The Wikileaks collection

[mendel]

The practical limitations of attack aviation is glaringly exposed, including their great field of view but poor ability to discern fine detail, and inability to influence the battle by anything other than shooting.

I don't think it's the fine detail that's the issue here. Apart from the points in your summary, I see a psychological issue.

After a few days thought about this, I was reminded of Judge Dredd, an old Science Fiction "street cop empowered to act as judge, jury, and executioner". I see the four Apache crew in exactly that role. (Unlike the kind of operations that Anthony Martinez described, where somebody on the ground reviews the video feeds and decides on the use of deadly force (but the crews would still play a large part in the decision-making process), it seemed to me that in this case, the Apache crews were on their own, with "Bushmaster" merely clearing them to fire in the sense of "we're out of the way".)

I've read the Apache crew's witness statements which the DoD has released. It confirms the impression that the video has left me with: that they've consistently overestimated the actual threat; their witness statements speak of 15 people on the street when there were 8, and 5-6 people in the van episode when there were clearly 3. Since I expect people who are allowed to handle helicopters to be able to count, I get the distinct impression that on that day, they were not in the frame of mind that I would wish somebody who acts as in the abovementioned triple role to be in when assessing matters of life and death. (Maybe battle fatigue?) A system that put these people on that day in this role seems broken to me. Has it been fixed?

I've read numerous forum posts on this issue that thank the Apache crews for "saving their bacon"; imagine the number of Iraqis that blame them for killing their sons, husbands or fathers, and it's clear that this is a sensitive issue if we've got a conscience. The question is not, "can these people be legally convicted for this", but rather "do we want things to keep on happening this way"? What has been done to change this, and what still needs to be done?

[Cecil Turner]

I don't think it's the fine detail that's the issue here. Apart from the points in your summary, I see a psychological issue.

In my opinion, using a SciFi flick adapted from a comic book as a cultural reference really doesn't add. And I think logical arguments are more impressive than armchair psychoanalysis.

It confirms the impression that the video has left me with: that they've consistently overestimated the actual threat; their witness statements speak of 15 people on the street when there were 8, and 5-6 people in the van episode when there were clearly 3.

I've not read the apache witness statements and would appreciate a link. But there are at least 17 people in the opening scene on the video, and 9 on the corner. And there are two RPGs, but they only see the big bulky one (that happens to be a video camera). I think that reinforces my view that their analysis suffered from missing fine detail, not overestimation. But they also are barely making out weapons (e.g., missing the AK and RPG at first, then mistaking them for two AKs), and so are logically assuming the others are similarly equipped and so there are others there they can't see. (Which is indistinguishable from overestimation as a practical matter.)

I've read numerous forum posts on this issue that thank the Apache crews for "saving their bacon"; imagine the number of Iraqis that blame them for killing their sons, husbands or fathers, and it's clear that this is a sensitive issue if we've got a conscience.

You persist in viewing these guys as noncombatants and I just can't feature it. They brought along the RPGs for a reason, and I can't think of a more logical explanation than they were setting up a photo shoot of the shot, and still fairly casual and getting ready to drop the empty tubes and run like hell after they took it. If that were a US mission, with combat camera support and drivers, they'd all be wearing uniforms and we wouldn't be pretending it was a war crime if they were engaged by the enemy.

I'm not sure about the van (and the kids are inexplicable), but it seems to me the "saving their bacon" view is at least as valid as the "innocent bystanders with RPGs" one. The ground witnesses consistently claimed only the two kids were noncombatants, and I think they're right.

[mendel]

You persist in viewing these guys as noncombatants and I just can't feature it.

There were 11 military-age Iraqis and 2 children. We can see from the footage that nobody removed any weapons from the scene after the Apache attack. The 2nd Brigade combat team investigator states in his sequence of events (6.g) that they found 2 RPG-7 and one AK-47; on the face of it, that leaves 10 unarmed people, keeping in mind that they didn't have the time to do a detailed site examination, so there may have been more weapons present than indicated in the report (but I doubt they'd have overlooked that many).

If this was a military operation (with uniforms and all), even the drivers would at least have sidearms.

My view is, if they didn't bring weapons, they're noncombatants. Your view seems to be, if they're in the vicinity of an RPG, they're combatants. That's where we differ.



