Sisyphus and Counterinsurgency

[Cavguy]

CavGuy:

For the ME and South Asia where cities and capitals are a recent phenomenon, the certainty is far less if it exists at all -- though there is no question that AQ, The Talib, et.al. are smart enough to use that parameter as a psyops tool even if they know better. Rural populations worldwide don't think nearly as highly of cities as urban dwellers do, nor do they care much for or have much respect for urban dwellers. That is particularly true among mountain folks.

Pakistan is indeed an example of the principle -- it has suffered such bombings in the cities since 1947. It's still there...

Added note: % of Population urban; Iraq > 70; Afghanistan ~ 24 , Pakistan ~ 34%

No disagreement it's different, but the principle is the same - your urban centers, where the government is, have to be relatively stable. 100% security is never possible, but you have to avoid what is happening now, which is the growing roots of Taleban cells sprouting in Kabul and Kandahar.

I highly recommend John McCuen's take on this from his 1963 book, Art of Counterinsurgency War - he talks in depth about "uncovering your base" while chasing enemy into his sanctuaries, thus allowing him to destabilize your base.

[Ken White]

Did in fact agree with him when I bought his book at the SF bookstore in 1966 -- until I tried apply that to Viet Nam and realized that a predominately rural nation with no particular concern for its cities doesn't react that way. Not at all. He is correct in this:

"...he talks in depth about "uncovering your base" while chasing enemy into his sanctuaries, thus allowing him to destabilize your base.

but that presumes there is such a base in the cities; in Afghanistan, unlike Iraq, there is none. Nor was there one in Viet Nam and only when we finally realized that and worked the rural areas did we start achieving any success in the COIN fight there.

He also said this in that book:
""To protect oneself against the methodical, crushing body blows of the revolutionaries and to be able to strike them in their most vital parts, it is necessary to fight them on their own battlefields-in their own media. It is necessary to parry the revolutionary weapons, adopt them, and then turn them against the revolutionaries."" (Emphasis added / kw).

I suggest that is more germane to Afghanistan and that what worked in Iraq will have limited -- not none, just limited -- applicability in Afghanistan.

No disagreement it's different, but the principle is the same - your urban centers, where the government is, have to be relatively stable. 100% security is never possible, but you have to avoid what is happening now, which is the growing roots of Taleban cells sprouting in Kabul and Kandahar.

They aren't sprouting in either city -- they never left. The Afghan intel and security guys can and will root 'em out (they're doing a pretty good job, BTW) but, unlike us, they aren't going to worry about the minor players, appearances, making a name for themselves or near term fixes; their concern is for long term stability and they'll get it in their own way. They will have to do it, we cannot (and should not even try, it'll merely set us up for failure) and they won't do it on our timetable -- nor should they.

Kabul and Kandahar have rarely been "relatively stable" over the centuries; the artificial domestic tranquility imposed by Saddam in Iraq or the Shah in Iran have never existed in Afghanistan and the cities have never had the pull they do in less harsh terrain. Add to that that mountain people would rather fight than eat and any attempt to concentrate effort on the cities in Afghanistan -- as was necessary in Iraq -- will create problems...

[Ron Humphrey]

First Ken, reference your wisdom about the importance of the larger urban cities as far as the outer regions. I accept that what you say is true because it makes sense from a less western perspective and given the population dispersal.

That said, if we go with that then more efforts should be made to help establish stability in outer regions and of course the enemy should be kept on the defensive. In order to do this it would seem we would have to work towards greater development of infrastructure within those regions and thus hopefully bring them to at least more closely reflect the larger urban cities. Along with that comes the need for political and military ties between the parts in order to facilitate greater unity of effort and a stronger overall HN presence throughout the country.

If this all goes well wouldn't we still come back to the need for more stability in the largest centers since That is where the HN must project its power from. Also considering that the more the coalition does the less the ANA is actually doing so that would seem somewhat counter-productive.

Long and short-
Would it not be more effective in the end to use coalition forces to assist in securing the urban areas and select outer areas from which the ANA with the capabilities assistance we can offer go out and take the fight to those who oppose them. In the end if AQ and others get to fight us then we easily become the problem if on the other hand we work to make sure they lose to Afghans then the picture might change all together.

