SMALL WARS COUNCIL
Go Back   Small Wars Council > Conflicts -- Current & Future > Other, By Region > Americas

Reply
 
Thread Tools Display Modes
Old 08-14-2006   #1
SWJED
Small Wars Journal
 
SWJED's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2005
Location: Largo, Florida
Posts: 3,988
Default Drugs & US Law Enforcement (merged thread)

Joint Force Quarterly 3rd Quarter 2006 - JIATF - South: Blueprint for Success by Richard M. Yeatman.

Quote:
Over the last 17 years, the Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF–S) has built an unparalleled network of law enforcement, intelligence, and military assets to focus on detecting the movements and shipments of narcoterrorist organizations.

With this evolving structure, JIATF–S serves as a model for bringing the most effective assets to bear on complex national policy issues, whether it be illegal drugs, weapons proliferation, or international terrorism. Fundamental to any task force is a clear mission statement. If the statement, and thus the mission itself, lacks specific goals, agencies may be reluctant to participate for fear they have little to gain. Therefore, JIATF–S must target specific missions and clearly define their objectives, to include detecting, monitoring, and targeting narcoterrorists and the drugs they profit from. Since law enforcement agencies have a vested interest in achieving these objectives, the application of an interagency partnership has been successful.

JIATF–S serves as a model that other interagency organizations can tailor to their specific goals. For example, an interagency effort to track military equipment destined for terrorist organizations could include individuals from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Homeland Security, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). For task force participants to feel connected to results, they must be part of the command. Within the JIATF–S organizational structure, representatives from DOD, Homeland Security, and the Justice Department, along with U.S. Intelligence Community liaisons and international partners, work as one team. Interagency personnel are fully integrated within the command structure and serve in key leadership positions. This integration promotes trust and facilitates the sharing of law enforcement investigative information, which is critical for any intelligence-driven organization.

While traditional joint operations focus on efforts among the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force, JIATF–S has gone past these traditional boundaries, becoming a fully integrated interagency command. Whereas most organizations count on liaison officers to represent them, JIATF–S takes this concept much further. The top command structure demonstrates total integration, with the Director being a Coast Guard rear admiral and the Vice Director coming from Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Integration also exists through the lower levels of the command: both the Directors for Intelligence and Operations are military officers, but their Deputies are from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and Customs and Border Protection. Intelligence analysts from the DEA, CBP, and FBI are located in the Joint Intelligence Operations Center to ensure that law enforcement agencies are involved in daily operations and that information is not stovepiped…
SWJED is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 08-18-2006   #2
Strickland
Council Member
 
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: Stafford, VA
Posts: 262
Default

At the risk of throwing a turd in the punchbowl over this report, how would we grade our progress in the war on drugs, and by extension JIATF South? The FARC reportedly receives $600 million a year in drug profits.

Scenario - JIATF South has intelligence that 100 speedboats full of cocaine are preparing to leave the coast of Colombia for multiple destinations. During this period, they get further intelligence on 10 of the 100 which confirms that they have cocaine. They have no further intell on the remaining 90, but still believe these to be drug shipments. Out of these 10 boats, they decide that the glacial process of interagency coordination will allow them to target 3 of the 10. Out of these three, they interdict one, and seize a large amount of cocaine. Question - what percentage of drug shipments did they stop? Did they stop 1 of 100? 1 of 10? 1 of 3? of 1 of some unknown number? Answer - they would report that they interdicted 33% of drug shipments or 1 of 3.
Strickland is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 09-16-2006   #3
pcmfr
Council Member
 
pcmfr's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2006
Posts: 62
Default

JIATF S is in the business of identifying drug routes and keeping their various interagency stakeholders happy with bureaucratic churn. Very little of their work actually involves intercepting drugs. Take a look at their record of vessels and a/c detected vs. intercepted over the past few years, and you will be shocked. Of course, some of the blame can be placed on the lack of assets available to them, but a large part goes to the ridiculous ROE we place on the forces doing the interceptions. The war on drugs is a joke. As long as we treat these vessels as a law enforcement problem rather than a threat to national security, the joke will endure.
pcmfr is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 09-17-2006   #4
slapout9
Council Member
 
slapout9's Avatar
 
Join Date: Dec 2005
Posts: 4,817
Default Check the next to the last paragraph

1-If you read the next to the last paragraph in the article you will find it is arrest that count not boats or shipments seized. This is part of a three pronged DEA strategy of get the kingpin,get the money,get extradition to the USA. And it is highly successful!!!Relative to Columbia.