While there are 17+ people in the shot at 6:19:25, they're beginning to disperse, some moving off with scooters; the gunner switches to closeup to examine at 19:45 the photographers with two cameras with two apparently unarmed companions walking towards the corner, and then at 20:20 4 people with 2 AK 47 and one RPG that are joined by two more apparently unarmed people.

Then the situation with the camera looking around the corner develops, where the Apache crew states (20:40) "yeah, we had a guy shootin'", and BM comes back with "negative". From the further unfolding of events, I think that didn't really get through to them, because from then on they seem to operate on the assumption that any delay is going to cost friendly lives (they then fire into a group of ~10 men, 5 of whom they have PID'd with weapons, if we're including the two cameras - they may not even have misidentified them).

Would more detail have prevented them from mistaking a lens flash for a muzzle flash as their flight path made them lose sight of the cameraman? Hard to say, but I doubt it. I want to know what made them miss the fact that ground said there was no shooting, and what made them see the van as a legitimate target. Why weren't they able to make the most of the available information? How can we provide something in real-time that comes closer to our hindsight awareness of the situation? These are larger issues than mere lack of detail (I doubt adding detail would fix them), and I don't see anybody adressing them.

I'm not sure about the van (and the kids are inexplicable), but it seems to me the "saving their bacon" view is at least as valid as the "innocent bystanders with RPGs" one.

My point is precisely that both views towards the Apache crews (and other military) are valid (in general, not just in this operation - in fact, whenever "collateral damage" is willingly incurred); that's why good judgement is needed to make conscientious decisions in these circumstances.


I like JMM's reply to my post, except for the polemic barbs ("require multi-party review and agreement before a shot can be taken" - come on!).

[Cecil Turner]

If this was a military operation (with uniforms and all), even the drivers would at least have sidearms.

So if the combat cameraman ditches his sidearm he's protected? Recce pilots? How about a MG a-gunner or tank driver? Obviously not; they're combatants. They bring sidearms along because there's no reason not to, not because they're likely to be useful.

My view is, if they didn't bring weapons, they're noncombatants. Your view seems to be, if they're in the vicinity of an RPG, they're combatants. That's where we differ.

If they're executing a combat mission, they're combatants. That includes the guy standing next to the guy with an RPG as he prepares to fire (on a US convoy), the guy who's holding the extra round, the drivers, scouts, messengers, and the camera guys. The most logical reason not to carry extraneous weaponry is that they have to escape afterward, possibly through checkpoints (which is also the most logical reason for the kids); that doesn't mean they are noncombatants, it means they're "unlawful" combatants.

Then the situation with the camera looking around the corner develops, where the Apache crew states (20:40) "yeah, we had a guy shootin'", and BM comes back with "negative". From the further unfolding of events, I think that didn't really get through to them, because from then on they seem to operate on the assumption that any delay is going to cost friendly lives (they then fire into a group of ~10 men, 5 of whom they have PID'd with weapons, if we're including the two cameras - they may not even have misidentified them).

Those conversations aren't related: from context the ground radio transmission is obviously to the other ground unit (somewhat stepped on in the recording by the intercom). And the implication that they should hold fire on an ambusher because the enemy might've brought some unarmed men to the ambush site strikes me as eyerollingly ludicrous. (And, like some of the other disputed changes to the GCs, likely to produce a battlefield even more dangerous to civilians rather than more civilized.)

Would more detail have prevented them from mistaking a lens flash for a muzzle flash as their flight path made them lose sight of the cameraman? Hard to say, but I doubt it. I want to know what made them miss the fact that ground said there was no shooting, and what made them see the van as a legitimate target.

I don't think there's any evidence to support the "lens flash" theory either. The lens remains pointed at the ground and the chatter afterward is that the RPG is "getting ready to fire." As to the ground guy's radio comm, he takes responsibility at ~15:25 into the long vid, and it's clear he vectored the Apaches onto the target, not that he was trying to warn them off. Finally, a van removing combatants from a battlefield is a legitimate target.

I find this overanalysis fun (obviously), but essentially meaningless. The guys actually in contact had to operate with far less information, with far more stress in far less time, and the arguments for their misconduct even with hindsight are underwhelming. The glaring things to me are that the insurgents were playing the ROE like a Stradivarius, and correctly prioritizing the propaganda mission above casualty production. Their allies and fellow travelers still are. And the biggest takeaway is that we need to get our IW act together (starting with better controls over engagement videos).

