but many don't have much but the badge, so they cling to that.

"Strategy" has lay and professional definitions; and both are employed within the military ("What is your strategy for writing a strategy for operations in Afghanistan"?) You just have to shrug it off and not get too wrapped up over the "WTF" factor of such a comment.

But tactics do get to the matter at hand, and are requred at all levels. I like the warfighting/winning construct for operational art; and for me, Strategy is the larger understanding of the dynamics at work with in which all of this takes place, with a corresponding framework based on that understanding, that allows one to have a sense of if their operational art is apt to take them anyplace they want to go in a manner that they actually want to arrive there; and also to guage if the tactics employed posesses any unintended effects that may well be very detrimental as well.

Personally, and this is me, I spend a lot of time on the "understanding" part of strategy. I think its important, but too often it gets a quick brush, as there are always more urgent matters to attend to.

[William F. Owen]

One view I wa stold by an Australian practicioner/theorist is that the Operational Art is the art of winning wars as opposed to battles.

I submit that "Operational Art" is - as the Soviets described it - the art of conducting operations. The "art" of wining wars is most definitely strategy.

The theories held up in the period 1941 - 1945. The operational arts looks at a series of fronts inside the whole conflict.

...and that's my major beef. I am not sure the Theories did hold up. There is a chasm between Soviet Theory and Practice. Yes they won - as vast cost, with huge numerical superiority.

The paper wrongly promotes Tukhachevsky as the star of the operational art, but it was Sveckhin and to a lesser extent Kamanev who started it, although Tukhachevsky put it into practice. The Operational art was based on the needs of various fronts during the Russian Civil War.

Depends where you start the clock. A.A. Sveckhin's 1927 paper is for some reason commonly cited, but as concerns someone talking about solving the "problem", but it's Triandafillov's 1929 "The Nature of Operations of Modern Armies," is, IMO the actual starting point.
- but If you believe the PU-36, is the "how to" cook book of "Deep battle" then poster child of the "Operational Level," is Tukhachesvsky. Svechkin and Triandifillov never really say anything about "Deep Battle" and it is that which has come to define the idea of Operational Art.

[Chris jM]

From Wilf: I do not think there is an "Operational Level." I think it's rubbish and have thought so for some time.

I understand your view and that of the authors of the original monograph in that we may be eroding good tactics and good strategy by needlessly imposing another layer to warfighting. On the other hand, could we become so reductionist on the subject of war that we prohibit the creation of any framework that assists us?

Having read the contributions to the argument I’m going to succumb to hubris and argue that the definition of operations I put forward (The Operational Level of War - identified by military elements that achieve their tasks solely within their own chain of command) is both accurate and useful. I do feel somewhat heartened in that I’m at least getting to grips with what was initially conceived of by the original Soviet theorists according to GI Zhou, so if I’m wrong at least I am not alone in my errors. NB: I am doing this to be the devil's advocate while I try to reason my own way through the Operational riddle, and being doctrinally-brainwashed it's easier for me to argue for an Op level while weighing up the argument complete.

Firstly, what is the alternative to the Operational level? A tactical level of war exists – that is evident. How, then, do we link the tactical undertakings of a force to the strategic objectives? If we claim (as the ‘Alien’ authors do) that tactics should interact directly with the strategic level and be viewed more as campaigning (a series of tactical activities rolled together simultaneously or sequentially is my understanding of this term as they used it) we are creating a ‘grand tactical’ level of war. It’s not pure tactics in that the physical tactical undertaking is generating second-order effects. It’s one thing killing, destroying and seizing and another converting those achievements into an end-state imposed upon an enemy or third party (i.e. converting ways into means). Battlefield victory does not make a war won, and the art of using battles to win wars – as was eloquently stated – is required.

Therefore there will always be the need for command chain to ensure that tactical activities are conforming to the military objectives being pursued. If I’m correct we are either looking at this activity being viewed as part of the tactical level – what I have termed ‘grand tactics’ for my own identification – or the doctrinally correct ‘operational level’. ‘Grand tactics’ implies that the tactical level is self-directing and self-regulating; that is the tactical commanders deal with both the ways and means. ‘Operational’ implies that a separate, distinct level of command deals with the ‘means’ level of ‘ends-ways-means’.

