Sisyphus and Counterinsurgency

[Ken White]

CavGuy:

For the ME and South Asia where cities and capitals are a recent phenomenon, the certainty is far less if it exists at all -- though there is no question that AQ, The Talib, et.al. are smart enough to use that parameter as a psyops tool even if they know better. Rural populations worldwide don't think nearly as highly of cities as urban dwellers do, nor do they care much for or have much respect for urban dwellers. That is particularly true among mountain folks.

Pakistan is indeed an example of the principle -- it has suffered such bombings in the cities since 1947. It's still there...

Added note: % of Population urban; Iraq > 70; Afghanistan ~ 24 , Pakistan ~ 34%

[Cavguy]

CavGuy:

For the ME and South Asia where cities and capitals are a recent phenomenon, the certainty is far less if it exists at all -- though there is no question that AQ, The Talib, et.al. are smart enough to use that parameter as a psyops tool even if they know better. Rural populations worldwide don't think nearly as highly of cities as urban dwellers do, nor do they care much for or have much respect for urban dwellers. That is particularly true among mountain folks.

Pakistan is indeed an example of the principle -- it has suffered such bombings in the cities since 1947. It's still there...

Added note: % of Population urban; Iraq > 70; Afghanistan ~ 24 , Pakistan ~ 34%

No disagreement it's different, but the principle is the same - your urban centers, where the government is, have to be relatively stable. 100% security is never possible, but you have to avoid what is happening now, which is the growing roots of Taleban cells sprouting in Kabul and Kandahar.

I highly recommend John McCuen's take on this from his 1963 book, Art of Counterinsurgency War - he talks in depth about "uncovering your base" while chasing enemy into his sanctuaries, thus allowing him to destabilize your base.

[Ken White]

Did in fact agree with him when I bought his book at the SF bookstore in 1966 -- until I tried apply that to Viet Nam and realized that a predominately rural nation with no particular concern for its cities doesn't react that way. Not at all. He is correct in this:

"...he talks in depth about "uncovering your base" while chasing enemy into his sanctuaries, thus allowing him to destabilize your base.

but that presumes there is such a base in the cities; in Afghanistan, unlike Iraq, there is none. Nor was there one in Viet Nam and only when we finally realized that and worked the rural areas did we start achieving any success in the COIN fight there.

He also said this in that book:
""To protect oneself against the methodical, crushing body blows of the revolutionaries and to be able to strike them in their most vital parts, it is necessary to fight them on their own battlefields-in their own media. It is necessary to parry the revolutionary weapons, adopt them, and then turn them against the revolutionaries."" (Emphasis added / kw).

I suggest that is more germane to Afghanistan and that what worked in Iraq will have limited -- not none, just limited -- applicability in Afghanistan.

No disagreement it's different, but the principle is the same - your urban centers, where the government is, have to be relatively stable. 100% security is never possible, but you have to avoid what is happening now, which is the growing roots of Taleban cells sprouting in Kabul and Kandahar.

They aren't sprouting in either city -- they never left. The Afghan intel and security guys can and will root 'em out (they're doing a pretty good job, BTW) but, unlike us, they aren't going to worry about the minor players, appearances, making a name for themselves or near term fixes; their concern is for long term stability and they'll get it in their own way. They will have to do it, we cannot (and should not even try, it'll merely set us up for failure) and they won't do it on our timetable -- nor should they.

Kabul and Kandahar have rarely been "relatively stable" over the centuries; the artificial domestic tranquility imposed by Saddam in Iraq or the Shah in Iran have never existed in Afghanistan and the cities have never had the pull they do in less harsh terrain. Add to that that mountain people would rather fight than eat and any attempt to concentrate effort on the cities in Afghanistan -- as was necessary in Iraq -- will create problems...

[Ron Humphrey]

First Ken, reference your wisdom about the importance of the larger urban cities as far as the outer regions. I accept that what you say is true because it makes sense from a less western perspective and given the population dispersal.

