Mechanized Infantry Perceptions 2010

[Ken White]

Similarly if AIFVs and APCs are entirely crewed by infantry then the vehicle crew for artillery observation carriers consists entirely of artillerists etc etc. So before long almost every specialised arm is operating and maintaining its own carriers. That makes for a large number of sub-specialties.

Yes it does and it is noteworthy that Armies in peacetime tend to reduce the number specialties for ease of 'management' and then increase the number exponentially in war due to need (and training time available)...

Generalists work acceptably in peacetime; they do not do well in heavy combat or long duration wars -- one cannot get enough of them.

However, concede such exposure and reduced mobility could occur but only if that type of staff work had not previously managed to cause a unit’s destruction.

Been my observation that the general quality of Staff work is in fact that poor -- but that's not poor enough to lead (too often...) to the destruction of units.

The change to all-volunteer regulars and ‘genuine’ reservists has presumably assisted in reducing such unnecessary abandonment and also vandalism.

Actually, the reverse is true. Conscription provided US Forces with a more mature and better behaved force. However, the issue of abandonment is not predicated on the character of the force but a flawed premise that external support is as good as organic capability. It never is. As for the vandalism, not so much that as it is:

But perhaps infantry designated as mechanised or armoured do tend to behave like travellers on a luxury busline, where each crew and passenger seat can cost more than $500K or E500K......

Yes...

Unless it's their bus...

On this,

Nonetheless that sort of thing is unlikely on a back-country tour bus because there – excepting any sick or decrepit – dismounted passengers are commonly expected to help with wheel changes and with levering and pushing the bus out of muddy ground.

Of course -- but changing a power pack isn't muddy ground. Neither is replacing a thrown track simply a matter of manual laborers.

The larger point is that transported troops do not own the transport and thus tend to feel little to no responsibility toward it nor do they know how to do the various tasks involved with keeping the vehicle running well. Consider also that a two or three man crew is not of adequate size to care for any vehicle other than a designed for purpose (and thus expensive) a simple wheeled vehicle. A Squad or Section that has to care for their vehicle can and will do so.

Light infantry do not have to move extra loads by backpacking. There are many types of small self-powered load carrying vehicle such as the 2-wheel cross-country motor bike and ATVs with 3, 4 and 6 wheels. If such vehicles are not available or usable then – provided the AT load is breakbulk to say 80kg - infantry can use manually pushed/pulled load carriers with side-by-side wheels that resemble foldable golf trolleys or in-line wheels that look like stripped down mountain bikes.

The small self-powered vehicles may have to be moved in a truck or on a trailer. The conceptual push/pull load carriers might when unladen be simply tied onto the sides, roof or rear of a GS truck, PMV, APC or whatever.

That's all been done by many Armies. I've loaded and driven walking alongside Mechanical Mules and pulled Machine Gun Carts. None of those work all that well either. Great theoretically but practical failures.

[SethB]

The issue should not be the driving. Driving is fairly easy.

Maintenance is a much bigger issue.

When my unit goes to the field we average one mechanical failure every four hours. If I didn't have crews that knew their tracks, we'd never get them repaired. The maintenance section doesn't have enough people to do the work. I've watched my crews repair damage in hours, with no mechanic on site.

Single tracking Soldiers (11B, 11M, 11H, etc) is a great idea. It lets them be experts. Single tracking NCOs would work. Single tracking Officers would work, until they assume a BN or BDE CMD that they don't understand. As long as we track every officer as though he might one day be CJCS, we have to provide a well rounded experience for them.

And example would be the BDE CDR that expects every vehicle in the BDE to be inspected by the BDE SDO and SDNCO, twice every night. That works when you command a light unit that has some LMTVs and HMMWVs.

When you have 800 pieces of rolling stock, it doesn't work. It simply illustrates the disconnect between the light and heavy worlds.

[Compost]

Originally Posted by Compost
Similarly if AIFVs and APCs are entirely crewed by infantry then the vehicle crew for artillery observation carriers consists entirely of artillerists etc etc. So before long almost every specialised arm is operating and maintaining its own carriers. That makes for a large number of sub-specialties.