Tactical activities can be dealt with by applied drills and scientifically-based principles (suppression, combined arms, etc) while strategy needs to be treated as a unique undertaking at each turn given the unique and mind-bogglingly complex array of problems and potential consequences encountered when one deals with large, varied groups of people inherent at this level. The Operational level deals largely with second order effects, converting the direct actions achieved by a tactical level undertaking into an objectives that works towards the strategic ends.

Thus it seems to me that an Operational level of war exists in theory and should also in practise. I would disclaimer this that with my definition of an Operational level working solely within one’s own command chain is, due to being removed from direct feedback of tactical events (rather receiving only the feedback of tactical outcomes) and from strategic considerations, extremely vulnerable to inefficiencies and bad practices. Minus direct and immediate feedback the Operational level has very little evolutionary incentive to evolve towards best practices until it is too late.

As an interesting side-note, the Israeli offensive in 1967 (the Six Day War) did not have an operation ‘name’. From the IDF’s director of operations at the time:

We’ve got a plan for everything – even for capturing the North Pole. The plans are like bricks. They can be used one by one to build up for a structure as the situation develops. We don’t go in for pre-conceived, and therefore inflexible, master plans.’ Gen Weizmann

Excellent Operational level conduct or excellent campaigning at the Tactical level?

[William F. Owen]

On the other hand, could we become so reductionist on the subject of war that we prohibit the creation of any framework that assists us?

By making it simpler, more robust and flexible. Tactics are essentially "teaching." - that is what they flow from, so they are also tied to a level of command and planning. A Platoon commander used "Platoon Tactics." A Brigade Commander can use "Formation" or "Brigade Tactics." if you actually boil all the Soviet waffle down, that is what you get.

Firstly, what is the alternative to the Operational level? A tactical level of war exists – that is evident. How, then, do we link the tactical undertakings of a force to the strategic objectives?

In 1909, with vast million man armies, there were Tactics, Strategy and Operations. Operations ensured that battles/tactics took place at a time and place relevant to the strategy - so basically Operations was the conduct of Campaigns. - See Gallipoli or the Dardenalles.

Battlefield victory does not make a war won, and the art of using battles to win wars – as was eloquently stated – is required.

Wars are won by successful strategy. The military contribution to strategy is the destruction/defeat of the enemies military means. Essentially all this means is that the result of each battle has got to contribute to the next. D'erlon's failure to destroy Blucher at Ligny, meant Napoleon lost Waterloo.

Therefore there will always be the need for command chain to ensure that tactical activities are conforming to the military objectives being pursued.

Concur. Something Hannibal might have wanted to look into!

Just because you conduct "Operations," it does not follow that there is something called an "Operational Level." What we are all talking about is reaping the benefits of success at the tactical level. That is not enabled by dreaming up something called the "Operational Level." - Sherman knew how to apply tactics to fulfil his contribution to the strategy - so he conducted an operation to make sure the tactical actions were relevant to that.

[GI Zhou]

Wilf you wrote:

Depends where you start the clock.

A.A. Sveckhin's 1927 paper is for some reason commonly cited, but as concerns someone talking about solving the "problem", but it's Triandafillov's 1929 "The Nature of Operations of Modern Armies," is, IMO the actual starting point.
- but If you believe the PU-36, is the "how to" cook book of "Deep battle" then poster child of the "Operational Level," is Tukhachesvsky. Svechkin and Triandifillov never really say anything about "Deep Battle" and it is that which has come to define the idea of Operational Art.

I have to disagree with you. This is taken from my PhD so sorry for the dry tone:

Soviet staff officers, utilising their experiences during the 1919-1920 Civil War, first espoused the operational level of war in the mid-1920s. The nascent Red Army was involved in fighting on many fronts, and both strategy and tactics did not cover this type of conflict. The concept of the operational art was advanced by Alecsandr A. Svechin, who in 1926 was a member of the Frunze Academy and the Red Army Staff Academy. The concept was developed further by a number of theorists in the 1930s and received its full definition in the Red Army’s Polvei Ustav (Field Regulations) of 1936.