That said, if we go with that then more efforts should be made to help establish stability in outer regions and of course the enemy should be kept on the defensive. In order to do this it would seem we would have to work towards greater development of infrastructure within those regions and thus hopefully bring them to at least more closely reflect the larger urban cities. Along with that comes the need for political and military ties between the parts in order to facilitate greater unity of effort and a stronger overall HN presence throughout the country.

If this all goes well wouldn't we still come back to the need for more stability in the largest centers since That is where the HN must project its power from. Also considering that the more the coalition does the less the ANA is actually doing so that would seem somewhat counter-productive.

Long and short-
Would it not be more effective in the end to use coalition forces to assist in securing the urban areas and select outer areas from which the ANA with the capabilities assistance we can offer go out and take the fight to those who oppose them. In the end if AQ and others get to fight us then we easily become the problem if on the other hand we work to make sure they lose to Afghans then the picture might change all together.

Thought's

[Ken White]

...In order to do this it would seem we would have to work towards greater development of infrastructure within those regions and thus hopefully bring them to at least more closely reflect the larger urban cities. Along with that comes the need for political and military ties between the parts in order to facilitate greater unity of effort and a stronger overall HN presence throughout the country.

Note I am not suggesting the cities be ignored, simply that they should not be a priority item. Cities in such nations are, at this stage, primarily a market location (thus the importance of roads -- to both the good and bad guys...), they do not serve as a base for much of anything.

If this all goes well wouldn't we still come back to the need for more stability in the largest centers since That is where the HN must project its power from...

True; not more stability, just stability. I question the statement "that's where the host nation must project its power from." I don't think that's necessarily correct -- or desirable.

Also considering that the more the coalition does the less the ANA is actually doing so that would seem somewhat counter-productive.

That does not track with what I'm hearing on one level yet I can acknowledge the logic -- and thus we need to be careful not to overdo our effort...

Would it not be more effective in the end to use coalition forces to assist in securing the urban areas and select outer areas from which the ANA with the capabilities assistance we can offer go out and take the fight to those who oppose them. In the end if AQ and others get to fight us then we easily become the problem if on the other hand we work to make sure they lose to Afghans then the picture might change all together.

(emphasis added / kw)

I thought that's what we were doing? Though I doubt the picture will change much...

[AmericanPride]

This raises a myriad of thoughts in my head regarding the relationship between COIN and demographic geography. Basically, what is the extent of the relationship between the security of the population and the dismantlement of the insurgency? There is some dissonance between the two because the logical extreme of asserting that the population itself is the decisive object suggests that we ought to build a McDonald's and Wal-Mart in every neighborhood and hope that somehow the provision of material needs will somehow deflate the political will of the insurgency. I'm not certain that bridge between population security and an insurgency is that steady to cross in full faith. I'm not a historical expert on COIN, so I must ask if there's any example of successful COIN that relied on or emphasized nation-building missions? The successful examples that come to mind immediately (Philliphines, Kenya, and South Africa) all include rough treatment of the locals, which seems to contradict the popular notion that the general population should be treated nicely. That seems to be the case, and please feel free to correct me if my observations are absurd, because those campaigns targeted the specific power structures of the insurgency rather than attempt to appeal to the broader base of the general population So, my thoughts:

The demographics of the insurgency itself -- not simply ideology, but also its ethic, religious, tribal/clan, racial, cultural make-up and what political, economic, and geographic features of the region augment its strength.

1. The combination of these features that shape the insurgent identity (or identities) more or less ensures that it does not represent the population-at-large. If it did, I would question why the insurgency exists in the first place if, in a democratic environment, the state represents the general will of the people (why aren't the insurgents themselves in power?). It suggests in my mind that the democratization of the indigenous state would be an ineffective, perhaps even counter-productive, process, if not irrelevant. To me, it seems not so much a question of human security but of power. The former originates from the latter in my opinion.