2-For some time the DEA has warned that the major high drug traffic route is through MEXICO!!!!! not by air or sea.

3-600 million is a lot but it is far,far less than they were getting. It will be hard to replace to, with the new extradition treaty with Columbia many of those financial sources are gone for good. Especially when those Mother FARCers get a lot of help from uncle Hugo in Venezuela.

For details you can read the DEA 2006 report at the white house website office of drug control strategy. Not sure of the link, I read a hard copy from a friend.
slapout9 is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 09-17-2006   #5
pcmfr
Council Member
 
pcmfr's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2006
Posts: 62
Default

Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
2-For some time the DEA has warned that the major high drug traffic route is through MEXICO!!!!! not by air or sea.
It still goes from air or sea to get to Mexico. Most of the drugs are offloaded in Central America (especially Guatemala) then go overland to Mexico.
pcmfr is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 09-19-2006   #6
slapout9
Council Member
 
slapout9's Avatar
 
Join Date: Dec 2005
Posts: 4,817
Default Mexico-Meth-and the Patriot act

Here is a link about Mexico and the drug problrm and the Patriot act.

www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14817871
slapout9 is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 09-22-2006   #7
SWJED
Small Wars Journal
 
SWJED's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2005
Location: Largo, Florida
Posts: 3,988
Default Joint Interagency Group Working to Stop Flow of Drugs Into U.S.

22 September American Forces Press Service - Joint Interagency Group Working to Stop Flow of Drugs Into U.S. by Kathleen Rhem. Posted in full per DoD authorization...

Quote:
Agents and experts from many different government agencies are working together out of a headquarters in Key West, Fla., to stem the flow of drugs and other contraband into the U.S. from Latin America.

The Joint Interagency Task Force South is “a model for interagency cooperation,” Army Gen. Bantz J. Craddock told Pentagon reporters here Sept. 20. Craddock is the outgoing commander of U.S. Southern Command, which maintains operational control of the task force.

Military assets are often best suited for finding and tracking means by which criminal gangs move drugs, weapons and illegal immigrants into the United States. However, the military can’t arrest people in domestic operations. This is where interagency cooperation is vital.

Craddock explained that military assets within JIATF South detect and monitor drug traffickers moving from Latin America into the U.S. That’s the point in the process where representatives of law enforcement agencies step in.

“Every time there is an end game on the high seas or on land, there has to be a duly-authorized law enforcement detachment there,” Craddock said.

Coast Guard, Drug Enforcement Agency, or Customs and Border Protection agents work closely with the military to be on hand to make arrests. “JIATF South has a very mature, established process to be able to ensure that out on the seas, where we have grey-hulled Navy ships that can’t do arrests, there is a law enforcement detachment consisting of one or more of those agencies on board,” Craddock said.

In addition to the Defense Department, Coast Guard, DEA and Customs, other agencies represented at JIATF are: Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

Interagency cooperation is the only way to bring well-funded drug traffickers to justice, Craddock said. The key to that is to figure out what tactics they’ll use next. “These narcotrafficking organizations are very smart, obviously well-funded, (and) they watch closely what we do,” he said. “They respond; they’re agile; sometimes they can get inside of our response cycle.”

In 2004, U.S. officials interdicted 220 tons of cocaine coming into the U.S. In 2005, that figure went up to 252 tons. But the pace is down so far in 2006, Craddock said, explaining that narcotraffickers lost so much that they changed the way they do business.