Using the idea of successive operations, Svechin explained operational art thus:

The concept of the operational art was advanced by Alecsandr A. Svechin, who in 1926 was a member of the Frunze Academy and the Red Army Staff Academy. The concept was developed further by a number of theorists in the 1930s and received its full definition in the Red Army’s Polvei Ustav (Field Regulations) of 1936. Using the idea of successive operations, Svechin explained operational art thus:

. . . tactical creativity is governed by operational art. Combat operations are not self contained, they are only the basic material from which an operation is formed. Only in very infrequent cases can one rely on achieving the ultimate goal of combat operations in a single battle. Normally this path is broken into a series of operations separated by more or less lengthy pauses, which take place in different areas in a theatre and differ significantly from one another due to the differences between the immediate goals one’s forces strive for.

He further wrote:

An operation is a conglomerate of quite different actions: namely, drawing up the plan of the operation; logistical preparations; concentrating one’s forces at the starting position; building defensive fortifications; marching; fighting battles which lead to the encirclement or destruction of a portion of the hostile forces and the forced withdrawal of other hostile forces, either as a result of a direct envelopment or as a result of a preliminary breakthrough, and to the capture or holding of a certain line or geographical area. Tactics and administration are the material and the success of the development of an operation depends on both the successful solution of individual tactical problems by the forces and the provision of all the material they need to conduct an operation without interruption until the ultimate goal is achieved. On the basis of the goal of an operation, operational art sets forth a whole series of tactical missions and a number of logistical requirements. Operational art also dictates the basic line of conduct of an operation, depending on the material available, the time which may be deployed for battle on a certain front, and finally on the nature of the operation itself. We cannot acknowledge the full superiority of objective battlefield conditions over our will. Combat operations are only one aspect of the greater whole represented by an operation, and the nature of the planned operation.

In the immediate post-civil war period, Soviet Russian military academicians, staff and commanders set up associations to study military science, under the guidance of the Communist Party. One area that was of particular concern to the Military Studies Society of the Red Army was how to articulate as doctrine forms of combat action as well as the restructuring of the armed forces to match these changes in military thought. Two leaders of this school of thought were S.S. Kamanev, the commander of the Red Army from 1919-1924 and M.N. Tukhachevsky. Kamanev wrote:

In spite of all victorious fights before the battle, the fate of the campaign will be decided in the very last battle – Interim defeats in a campaign, however serious they may be, subsequently will be viewed as ‘individual episodes’ – In the warfare of modern large armies, defeat of the enemy results from the sum of continuous and planned victories on all fronts, . . . the uninterrupted conduct of operations is the main condition of victory.

In 1926 Tukhachevsky wrote:

Modern tactics are characterised primarily by organisation of battle, presuming coordination of various branches of troops. Modern strategy embraces its former meaning: that is the ‘tactics of a theatre of military operations.’ However this definition is complicated by the fact that strategy prepares for battle, but it also participates in and influences the course of battle. Modern operations involve the concentration of forces necessary to strike a blow, and the infliction of continual and uninterrupted blows of these forces against the enemy throughout an extremely deep area. The nature of modern weapons and the modern battle is such that it is impossible to destroy the enemy’s manpower by one blow in a one day battle. Battle in a modern operation stretches out into a series of battles not only along the front but also in depth until that time when the enemy has been struck by a final annihilating blow or when the offensive forces are exhausted. In that regard, modern tactics of a theatre of military operations are tremendously more complex by the inescapable condition mentioned above that the strategic commander cannot personally organise combat.

In all my readings I never came across the term 'Deep Battle' . From memory this is a US Army term which is used to describe the area 70 to 150km behind the FEBA (old term I know). To strike at the second echelon. It is certainly not what Soviet officers were talking about. A series of successive battles in disparate sections along many fronts.

However I really do believe, to quote a mentor and friend, we are over intellectualising something which is quite simple. We are all arguing over the same thing, from a different viewpoint.

