Syria: a civil war (closed)

[Entropy]

Maybe I am still just being daft today, but what are the congruent interests of Russia, China, and Iran? The ability to stick it to the West (and specifically the US) through Lawfare?

John,

Mark Safranski makes some good arguments here:

So it can hardly be reassuring to Moscow or Beijing that when the dust has yet to settle in Libya, that the United States and it’s NATO allies are now pressing for new UN resolutions designed to justify military intervention in Syria to overthrow Bashar Assad. Like the late and unlamented Colonel Gaddafi, Bashar Assad is a cold-blooded murderer, but unlike the crazy Colonel, Assad is a client of Russia and close Syrian ties to Moscow go way back to the earliest days of his father’s dictatorship. There’s no way, in such a short amount of time, that an American effort to topple Assad – however justified morally – that Vladimir Putin and to be truthful, many ordinary Russians, would not view that as a Western attempt to humiliate Russia. And R2P would indicate still more humiliations to come!

and

Iran, North Korea, Syria, Zimbabwe and other states ruled by kleptocrats and monsters act as buffers for China and Russia. Aside from the benefits these failed states can bring as customers for military hardware or sellers of raw materials, the attention of Western statesmen and human rights activists are diverted by the cause du jour in these hellholes, rather than being focused on what Beijing and Moscow might be up to at home or abroad. Every dismantling of an anti-Western dictatorship, from their perspective, is a step closer to their direct confrontation with the West’s hyperactive, erratic, morally hypocritical, meddling, ruling elite who will be no more able to ignore “grave injustices” in Wuhai or Kazan than they could in Aleppo or Benghazi.

This is not an argument that we should not press our claims, or not try to keep nukes out of the hands of religious fanatics or refrain from crushing states that attack us with terrorist proxies; we can and should do all of these things with vigor. But when possible, much is to be gained by pursuing our interests in a manner that permits other great powers to at least save face. Destroying Iran’s government because of it’s nuclear activities, for example, is not a strategic “win” if the way we do it convinces China and Russia to form a military alliance against the United States.

Read the whole thing.

[Uboat509]

The Economist has a good deal of quality reporting on the subject of Syria including this piece which sheds some light on the complexity of the issues there. On the face of it, it seems like a no brainer but nothing in the world of international relations is ever that simple. To begin with, the Gulf Arab states have competing interests at stake. On the one hand, most of them are hardly paragons of democratic reform and the Arab Spring has probably made most of them nervous if not out right scared. The overthrow of another authoritarian Arab regime is bound to stir up pro-democracy (or at least anti-regime) sentiment in their own states. On the other hand, the mounting excesses of the Assad regime is bringing unwanted attention to the state of governance in the Gulf Arab states as a whole. They are facing further pressure to support the (largely) Sunni opposition forces against an oppressive Shia government by their own populations.
Individual states have interests of their own to consider. Jordan is no friend of the Assad regime but does not relish the idea of Islamists coming to power in Syria. Paradoxically, Israel may have similar feelings. Assad funneled money and equipment to Hamas and Hezbollah but did not pass on chemical or biological weapons nor did he directly threaten Israel. A new, more Islamist government in Syria may not show the same restraint. Of course the interests of Iran and Lebanon in preserving the Shia dominated regime of Assad is fairly obvious and the Shia dominated government in Iraq seems to have aligned itself that way to at least some extent.
For the West, Syria presents difficult problem in that the opposition is divided and disorganized. It is difficult to know who to support or how. The sectarian nature of the crisis is also worrying. The opposition is largely Sunni in composition. That the Shia minority is standing by the regime is no surprise. What is surprising is the fact that several Christian sects, the Druze and even the Kurdish minority are either out right supporting the regime or at least hedging their bets against whoever ultimately triumphs. These groups have benefited from the largely secular nature of the Assad regime and they fear, not with out some justification, the potential backlash if an Islamist government were to take power in Damascus.
The are no simple answers nor courses of action that do not have serious potential consequences. The governments of a good many states are making strong statements about what should be done about Syria but few are probably willing, or able to pair actions with their statements. Ultimately, the world may very well find that the solution to the crisis in Syria is not the best option but rather the least bad one.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Abu M who commended this CNAS commentary by Marc Lynch:http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/...tWar_Lynch.pdf

Sombre conclusion (in part):

....there are no realistic military options available that could improve the situation, and those calling for military intervention must demonstrate not only that it is just, but that it can work. They have not. Diplomatic options are no more likely to produce immediate results. However, they still hold out the best hope of pushing Syria towards a negotiated political transition without either making the situation worse through
a poorly conceived military intervention....