2. The insurgent demographics indicate the sources of the movement's strength. As Ken suggested, that strength may not be in locations we would initially assume. In what ways could an agrarian, radical religious, anti-modern insurgency (i.e. the Taliban) find sympathy among the demographics of a major urban center? If there's not much in the way of a power base in the cities, why devote extensive valuable resources to patrolling those cities? Which brings me to point three....

3. How does a military, other than by coercion, establish, generate, and project power? How does a military maneuver through the "demographic terrain" and place an insurgency in a position of most disadvantage? Should, for example, the military promote a favorable version of the indigenous religion in order to counteract the radicalism of the insurgency? Alternatively, should the military adopt a similar version to the insurgency's religion IOT to co-opt their beliefs (much like campaigning politicians do to draw support away from their opponent)? How do we go about shaping the demographic battlefield, if as it's commonly accepted, the people themselves are a part of the terrain, and how do we leverage demographics to our advantage?

[Cavguy]

Basically, what is the extent of the relationship between the security of the population and the dismantlement of the insurgency? There is some dissonance between the two because the logical extreme of asserting that the population itself is the decisive object suggests that we ought to build a McDonald's and Wal-Mart in every neighborhood and hope that somehow the provision of material needs will somehow deflate the political will of the insurgency.

Nice long post I will respond more later ... but I wanted to catch you on this point.

Building "things" for the population does not usually work. We have conflated economic projects and stability too often. Quite simply, there is not enough money in our treasury to make Afghanistan's infrastructure like ours - nor should it.

Re-read point #7 in the article - human infrastructure is key. Physical infrastructure matters so the government can provide basic needs for its people, but if the human ability is lacking, it really doesn't matter how many power lines you string or jobs you provide.

COIN, and "hearts and minds", is all about self-interest. Dr. Kilcullen would argue most people try and sit on the fence. Both sides work to push people off the fence. Therefore, your actions must focus on motivating the populace to get off the fence and take a clear side. This can be done through bribery, loyalty, coercion, patriotism, threats, and force. Winning "Hearts and Minds" doesn't mean they necessarily like you - just that you have made it in their interest to support your side. Their "mind" is the practical reason (money, job, etc), the "heart" is the emotional component (political, safety, religious, etc.) that goes with it.

[AmericanPride]

Nice long post I will respond to more later

I need to re-read Army effective writing. :P

I'll wait for your larger response before I release my next barrage of questions.

[Bob's World]

One of the basic tenants of insurgency (and therefore COIN), is that seizing and holding physical terrain means nothing. The terrain being contested is that of the support of the populace.

Now, the counterinsurgent has the added risk/burden of the negative strategic communications effect of not being able to hold or secure key cities, LOCs, etc, and the wise insurgent will exploit this while at the same time committing to holding nothing.

The bigger issue is not one of city vs country; but rather one of a Afghan governance overly shaped and formed by Americans vice an Afghan governance truly shaped and designed by Afghans for Afghans.

In a land of militias, and weak central governance, we demanded they stand down militias and build a strong central governance and army to enforce its will. One has to ask, do the people of Afghanistan see this as their government representing them, or do they see it as one that is a puppet of the U.S? (Note, not asking how do we see it, nor what it is, but how does their own populace perceive it).

Excluding Taliban from the government is probably similar to excluding Nazi's from a post WWII government in Germany. Many Afghans support the Taliban position, and for them to not have representation is a problem that is sure to fester, and it appears that it has.

Then there is the catch-22 of our own presence. We need to be there to help this government build adequate capacity to stand alone, yet our very presence breeds a resistance insurgency that is not against the government so much as being against having a foreign power so prominent in their country. This is not insurmountable, but it is that very real baggage everytime you conduct FID; but particularly when you transition from UW to topple the government to FID to support the new government that replaced the old one. Can you say "conflict of interest"?

My thought is, that before we can move forward in Afghanistan, we must first step back. At the end of the day; the U.S. is far better served by an Afghan government that has the support of its own populace; than it is by an Afghan government that supports our government. Ideally we should strive for both, but if it can be only one, we want to be "blamed" for facilitating the former over the latter.

