Nation-Building Elevated

[Steve the Planner]

Dayuhan:

As I understand it, many areas of Afghanistan were, in effect, self-governing and stable enough, in their own way, but decades of conflict leveled or destabilized a lot of old structures and systems, including with refugee flows and cross-border movements.

In some places, who is in charge, and in charge of what, may be both stable and well-known and understood.

Problem 1: What we are looking for is something very different than what existed before---a nationally-focused interest and commitment to centralized governments that both create and provide demonstrably different levels of economic, social and political linkages and dependencies on more advanced economic dependencies that will create future levarage against barbarism and "old ways".

The advanced economic performance and dependencies are inextricably linked, too, to social advancement factors including higher levels of education and transformational women's rights changes, and acceptance of other religions, cultures and heritages that have criss-crossed Afghanistan (the Bamyan Buddhas, etc...).

So, it is far beyond simple "reconstruction," and the "development" aspects are tightly wound with essential cultural and societal advancement factors that are truly remarkable in their breathtaking audacity---all this now wrapped around the axle of the original anti-AQ mission.

All these things are laudable, but, if our success (and Karzai's continuation) is dependent on them, it is certainly a huge mountain to climb.

The alternative is pretty simlar to what we did in Northern Iraq with MG Hertling: If nobody else has a plan for civilian reconstruction/stability, and I need a plan to accomplish my mission, then I will make a plan, and executed it.

That's a far cry from accidentally stumbling into success one battle space at a time. Intentionality, forethought, some basic interoperability and consistency (or each recovered area will be dissimilar and incompatible with the next), and some guiding purpose....

Amazing task, though.

[Dayuhan]

Problem 1: What we are looking for is something very different than what existed before---a nationally-focused interest and commitment to centralized governments that both create and provide demonstrably different levels of economic, social and political linkages and dependencies on more advanced economic dependencies that will create future levarage against barbarism and "old ways".

The advanced economic performance and dependencies are inextricably linked, too, to social advancement factors including higher levels of education and transformational women's rights changes, and acceptance of other religions, cultures and heritages that have criss-crossed Afghanistan (the Bamyan Buddhas, etc...).

Yikes. If that's problem 1, I don't even want to ask about problem 2.

The big problem I see with "problem 1" is the bold "we" in the citation above.

Somehow "we" went from wanting to see an Afghanistan that doesn't shelter people who attack us to wanting "a nationally-focused interest and commitment to centralized governments that both create and provide demonstrably different levels of economic, social and political linkages and dependencies on more advanced economic dependencies that will create future levarage against barbarism and "old ways". In the process (in my perhaps not entirely humble opinion at least) we went from climbing a mountain to rolling the rock of Sisyphus up a mountain. I can't imagine what would make anyone think that "we" are in a position to create, impose, dictate, inspire, incubate, or otherwise achieve such a thing in Afghanistan.

And at the end of the day, who are "we" to be telling the Afghans what they should become?

[Steve the Planner]

Relax:

Step 1 is still security, and to hold it until Step 2 can get done.

Oh, did I mention that step 2 is usually considered a process of social and economic advancement that takes place over about 20-50 years.

Here, we have to compress it a little...

Actually, the Genral should give it a few more weeks, and if nobody can come up with a credible and implementable civilian sub-national plan and schedule, develop and implement one based on the pieces he does have...and get on with it. Government by... and for...

For that, the rule is simple. Be humble and ask the people what they need to function reasonably, wrap that into a viable governance and economic implementation program that has prospects for sustainable application (and maybe even future societal advancement), and move down the road to implementation (if the partners will agree).

[Dayuhan]

For that, the rule is simple. Be humble and ask the people what they need to function reasonably, wrap that into a viable governance and economic implementation program that has prospects for sustainable application (and maybe even future societal advancement), and move down the road to implementation

If that's simple, I'd hate to see complex.

To start with, I suspect that the assumption of a centralized government is going to meet substantial opposition from local and regional powers, who are likely to be extremely suspicious of any central government they don't control.

[Steve the Planner]

I think that is the point.

Without an effective subnational governance plan emenating from the center, each area will set it's own course, which we will then support instead.

At that point, you have, by default, bypassed the central government, and, therefore, undermined it.

You already see it going on now with Intl aid starting to bypass Kabul.

A recent story on Pashtuns agreeing to oppose Taliban in exchange for development aid was quite instructive. They are as equally opposed to Kabul, which steals their money.

One deal at a time might end immediate AQ threats, but it won't make a nation (except by complete accident). Are we out to end immediate AQ threats or to build a nation as a more permanent threat reduction step?

[M-A Lagrange]

A recent story on Pashtuns agreeing to oppose Taliban in exchange for development aid was quite instructive. They are as equally opposed to Kabul, which steals their money.

Would not be surprised. In DRC we traded (with low effect) discipline and no civilian harassement against food for the FARDC who were not payed by the government.
As some say: peace has a price, just find it.

But it's an old concept. The may-may in DRC went up to the point to take hostages to get aid. Even government official who were on their side.
The result in the end is quite conter productive as Gov makes sure those places are margenalised after.

[Steve the Planner]

" But it's an old concept. The may-may in DRC went up to the point to take hostages to get aid. Even government official who were on their side.
The result in the end is quite conter productive as Gov makes sure those places are margenalised after. "

The risk of creating local self-government without connection and explicit support of the central government is that there comes a time when the locals eoither are, or are not, supported by the national government---which, in the end, will control money, police, and troops.

Where do the locals end up in that game? What was the net effect of disconnected local capacity building?