Some of this week's newsreel has been grim. It is ironic that the focus has been Homs, or it's suburbs and what did the world do last time Homs was bombarded? Nothing.

[JMA]

Hat tip to Abu M who commended this CNAS commentary by Marc Lynch:http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/...tWar_Lynch.pdf

Sombre conclusion (in part):

Some of this week's newsreel has been grim. It is ironic that the focus has been Homs, or it's suburbs and what did the world do last time Homs was bombarded? Nothing.

Went in (supposedly) for Bhengazi but not for Homs.

Simple deduction is that its all about oil and balls.

Syria has no meaningful oil and the US/Europe don't have the balls to stare down Russia and China

[Surferbeetle]

In general, history reflects that Russians are accomplished mathematicians, engineers, and chess players...from time to time of late there are also glimmers of hope when it comes to politics and economics.

Asad soll nach Russland ins Exil, 24. Februar 2012, 21:13, NZZ Online

Der tunesische Präsident Moncef Marzouki schlug zum Auftakt der Konferenz vor, dem syrischen Präsidenten Bashar al-Asad Straffreiheit zu gewähren und ihm den Gang ins Exil zu ermöglichen. Als Aufnahmeland brachte er Russland ins Gespräch.

Am Treffen in Tunis nimmt auch eine Delegation aus der Schweiz teil. Nicht vertreten sind Russland und China, die im Uno-Sicherheitsrat schärfere Massnahmen gegen das syrische Regime verhindert hatten.

http://translate.google.com


[Swiss]Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
Swiss representations: Russia

[Surferbeetle]

Robert Fisk: From Washington this looks like Syria's 'Benghazi moment'. But not from here, TUESDAY 07 FEBRUARY 2012, The Independent

The destruction of the Alawite-led government in Syria – which means in effect, a Shia regime – will be a sword in the soul of Shia Iran. And look at the Middle East now from the windows of the massive presidential palace that overlooks the old city of Damascus. True, the Gulf has turned against Syria. True, Turkey has turned against Syria (while generously offering Bashar exile in the old Ottoman empire).

But look east, and what does Bashar see? Loyal Iran standing with him. Loyal Iraq – Iran's new best friend in the Arab world – refusing to impose sanctions. And to the west, loyal little Lebanon refusing to impose sanctions. Thus from the border of Afghanistan to the Mediterranean, Assad has a straight line of alliances which should prevent, at least, his economic collapse.

As long as Syria can trade with Iraq, it can trade with Iran and, of course, it can trade with Lebanon. The Shia of Iran and the Shia majority in Iraq and the Shia leadership (though not majority) in Syria and the Shia (the largest community, but not a majority) in Lebanon will be on Assad's side, however reluctantly. That, I'm afraid, is the way the cookie crumbles. Crazed Gaddafi had real enemies with firepower and Nato. Assad's enemies have Kalashnikovs and no Nato.

Assad has Damascus and Aleppo, and those cities matter. His principal military units have not defected to the opposition.

The "good guys" also contain "bad guys" – a fact we forgot in Libya, even when the "good guys" murdered their defected army commander and tortured prisoners to death. Oh yes, and the Royal Navy was able to put into Benghazi. It cannot put into Tartous because the Russian Navy is still there.