[William F. Owen]

I have to disagree with you. This is taken from my PhD so sorry for the dry tone:

Not sure what you are disagreeing with, but I would be interested to read your PhD.

I am pretty well aware of how the Soviets tried to explain the idea - which is why I remain unconvinced. You are right that the term "Deep Battle" is never used. IMO, it actually comes from Simpkin's book on Tukhachesvsky. - which is why is said,

- but If you believe the PU-36, is the "how to" cook book of "Deep battle" then poster child of the "Operational Level," is Tukhachesvsky. Svechkin and Triandifillov never really say anything about "Deep Battle" and it is that which has come to define the idea of Operational Art.

Sure AA Svechkin may up with the all terminology, but what about the actual practice? I've only read the paper attributed to Svechkin, in the 1927 "Strategiya," - and it's pretty rambling stuff, and the definitions are not good.
He does not tackle the real issues that Triandiffolov does. IMO, Triandiffolov gets the ball rolling in a practical way - a year later, and may have written it well before. You have to split and encircle enemy armies, to destroy them across their "depth." Like it or not, "Deep Battle" is how the Soviet attack into the enemies depth is described.

Now I do not believe that PU-36 is the "how to" cook book of "Deep battle," because it's actually pretty banal stuff. I do not think it is actually anything much to do with Operational Art either, but it is supposed to be the practical guidance laid out by Tukhachesvsky. If you know or can prove he didn't write it, then sing out.

[Steve Blair]

Just because you conduct "Operations," it does not follow that there is something called an "Operational Level." What we are all talking about is reaping the benefits of success at the tactical level. That is not enabled by dreaming up something called the "Operational Level." - Sherman knew how to apply tactics to fulfil his contribution to the strategy - so he conducted an operation to make sure the tactical actions were relevant to that.

Sherman was actually tactically weak, so using him for this isn't really a good example. Sheridan was a much stronger tactical commander, IMO, than Sherman. So maybe Sherman's a better example of the "operational" level....

[William F. Owen]

GI Zhou, In terms of clarity, let me state my thesis, then you can re-butt.

a.) AA Svechkin wrote a not very good paper with some definitions in. I am not aware of any particularly insightful work he does after that.

b.) Triandifflov wrote a not entirely original book, which was a practical expression of how to destroy/defeat very large armies - the problem Svechkin was talking about.

c.) Regardless of the terms, what is contained in PU-36 is not demonstrative of something called "Operational Art".

[William F. Owen]

Sherman was actually tactically weak, so using him for this isn't really a good example. Sheridan was a much stronger tactical commander, IMO, than Sherman. So maybe Sherman's a better example of the "operational" level....

Eyh... well he delivered his tactically weak stuff where it has strategically useful, by virtue of "Operations." Operations are vital - but that does not make an "operational level of war."

[Tukhachevskii]

...of my days at Uni came flooding back after reading some of the above posts (I had a particular fondness for Soviet Military Thought; hence my moniker). I understand, wholly, the confusion around the Operational level of war; even my lecturers had trouble defining this one. Personally, I prefer Svechin's definition because of its pragmatic rather than dogmatic/doctrinal bent;

"tactics makes the steps of which operational leaps are assembled; strategy points out the path"

In Soviet military science and strategic thought any physical combat between units of any size was defined as a "tactical action" regarding boi (combat /fighting in the literal sense). Operations loosely refered to all the competencies, manoevres, resource allocations, planning and logistics required to get a particular unit to a particular location to secure a particular objective or acheive a particular mission. Soviet Divisional, Army, Army Group and Front level forward detachments (anything from coy to Reg/Div in size) regardless of the manourvere they were conducting (tactical forward reconnaissance, seizure of a bridge, an OMG, etc) were considered to be engaged in tactics once in actual contact with the enemy.

Confusingly, Edward Luttwak defined operational art and the operational level of war as that doman within which units tasked with strategic objectives conducted "relational manouvre" prior to their units shaking out and engaging in tactical level actions to attain their missions. (I have a pdf if anyone is interested enough to bother requesting it)

The way I figure it, Operational art, concerns the unification of tactical actions and their harmonisation with strategic requirements through the campaign. Operational art, therefore, (or, at least from what I was taught) concerns campaigns (multiple battles and objectives) whereas tactics concerns singular engagements. The old school definition for what we now call the operational level was "grand tactics". I think there's a clue in there somewhere.