Yes it does and it is noteworthy that Armies in peacetime tend to reduce the number specialties for ease of 'management' and then increase the number exponentially in war due to need (and training time available)...

Generalists work acceptably in peacetime; they do not do well in heavy combat or long duration wars -- one cannot get enough of them.

Understand you believe light infantry should be able to packpack everything, yet make expedient use of transport units that operate ATVs, GS trucks, utility helicopters etc.

However, light infantry may on occasion have to operate in conjunction with heavy armour. In that role particularly, and also in others, it would be useful for light infantry to have expedient use of armoured vehicles such as APCs and AIFVs that are better protected and more capable than austere PMVs.

How are light infantry to train and exercise for and operate in such roles if the temporary detachment of APCs and AIFVs from mechanised and armoured infantry units is nor appropriate, permissable or whatever ?

One solution would be some (small) number of armoured transport units equipped with APCs and AIFVs.

Are there other solutions that do not involve some degree of sharing with mechanised and armoured infantry units ?

[Ken White]

However, light infantry may on occasion have to operate in conjunction with heavy armour. In that role particularly, and also in others, it would be useful for light infantry to have expedient use of armoured vehicles such as APCs and AIFVs that are better protected and more capable than austere PMVs.

First, we need to define exactly what 'light' Infantry happens to be. To me, the word light means just that. They are lightly equipped to include few to no assigned vehicles and are more highly trained than normal infantry. They are expected to be foot or opportunity mobile. They are incapable of extended operations and their use is conjunction with Armor should be extremely rare. A US example would be airborne units and the former 7th Inf Div (and not the Tenth Mountain Division which is a hybrid)

Just plain Infantry, OTOH, is a different case. They posses and routinely use vehicles, have greater staying power and will frequently work with Armor (most US Infantry prior to 1980 fit this, today the closest US fit to this category are the Stryker Brigades). Armored Infantry (or Mechanized Infantry) is yet another variation ans they have even more staying power, more and heavier assigned vehicles and routinely work with Armor. Today, most US infantry is in this category today though we seem to continue adding Stryker Brigades....

We can then proceed to this:

How are light infantry to train and exercise for and operate in such roles if the temporary detachment of APCs and AIFVs from mechanised and armoured infantry units is nor appropriate, permissable or whatever ?

For true Light Infantry, the answer is rarely and with the aid (and vehicles) in training of heavier Infantry units. Pretty much the same for Infantry while Mech Infantry has organic carriers and could / would assist the others.

One solution would be some (small) number of armoured transport units equipped with APCs and AIFVs.

We tried that and it did not work well for us. Other Armies may have more success -- or a greater need to do something along that line.

Are there other solutions that do not involve some degree of sharing with mechanised and armoured infantry units ?

Not of which I'm aware.

We have, from time to time, successfully 'mounted' Light Infantry for specific operations -- the 82d Airborne Division elements in Iraq (but not so much in Afghanistan other than the dangerous and unnecessary MRAP...) come to mind, they were assigned and successfully employed vehicles in Iraq then reverted to pure light infantry tasks and few to no vehicles when elsewhere.

As always, METT-TC.

[B.Smitty]

First, we need to define exactly what 'light' Infantry happens to be. To me, the word light means just that. They are lightly equipped to include few to no assigned vehicles and are more highly trained than normal infantry. They are expected to be foot or opportunity mobile. They are incapable of extended operations and their use is conjunction with Armor should be extremely rare. A US example would be airborne units and the former 7th Inf Div (and not the Tenth Mountain Division which is a hybrid)

Since the utility of pure, un-augmented light infantry seems to be rather limited. Perhaps we need to look at reconstituting most of them as "just plain infantry" units. I realize we are doing this, to some extent, with the Stryker brigades, but even these are "deployability challenged", fairly expensive, and not suited to certain types of conflicts (e.g. Afghanistan).