Dr. Robert Fisk, bio by wikipedia

Fisk has said that journalism must "challenge authority, all authority, especially so when governments and politicians take us to war." He has quoted with approval the Israeli journalist Amira Hass: "There is a misconception that journalists can be objective ... What journalism is really about is to monitor power and the centres of power."[7] Speaking on "Lies, Misreporting, and Catastrophe in the Middle East," at the First Congregational Church of Berkeley, 22 September 2010, Fisk stated, "I think it is the duty of a foreign correspondent to be neutral and unbiased on the side of those who suffer, whoever they may be." [8]

Fisk was educated at Yardley Court preparatory school,[13] Sutton Valence School and at Lancaster University [14] and has a PhD in Political Science, from Trinity College, Dublin in 1983.[15] The title of his doctoral thesis was "A condition of limited warfare: Éire’s neutrality and the relationship between Dublin, Belfast and London, 1939–1945".[15] He worked on the Sunday Express diary column before a disagreement with the editor, John Junor, prompted a move to The Times.[16] From 1972–75, the height of The Troubles, Fisk served as Belfast correspondent for The Times, before becoming its correspondent in Portugal covering the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution. He then was appointed Middle East correspondent (1976–1988). When a story of his was spiked (Iran Air Flight 655) after Rupert Murdoch's takeover, he moved to The Independent, with his first report published there on 28 April 1989.

[davidbfpo]

Whilst the West, Arab League and others "fiddle as Rome burns" making solemn declarations it appears that other nations are "punching above their weight" and using those guarantors of stability - guns.

Well that is my reading of this FP Blog article and this appropriate passage:

...the Saudis have run out of patience. They now unabashedly advocate for arming the Free Syrian Army.

This is not an empty threat. The Saudis know how to procure and move weapons, and they have no shortage of cash. If Riyadh wants to arm the opposition, armed it shall be. And those who receive the weapons will likely be at least amenable to the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam that has spawned dangerous Islamist movements worldwide.

Of course, a Saudi-led insurgency would not be in the cards if the Obama administration were not so opposed to empowering the opposition. But the longer Obama waits and the deeper the humanitarian crisis worsens, the more likely it becomes that other actors will tip the balance in Syria. Using history as a guide, none would be more dangerous than Saudi Arabia.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...ition?page=0,0

I am not sure what Obama is waiting for!

[tequila]

That FP article by Jonathan Schanzer seems to presume that there is some sort of well-defined pro-Saudi Salafist faction that we are going to 'lose Syria' to if we don't get off our butts and start arming ... who? What, the nice, liberal, secular faction? Can Schanzer identify who these people are, and ensure that they won't share or be taken over by the nasty Salafist jihadist faction? Somehow I doubt it.

I'm not sure how the U.S. throwing money and weapons into the black hole of the splintered and localized Syrian opposition factions is going to accomplish anything, except ensuring that U.S. weapons will be floating around the Middle East killing people for years to come. If we could pick out an organized group and empower them to the point where they could win, that would be one thing, but the Syrian groups make the Libyans look organized. At least Benghazi represented a safe area where weapons could be assimilated and groups could be trained on their use. Weapons pumped into Syria, if they even reached the right hands, would be thrown into battle immediately by people desperate to defend themselves but completely untrained.

And what sort of weaponry do these groups need? They don't need small arms - they need antiarmor weapons, explosives for IEDs, mortars, and heavy machine guns that will allow them to at least defend their neighborhoods against Syrian Army vehicles and artillery. Unfortunately this is also the sort of stuff that could be turned on future American forces or Israeli forces, or indeed forces of the Gulf Arab states. And it would be going to groups that could easily lose it to Syrian government forces, or sell it on to anyone.

[Bob's World]

Several good thoughts in UBoat's post above. There are few, if any, "right" answers regarding Syria or the many other similarly situated nation-states in the Middle East. Governments and populace groups, and individuals will ultimately act IAW what they believe best serves their interests as they define them to be, and as they understand the situation. Many will miscalculate on both parts of that equation.

For the US we struggle on many levels. What are our interests? We've been all over the map on that in recent years, and have made some pretty sketchy interest-based arguments for operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya to name few more significant ones. I would love to see us purge the "value-based" interests from our playbook. A well intended idea, but is simply does not play out well or produce the security effects we hoped for when we decided post-Cold War that our security is enhanced by making other states more like us. Governments and populaces need to find their own sweet spot on issues like form of governance and values; selling what works for us only delays others getting to what works for them.

