Tentative Guidelines for building partner armies post conflict

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Colin--

Only a couple of bones to pick with you. First, it does not appear that you give enough attention to what mission(s) you are giving to the security forces in the context of the threat(s) they face. Panama and Haiti chose to have only police forces after inteventions. In Panama's case, however, the threat is larger than a police force alone can handle so there are some interesting adjustments that have been and are still being made ad hoc. So, a threat analysis coupled with a mission analysis is a critical early step.
Second, what is the military tradition of the country? If there is an indigenous military tradition, how does one best exploit it to meet the threat and achieve the objective? If there is no real threat, is not having a military a viable option given the indigenous military tradition? El Salvador is a good example of such a case. While there is no longer a real military threat, not having a military would violate Salvadoran tradition and national pride, etc. So, how do they make best use of that tradition without their military becoming a threat itself?
Third, I would take minor issue on the use of technology - especially computers. Again Salvador provides a useful example. One of the major problems through the whole war was that the ESAF had no personnel record management system. This had all sorts of major negative consequences. Toward the end, we put an advisor with the C1 (Pers & Admin) of the joint staff and developed a personnel records sytem. This became essential to the ESAF reserve system that grew out of the aftermath of the war and critical to the reserve call up during the Hurricane Mitch disaster.
Finally, I would take major issue on philosophical grounds with you on the use of PMCs. IMO there is far too much policy involved in developing a security force to entrust it to a private entity no matter how patriotic are its principals and staff. Organizing, training, equipping, and sustaining a security force is inherently a governmental activity and needs to be undertaken by the host and supporting governments. While there is a role for contractors, it is, IMO, small and entirely one of supporting the govts involved. It is, for example, fine for a contractor to provide the mess hall; it is not fine for the contractor to train the police or military. It is fine for the contractor to set up and maintain a computer system; it is not fine for the contractor to tell the govt what it should use the system for or to maintain its military/police personnel records.

So much for my opinions.

Cheers

JohnT

[Colin Robinson]

John,
Thanks for your input. Of course, as the British would put it 'selection and maintenance of the aim' should be right up front. I should have seen that, despite all the reading of the OECD Security Sector Reform handbook I've been doing.
A modern bureaucratised army does definitely need a personnel system. But when, for example in Afghanistan, half the officers are illiterate, not even to mention computer-illiterate, does this need to be computerised? As New Zealanders, we ran our bit of the First and Second World Wars, along with everybody else, on physical files, and secretaries. What do you think about not loading indigenous armies initially upfront with computerised bureaucratic systems - they could always be introduced later on.
Thanks for your thoughts about PMCs. I tend to agree, and so says one important interlocutor who was personally involved in Liberia with DynCorp. For the moment, barring any other evidence, I think I will write that U.S. PMCs should be limited to training and equipping forces - thus DynCorp's and PAE's role in Liberia was an inappropriate extension of PMCs' role.

Cheers
Colin

[Colin Robinson]

One other minor question. I'm intrigued at the Salvadorian use of 'C' for a joint staff post. Was there a reason why 'J' was not used?
Thanks again

[Dayuhan]

Second, what is the military tradition of the country? If there is an indigenous military tradition, how does one best exploit it to meet the threat and achieve the objective?

This point underscores a problem that we all too often dodge around: in many cases the "indigenous military tradition" in the environments where we're trying to build military/police forces is that the guy with the gun gets to do whatever he wants and the whole point of a military/police position is the ability to use it for personal/family/clan/faction advantage - up to and including taking over the country. Trying to counter that sort of tradition is a major challenge. Of course people will sit through our lectures about civilian supremacy, human rights, and military/civil relations, and of course they will nod their heads and recite the mantras at every full stop - if that's a prerequisite for getting the hardware. What they do when they're out on their own is likely to be another story altogether.

Not saying I have a solution, but the problem deserves more attention.

[John T. Fishel]

Dayuhan, you cite one of the problems but it has another side. Most military cultures have common elements and similar aspirations for "professionalism." These can be exploited by the interveining power even when dealing with "warlords." As an example, one could seek to discover Dostum's military ideal and pick charateristics of that individual that Dostum admires with the intention of encouraging him to adopt those characteristics and behaviors. The key is knowing the culture and the guy you are advising and getting him to make your ideas his own with him getting ALL the credit.

Cheers

JohnT

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan, you cite one of the problems but it has another side. Most military cultures have common elements and similar aspirations for "professionalism." These can be exploited by the interveining power even when dealing with "warlords."

Possibly I am overly cynical, but I can't help feeling that when abstract aspirations of professionalism come up against material self-interest something's gonna be set aside, and it ain't gonna be self-interest. We also have to consider the almost unlimited human capacity to reconcile the irreconcilable in our own perceptions. I've had abundant opportunity to observe a military force where sale of weaponry, protection of criminal enterprises, profitable side-deals with corrupt politicians, gratuitous human rights abuse and much more are commonplace. Many members of that military would react with absolute righteous fury to any suggestion that they were anything other than a professional force. I've never been quite sure how they work that out in their own minds, but they seem able to do it.