Maybe we need to look at a TOE that mounts most or all "light" infantry on HMMWVs or trucks.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m...g=content;col1
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...f&AD=ADA339420
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf

The resulting organization would train to fight dismounted, but also have organic vehicular mobility. HMMWVs are much lighter and cheaper than Strykers, and have more utility as logistics platforms.

[Chris jM]

Since the utility of pure, un-augmented light infantry seems to be rather limited. Perhaps we need to look at reconstituting most of them as "just plain infantry" units.

Or you can use light infantry to their strengths. Dominate areas where vehicles are unsuitable (the mountains inside Afghanistan), conduct persistent, economy-of-effort security operations around rural populations and fight the enemy on his own terms (light, away from predictable routes and in areas he doesn't expect it).

If one uses Loss-Exchange-Ratios as a guide, one light-infantry platoon placing an ambush deep in Indian country can be worth an entire Bn of Mech Inf who are limited to driving back and forth along a single route for a month.

It is very situationally dependent, but the flexibility and utility offered by light inf should, I strongly believe, be retained. Keep the 'MRAP mentality' out of the picture, and aim at being able to raise, train and deploy a range of competent and audacious infantry forces (SF/Cdo, light, motorised, mech, armd). Inevitably the roles will never be as clear cut in practice, but I would much prefer re-rolling a Light Infantry unit into a motor or mech role than trying to tell Mr Back-seat-Trooper that he needs to re-enact Marius's mules.

WRT the culture of equipment care, tough force-on-force training will drive home the validity and necessity of combined-arms operations and even the dumbest grunt will realise that those APC-things are actually really good if he doesn't want to assault 600m on his guts, deflect 7.62mm on his own accord and wants a lift home afterwards. A competent and professional unit will be able to care for the equipment they employ if they have sufficient 'belonging' to the wider group. There are problems if units are affected by tribal divisions that see little universal cohesion, and this will manifest itself in both poor tactical/technical performance and poor equipment maintainence. While Fuchs is right that reassigning ownership and responsibility will work some of the time, it won't always be a possible solution. Good training, on the other hand, will always be a relevant solution.

[gute]

Or you can use light infantry to their strengths. Dominate areas where vehicles are unsuitable (the mountains inside Afghanistan), conduct persistent, economy-of-effort security operations around rural populations and fight the enemy on his own terms (light, away from predictable routes and in areas he doesn't expect it).

I was reading some comments made by Mike Sparks (I don't know much about him, but he seems to be controversial) regarding infantry and it's use. He doesn't seem to have much use for light infantry claiming only about 10% of the earth's land mass is not easily accessible, which would require true light infantry. His reasoning seems sound.

[ganulv]

He doesn't seem to have much use for light infantry claiming only about 10% of the earth's land mass is not easily accessible, which would require true light infantry.

10% of a dollar is .10¢ but 10% of our planet’s surface area is about 51,000,000 km2.

If I didn't have crews that knew their tracks, we'd never get them repaired. The maintenance section doesn't have enough people to do the work. I've watched my crews repair damage in hours, with no mechanic on site.

I know a fellow who was an LAV crewman and he has described a relationship with the mechanics that didn’t sound to me to be outright antagonistic but apparently wasn’t exactly cozy, either.

[B.Smitty]

Or you can use light infantry to their strengths. Dominate areas where vehicles are unsuitable (the mountains inside Afghanistan), conduct persistent, economy-of-effort security operations around rural populations and fight the enemy on his own terms (light, away from predictable routes and in areas he doesn't expect it).

Assuming most light infantry deployments require significant vehicular augmentation anyway, wouldn't it make sense to design most infantry TOEs to reflect this? Perhaps even add drivers and gunners so you don't have to dedicate squads to vehicle security while the rest of the unit dismounts.

In the rare situations where vehicles are unsuitable, deploy without them.