We also need to get past seeing these situations in simplistic black and white constructs of preserving some regime or helping some opposition. "Winning" in these situations is not about who occupies the capital as the dust settles. Winning is getting to an evolved form of governance that serves and is recognized by a larger percentage of the populace. If 60% of the Syrian populace generally accepts Assad's regime (though most of those would probably chew our ear off as to reforms they'd like to see), the question is "how does Syria get to a form of governance that serves a larger percentage, and that is more in synch with the expectations of a larger segment of the populace"?

I think Assad's effort to conduct constitutional reforms is a smart move. I believe it should be accompanied by processes that allow the people to feel like they had a voice in what those reforms should address and that a new ROE would open the door to allowing more foreign governments to lend their support to the reform process.

As to the Saudis? They play a dangerous game, and I believe their direct involvement is a powerful indicator of just how nervous they are. Conditions of insurgency are very high in the Kingdom, and who knows what spark will set events in motion that overcomes the powerfully effective internal security mechanisms that keep them in check now. For the US, Saudi stability has long been a priority pillar for sustaining our interests in the region. The "ways" applied to secure that interest in the past are inappropriate for the emerging environment. Our Ends need to be stated simply as "stability" and we need to be much more flexible as to who leads the nation or how they lead the nation, so long as they maintain a more natural form of stability. The artificial stability we have backed so long is producing powerful negative effects (in many states, not just Arabia).

We are at the point where many governments must evolve and make compromises. Governments don't like that. Assad must compromise internally. Saudis must compromise internally. The US must compromise externally. The people are speaking, and governments can no longer discount those voices.

[Dayuhan]

the question is "how does Syria get to a form of governance that serves a larger percentage, and that is more in synch with the expectations of a larger segment of the populace"?

That may be "the question" for Syrians, though it seems they are defining "the question" more in terms of whether or not Assad should go. I see no reason why it should be "the question" for the US to ask, nor any reason why it should be our business to define "the question" for Syrians.

I think Assad's effort to conduct constitutional reforms is a smart move. I believe it should be accompanied by processes that allow the people to feel like they had a voice in what those reforms should address and that a new ROE would open the door to allowing more foreign governments to lend their support to the reform process.

What "reform process" would that be, and what business would any foreign government have with it? I don't see any evidence of any "reform process" of any kind. This isn't about the Constitution, it's about Assad, who will do as he wishes regardless of what the Constitution says, until and unless he's overthrown.

As to the Saudis? They play a dangerous game, and I believe their direct involvement is a powerful indicator of just how nervous they are. Conditions of insurgency are very high in the Kingdom, and who knows what spark will set events in motion that overcomes the powerfully effective internal security mechanisms that keep them in check now.

I don't ee any connection between Saudi involvement in Syria and audi domestic politics. Seems to me the Saudis just see an easy low-risk chance to stick it to the Iranians indirectly, and want to exploit that opportunity. How would Saudi involvement in Syria alleviate any domestic issues? In fact the Saudi are relatively secure at home at this point - one reason why they're being a bit adventurous outside the borders - and the supposed "conditions of insurgency" are a lot lower than they were in the late 90s. That's less a function of internal security mechanisms than of the prosperity brought by high oil prices and by a widespread view among Saudis that disorder is scarier than tyranny. It's not an unreasonable view: they know they're sitting on something that everybody wants, and that internal instability would likely draw in the vultures. While the royals may not be popular, they do enjoy an intrinsic popular perception of hereditary legitimacy (incomprehensible to an American, but our opinions are irrelevant), and few alternatives have emerged hat have any popular support at all.

For the US, Saudi stability has long been a priority pillar for sustaining our interests in the region. The "ways" applied to secure that interest in the past are inappropriate for the emerging environment. Our Ends need to be stated simply as "stability" and we need to be much more flexible as to who leads the nation or how they lead the nation, so long as they maintain a more natural form of stability.