[motorfirebox]

If this was a military operation (with uniforms and all), even the drivers would at least have sidearms.

My view is, if they didn't bring weapons, they're noncombatants. Your view seems to be, if they're in the vicinity of an RPG, they're combatants. That's where we differ.

Er, the men in that video were quite a bit more than 'in the vicinity' of an RPG (seriously--you can't complain about hyperbole and then say something like that). They were quite obviously grouped with the men carrying the weapons; it's not like they were, by happenstance, crossing the street at the same time a guy with an RPG walked by.

And the idea that no weapon = noncombatant is problematic. Glaringly, it doesn't take into account spotters. Obviously, the base assumption about a guy without a weapon is that he's a noncombatant, but if his behavior indicates otherwise, it's reasonable to make a reassessment. A guy who just planted an IED and is in the process of escaping is, after all, not carrying a weapon.

Regarding the first sentence I quoted--these insurgents aren't carrying out military operations. I mean, that's kinda the whole problem, here. Their tactics necessitate a different method of identifying targets than we would use against another uniformed military.

[jmm99]

from Mendel
I like JMM's reply to my post, except for the polemic barbs ("require multi-party review and agreement before a shot can be taken" - come on!).

I simply expressed the possibility of a ROE requiring that. We (US) have seen that possibility become a reality in our own operations. A Vietnam joke was a multi-helicopter stack (all directing the platoon leader on the ground), with GEN Westy at the top.

Now, we have the ability to create a multi-level virtual stack, running up to and including the White House. We have seen in Astan (e.g., Tora Bora, but also less "high value" operations) situations involving exactly what I stated - "multi-party review and agreement before a shot can be taken".

Others could expand on that, I'm sure.

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

I have only skimmed this thread and cannot find a reference to the commentary on Matt Armstrong's blogsite:http://mountainrunner.us/2010/04/wikileaks.html which includes references to a 'rebuttal video'.

Hat tip to Zenpundit:

Matt Armstrong has a must-read, incisive, take on the manipulatively edited propaganda popularly known as the “Wikileaks video”

[jmm99]

I ran into this Der Spiegel article, Changing the Rules in Afghanistan: German Troops Beef Up Fight against Taliban, from July 2009, reflecting changes in their ROEs (making them more permissive).

07/09/2009

Changing the Rules in Afghanistan
German Troops Beef Up Fight against Taliban
By SPIEGEL Staff

Behind closed doors, the German government is slowly but surely changing the rules for combat on Afghanistan, allowing its forces to take a more offensive approach. At the same time, German popular support for the "war" that no one wants to call a war continues to decline.
....
On April 8, nobody even noticed when a few words -- important words --were deleted from a NATO document. One of the deleted phrases was: "The use of lethal force is prohibited unless an attack is taking place or is imminent."

On March 3, 2006, the Germans had this sentence added to the NATO operations plan for Afghanistan as a "national clarification" or caveat. Bundeswehr soldiers were only to shoot in self defense. And there were further explanations in bylaws 421 to 424 as well as in rule 429 A and B. For instance, Germans were not to refer to their actions using the word "attack." Instead they would talk about the "use of appropriate force."
....
This policy is now outlined on the pocket-sized reference card of combat guidelines that German soldiers carry with them. The Bundeswehr calls it "a structural adjustment;" the Defense Ministry's legal department is considering swapping Chapters II and III on the pocket card around. This means that the chapter, "Use of Military Force to Complete a Mission" would be placed ahead of the chapter, "Use of Military Force in Self-Defense" -- which, one assumes, would mean that the former becomes more important. Additionally, to avoid future misunderstandings, examples will be included to illustrate to soldiers when they are permitted to use lethal force.

Another issue being discussed is whether the guideline in Section II, No. 4 should be amended. The current wording states that defensive measures can be taken if an attack is "imminent." The words could be changed to read that defensive measures can be taken "if there is evidence of an approaching attack."

When the Bundeswehr got into a gun battle in Chahar Dara two weeks ago, some soldiers thought that they had to wait until they were shot at before they could fight back. Essentially they turned themselves into targets -- and this is exactly the kind of confusion the German military wants to eliminate.