Craddock explained that drug runners used to carry their loads in large boats, but these were easy for U.S. government assets to find and catch. Several years ago, narcotraffickers began using hard-to-find, faster boats -- 40-foot boats with four 240-horsepower motors. “They move across the calm seas of the eastern Pacific or Caribbean at 60 knots,” Craddock said.

“So we changed some techniques,” he added. JIATF began using helicopters on Coast Guard ships as a way to keep up with the drug traffickers. This way of doing business is very effective in finding and catching these fast boats, he said.

“Now, we think, based upon what we’re seeing, that because of our effectiveness in the maritime arena, they may be going back to more air transport,” Craddock said.

“The challenge we’ve got is not to catch them. We’ll catch them,” the general said. “The challenge is to get in front of their next step and be waiting to make sure that their changed mode of operation isn’t effective and we keep them off balance. When they’re taken out of their game plan, they’re very vulnerable.”

Another reason the mission of the Joint Interagency Task Force South is vital to the U.S. is because it helps Latin American nations better police their own waters and airspace and cuts down on ungoverned areas in the Western Hemisphere. The task force has forged relationships with the governments of several nations and has many interdiction and information-sharing agreements throughout the region. Eleven foreign officers are permanent members of the JIATF South staff.

The United States is concerned about ungoverned areas because they can become breeding grounds for extremism or safe havens for terrorists, Craddock said. “It’s the hole-in-the-wall gang,” he said. “If one’s safe, a bunch more are going to show up because they feed off each other.”

Officials also are concerned that narcotrafficking funds terrorism. “Narcotrafficking is extremely lucrative. Look at Afghanistan, at the poppy cultivation there; it feeds al Qaeda,” Craddock said. “We believe that there are inroads, contacts, relationships, funds being raised in Latin America from the narcotraffickers that are moving into extremist organizations and migrating out of the region.”
SWJED is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 09-28-2006   #8
SWJED
Small Wars Journal
 
SWJED's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2005
Location: Largo, Florida
Posts: 3,988
Default Plan Colombia: Big Gains, But Cocaine Still Flows

28 September Christian Science Monitor - Plan Colombia: Big Gains, But Cocaine Still Flows by Danna Harman.

Quote:
... The US Embassy in Bogotá, since the launch of the $4.7 billion Plan Colombia in 2000, has grown into the second largest US diplomatic mission in the world, after Baghdad. It employs over 2,000 people, including some 350 US military personnel and 750 contractors.

The cornerstone of Plan Colombia is the massive effort to eradicate Colombia's coca plants before they are processed into cocaine. Some 20 aircraft, piloted by contractors with DynCorp International, headquartered in Falls Church, Va., take turns carrying out daily spray missions. Army and police units assist these efforts by clearing the ground of coca farmers, guerrillas, or traffickers below, and by protecting the spray mission from above - with a fleet of 71 US provided helicopters. The majority of the State Department's counternarcotics and law enforcement budget in Colombia is dedicated - directly or indirectly - to these endeavors.

In 2005, a record-breaking 170,000 hectares (419,000 acres) of coca were destroyed: 138,000 sprayed and 32,000 pulled out by hand or plowed under.

In total, since the program began in 1994 (and particularly since it was ramped up in 2000), 986,925 hectares of coca plant and opium poppy have been eradicated - an area almost equivalent to the size of the states of Rhode Island and Delaware combined.

Drug seizures are another pillar of the plan, and here too, there are results. Two hundred and twenty-five tons of cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base were seized in 2005, up from 125 tons in 2002, and the number of clandestine drug labs destroyed soared to nearly 2,000 last year from 317 in 2000, according to a July study by Colombia's National Narcotics Directorate (DNE). Meanwhile, the number of traffickers extradited to the US in the last four years is climbing toward 400.

"We are squeezing them. We are forcing them to change their drug trafficking routes and their methods," says Walters.