We need to be more flexible as the who leads the nation?? How is it any of our business? We don't decide who leads Saudi Arabia. For better or worse, the Saud family leads Saudi Arabia. They don't need our approval or help to maintain that rule, and our influence over how they rule is slim to none.

We are at the point where many governments must evolve and make compromises. Governments don't like that. Assad must compromise internally. Saudis must compromise internally. The US must compromise externally. The people are speaking, and governments can no longer discount those voices.

I suspect Assad is beyond the point of compromise. We can say what we will about what the audis "must" do, but they won't listen to us and we can't compel or persuade him to do anything they don't want to do, so there's little point in discussing it. As for us... well, people are indeed speaking, but they're saying a whole bunch of different things, many of them contradictory... as anyone reasonable would expect. As always, we'll listen to those who tell us what we want to hear, which makes compromise complicated.

The media in Homs are clearly trying to generate a "Benghazi moment", but I doubt that it'll work, at least not if "working" means generating direct foreign intervention. I don't think the US gives a rats ass about what the Russians or Chinese think, but the administration does have to notice what the voters think. Another military commitment would not go down well with Obama's base, and there's an election coming up... and without US participation it's difficult to see overt intervention happening. If it's gonna be covert, better let the Saudis do it.

[ganulv]

I don't see any connection between Saudi involvement in Syria and Saudi domestic politics. Seems to me the Saudis just see an easy low-risk chance to stick it to the Iranians indirectly, and want to exploit that opportunity.

If you had to guess whether anyone is going to stand up to a Shiite government battering a city full of Sunnis aren’t the Saudis guesses one, two, and three?

I don't think the US gives a rats ass about what the Russians […] think, but the administration does have to notice what the voters think.

Ergo the missile shield.

[Bob's World]

That may be "the question" for Syrians, though it seems they are defining "the question" more in terms of whether or not Assad should go. I see no reason why it should be "the question" for the US to ask, nor any reason why it should be our business to define "the question" for Syrians.

I am not "the US," I'm just a guy expressing my opinion on what the question for the Syrians should be.

What "reform process" would that be, and what business would any foreign government have with it? I don't see any evidence of any "reform process" of any kind. This isn't about the Constitution, it's about Assad, who will do as he wishes regardless of what the Constitution says, until and unless he's overthrown.

Taking out Assad is a "reform process" but not likely to be a very stable or effective one for the Syrian people. Assad implenting true reforms linked to acutal perceptions of grievance of the rebelling populaces, while sustaining support of non-rebelling populaces would be better. A constitution can help get at that, but it really depends on the content and nature of the document and the degree of trust and buy-in across the populace. I haven't seen anything that indicateds Assad sought that input, so I doubt it will have that buy-in. My comment was that I think he should have been more transparent and inclusive in the process for best effect.

I don't ee any connection between Saudi involvement in Syria and audi domestic politics. Seems to me the Saudis just see an easy low-risk chance to stick it to the Iranians indirectly, and want to exploit that opportunity. How would Saudi involvement in Syria alleviate any domestic issues? In fact the Saudi are relatively secure at home at this point - one reason why they're being a bit adventurous outside the borders - and the supposed "conditions of insurgency" are a lot lower than they were in the late 90s. That's less a function of internal security mechanisms than of the prosperity brought by high oil prices and by a widespread view among Saudis that disorder is scarier than tyranny. It's not an unreasonable view: they know they're sitting on something that everybody wants, and that internal instability would likely draw in the vultures. While the royals may not be popular, they do enjoy an intrinsic popular perception of hereditary legitimacy (incomprehensible to an American, but our opinions are irrelevant), and few alternatives have emerged hat have any popular support at all.

Countries act based on their perceptions of their interests. Saudi Arabia acts on the percptions of the interests of the Saudi family. That is significantly different. They don't typically act openly to support such events, they are now. There is a reason. My belief is that it is related to their growing concerns over their own ability to sustain security at home. Reasonable minds may differ, and I certainly have not discussed this with the King

We need to be more flexible as the who leads the nation?? How is it any of our business? We don't decide who leads Saudi Arabia. For better or worse, the Saud family leads Saudi Arabia. They don't need our approval or help to maintain that rule, and our influence over how they rule is slim to none.