The tankers were bombed in Sep 2009 - the theories for engagement appeared to be "hot pursuit" or prevention of the tankers' use in future attacks. See posts #105, Another Incident, and #106, Cross-reference & comments, for links to the tanker bombing incident (and Wiki, Kunduz airstrike).

The Jul 2009 Der Spiegel article has a quote by Oberst Klein, who was responsible for the decision to bomb the tankers.

Winfried Nachtwei, the German Green Party's parliamentary expert on defense, said it was reasonable to amend the pocket card if it meant that German soldiers can better defend themselves. "But," he argued, "we must be careful not to be drawn into a whirlpool of escalation. It would be counterproductive to end up looking like we are hunting the Taliban, nor would that be compatible with our mandate. Anyone who thinks you can simply clean up out there is out of touch with reality. You can actually get further over three cups of tea in Afghanistan."

Part 2: 'We Will Strike Back with all Necessary Force'

However soldiers in Kunduz told a different tale. "We will strike back with all necessary force," said Colonel Georg Klein, 48, commander of the field camp.

Combat has become routine for German soldiers stationed in Kunduz. After returning to the camp, the men mentioned their "TICs," or "troops in contact" (military jargon for enemy contact) almost casually. For them, requesting American "Reaper" drones to fire at booby traps is just common practice now.

Anyway, clearly not all the soldiers are unnerved by the finer legal details of combat. On May 7, in view of a German convoy, a number of Afghan fighters jumped off their motorcycles and went into combat position. But before they could fire their rockets and assault rifles, the Bundeswehr troops opened fire on them, killing at least two.

"What happened afterwards gave the troops a sense of security," said Klein. Instead of launching an investigation, as would have been the case in the past, the public prosecutor's office in Potsdam, near Berlin, concluded that the soldiers had acted in self-defense. Klein and his men see this as setting a precedent. "Soldiers need courage in the field, what they certainly don't need is fear of a public prosecutor," noted one officer.

A further change in Germany's Astan position occured in Feb 2010, from The Intelligence Daily, German army given green light to kill civilians in Afghanistan:

February 17, 2010

in Analysis, Defense

By Peter Schwarz

(WSWS) — The German government has now reclassified its military mission in Afghanistan as intervening in a civil war or, as they say in legal jargon, a “non-international armed conflict.” This was announced by Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle (Free Democratic Party—FDP) on Wednesday in a government statement to the Bundestag (parliament). Previously, the government had described the Afghan intervention as a stabilization operation to assist with peacekeeping.

The recasting of the mission has far-reaching legal consequences. In a civil war, international criminal law applies and not, as hitherto, the German criminal code and police law. Before the reclassifying of the conflict, German soldiers could, in theory, only make use of firearms in exceptional circumstances, such as in self-defence. International criminal law is much more lenient, and even tolerates the killing of uninvolved civilians if this is proportionate to the expected “military advantage.”

Now, German soldiers who shoot Afghan civilians must no longer reckon with an automatic investigation by the state prosecutor. The latter only needs to be involved if the killing is “disproportionate,” although this term is defined very vaguely. Although this reclassification does not give the Bundeswehr carte blanche to kill civilians indiscriminately, the threshold has been significantly lowered. The risk that a soldier could be held criminally responsible for killing an innocent bystander is now much lower. (much more in article).

As to this source (WSWS), I note that it is the voice of the "International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI)"; but the basic facts are confirmed in the Frankfurter Rundschau, Germany Finally Acknowledges Civil War in Afghanistan (trans). The point of this paragraph is that the same facts and events give rise to very different headlines and narratives, dependent on political view.

So, both Germany and the US have had some problems in deciding on the rules that should apply to irregular warfare.

Regards

Mike

PS - mendel: you're making too much of a sentence which explicitly spoke of a possible ROE policy, which is posited to be quite restrictive and require higher-level approval for certain uses of force. But, if you want that hypothetical to be "polemic phrasing", who am I to dissuade you.

I'd consider the WSWS headline, "German army given green light to kill civilians in Afghanistan", to be a polemic.

[Cecil Turner]

I have only skimmed this thread and cannot find a reference to the commentary on Matt Armstrong's blogsite:http://mountainrunner.us/2010/04/wikileaks.html which includes references to a 'rebuttal video'.