A better-trained and -equipped military and police, meanwhile, has meant that overall security in Colombia has vastly improved, especially in the urban areas. From 2002 to 2005, the murder rate fell 35 percent - from 28,837 murders to 18,111 - and kidnappings have dropped from nearly 3,000 in 2002 to 800 last year, according to Uribe's office. As a consequence, nearly 1 million foreigners visited last year, a 21 percent jump compared with 2004, and foreign investment hit $10 billion last year, a fivefold increase since 2002...

But even Plan Colombia advocates admit the impressive statistics do not a complete victory make.

"We're making first downs," US Ambassador to Colombia William Wood is fond of saying, "...but we're not sure how long the football field is."

President Uribe is often even more circumspect. "It is clear we cannot abandon Plan Colombia," he said while in New York last week."But it is also clear that, in comparison to our efforts, we should be seeing better results."

Sometimes, it seems the harder Colombians and Americans fight, the more the drug lords push back and the coca fields reproduce...
SWJED is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 09-28-2006   #9
slapout9
Council Member
 
slapout9's Avatar
 
Join Date: Dec 2005
Posts: 4,817
Default It's Mexico

Here is a link about the breakup of the Cali cartel and forfeiture of over 2 Billion dollars to the US from Columbia. I don't why we keep spraying weed killer everywhere when we know putting them in jail and taking their money works.


But the big news is the DEA is finally stating in public that most of Columbia's cocaine industry is controlled by MEXICO!!!!!! no need to fly or swim to get across the border. Here is the link.


http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13415616
slapout9 is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 09-30-2006   #10
SWJED
Small Wars Journal
 
SWJED's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2005
Location: Largo, Florida
Posts: 3,988
Default Another from the CSM and one from the LAT...

All three articles from the CSM series and an article from the LAT:
SWJED is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 10-04-2006   #11
Strickland
Council Member
 
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: Stafford, VA
Posts: 262
Default

Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
1-If you read the next to the last paragraph in the article you will find it is arrest that count not boats or shipments seized. This is part of a three pronged DEA strategy of get the kingpin,get the money,get extradition to the USA. And it is highly successful!!!Relative to Columbia.

2-For some time the DEA has warned that the major high drug traffic route is through MEXICO!!!!! not by air or sea.

3-600 million is a lot but it is far,far less than they were getting. It will be hard to replace to, with the new extradition treaty with Columbia many of those financial sources are gone for good. Especially when those Mother FARCers get a lot of help from uncle Hugo in Venezuela.

For details you can read the DEA 2006 report at the white house website office of drug control strategy. Not sure of the link, I read a hard copy from a friend.
Are you suggesting that we are winning the war on drugs?
Strickland is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 10-04-2006   #12
slapout9
Council Member
 
slapout9's Avatar
 
Join Date: Dec 2005
Posts: 4,817
Default

Major Strickland,
No! I am not suggesting we are winning the war on drugs. I do think Columbia is one of the more successful operations. And the final success of Columbia is in the vital interest of the US. Here is why?

1-At the Strategic effects level non-drug related employment is up.
2-Tourism is up over 21%, people don't vacation in high crime areas.
3-Arresting drug king pins and asset seizure is the most effective TTP that LE has. Just recently one drug conviction resulted in over 2 Billion dollars being returned to the US Gov.
4-Mexico is a big problem and it is not just drugs. Strategypage.com just ran an article a few days ago about Cubans switching ID's with Mexicans and crossing the border into the US.
5-So much pressure is being put on Columbia that they are moving to Mexico, displacement at it's worst.
6-FARC may be the x factor that upsets the progress that has been made in Columbia.
7-Finally Columbia is critical because it has one of the largest undeveloped oil reserves in our hemisphere. With drug activity on the decrease it raises the chances of oil company investment and produce a much needed near by source of petroleum.
8- As for Mexico we should have closed the border along time ago.
slapout9 is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 02-25-2007   #13
Wildcat
Council Member
 
Wildcat's Avatar
 
Join Date: Jan 2007
Location: Inside your OODA loop
Posts: 72
Default Colombia

Moderator's Note: On 18th April 2011 seven threads merged to this re-named thread Colombia, FARC & insurgency (merged thread). Seeven SWJ Blog threads merged in today. Six threads merged in 8th October 2016 (ends).