Complicating the matter is that in many of the environments in which we try to develop forces, primary loyalties are to family/clan first, tribe/ethnic group second, religious identity third... and the abstraction of "nation" somewhere way down the hierarchy. Even when individuals would like to embrace the sort of conduct that Americans see as "professional", family pressure and the expectation of favoritism may be impossible to overcome. Complicating the situation even more is that in many cultures the root perception of what a military or police force (or for that matter a government) is and does is... shall we say slightly different from ours. Or possibly more than slightly.

As an example, one could seek to discover Dostum's military ideal and pick charateristics of that individual that Dostum admires with the intention of encouraging him to adopt those characteristics and behaviors. The key is knowing the culture and the guy you are advising and getting him to make your ideas his own with him getting ALL the credit.

I always worry when I hear Americans talking as if we are the ones shaping and manipulating. The people we're dealing with ain't silly putty, they have their own agendas and they actively pursue them. Americans, alas, have a well-earned reputation for being very easy to manipulate, and much of the time when we think we are the ones doing the shaping we are actually being worked. While we sit around talking about knowing the culture and getting them to make our ideas their own, they are sitting around their own campfire reminding each other to tell the rich Americans whatever they want to hear, parrot their own words back at them, make them think we're adopting their ideas, show 'em just enough leg to keep the goodies flowing, and take 'em for every damn thing they've got while doing exactly what we want to do.

We don't play this game very well, and we get worked a lot.

[Ken White]

...Americans, alas, have a well-earned reputation for being very easy to manipulate, and much of the time when we think we are the ones doing the shaping we are actually being worked...whatever they want to hear, parrot their own words back at them, make them think we're adopting their ideas, show 'em just enough leg to keep the goodies flowing, and take 'em for every damn thing they've got while doing exactly what we want to do.

We don't play this game very well, and we get worked a lot.

Amen. In WW II we got worked some but also did some decent (or indecently successful, viewpoint dependent) working. However, I cannot think of an international affair since with a major US commitment where we did not get taken to a considerable extent that generally made our effort far less valuable than it could or should have been. Not one.

Every nation, every nationality with whom I've worked has produced people who noted our propensity to get suckered. Every one.

[John T. Fishel]

Some Americans play the game very well; most don't. Neither do most Brits, Canadians, Frenchmen, Russians, Japanese, Chinese... But some of them do play it well. Two classic Ameican and Brit examples are Edward G. Lansdale and T. E. Lawrence.

Nor do I think that host nations are eminently maleable - we manipulate and so do they. Sociologists dub this a "social exchange mechanism." But my point, probably poorly developed, was that when working with a HN military (or civil govt) it is essential to help them achieve what they want - if what they want can advance our goals. If not, then we should not assist, in general (although I can think of circumstances where it might be in our interest to do so). Of course, if what they want actually runs counter to our goals then that is another story and there probably isn't any room to bargain.

Cheers

JohnT

[Dayuhan]

Some Americans play the game very well; most don't. Neither do most Brits, Canadians, Frenchmen, Russians, Japanese, Chinese... But some of them do play it well. Two classic Ameican and Brit examples are Edward G. Lansdale and T. E. Lawrence.

Wilf, who knows the story better than I, would say the Lawrence legend is much inflated, and from a Philippine perspective I'd have to say the same of Lansdale.

To get back to the OP, though, the points I'm trying to make re the problem of building armies would run something like this...

1. The nuts and bolts of building military skills and military systems is only half the battle, and probably the easier half. Assuring that these skills and systems will be applied to national objectives, rather than personal or extranational objectives, is far more difficult, especially where there is a long tradition of using military and police positions for personal or ther non-national (clan, tribe, faction, whatever) gain.

2. From the level of design and planning down to the level of the actual advisor there must be constant awareness that many, in some cases most, of the individuals we deal with will have agendas and objectives other than those they reveal to us. The national leadership will attempt to pack the leadership with loyalists who will try to keep them in power. Warlords and tribal leaders will try to maneuver their own people into key positions. Even among the ranks there will be many who joined with the assumption and expectation of using their position for personal gain.

3. People will attempt to manipulate us. When the people we deal with learn our jargon and tell us exactly what we want to hear, that doesn't mean they get it. It means we're being worked. The guy who challenges you, questions your doctrine and ideas, and has a tendency to do things his own way is probably a lot more honest - and probably a better candidate for cooperation - than the guy who parrots our own words back at us.

[Schmedlap]

Some Americans play the game very well; most don't. Neither do most Brits, Canadians, Frenchmen, Russians, Japanese, Chinese... But some of them do play it well. Two classic Ameican and Brit examples are Edward G. Lansdale and T. E. Lawrence.

Wilf, who knows the story better than I, would say the Lawrence legend is much inflated, and from a Philippine perspective I'd have to say the same of Lansdale.

"Played the game well" and "inflated legend" are not mutually exclusive.