Hat tip to Zenpundit:

I didn't find it very useful. I'd already seen all the "context" it pointed out, and the claims of editing are fairly weak, since WL provided the full video (and I mostly ignored the inflammatory WL commentary anyway). Also, the WL running trancript makes mistakes in several places, but the one correction made in the rebuttal (for "f***ing pr*ck") wasn't one of them.

[mendel]

Er, the men in that video were quite a bit more than 'in the vicinity' of an RPG [...]

And the idea that no weapon = noncombatant is problematic. Glaringly, it doesn't take into account spotters.

I was trying, in one simplified sentence, to sum up the distinction between Cecil and myself. Of course I know about people who may have combat roles without being armed, but in the incident under discussion, I didn't see any, so I wanted to not split hairs here.

Your basic arguing point is still that they're combatants because they're close to an RPG, and you presume to correct me on how close. However, my point stands that other than the proximity (and being in a spot where insurgents were expected to be), I see no evidence that could possibly justify labeling all those 11 people insurgents. Give me a scenario where all of these 11 people have a role in a combat operation that involves 2 RPG and a Kalashnikov, and I'll believe you're not employing a double standard. Until then, please accept that some of those were in fact civilian noncombatants.

You come across as if your "different method of identifying targets" means "anyone who looks hostile to me is a target", and I'm sure that's not what you want to say. So what other method than "they've got a weapon and are aiming it at people" (and yes, that would include IEDs), or that they are directly supporting people who do, do you want to use?

Cecil, you're reading all sorts of of meanings out of my post that I didn't put in there, and it'd be too cumbersome for me to set all that straight. The "lens flash" is at 6:20:37 Z to 6:20:38 Z in the video.

JMM, I don't doubt a multilevel review is indicated in some cases (e.g. planned air strikes), but your polemic phrasing makes it sound as if the red tape prevented soldiers even from returning fire without multi-level review. I really hope that was an exaggeration.

[Cecil Turner]

I was trying, in one simplified sentence, to sum up the distinction between Cecil and myself. Of course I know about people who may have combat roles without being armed, but in the incident under discussion, I didn't see any, so I wanted to not split hairs here.

Your basic arguing point is still that they're combatants because they're close to an RPG, and you presume to correct me on how close. However, my point stands that other than the proximity (and being in a spot where insurgents were expected to be), I see no evidence that could possibly justify labeling all those 11 people insurgents.

I think that sums up the distinction quite well (i.e., I think they're combatants, you don't). I would dispute the issue being primarily that of proximity (i.e., they're not just crossing the street together, but obviously working together doing something). They were interrupted before they completed it, but it looks to be an ambush primarily designed for a propaganda photo. (Which makes the whole thing look funny to a military observer.) If that's what it is--with the unarmed folks collocated in the ambush site--I can't see any labeling other than "combatant" or "insurgent" being possible. And I still can't see any innocent explanation fitting the known facts. I admit this is problematic if the ROE had allowed an engagement that subsequently turned out to be innocents, but don't see that as happening here.

(And as an aside, the ROE could also allow engagement if they're all in the same group of known insurgents such as "Mahdi Army" which I think these folks are; but that's irrelevant to this incident as no one cited it as a reason or as something they were thinking about at the time.)

Cecil, you're reading all sorts of of meanings out of my post that I didn't put in there, and it'd be too cumbersome for me to set all that straight. The "lens flash" is at 6:20:37 Z to 6:20:38 Z in the video.

From shadows, the camera lens is down sun when pointed at the convoy. There is no flash that could be mistaken for a firing signature (and in any event they don't look very similar and nobody claims that happened). I'm not sure if you're thinking the aircrew thought a shot had already been taken or was merely imminent, but I think from the chatter and vid the latter is correct. The aircrew missed several things, but I don't think they misconstrued a shot that wasn't there.

[motorfirebox]

Your basic arguing point is still that they're combatants because they're close to an RPG, and you presume to correct me on how close.