I posted this AAR on SOCNET after several of the guys there gave me help prior to my trip, and Jedburgh suggested I post it here as well.

Last semester I took a polisci seminar entitled "Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies," and had the good fortune of traveling to Colombia with my classmates and our professor for a weeklong research trip. Most of our time we spent going to meetings all over Bogota, but we also spent two days and two nights in the Eje Cafetero, going canopying, whitewater rafting, and horseback riding. In the interests of time and space, I'll limit this AAR to the more relevant aspects of the research trip.

We flew into Bogota on the 12th of December and had our first meetings on the 13th. Spread out over the course of the week were meetings with several NGOs and other organizations, including:
- CODHES
- Fundacion Seguridad y Democracia (FSD)
- National Democratic Institute (NDI)
- Transparencia por Colombia
- Corporacion Nuevo Arco Iris
- OAS mission in Colombia
- Professors at Universidad de los Andes and Universidad del Rosario
- Former mayor of Bogota Enrique Penalosa

Our discussions with those largely revolved around internally displaced persons (IDPs) and demobilization of paras and guerrillas. The most interesting of those, in my opinion, was the Corporacion Nuevo Arco Iris, as it was headed up by two former guerrillas who demobilized and were involved in promoting peaceful DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) for guerrillas and paras. I'll go into more detail on the bigger meetings, however.

We started off meeting with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 13th, discussing not just HR, but also the dimensions of narcotrafficking and historical ties b/w guerrillas and peasants in rural departments. The afternoon of the 14th we met with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, discussing many of the same issues. We had a meeting with Juan Forero, who is the Washington Post's correspondent in Colombia. He had interviewed our professor before for an article, and he turned out to be one of the most interesting people on our trip; urbane, witty, articulate. He even met us for dinner the next night at a nice restaurant, where we talked about Colombia's security situation over mojitos and Club Colombia beers.

The 15th was our biggest day. We began with a meeting with ARD, the Agency for Rural Development, which was contracted by USAID. Our next meeting was with some of the editorial board of El Tiempo, Colombia's most circulated newspaper and, arguably, its most controversial, seeing as the director of the investigative unit, Martha Soto, with whom we talked for a while, was working on uncovering ties between members of the Colombian Congress and the paras/guerrillas. Their office (or compound, rather) had incredibly tight security because their previous office was hit by a car bomb a few years back. Rafael Santos, the adjunct director of the paper, was among the people talking with us. For those not familiar with Colombia's domestic politics, he belongs to THE Santos family, one of the most prominent families in the country.


Next we were off to the US Embassy, where first we met with representatives from USAID (US Agency for International Development). One lady wasn't too pleased when I posed a question to her about the perceived failings of Plan Colombia and the effects the aerial spraying of supposed coca fields has had on rural peasants. She seemed to be pretty much spitting out the "party line" the whole time we were there. We also met with a Foreign Service pol-mil officer, but before that we met with two Army SF officers with the PATT (Planning-Assistance Training Team) and two of their NCOs; the LTC was the PATT chief, the MAJ his deputy. I won't mention names in the interest of PERSEC. The two NCOs (I didn't see their rank insignia clearly from where I sat) had apparently just returned that day from training CAF troops. We got them to address issues like the current troop cap in Colombia, ROEs, force protection, et cetera. That was, of course, the most fun for me.

Findings
There are many differing opinions (of course) on the current nature of the guerrilla war. Because of FARC's extensive ties to the drug trade, most people believe they've shed their Marxist/Maoist roots and become opportunistic businessmen in some way, and that the only reason the FARC still exists is its revenues from the drug trade which it uses to buy weapons and support itself. Some of our speakers suggested, however, that the ideological roots were still there because the FARC still maintained power primarily through wielding weapons, not through narcotrafficking.