Thought's

[Ken White]

...In order to do this it would seem we would have to work towards greater development of infrastructure within those regions and thus hopefully bring them to at least more closely reflect the larger urban cities. Along with that comes the need for political and military ties between the parts in order to facilitate greater unity of effort and a stronger overall HN presence throughout the country.

Note I am not suggesting the cities be ignored, simply that they should not be a priority item. Cities in such nations are, at this stage, primarily a market location (thus the importance of roads -- to both the good and bad guys...), they do not serve as a base for much of anything.

If this all goes well wouldn't we still come back to the need for more stability in the largest centers since That is where the HN must project its power from...

True; not more stability, just stability. I question the statement "that's where the host nation must project its power from." I don't think that's necessarily correct -- or desirable.

Also considering that the more the coalition does the less the ANA is actually doing so that would seem somewhat counter-productive.

That does not track with what I'm hearing on one level yet I can acknowledge the logic -- and thus we need to be careful not to overdo our effort...

Would it not be more effective in the end to use coalition forces to assist in securing the urban areas and select outer areas from which the ANA with the capabilities assistance we can offer go out and take the fight to those who oppose them. In the end if AQ and others get to fight us then we easily become the problem if on the other hand we work to make sure they lose to Afghans then the picture might change all together.

(emphasis added / kw)

I thought that's what we were doing? Though I doubt the picture will change much...

[AmericanPride]

This raises a myriad of thoughts in my head regarding the relationship between COIN and demographic geography. Basically, what is the extent of the relationship between the security of the population and the dismantlement of the insurgency? There is some dissonance between the two because the logical extreme of asserting that the population itself is the decisive object suggests that we ought to build a McDonald's and Wal-Mart in every neighborhood and hope that somehow the provision of material needs will somehow deflate the political will of the insurgency. I'm not certain that bridge between population security and an insurgency is that steady to cross in full faith. I'm not a historical expert on COIN, so I must ask if there's any example of successful COIN that relied on or emphasized nation-building missions? The successful examples that come to mind immediately (Philliphines, Kenya, and South Africa) all include rough treatment of the locals, which seems to contradict the popular notion that the general population should be treated nicely. That seems to be the case, and please feel free to correct me if my observations are absurd, because those campaigns targeted the specific power structures of the insurgency rather than attempt to appeal to the broader base of the general population So, my thoughts:

The demographics of the insurgency itself -- not simply ideology, but also its ethic, religious, tribal/clan, racial, cultural make-up and what political, economic, and geographic features of the region augment its strength.

1. The combination of these features that shape the insurgent identity (or identities) more or less ensures that it does not represent the population-at-large. If it did, I would question why the insurgency exists in the first place if, in a democratic environment, the state represents the general will of the people (why aren't the insurgents themselves in power?). It suggests in my mind that the democratization of the indigenous state would be an ineffective, perhaps even counter-productive, process, if not irrelevant. To me, it seems not so much a question of human security but of power. The former originates from the latter in my opinion.

2. The insurgent demographics indicate the sources of the movement's strength. As Ken suggested, that strength may not be in locations we would initially assume. In what ways could an agrarian, radical religious, anti-modern insurgency (i.e. the Taliban) find sympathy among the demographics of a major urban center? If there's not much in the way of a power base in the cities, why devote extensive valuable resources to patrolling those cities? Which brings me to point three....

3. How does a military, other than by coercion, establish, generate, and project power? How does a military maneuver through the "demographic terrain" and place an insurgency in a position of most disadvantage? Should, for example, the military promote a favorable version of the indigenous religion in order to counteract the radicalism of the insurgency? Alternatively, should the military adopt a similar version to the insurgency's religion IOT to co-opt their beliefs (much like campaigning politicians do to draw support away from their opponent)? How do we go about shaping the demographic battlefield, if as it's commonly accepted, the people themselves are a part of the terrain, and how do we leverage demographics to our advantage?

[Cavguy]

Basically, what is the extent of the relationship between the security of the population and the dismantlement of the insurgency? There is some dissonance between the two because the logical extreme of asserting that the population itself is the decisive object suggests that we ought to build a McDonald's and Wal-Mart in every neighborhood and hope that somehow the provision of material needs will somehow deflate the political will of the insurgency.

Nice long post I will respond more later ... but I wanted to catch you on this point.