That is not my basic theory. That is your hyperbole about my basic theory. You're fixating on proximity as if it's the only factor, or the deciding factor. The deciding factor, in this case, is the voluntary grouping and cooperation. Again, the unarmed men aren't simply walking near the guys with the weapons, they're walking with them. By your reading, if there were a guy with an RPG standing in a crowded market, I would be fine with classifying the bystanders around him as insurgents, based on their proximity. But I'm not. I would classify such bystanders as bystanders. Proximity to a weapon is not the only, and certainly not the deciding, factor in determining who may or may not be classified as an insurgent.

However, my point stands that other than the proximity (and being in a spot where insurgents were expected to be), I see no evidence that could possibly justify labeling all those 11 people insurgents. Give me a scenario where all of these 11 people have a role in a combat operation that involves 2 RPG and a Kalashnikov, and I'll believe you're not employing a double standard. Until then, please accept that some of those were in fact civilian noncombatants.

The unarmed men could easily be assigned as scouts, lookouts, and spotters. They and the men with the weapons travel as a group, and if eyes on the group's target are required, some of these men split off and do it. If they were armed, they'd draw attention to themselves; unarmed, they're more free to move around and gather information. That's just a theory, of course, but one that fits the requirements you laid out.

You come across as if your "different method of identifying targets" means "anyone who looks hostile to me is a target", and I'm sure that's not what you want to say. So what other method than "they've got a weapon and are aiming it at people" (and yes, that would include IEDs), or that they are directly supporting people who do, do you want to use?

I would base it on behavior. Pointing a weapon is one behavior. Acting in concert with people who point weapons is another behavior.

[BayonetBrant]

Stephen Colbert actually asks some of the tough questions you would've liked to have heard from NBC or the NY Times...

http://www.colbertnation.com/the-col...julian-assange

[mendel]

Thank you, Cecil and mfbox, I understand better now where you're coming from.

The deciding factor, in this case, is the voluntary grouping and cooperation.

The witnesses said that people clustered around the press, which another journalist confirms tends to happen there (I think it happens pretty much anywhere in the world when a camera crew turns up). That would explain the grouping, and tbh I don't see much evidence of organized cooperation in the video, much less cooperation with armed combatants.

It comes down to what one wants to believe, I guess.

[William F. Owen]

I've read the Apache crew's witness statements which the DoD has released. It confirms the impression that the video has left me with: that they've consistently overestimated the actual threat; their witness statements speak of 15 people on the street when there were 8, and 5-6 people in the van episode when there were clearly 3. Since I expect people who are allowed to handle helicopters to be able to count,

Memory is actually quite a dynamic thing. It's not a recording. Memories of stressful situations are especially imprecise

The question is not, "can these people be legally convicted for this", but rather "do we want things to keep on happening this way"? What has been done to change this, and what still needs to be done?

War is chaos. You cannot engineer this stuff from not happening, in a dynamic, lethal and adversarial environment. ROE is the best you can do.

... and in 2007 961 US personnel died in Iraq. in 2009 it was 150. This year it's 20. Things are better for now

[motorfirebox]

I've read the Apache crew's witness statements which the DoD has released. It confirms the impression that the video has left me with: that they've consistently overestimated the actual threat; their witness statements speak of 15 people on the street when there were 8, and 5-6 people in the van episode when there were clearly 3. Since I expect people who are allowed to handle helicopters to be able to count, I get the distinct impression that on that day, they were not in the frame of mind that I would wish somebody who acts as in the abovementioned triple role to be in when assessing matters of life and death. (Maybe battle fatigue?) A system that put these people on that day in this role seems broken to me. Has it been fixed?

What would have been different about the Apache crew's response if their estimates had been more accurate?

[Uboat509]

This is what I was talking about with regards to people who have not experienced combat judging the actions of others during combat. I have not commented on whether or not I believe that the crew acted properly or not, and I won't. That was settled by the 15-6. You don't have to like it but that is the way it is.
I will say this, however, it is very easy to second guess the actions of the crew when you have to the benefit of hind-sight and plenty of time in a stress free environment with which to make those judgments. At any given time, the aircrew must be aware of where other aircraft are, where friendly forces are, where the enemy is or is reported to be and what each of those entities is doing now and what they will likely be doing next and they have to do all this from a moving aircraft. They often must make snap judgments based on whatever information they have on hand because the enemy has an annoying habit of not waiting for them. On top of all that they have the additional stress of knowing that if they fail and don't see or don't engage an enemy then the consequences could be a dead or severely wounded US or coalition soldier.