According to FSD, there have been remarkable gains in security: kidnappings, homicides, and attacks on national infrastructure have significantly fallen in the past four years. But, to some people, a peaceful solution still feels over a decade away, if not further. The paras are easier to negotiate with because they are not as ideologically driven, but it's hard for the government to make its case because the paras originated as local militias to protect peasants from the guerrillas when the government forces could not adequately do the job. To this day, government presence in some of the rural departments is scarce, or even non-existent.

Security problems are exacerbated by the plight of IDPs, some of which results from the paras and guerrillas, some of which results from the aerial spraying program associated with Plan Colombia, which targets coca fields, but also often ends up destroying the livelihood of many peasants and galvanizing further support for the guerrillas.

Other stuff
We were saddled with so many meetings that we had very little downtime. Most nights I didn't get to bed until 1:00 or 2:00, and then we'd be back up at 5:00 or 6:00 to eat breakfast and get back on the road. I was sick for a few days as a result, and didn't get any decent sleep until we flew to the rural areas, then I felt fine. I'll say this: the coffee was amazing, and so was the food. The best meal I had was in the Eje Cafetero, the rural coffee-growing region of Colombia, at the finca where we stayed.

Our second night in Bogota we went to a bar known as the Bogota Beer Company (which was hit by a grenade a couple years ago) and proceeded to drink, including my professor. We suddenly started arm-wrestling after several drinks, and after I beat a friend of mine, my professor challenged me and, after a minute-long battle, finished me off to howls of laughter and cheering. It was a great night. And, yeah, the women are gorgeous. We played a drinking game with a group of girls from the Universidad de los Andes.

In the Eje Cafetero we went whitewater rafting the first morning, then canopying in the afternoon. As we were doing the last quarter-mile stretch of water, our Colombian guide slapped his paddle on the water with a loud BANG and our professor ducked and went, "Oh, ####!" When he looked up and saw us laughing, he admitted for a moment he thought we were taking small arms fire. He gave one piece of standing advice: if we ran into trouble, we were not to surrender to, but to run without stopping. Methods the guerrillas used on captives including tying them to trees and letting fire ants eat them, so it's supposedly better to take a 7.62mm slug to the back of the head while running away than to risk capture.

Armed soldiers were everywhere. Nothing makes you feel secure like a CAF soldier in full combat kit standing on a street corner with a Galil slung across his chest.

Last week we gave a presentation at the college on the trip, and I discussed the security situation. Afterwords, a Colombian student at our school came up and thanked us, saying we seemed to have a better grasp of her country than she did.

That's my summary. Feel free to comment. I'd be more than happy to elaborate on certain parts of the trip if anything was too vague, or if people might like to know more specifics. If anyone has questions about individuals, particularly embassy personnel with whom we met whose names I didn't want to put in this public forum, please PM me.

Last edited by davidbfpo; 10-08-2016 at 11:22 AM. Reason: Mod's Note added and updated after more merging today.
Wildcat is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 02-26-2007   #14
goesh
Council Member
 
Join Date: Jan 2007
Posts: 1,188
Default FARC, Suppressed Uzis and Gorgeous Women

When I saw the 4 troopers bunched up, wearing no Kevlar and looking all togather in one direction most likely smiling at a woman passing by, I couldnt' help but think of FARC doing a drive-by with a silenced Uzi. FARC has made alot of hits on police and security forces.
goesh is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 02-26-2007   #15
Wildcat
Council Member
 
Wildcat's Avatar
 
Join Date: Jan 2007
Location: Inside your OODA loop
Posts: 72
Default

Quote:
Originally Posted by goesh View Post
When I saw the 4 troopers bunched up, wearing no Kevlar and looking all togather in one direction most likely smiling at a woman passing by, I couldnt' help but think of FARC doing a drive-by with a silenced Uzi. FARC has made alot of hits on police and security forces.
Some were more attentive than others. When we got into the area around the presidential residence in Bogota, they were all-business. Magazines were inserted, though I doubt they had racked rounds into the chambers yet. There were even quite a few plain-clothes security folk around with earpieces and probably concealed sidearms, and no pictures were allowed. It was intimidating, to say the least.
Wildcat is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 03-07-2007   #16
Jedburgh
Council Member
 
Join Date: Oct 2005
Posts: 3,097
Default

Thanks for the AAR. I really appreciate your on-the-ground insights.