Building "things" for the population does not usually work. We have conflated economic projects and stability too often. Quite simply, there is not enough money in our treasury to make Afghanistan's infrastructure like ours - nor should it.

Re-read point #7 in the article - human infrastructure is key. Physical infrastructure matters so the government can provide basic needs for its people, but if the human ability is lacking, it really doesn't matter how many power lines you string or jobs you provide.

COIN, and "hearts and minds", is all about self-interest. Dr. Kilcullen would argue most people try and sit on the fence. Both sides work to push people off the fence. Therefore, your actions must focus on motivating the populace to get off the fence and take a clear side. This can be done through bribery, loyalty, coercion, patriotism, threats, and force. Winning "Hearts and Minds" doesn't mean they necessarily like you - just that you have made it in their interest to support your side. Their "mind" is the practical reason (money, job, etc), the "heart" is the emotional component (political, safety, religious, etc.) that goes with it.

[AmericanPride]

Nice long post I will respond to more later

I need to re-read Army effective writing. :P

I'll wait for your larger response before I release my next barrage of questions.

[reed11b]

Cavguy,
I think you are partially right, but the cities is where I disagree. I think Ken has it right on this account. The tribal make-up of the cities make them unlikely strongholds for the Taliban anyway and the majority of the ANA and ANP are going to focus on the two main cities. Yes provide them some support, but holing up in the cities in this case and bombing or sending out battalion plus size units to smash the rural tribal areas where the Taliban and AQ get most of there recruits will only provide more recruits. The concentration of force should be to isolate the region where the Taliban and AQ are stronger. From there practice COIN to reduce there support network, and be ready to use conventional tactics whenever they chose to consolidate there forces. Building an effective human infrastructure in the Afghan government is really a state department job, but if the DOD is the only one around to do it, that takes knowledge and skill sets, not manpower.
Reed

[Ron Humphrey]

Did not mean to infer that ANA is slacking in their efforts at all but rather was referring to possible issues of giving too much help so as to actually keep them from growing and gaining experience in the way they should.

From what I know they are getting it right. Just commenting in the overall approach context.

As to projection of power, although I think I understand the concern with this approach I question if it's not required given that even in countries where most of the outer areas are almost autonomous the central governing authority has to be able to tie in somehow be it through physical, military, political, or social.
So Power in the most general of definitions not necessarily kinetic

[Cavguy]

Seems like Dr. Kilcullen agrees with my idea of protecting the cities first:

http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog...len-on-af.html

Let’s take these one at a time. Has there been too much emphasis on offensive operations, especially air strikes? We read a lot recently about civilian deaths and growing Afghan anger. Should we cut back on the use of air power and put in more ground troops, as Obama has said he will? Or is this not a matter of managing numbers and assets so much as changing the focus of our tactics?

It’s both. There has been an emphasis on fighting the Taliban, which has led us into operations (both air and ground-based) that do a lot of damage but do not make people feel safer. Similarly, we have a lot of troops in rural areas—small outposts—positioned there because it’s easier to bring firepower to bear on the enemy out in these areas. Meanwhile, the population in major towns and villages is vulnerable because we are off elsewhere chasing the enemy main-force guerrillas, allowing terrorist and insurgent cells based in the populated areas to intimidate people where they live. As an example, eighty per cent of people in the southern half of Afghanistan live in one of two places: Kandahar city, or Lashkar Gah city. If we were to focus on living amongst these people and protecting them, on an intimate basis 24/7, just in those two areas, we would not need markedly more ground troops than we have now (in fact, we could probably do it with current force levels). We could use Afghan National Army and police, with mentors and support from us, as well as Special Forces teams, to secure the other major population centers. That, rather than chasing the enemy, is the key.

The underlying reason as I mentioned before is here - the real threat is the political organization developing in the cities while we chase units in the mountains:

It sounds like you’re proposing classic counterinsurgency strategy: a combination of offensive and defensive military operations, political and economic development, and diplomacy. Isn’t that what we’ve been doing these past seven years? Have we just not been doing enough of all these? Or do we need to change strategy to something fundamentally new?