From the first link in my last post,

To be able to focus our efforts on the population, the task force had to get its maneuver forces to where the people lived. Unfortunately, for a light infantry unit, nothing was within walking distance. Paktika is 19,101 square kilometers, with over 600 kilometers of border with Pakistan. The "box" at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, the Army's premier light infantry training area, is approximately 800 square kilometers, only about one-sixth of which is used by a light infantry battalion during a rotation. According to the MTOE, the primary maneuver forces in a light infantry battalion, the rifle companies, have no internal transportation assets. The only vehicles it has are assigned to headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) and consists of approximately 40 cargo HMMWVs which are used to transport the battalion headquarters, staff, specialty platoons, and limited supplies across the battlefield. This lack of vehicles presented a significant problem for missions that demanded rifle companies and platoons to move hundreds of miles for weeks at a time. Anticipating this sort of challenge prior to deployment, the battalion reorganized and deployed 27 organic HMMWVs, and once in theater, the task force signed for more vehicles that had become installation equipment from previous rotations. The task force signed for approximately 25 M1114, up-armored, five-person models, most less than three years old with improved engines, suspensions, and drive trains. To supplement these gun trucks, the task force also signed for approximately 65 M998, M1038, and other miscellaneous unarmored cargo models, capable of carrying up to 11 Soldiers, their weapons, and supplies. These vehicles, as well as the 27 from Hawaii, had an average age of 15 years and had no improvements to the major stock components. These cargo versions were modified with Kevlar blankets and sheeting to improve survivability, and units strapped M240B machine guns on tripods to the top of the vehicle's cab to create a makeshift weapons platform. With a hodgepodge collection of tactical vehicles, TF 2-27 became motorized.

While creating a fleet of vehicles for the mission in Paktika and motorizing TF 2-27 worked, it was far from ideal. The cargo HMMWV, which made up well over half of the vehicles used by the maneuver elements in the task force, was never meant to be a tactical troop carrier, and its use as such had a variety of disadvantages. The number of vehicles assigned to each company, between six to eight M1114s and 10-15 cargo variants, required companies and platoons to put an average of 10 Soldiers in a cargo variant, and the limited space in the cargo area made carrying the necessary food, water, parts, and equipment to sustain operations challenging at best. The lack of room in the cargo space made firing weapons or defending the vehicle difficult as well.

Another problem with reorganizing as a motorized battalion when TF 2-27 arrived in Paktika was the lack of tactical and technical training and experience with vehicles throughout the task force. Though the battalion was a well-trained infantry unit, there was a significant dearth of experience working as a mounted force. The task force lacked qualified drivers and qualified M2 and Mk19 gunners, and few, if any, had conducted a mounted live-fire exercise. As with most infantry tasks, this lack of experience could have been overcome had the task force had vehicles to train with prior to deployment. Although there are a limited number of vehicles in a light infantry battalion, it was not possible to get every company trained in mounted tactics prior to our departure. Once in Paktika, the tactical learning curve was steep, but the battalion accepted a large amount of risk in the first month, using vehicles that the operators were just not trained to use. The technical learning curve was not as steep, and it had greater longterm effect. Maintenance on any piece of equipment is important to ensure that it works when it is needed. It is especially true with vehicles, and that truth is magnified when those vehicles are operating in the conditions mentioned above. Trained vehicle operators are taught to inspect the vehicle before every use, monitor its condition during operation, and check the vehicle every time it stops. The majority of the Soldiers operating vehicles did not receive formal training on the maintenance required for a HMMWV, and this had a major impact on the vehicles. In the first month, operator errors resulted in vehicles breaking down at an extremely high rate. Simple mistakes such as failing to tighten loose half-shaft bolts before operation and putting the wrong kind of fuel in the engine were common, and these mistakes could have been avoided with proper training prior to deployment. Had the rifle companies spent even one month with their vehicles prior to deployment, many of the problems the task force experienced could have been avoided.

[Compost]

Or you can use light infantry to their strengths. Dominate areas where vehicles are unsuitable (the mountains inside Afghanistan), conduct persistent, economy-of-effort security operations around rural populations and fight the enemy on his own terms (light, away from predictable routes and in areas he doesn't expect it).

Most commentators seem to come from the same camp area, and that is one which can be used for light infantry and similar units with ready access to heavier equipment.

Such camps can be useful if well provisioned but austere, and situated for supporting extended operations ‘outside the wire’ and not used merely for brief forays into ‘indian county’.