To expand on Columbia, here's an article from the current (Mar-Apr 07) Military Review:

A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe's Columbia (2002-2006) vs FARC
Quote:
...What bears repeating is the point to which this analysis has returned often: the present effort is both correct and sustainable; it is the right strategic posture required for progress and popular security. Hence, continued care must be exercised to ensure that Democratic Security remains a multifaceted approach—a strengthening of the state’s governance, finances, and democratic capacity enabled by the ever more powerful and capable shield provided by the security forces. By themselves, these facets are not the solution—that lies in the use of legitimacy to mobilize response against those using political violence for illegitimate ends—but they will certainly enable it.
..and older background from SSI:

Columbian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency (Jan 02)

The Past as Prologue? A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 1958-66 (Mar 02)
Jedburgh is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 03-08-2007   #17
tequila
Council Member
 
tequila's Avatar
 
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: New York, NY
Posts: 1,665
Default

Is there any analysis available about the impact of the AUC militias on FARC? I think any analysis that focuses exclusively on FARC vs Colombian Army is very incomplete.
tequila is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 04-17-2007   #18
SWJED
Small Wars Journal
 
SWJED's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2005
Location: Largo, Florida
Posts: 3,988
Default Colombia and the United States--The Partnership: But What Is the Endgame?

Recent release by the US Army's Strategic Studies Institute - Colombia and the United States--The Partnership: But What Is the Endgame? By Ambassador Myles R. R. Frechette.

Quote:
American Ambassador to Colombia, 1994-97, Myles R. R. Frechette provides authoritative, eloquent, and impassioned perspectives on both the achievements and failures of American and Colombian efforts. He argues that American policy made analytical errors that need to be rectified, including underestimating the long-term complexity and interrelated nature of the problem, while both nations overestimated the amount of support that Colombia would receive from the international community. Moreover, nation-building and the rule of law are strategic imperatives which American policy must take seriously. Finally, it is critical to appreciate that Colombian cultural characteristics sharply influence what Colombians will do on their own behalf.
SWJED is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 05-09-2007   #19
CSC2005
Council Member
 
CSC2005's Avatar
 
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: VA
Posts: 30
Default Looking for people with experience training Colombian Military

I am working on a study of international training cultures. We are looking for people who have spent a fair amount of time training the Colombian military during the past 10 years. If you would like to share your knowledge or know of anybody, please let me know.

_Art
Quantico, VA
CSC2005 is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 05-09-2007   #20
NDD
Council Member
 
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: SOTB
Posts: 76
Default

Wildcat, are you the dude that promised me beer, then blew me off? Nice AAR.

goesh,
It don't work that way.
NDD is offline   Reply With Quote
Reply

Bookmarks

Tags
colombia, farc, military, security sector reform

Thread Tools
Display Modes

Posting Rules
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts

BB code is On
Smilies are On
[IMG] code is On
HTML code is Off

Forum Jump

Similar Threads
Thread Thread Starter Forum Replies Last Post
Syria: the case for action davidbfpo Middle East 161 10-01-2013 07:30 AM
The Rules - Engaging HVTs & OBL jmm99 Military - Other 166 07-28-2013 07:41 PM
Wired’s 2008 Smart list SWJED Social Sciences, Moral, and Religious 19 09-26-2008 06:24 PM
LE Resources sgmgrumpy Law Enforcement 11 09-22-2007 01:41 PM


All times are GMT. The time now is 05:30 PM.


Powered by vBulletin® Version 3.8.9. ©2000 - 2017, Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.
Registered Users are solely responsible for their messages.
Operated by, and site design © 2005-2009, Small Wars Foundation