Well, we need to be more effective in what we are doing, but we also need to do some different things, as well, with the focus on security and governance. The classical counterinsurgency theorist Bernard Fall wrote, in 1965, that a government which is losing to an insurgency isn’t being out-fought, it’s being out-governed. In our case, we are being both out-fought and out-governed for four basic reasons:

(1) We have failed to secure the Afghan people. That is, we have failed to deliver them a well-founded feeling of security. Our failing lies as much in providing human security—economic and social wellbeing, law and order, trust in institutions and hope for the future—as in protection from the Taliban, narco-traffickers, and terrorists. In particular, we have spent too much effort chasing and attacking an elusive enemy who has nothing he needs to defend—and so can always run away to fight another day—and too little effort in securing the people where they sleep. (And doing this would not take nearly as many extra troops as some people think, but rather a different focus of operations).

(2) We have failed to deal with the Pakistani sanctuary that forms the political base and operational support system for the Taliban, and which creates a protective cocoon (abetted by the fecklessness or complicity of some elements in Pakistan) around senior al Qaeda and Taliban leaders.

(3) The Afghan government has not delivered legitimate, good governance to Afghans at the local level—with the emphasis on good governance. In some areas, we have left a vacuum that the Taliban has filled, in other areas some of the Afghan government’s own representatives have been seen as inefficient, corrupt, or exploitative.

(4) Neither we nor the Afghans are organized, staffed, or resourced to do these three things (secure the people, deal with the safe haven, and govern legitimately and well at the local level)—partly because of poor coalition management, partly because of the strategic distraction and resource scarcity caused by Iraq, and partly because, to date, we have given only episodic attention to the war.

So, bottom line—we need to do better, but we also need a rethink in some key areas starting with security and governance.

[Ken White]

Problem is that you do that; most of the bad guys in the cities just lay low and chill and chat with your patrols, smiling broadly and improving their English, while some of them move to the boonies -- and not as reluctantly or in as small numbers as in Iraq; the crowds in cities are a recent phenomenon in Afghanistan, they're basically country boys. They can climb those hills like mountain goats and a guy in armor isn't going to catch them.

When they get out of town, they'll join up with new hires from Pakistan and start rolling up the hinterlands; then you've got a full scale war on your hands. I'll guarantee you they will move faster than we do under current conditions...

The key to that is more Aviation; the key to more aviation is longer tours for the airplane units.

No easy solutions there...

I agree with him re: Pakistan but I think he's being a little unfair to a lot of people. Pakistan is trying, it's just devilishly difficult for them and it will take some years yet. We all can wish that weren't so but I suspect it will remain troublesome for another couple of years at least.

Understand, I'm not disagreeing with you or him, merely playing devil's advocate and pointing out minor things he elides.

He does make two very important points:

"(And doing this would not take nearly as many extra troops as some people think, but rather a different focus of operations)."

Totally true but problematic due to this:

"...partly because of poor coalition management, partly because of the strategic distraction and resource scarcity caused by Iraq, and partly because, to date, we have given only episodic attention to the war.

While the last two items are true, the first is the major problem and will remain so. Something about the "U" in MOOSEMUSS, I think. That, most unfortunately, is unlikely to improve. As I said, no easy solutions...

[slapout9]

Seems like Dr. Kilcullen agrees with my idea of protecting the cities first:

The underlying reason as I mentioned before is here - the real threat is the political organization developing in the cities while we chase units in the mountains:

Cavguy, I just read that yesterday. 80% in the cities WOW! Physical security of the people is somehting that the military can do well and will have to be done, but you can only do it for so long. The bigger problem is long term economic security. In your article Retaking Sa'ad at the end under lessons learned you talk about this and it was one of the most important parts of the article. Iraq has oil so their future is pretty well determined, Astan has......drugs wicked problem!

[Bill Moore]

My biggest beef with Kilcullin's proposal is that he is proposing that "we" have to protect the population. That isn't a counterinsurgency, that is an occupation and again I beat my drum "armed nation building".

I assume the analysis exists (well maybe not), but is it a fact that the people are turning to the Taliban because they're being coerced because we're not protecting them, or do they simply prefer Taliban leadership? It sounds to me like we're making some wild assumptions here based on our Western bias of what good government should look like. Does you're average Afghan really want to live under a Western Style government with radically different values? Are they fighting us because the Taliban is standing behind them with bayonets to their backs, or are they fighting us because well...... we're us?