[Surferbeetle]

My thought is, that before we can move forward in Afghanistan, we must first step back. At the end of the day; the U.S. is far better served by an Afghan government that has the support of its own populace; than it is by an Afghan government that supports our government. Ideally we should strive for both, but if it can be only one, we want to be "blamed" for facilitating the former over the latter.

Here is a small concrete step in that direction:

Language company first in Army

The company, which officially unfurls its flag Oct. 23, provides uniform-wearing interpreters and translators to units deploying to places like Iraq and Afghanistan. While not yet fully manned, the unit will eventually include more than 140 native speakers of languages like Arabic, Farsi, Pashtu, Kurdish and Dari.

Once upon a time the US direct commissioned people with rare and necessary skills, and one could argue that language and cultural skills are in fact just that. If done with an eye for the strategic and pragmatic issues, I would suggest that a 'unconventional' solution can found to the problems that we all share...

[reed11b]

One of the basic tenants of insurgency (and therefore COIN), is that seizing and holding physical terrain means nothing. The terrain being contested is that of the support of the populace.

I agree and disagree, if holding terrain denies freedom of movement or access to the population (i.e. cities) then it has benefit, I still argue that COIN is 66% military (though often by unconventional means, more on that later) 33% Law Enforcement and 1% Social Service/Infrastructure. To state that physical terrain is meaningless in COIN is counter-productive.

In a land of militias, and weak central governance, we demanded they stand down militias and build a strong central governance and army to enforce its will. One has to ask, do the people of Afghanistan see this as their government representing them, or do they see it as one that is a puppet of the U.S? (Note, not asking how do we see it, nor what it is, but how does their own populace perceive it).

Good points, and ones I will comment on at a later time.

Excluding Taliban from the government is probably similar to excluding Nazi's from a post WWII government in Germany. Many Afghans support the Taliban position, and for them to not have representation is a problem that is sure to fester, and it appears that it has.

I would argue that this is not true; they had support w/i a limited tribal framework and terrorized the rest of the country into deferring to them. They still do not have true popular support w/i the country, hence their base of operations in Pakistan.

Then there is the catch-22 of our own presence. We need to be there to help this government build adequate capacity to stand alone, yet our very presence breeds a resistance insurgency that is not against the government so much as being against having a foreign power so prominent in their country. This is not insurmountable, but it is that very real baggage everytime you conduct FID; but particularly when you transition from UW to topple the government to FID to support the new government that replaced the old one. Can you say "conflict of interest"?

Again, I disagree strongly. If we had removed the Taliban from power and left after Karzai had been elected, The Taliban would have attacked all the same w/ exactly the same base of support, which is limited and ruled through fear again. Our presence does little to attract support to the Taliban except when we choose to act poorly (i.e. Air Strikes). If it was a popular uprising then I would say your points had more merit.

My thought is, that before we can move forward in Afghanistan, we must first step back. At the end of the day; the U.S. is far better served by an Afghan government that has the support of its own populace; than it is by an Afghan government that supports our government. Ideally we should strive for both, but if it can be only one, we want to be "blamed" for facilitating the former over the latter.

I agree only in that by stepping back we can examine what the LOC that the Taliban and AQ use, as well as there support base and formulate an effective strategy based on this knowledge, instead of our current tendency to "act" even when we are not sure what exactly it is that we are doing. The Taliban could care less about the support of the populace, fear will work just as well for their purposes.
Reed
P.S. Sir, I do want to make clear that I feel that you are a fantastic addition to this forum and that I agree more often then disagree with what you have to say.

[Bob's World]

Don't appologise for disagreeing. If I wanted to find a group of people who agreed with everything I said I would just adopt the party line and go talk to my peers. I put ideas out here not to bend people to my perspective, but because I believe the majority position that is being put out by "experts" has serious flaws to it, and that by putting out a new perspective it allows people like your self to challenge yourself, and to challenge me; and also allows me a broad perspective of feedback to sort out where perhaps I am off base, or where I just need to tighten up my argument. You all make me think, and that helps me give my boss better product.