[Fuchs]

A policeman also needs to do snap judgments sometimes and may be tired.
Nevertheless, we expect him not to kill without a reason that withstands a judge's curiosity - or else he faces and deserves serious problems.

Extenuating circumstances aren't the same as "not guilty".
Also keep in mind that these men were highly trained and not mere enlisted personnel or even conscripts. You should be able to have high expectations of their judgmental abilities or else you shouldn't entrust them a multi-million dollar machine of war for a combat mission over a densely populated city.

[jmm99]

from mendel
After a few days thought about this, I was reminded of Judge Dredd, an old Science Fiction "street cop empowered to act as judge, jury, and executioner". I see the four Apache crew in exactly that role.

The problem with this word picture (to this apparently Neanderthalian USAian, JMM) is not that it refers to a sci-fi character, but that it attempts to import the concepts from a civilian due process legal trial and sentencing into a combat situation.

In a combat situation (whether regular or irregular), the soldier operates under the same basic rules: definition of the enemy, distinguishing combatants from civilians, military need for the action taken and proportionality (which does not mean that civilians have to be absent in order to fire on the target). The decision to shoot or not rests on the shoulders of that soldier, who is indeed "judge, jury, and executioner".

Those rules are more difficult to apply in an irregular warfare situtation where irregular combatants are "transitory guerrillas" - they meld into the general population which becomes in effect their camo and cover. It is in this situation that the divergence occurs between parties who have adopted Hague, 1949 GCs, 1977 API&II and the ICRC requirements of "direct participation" in "hostilities" (e.g., Germany) - and those parties who accept only Hague and the 1949 GCs (e.tg., USA).

Now, it is quite possible that, in Germany (I don't know their ROEs), the rules of engagement take away that decision from the soldier at the tip of the spear - and require multi-party review and agreement before a shot can be taken. All that should come out in the charging documents and subsequent events in the German Astan tanker bombing case.

The decision can also be taken from the individual soldier at the tip if the military in question has micro-management in practice (even if not required by the ROEs). In a micro-management environment, legalistic analysis may outweigh operational analysis; but political considerations are more likely to outweigh both legalisms and operations.

The comments from Fuchs, Mendel and others possibly reflect the influence of "international humanitarian law" as it is accepted in their countries; and as it apparently is being applied in Germany in the Astan tanker bombing case.

The problem for many here (including myself) is that their conclusions about this Apache incident are phrased in terms of what would be - if German law applied here. Thus, the Apache crew are "indicted" as "war criminals".

The broader picture, as I see it, is that there are serious chasms within the "Coalition" as to the basic issues of enemy definition, civilian distinction, military need and proportionality.

Regards

Mike

PS - PeaceOutE. Has this case been re-opened for investigation ? Not that I'm aware. It was investigated and the report can be found here, AR 15-6 Legal Review - first linked by pjmunson in this thread at post #8. No criminal liability was found.

It it has been re-opened, please provide a reference so we can explore the logic of that.

[Ken White]

Many seem to miss that distinction, though JMM grasps it quite well.

The civilian concept of self defense is not directly translatable to combat. Nor can the actions of Police Officers, charged with protecting the public be equated to armed forces in combat, charged with killing enemies (all other aspects of warfare are essentially political). Two very different mindsets are required and developed. Some will say Armies should not be so trained, that could be but it's irrelevant, at this time they are...

Fuchs makes a a very valid point:

...Also keep in mind that these men were highly trained and not mere enlisted personnel or even conscripts. You should be able to have high expectations of their judgmental abilities or else you shouldn't entrust them a multi-million dollar machine of war for a combat mission over a densely populated city.

What he elides is that they were highly trained combat aviators in a combat situation, doing what was almost guaranteed they would do. The real issue for many is perhaps whether they should have been in that situation, as Fuchs says in the last phrase. Whether they should have been or not, they were there and to expect other than a combat mentality effort is at best naive.

Many are commenting on the video, while several have commented that this is an extract and that some context may be missing, few seem to be recalling that this incident was thoroughly investigated and reported at the time and even fewer seem to be considering what the US Troops on the ground were telling the Apache crews. Those folks were not as highly trained and saw different things -- as much as one sees while the adrenalin flows -- different than the Aviators saw at the time and quite different than viewers of the video see today...