Anyway, here are some other texts which may help/hinder/cloud further understanding;

David Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Art of War: Part I" and "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part 2" in Parameters, 1987.

J. J. Schnieder, "Origins of Operational Art" in Parameters, 1987.

John Kiszely, "Thinking about the Operational Level", RUSI.

Col. M. R. Matheny, "The Roots of Modern American Operational Art".

See also, Martin Dunn, "Levels of War: Just a Set of Labels?", who defines operational art as ...

...The Operational level of war is concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns. it is at this level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions, tasks and resources to tactical operations.

This has probably confused things terribly but then again, in the spirit of my namesake, why not?

[GI Zhou]

In Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, Brassey’s,London, 1985, pp 23 & 24, Simpkin wrote that

operational art is manoeuvre warfare inside a theatre, as opposed to attrition warfare.

My refences are:

Svechin, A.A. Strategy, East View Publications, Minneapolis, 1992, p. 68. This is a translation of his 1927 work, Strategiia, printed in Moscow by Voennyi vestnick.

Kamanev, S.S. ‘Ocherednye voennye zadachi’, (Successive military objectives), in Voprosy strategii I operativnogo iskusstva v sovietskikh voennykh trudakh (1917-1940) , Voenizdat, Moskva, 1965, pp. 149 – 152cited in Glantz, D.M. Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle, Frank Cass, London, 1991, p. 21; and

Tukhachevsky, M.N. ‘Voina’ (War,), 1926, in Voprosystrategii I operativnogo iskusstva v sovietskikh voennykh trudakh (1917-1940),Voenizdat, Moskva, 1965, pp. 104-105, cited in Glantz, op. cit., p. 22.

Wilf, message me your email address and I will send you my PhD and book.

Secondly could someone show me how to do use the quotation boxes please.(Mod's note PM sent earlier).

Cheers,

GI Zhou 0337 hrs

[Tukhachevskii]

In Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, Brassey’s,London, 1985, pp 23 & 24,

IMO, this is a very problematic book. Simpkin knew his stuff, undoubtedly, but it's the use to which he put said stuff that raise numerous issues for me at least.

[Pete]

Boy, was I ever wrong about the Small Wars Council forum. I thought it would be a place that sought to address the small wars deficiency in U.S. military doctrine. Instead, the U.S. Army's institutional response to the small wars situation, FM 3-24, has, along with the horse it rode in on, been thoroughly torn to pieces! Now you guys are complaining about a 1980s version of FM 100-5, a manual that doesn't even exist anymore under the same name! This place isn't reformist, it's reactionary, and really really reactionary at that, the way a discussion forum for exiled Tsarist officers would have been in the 1930s!

[Steve Blair]

Boy, was I ever wrong about the Small Wars Council forum. I thought it would be a place that sought to address the small wars deficiency in U.S. military doctrine. Instead, the U.S. Army's institutional response to the small wars situation, FM 3-24, has, along with the horse it rode in on, been thoroughly torn to pieces. Now you guys are complaining about a 1980s version of FM 100-5, a manual that doesn't even exist anymore under the ssame name. This place isn't reformist, it's reactionary, and really really reactionary at that, the way a discussion forum for exiled Tsarist officers would have been in the 1930s!

I think it depends on whose comments and threads you follow, Pete. I (for one) have been deeply concerned by the (strong) possibility that the Army would repeat the post-Vietnam mistake of burying Small Wars training. While mine may be a minority concern, it is one that others here do share (with their own reasons and reasoning, to be sure, as well as their own takes on the situation and possible solutions). Prolific posters do not necessarily indicate a consensus opinion on this or any other forum.

[Entropy]

Wilf,

Just because you conduct "Operations," it does not follow that there is something called an "Operational Level." What we are all talking about is reaping the benefits of success at the tactical level. That is not enabled by dreaming up something called the "Operational Level." - Sherman knew how to apply tactics to fulfil his contribution to the strategy - so he conducted an operation to make sure the tactical actions were relevant to that.