We felt it was "our business" in 1945 and committed ourselves to sustaining the Saudi family as part of our bargain for special access and influence in the Kingdom. More accurately it was the "ways" we applied to secure our national interests in the Arab penninsula. My comment is simply to note that I believe those "ways" are in need of a major refresh; one based in a stated position of our wilingness to work with any form of government in power there regardless of who leads it. Stable oil prices are "our business" and approaches that used to work to produce that are not working so well in the modern age.

I suspect Assad is beyond the point of compromise. We can say what we will about what the audis "must" do, but they won't listen to us and we can't compel or persuade him to do anything they don't want to do, so there's little point in discussing it. As for us... well, people are indeed speaking, but they're saying a whole bunch of different things, many of them contradictory... as anyone reasonable would expect. As always, we'll listen to those who tell us what we want to hear, which makes compromise complicated.

He is compromising, so clearly not "beyond the point." Is it too little too late? Quite likely. I agree that the people are saying many things. It is just noise. Let them pick trusted representatives of their many facets and allow them a forum to express those positions more clearly and to shape a constitution and how Syria transitions over time to a leader wanted by the majority of the people. That may well turn out to be Assad.

The media in Homs are clearly trying to generate a "Benghazi moment", but I doubt that it'll work, at least not if "working" means generating direct foreign intervention. I don't think the US gives a rats ass about what the Russians or Chinese think, but the administration does have to notice what the voters think. Another military commitment would not go down well with Obama's base, and there's an election coming up... and without US participation it's difficult to see overt intervention happening. If it's gonna be covert, better let the Saudis do it.

As usual, a mix of violent agreement, and misinterpretation of the intent of many of my comments as seen through your perspective and experience. If the US should do anything it should be to encourage a mediation. Clearly the Saudis are not the best choice. Perhaps Turkey. Urge a ceasefire and talks. That is neutral. We will need to work with whomever emerges, so best to not put all our money on one color. When we do that we usually reach out and stop the wheel where we want it to stop, and that leads to bigger problems over time.

[J Wolfsberger]

Clearly the Saudis are not the best choice. Perhaps Turkey.

Two observations:

1. Turks are not Arabs. There is a blood rivalry that would surface almost immediately.

2. Ottoman Empire. This is a region full of people who can still get themselves in a lather over the Crusades - which they won over 700 years ago. The Empire has been gone less than 100, so there is still widespread distrust of the Turks based on a belief that the Turks would like to reestablish the old Empire.

Events in Syria, and especially Homs, are a tragedy. But it isn't our tragedy. I strongly suspect that the only role the U.S. could play by getting actively (i.e. militarily) involved is "useful idiot."

[Bob's World]

As I said "Perhaps Turkey."

Yes, Syria was once part of the Ottoman Empire, but it was the decision of European leaders, not Syrian leaders to end that relationship. I suspect Turkey as a rising regional power is still the best bet for having the right mix of influence; shared history, culture and interests; and has itself gone down the road of governmental reform, beginning over 100 years ago, so has a much greater empathy for the challenges faced in Syria than the US or Saudi's or any others I can think of.

I think there are too many teetering states in the region, states with artifical stability enforced through state power, to simply let events such as are going down in Syria play to a natural, bloody end of survival of the fittest. Also there are too many interests of powerful states elsewhere also in the balance. Some action is necessary, but so far we have opted for approaches base far too much on US perspectives and far too shaped by our "knowledge" of what worked in the past, rather than an understanding that we need to evolve to ways better tailored to the world as it exists and is evolving today.

Any type of direct US involvement as lead is a bad idea. Military intervention is a very bad idea. We need to step above the fray, and act consistently with our express principles as a nation as we work to secure our interests in that region. There are surely strong, reasonable voices in Syria. How to best give help create the opportunity for them to step forward and be heard is the challenge. A credible 3rd party in needed, and if truly credible, then ceasefire should be possible as well. Move this beyond "action and reaction" violently and get to interaction. This is hard, but not impossible.