I don't necessarily disagree with starting in the cities first, I don't see how you could it any other way, but two notes of caution. One we're not starting, we been there seven years now. Ideally you would have a strategy before you start fighting, but we weren't afforded that luxuary in Afghanistan. Two, you better have a plan to expand out from the cities without losing the cities, otherwise the cities become isolated outposts, which leads to economic isolation and ruin. The bad guys will eventually hurl a few diseased carcasses into the city and....., you know the deal.

Beyond that, begin with the end in mind, and that requires answering what type of government do the Afghan people want? Acceptance and evolutionary change at a glacial pace is generally more effective than revolutionary change imposed by an outside power. Revolutions succeed because they are the will of the people, not a foreign power.

Once we determine what type of government they want, how do we empower that government, how do we put their face in the lead on all operations, how do we empower them to control their population? That needs to be our long term exit strategy, and if we have to keep that in mind at all times. We can provide security to some degree (unless we pass the tipping point and turn the populace against us, which we may be doing if you believe the media reports), but before we commit to these major security operations (it terribly late in the game to start implementing step one of a basic COIN strategy), why are we doing it? Security of the populace is critical because it creates a window of opportunity for something to happen (a political settlement), and we should have that something in mind in mind before we act. Protectng the population is essential, and that is beyond debate, forget the myth of network targeting and focus on changing the environment. Just remember that protecting the population in itself doesn't win the conflict. How do we win? Strategy before tactics.

[Entropy]

Hmm, I wonder where Dr. Kilcullen is getting his population data. Reliable date is admittedly hard to come by (the last census was in the 1970's). There was supposed to be a census this summer, but it was cancelled because of poor security.

However, Dr. Kilcullen's 80/20 figure is completely inconsistent with any of the many population guestimates I've seen. Estimates from Afghanistan's central statistics office (as good as any) put the combined population of both Helmand and Kandahar provinces at about 1.6 million (a conservative figure - other estimates put it over 2 million). 80% of that is about 1.3 million. None of the figures I've seen put Kandahar city above 400k in population and Lashkar Gah above 60k. I expect wide margin of error when talking population stats for Afghanistan, but for Dr. Killcullen to be correct the actual populations for these two cities would have to be at least 2-3 times any of the estimates. And that's assuming he only means Helmand and Kandahar provinces when he says "the southern half of Afghanistan" which seems unlikely. The six southern-most provinces have an estimated population of just over 3 million. 80% of this number would give Kandahar and Lashkar Gah cities almost 2.5 million people combined and make Kandahar as populous as Kabul and Lashkar Gah almost as big as Herat. That is simply wrong.

It's not an 80% urban insurgency in the south or anywhere else. On this point he could not be more wrong, and this faulty premise completely undermines the entire strategy laid out in the interview. Most of southern Afghanistan is rural - small towns and villages. Regardless, both Kandahar and Lashkar Gah are comparatively secure (and have been), though the situation is worsening. One might argue that worsening is not from the failure to protect the cities, but failure to protect the surrounding districts and provinces. Putting more resources into the those two southern cities will therefore not accomplish much (and quite possibly be counter-productive) except cede vitally important small towns, villages and district centers to the enemy.

I'm frankly quite shocked Dr. Kilcullen would make such a huge error.

[Ken White]

catching that, I called a neighbor who's a USAR CA guy who returned from Kandahar less than a year ago. He says that if The good Doctor is correct, the population of K-town has more than tripled in a year. He, too is dubious. I have another contact with fairly recent experience and current acquaintances there. I'll try to get hold of him this weekend.

This comment:

"I'm frankly quite shocked Dr. Kilcullen would make such a huge error."

made me smile as I recalled making a similar comment years ago (when I was new to BIG staffs in high places) about a sharp young Action Officer's strange boo-boo to an old Colonel who smiled and pointed out that you can assign a guy a project he absolutely hates and after 90 days of working on it he'll defend it to the death; they, he said "...marry their programs and lose sight of how ugly the Bride was..."

ADDED: Sunday, 16 Nov 08. Around 2015 local, talked to the one who had also been to Kandahar on his last tour. He too is highly skeptical and really doubts that percentage of urban dwellers but will ask some who are there during the coming week for a current assessment.

[Cavguy]

It seems like the city strategy wins ...

http://feeds.reuters.com/~r/reuters/...4B601U20081207

NEW YORK (Reuters) - Most of the additional U.S. troops heading to Afghanistan early next year will be deployed near Kabul, reflecting worries about the capital's vulnerability, The New York Times reported in Sunday editions.