I don't really have a dog in this argument about levels of war, but to play the devil's advocate, could not the "operational level" be the coordination of various bureaucratic fighting organizations toward strategy fulfillment? In other words, "joint" and "coalition" operations may constitute an "operational level" of war - the coordination of different forces which use different equipment, tactics and doctrine all toward a common purpose?

[Ken White]

Boy, was I ever wrong about the Small Wars Council forum.

All sorts of stuff...

I thought it would be a place that sought to address the small wars deficiency in U.S. military doctrine. Instead, the U.S. Army's institutional response to the small wars situation, FM 3-24, has, along with the horse it rode in on, been thoroughly torn to pieces!

Seems to me that dissecting FM 3-24 would be totally consistent with your "address the small wars deficiency in U.S. military doctrine" comment...

I for one said it was deficient in that it was too long, too esoteric and roamed into policy matters not the Armed forces business among other things. A number of suggestions for improvement have been offered by many.

Several here got involved in getting the Army to allow comments to several new manuals in open forum here. I don't recall your contributions to that effort, so could you remind if you partook or not?

Now you guys are complaining about a 1980s version of FM 100-5, a manual that doesn't even exist anymore under the same name!

I think you missed a number of things.

- This thread started last year with a link to a monograph published by internationally respected military thinkers 16 Sep 09. That's fairly current. In that monograph, the authors contend that the US Army lost the bubble by getting wrapped around 'the operational art.' A contention with which I agree. Whats' your opinion?

- That monograph was linked and comments were solicited. Some comments did indeed address the old 100-5 but in direct reference to the Monograph . Those all ceased last October with Comment #28. None of the 27 additional comments in the current sub-thread started by ChrisJM yesterday address FM 100-5 -- except yours...

This place isn't reformist, it's reactionary, and really really reactionary at that, the way a discussion forum for exiled Tsarist officers would have been in the 1930s!

Well, we could discuss WW I in greater detail I guess...

Neat thing is that participation is not mandatory.

[GI Zhou]

In 1993 my brother was in Saint Petersburg as a guest of the then new government. He was with a group of very senior officers who offered a toast. One officer offered the toast to the government. he was over ruled with the expression, (censored) the government, TO THE TSAR! My brother felt distinctly uncomfortable, as we are republicans, being our forefathers were Fenians and all. Selected by the best British judges on the first assisted migration scheme to Australia.

Lest anyone thinks that Afghanistan or Iraq were/are small wars per se, how many tens of billions and tens of thousands of soldiers have been or have set foot in country. How many soldiers are in Afghanistan now? To me that is a pretty big war.

It is on many fronts, with different players, and at stake is no less than the survival of the state. Many of the issues that faced Lenin, Trotsky et al.

Many people, well officers, grappled with what term to describe hunting small groupos of insurgents bent on causing havoc in isolated areas. Low Level Conflict was one until one is reminded the entire Australian Defence Force was deployed. All that training and doctrine paid dividends in the 1990s onwards, from East Timor onwards.

[Pete]

That monograph was linked and comments were solicited. Some comments did indeed address the old 100-5 but in direct reference to the monograph.

Ken, you and I discussed the operational level of war and its origin in the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 in this thread a few months ago. (Gosh, when a first sergeant has got your number it can turn into a long, long tour of duty ... )

[Chris jM]

By making it simpler, more robust and flexible. Tactics are essentially "teaching." - that is what they flow from, so they are also tied to a level of command and planning.

Just because you conduct "Operations," it does not follow that there is something called an "Operational Level."

Gotcha - or at least got the basis of your objections to the Operational on a simplistic level. I'm going to be interested in reading further on this subject when time allows (as such, thanks for the small bibliography Tukhachevskii - looks like a good list to start with) with the anti-Operational view fixed in mind.

I do hope that everyone here realizes that when I fail my next promotion course after I deliberately disregard the Operational Level of War and thus go against prime doctrine, I shall be naming and blaming you all!