But if we think calling for one side or another to step down, or see military intervention as our only two plays, we are unlikely to achieve the ends we seek through those ways and means. At least not in any enduring, and legitimate way.

[tequila]

Hamas ditches Assad, backs Syria revolt

Hamas sees the writing on the wall - maybe seeing Jordan and Turkey as new sponsors? Will more moderate sponsors lead to a more moderate Hamas?

[J Wolfsberger]

Hamas ditches Assad, backs Syria revolt

Hamas sees the writing on the wall - maybe seeing Jordan and Turkey as new sponsors? Will more moderate sponsors lead to a more moderate Hamas?

Conceivably. But I'm more concerned that a more radical protégé would lead to a more radical Jordan or Turkey.

[Dayuhan]

If the US should do anything it should be to encourage a mediation. Clearly the Saudis are not the best choice. Perhaps Turkey. Urge a ceasefire and talks. That is neutral. We will need to work with whomever emerges, so best to not put all our money on one color. When we do that we usually reach out and stop the wheel where we want it to stop, and that leads to bigger problems over time.

The Saudi are not the best choice? Who says we get to choose?

Given that neither side shows any inclination to negotiate, why call for something we can't make happen? Wouldn't that just underscore our impotence?

[Bob's World]

The Saudi are not the best choice? Who says we get to choose?

Given that neither side shows any inclination to negotiate, why call for something we can't make happen? Wouldn't that just underscore our impotence?

Again, who ever said I said that WE would chose??? Where do you get these ideas?

All I said the US should do is encourage mediation.

[Dayuhan]

Again, who ever said I said that WE would chose??? Where do you get these ideas?

I got the idea from these sentences:

If the US should do anything it should be to encourage a mediation. Clearly the Saudis are not the best choice.

Again, I see little to be gained by urging mediation when neither party wants it and we've no power to make it happen. Just makes us look impotent. Not much to be mediated, either: if Assad stays, under any terms, he wins and the opposition loses. If he goes, he loses and the opposition wins, though they will presumably fragment as soon as they do. What's to mediate?

[Bob's World]

I got the idea from these sentences:



Again, I see little to be gained by urging mediation when neither party wants it and we've no power to make it happen. Just makes us look impotent. Not much to be mediated, either: if Assad stays, under any terms, he wins and the opposition loses. If he goes, he loses and the opposition wins, though they will presumably fragment as soon as they do. What's to mediate?

I have not idea what "neither party wants", and neither do you. That is your opinion. My opinion is that most Syrians prefer a peaceful way of getting to a better future; and Assad is showing indications of being open to some degree of reasonable compromise. This is not about Assad winning or losing, this is, for Syrians, about getting to a better situation of governance. If they can do that without breaking what they have in place now they will be better off. The idea that creating a power vacuum is the best first step to getting to better governance is not one I would advocate.

For the US it is simply about not having an unstable situation expand to where it disrupts vital interests in the region. We profess we want to exercise "global leadership." I find that to have a great deal of hubris to it, but if we are to lead, then I recommend we find some more effective approaches than those applied over the past several years. There is little reputation or influence at stake is we publicly recommend that Assad engage his people in guided talks, and that he should initiate a ceasefire as a show of good faith. No "or else" at the end that we have to back up. He will get his "or else" from his own populace in good time if he continues on this path. In the recent path we have opted for regime change, calling for regime change, and providing air power to support regime change. I would put all of those well down on any list of COAs. We do not want to make an enemy of a state or a populace either one unnecessarily; but if the choice is pissing off a weak state or a strong populace, piss off the state. At least we have effective tools for dealing with enemy states. We're still shooting at noises in the dark when it comes to non-state threats.

As to my opinion that the Saudis are not a good choice, that is my opinion. I certainly never said we should pick or work to exclude any party from that role, just that IMO some would be more effective than others.