Citing U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan, the Times said the plans for incoming brigades would result in fewer or no reinforcements being available, at least for the time being, for areas of Afghanistan where the insurgency is most acute.

The focus on the capital also meant most of the new troops would not be deployed with the main goal of containing the cross-border insurgent flow from their rear bases in Pakistan -- something U.S. commanders would like and Afghan President Hamid Karzai has also recommended, the Times said.

[Rex Brynen]

Regarding the security situation around Kandahar, a couple of interesting graphics from the (Toronto) Globe and Mail:

• control of districts
  
• geographic location of all Canadian deaths in Afghanistan

A few of the latter seem to be slightly misplaced, but it nonetheless gives a good sense of how much the fighting has clustered relatively close to Kandahar city.

[Ken White]

It seems like the city strategy wins ...

in the long run, I suspect.

As I said on the SWJ Blog:

"Have to side with Gian on that one. Dave is correct in that most are in fact saying that the two theaters are dissimilar and that most acknowledge different approaches will be required.

However, while I read what is said, I also see what is happening. We need to be quite cautious in what we do in Afghanistan. The inadvertent human tendency to do what worked before confronted with a different situation is difficult to overcome and it appears to me that Gian is correct. We are about to apply, intentionally or not, an Iraqi template in a totally different situation. This, in my view is unwise."

[Surferbeetle]

From the current issue of Foreign Affairs

Afghanistan needs larger and more effective security forces, but it also needs to be able to sustain those security forces. A decree signed by President Karzai in December 2002 would have capped the Afghan National Army at 70,000 troops (it had reached 66,000 by mid-2008). U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has since announced a plan to increase that number to 122,000, as well as add 82,000 police, for a total of 204,000 in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Such increases, however, would require additional international trainers and mentors -- which are, quite simply, not available in the foreseeable future -- and maintaining such a force would far exceed the means of such a destitute country. Current estimates of the annual cost are around $2.5 billion for the army and $1 billion for the police. Last year, the Afghan government collected about 7 percent of a licit GDP estimated at $9.6 billion in revenue -- about $670 million. Thus, even if Afghanistan's economy experienced uninterrupted real growth of 9 percent per year, and if revenue extraction nearly doubled, to 12 percent (both unrealistic forecasts), in ten years the total domestic revenue of the Afghan government would be about $2.5 billion a year. Projected pipelines and mines might add $500 million toward the end of this period. In short, the army and the police alone would cost significantly more than Afghanistan's total revenue.

Many have therefore proposed long-term international financing of the ANSF; after all, even $5 billion a year is much less than the cost of an international force deployment. But sustaining, as opposed to training or equipping, security forces through foreign grants would pose political problems. It would be impossible to build Afghan institutions on the basis of U.S. supplemental appropriations, which is how the training and equipping of the ANSF are mostly funded. Sustaining a national army or national police force requires multiyear planning, impossible without a recurrent appropriation -- which would mean integrating ANSF planning into that of the United States' and other NATO members' budgets, even if the funds were disbursed through a single trust fund. And an ANSF funded from those budgets would have to meet international or other national, rather than Afghan, legal requirements. Decisions on funding would be taken by the U.S. Congress and other foreign bodies, not the Afghan National Assembly. The ANSF would take actions that foreign taxpayers might be reluctant to fund. Such long-term international involvement is simply not tenable.

[Ken White]

From your link:

"...And an ANSF funded from those budgets would have to meet international or other national, rather than Afghan, legal requirements. Decisions on funding would be taken by the U.S. Congress and other foreign bodies, not the Afghan National Assembly. The ANSF would take actions that foreign taxpayers might be reluctant to fund. Such long-term international involvement is simply not tenable."

That's only one problem...

I keep hearing folks saying we'll be there for years, America needs to support this effort, it's a long war and such. My perception is that everyone used to fighting off Alligators is saying that and just sucking it up to get on with it; "we 'won' in Iraq, we can do it in Afghanistan." Maybe.

I'm dubious. I still see absolutely no evidence that anyone has really thought this through and has an achievable and sensible goal for a very different country and people.

Keep doing what we've been doing while such a goal is developed and agreed to by all concerned? Sure. Keep doing what we've been doing and add to it while changing nothing? Not too smart IMO.