Many people think of COIN as a military operation; though most of the guys whose work on COIN has stood the test of time (note, anything published in the last 8 years has not stood that test yet), concur that COIN is civil business and must remain under civil lead to ensure that operations do not become too military (i.e., counterinsurgent vice counterinsurgency) in nature as they are likely to do if the military is in charge.

An insurgency and the military is best thought of in the same way we respond to natural disasters. An event occurs and it is incumbent upon the local governance to handle the situation, to include local militia (local guard commanders can respond without approval or authorization to save lives, property, etc). When it is beyond their capacity, they ask the governor for a declaration of disaster and the state applies its resouces to the problem as well, to include the national guard on state orders. As the event continues to exceed capacity a federal declaration is sought bringing in federal resources and the active military. If the event exceeds even that, international support from NGOs and states come in, to include foreign military. As the situation calms down, these resources come off in the same order they went in. Military at every level is last in and first out. The Mayor remains in charge of his city, the Governor his state, etc. Military always answers to civil authority. This is how COIN should work as well. The whole goal is to simply get the situation back down within the capacity of the local government.

[Rex Brynen]

If we had removed the Taliban from power and left after Karzai had been elected, The Taliban would have attacked all the same w/ exactly the same base of support, which is limited and ruled through fear again. Our presence does little to attract support to the Taliban except when we choose to act poorly (i.e. Air Strikes). If it was a popular uprising then I would say your points had more merit.

While I agree that the Taliban would have attacked the Karzai government with or without a coalition presence, I think it would be a mistake to underestimate the extent to which the presence of foreign troops both undermines Karzai's legitimacy (especially in the south) and generates popular resentment (thereby facilitating Taliban recruitment). The Taliban's base of support does not wholly rest on fear.

This isn't to say that the Afghan government would be more stable or successful without a coalition presence. The positives, for now, outweigh the negatives.

It is to say, however, that the local political and ideological consequences of a foreign military presence are far from inconsequential, and need to recognized and addressed.

[reed11b]

While I agree that the Taliban would have attacked the Karzai government with or without a coalition presence, I think it would be a mistake to underestimate the extent to which the presence of foreign troops both undermines Karzai's legitimacy (especially in the south) and generates popular resentment (thereby facilitating Taliban recruitment). The Taliban's base of support does not wholly rest on fear.
This isn't to say that the Afghan government would be more stable or successful without a coalition presence. The positives, for now, outweigh the negatives.

It is to say, however, that the local political and ideological consequences of a foreign military presence are far from inconsequential, and need to recognized and addressed.

I agree that the base of support is not wholly out of fear, most of it is tribal in nature with a few ideologue converts, but it's expansion capacity is limited as is our ability to recruit there support to our side. The numbers are not fixed, but there is a fairly fixed range, if that makes sense. Of course I am on the outside looking in, and dependent on open source information, so I could be very wrong.
Reed

[Entropy]

Interesting discussion here. A couple of points.

It's important to remember (since the media and our chattering class have forgotten) that after the Taliban defeat in 2002 the priority in Afghanistan was DDR. While I would agree that more effort should have been made at preventing a Taliban resurgence, the problem of large, heavily armed militias was a serious one that had to be addressed. After all, it was warlordism that provided the space and popular support for the original rise of the Taliban in the 1990's.

Bob's world said:

The bigger issue is not one of city vs country; but rather one of a Afghan governance overly shaped and formed by Americans vice an Afghan governance truly shaped and designed by Afghans for Afghans.

In a land of militias, and weak central governance, we demanded they stand down militias and build a strong central governance and army to enforce its will. One has to ask, do the people of Afghanistan see this as their government representing them, or do they see it as one that is a puppet of the U.S? (Note, not asking how do we see it, nor what it is, but how does their own populace perceive it).

