I guess I'm just frustrated because Donnelly, Kagan and, to a lesser degree, Kristol are friends of mine and they just keep beating the drum of the new strategy but I have yet to see a cogent explanation of what it is. A troop surge is an operation, not a new strategy. Rather than explain how the new strategy will better to lead to "victory" (or exactly what that is), they just spend all of their time lambasting anyone who isn't on board.
In a broader sense, I'm afraid that the conceptual underpinning of the "new strategy" is the idea that Andy Krepinevich and others were espousing that says that population security should be the central factor in counterinsurgency. In my tiny little mind, that is one more example of extrapolating general lessons from Cold War insurgencies. In Vietnam, El Salvador, etc., the "people" were "undecided" so the counterinsurgency campaign was designed to win them over with development, security, and reform. But in ethnic/sectarian insurgencies, people don't decide which side to support based on the provision of development, security, and reform. Loyalty is more primal.
Take the Palestinian insurgency. Nothing the Israelis can do will win the "hearts and minds" of the people. They understand that. But we're mucking around in Iraq with this Cold War conceptual framework. Hence we've designed a strategy based on providing development, security, and reform. As an American, I sincerely hope it works. As a student of insurgency, I doubt it will.
I buy the idea that what is driving the conflict is the simultaneous desire for sectarian security and domination by Sunni Arabs. If that is true, the only strategies that might work are either to truly subjugate the Sunni Arabs (and solidify Shiite domination), or play the role of mediators and peacekeepers.
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