This is a very important point. I've been meaning to write something on governance for a while now - maybe I'll find the time. Anyway, I would argue that there are many in Afghanistan who do not want central "governance" no matter it's character. "Governance" is all the rage these days and is the policy that naturally flows from the view that a stable, functioning and legitimate government is a universally desirable end goal. And it's easy to argue that point of view because certainly from our perspective, dealing with legitimate governments is preferable to alternatives.

So what happens with societies who have no interest in governance - societies that have long existed under different notions of stability and legitimacy? Are we going to show them the way to the benefits of governance and globalization (whether they like it or not)? What happens when they refuse?

If and when they refuse (as is likely and already happening) then we will be set on a course of conflict with these societies as we try to implement our idealistic notions of how societies should be ordered. We are already seeing a lot of that in Afghanistan and its neighbors. We are trying to "sell" governance and key players are not buying. These players see benefits flowing from a central government as, at best, a prelude to the disruption of their societies and local power structures and the imposition of unwanted central authority and dependence on outsiders.

The point in all this is to suggest that policies designed to bring governance in any time-frame shorter than generational are likely to be counterproductive in these areas and will bring more conflict, not less, as the "ungoverned" resist our efforts.

Sometimes more isn't better. I would therefore argue that in many parts of Afghanistan we need to quit pursuing our paternalistic notions of governance and work with the local power structures to ensure their independence from all outsiders - Kabul and Taliban alike. The irony here is that in order to save a central government in Kabul, we may have to undermine its authority in some parts of Afghanistan - at least until it grows in capability and legitimacy enough to overcome the very real and long-standing hostility to central authority among many populations in Afghanistan. In trying to control the entire country, the coalition and Afghan government are overreaching. Better, IMO, to work on governance and legitimacy in those areas where that goal is realistically achievable over the short-to-medium term. In those areas where it is not, try to strike deals that guarantee local independence in exchange denying sanctuary and support to the Taliban and their allies.

Anyway, that's my theory.

[Bob's World]

One question worth pondering is:

If militia forces in Afghanistan were able to outright defeat or frustrate the two greatest modern conventional militaries; how would the creation of a 3rd rate conventional military better secure Afghanistan against that same threat?

Or, said another way: What is the proper mix of security forces that the nation of Afghanistan needs for the threats they face?

One would think that a confederacy of militia forces, oriented more toward law enforcement vice attacking each other, with an added capability to deal with those external elements that come into the country conduct UW to incite and support insurgnecy would be most appropriate.

Often "mini-me" is probably not what is needed.

[Surferbeetle]

Sometimes more isn't better. I would therefore argue that in many parts of Afghanistan we need to quit pursuing our paternalistic notions of governance and work with the local power structures to ensure their independence from all outsiders - Kabul and Taliban alike. The irony here is that in order to save a central government in Kabul, we may have to undermine its authority in some parts of Afghanistan - at least until it grows in capability and legitimacy enough to overcome the very real and long-standing hostility to central authority among many populations in Afghanistan. In trying to control the entire country, the coalition and Afghan government are overreaching. Better, IMO, to work on governance and legitimacy in those areas where that goal is realistically achievable over the short-to-medium term. In those areas where it is not, try to strike deals that guarantee local independence in exchange denying sanctuary and support to the Taliban and their allies.

Anyway, that's my theory.

Entropy,

Is the City-State Model applicable for Kabul? Could it be a new Samarkand?

Samarkand was founded by the Persians in the late 6th century BCE and it was one of the main centers of Persian civilization in the ancient times. It is one of the oldest inhabited cities in the world, prospering from its location on the trade route between China and Europe (Silk Road). At times Samarkand has been one of the greatest cities of Central Asia. Founded circa 700 BC it was already the capital of the Sogdian satrapy under the Achaemenid dynasty of Persia when Alexander the Great conquered it in 329 BC (see Afrasiab, Sogdiana).

For the independent areas outside Kabul what would the model be? From a western view point are we interested in self-sustainable autonomous areas which are able to prevent some of the organizations that we are concerned about from taking root?

Regards,

Steve