The Warden Collection (merged thread)

[Cliff]

First, the Rings model is also a simple way of depicting a system that may be more complex than some not so smart guys who try to use it realize. i.e. it can lead to mistakes. Secondly, it can depict the system but as has been said, many things out there defy categorization as a system.

True, but we have to try to understand it somehow. Do the folks who say you can't understand things as a system advocate a trial and error approach to strategy?

I suggest that trying to understand the enemy's political system is often unnecessary -- it is also exceedingly difficult to get right, particularly if that system is conducted in another language and / or stems from a quite different culture. What is necessary from both a military and a strategic standpoint is relatively sure if basic knowledge of what that system does. 'What' needs to be known, 'why' and 'how' will most often be nice to have for diplomatic purposes but actually relatively useless for strategic or war purposes.

I agree that it is hard. Warden is arguing that we should acknowledge when things are difficult, but not let that make us think they are impossible.

Without quibbling over details, I agree Warden has some good points. As did John Boyd. And Curtis LeMay. Or CvC, Jomini, De Saxe (probably one of the best of the bunch) and Subatai (certainly one of the 'winningest' of all time...). So do you and so do I -- a lot of folks do. None of us or of them has all the answers. I know neither you or Slap suggest that, I'm just reiterating it to point out that the principle sometimes gets lost behind the name. Warden is good but he's not the be all and end all; the Rings have applicability in some situation -- but not in all. Airpower (all source) is great but it also has limitations -- as does ground power or sea power...

Agreed... again, Warden isn't saying there aren't limitations, he's just saying that we shouldn't let current limitations make us stop trying to overcome them.

My problem with John Warden or anyone who offers THE optimum solution (even though they add caveats, their primary pet rock shows in their pocket) is that I'm old and have yet to see any one trick pony win the dressage.

Valid point, I would re-iterate my point above on Warden's intent.

That's true, he always has -- and he rarely gets credit for that. I suspect his 'air power uber alles approach has a great deal to do with that and his valid points get obscured by that. Parochialism tends to draw parochial responses...

Unless the parochial response is from the Army, then it's ok, right?

Our 'strategies' (multi polar plural ) have not done that at all well in 236 years. Fortunately, we muddle through rather well.

We aren't doing the present really well. The future may be a step too far. The Wardens of this world might be able to get there but those really smart guys are only about 20% of the grand total -- that other 80% of us have to be dragged along and herded like a batch of cats. Hard to get there from here. Really hard. Particularly with a governmental system that changes directions every 2 to 8 years (that annoys the daylights out of the Strategists...). We tend to get really serious (that applies to both domestic and foreign political as well as military issues) only when confronted with an existential threat and there are none of those in view at this time...

Won't argue with you here- again, I think Warden acknowledges this, he just is trying to argue that difficult shouldn't mean impossible.

My next paper is going to be on ways to try and improve our strategic process...

Anyway, good points Ken, I think part of why Warden is misunderstood is because people see him as so parochial. What folks miss is that a lot of his efforts aren't addressed at outsiders, but the folks inside the USAF who are stuck in old ways of thinking. The message for them gets misread when people think it applies to outsiders...

V/R,

Cliff

[Marc]

Cliff,

There is one more thing missing in Warden's article: the effect of his strategy on OUR OWN leadership. This lacuna is a bit odd, because this effect was at the heart of his original article (see John A. Warden, “Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century”):

All military operations, including air operations, should be consonant with the prevailing political and physical environment. In World War II the United States and her Allies imposed widespread destruction and civilian casualties on Japan and Germany; prior to the Gulf War, a new political climate meant that a proposal to impose similar damage on Iraq would have met overwhelming opposition from American and coalition political leaders.

The problem with Warden's theory is that public and political intolerance for destruction and civilian casualties has grown faster than the effectiveness of surgical bombings. The steep increase in bombing precision that makes Warden's strategy feasible has been followed by an even steeper decrease in public tolerance for destruction and collateral damage. The 2006 invasion of southern Lebanon by Israel proved that Dan Haloutz's application of Warden's strategy destroyed the center of ISRAEL's five-rings model rather than Hezbollah's.

[Cliff]

The problem with Warden's theory is that public and political intolerance for destruction and civilian casualties has grown faster than the effectiveness of surgical bombings. The steep increase in bombing precision that makes Warden's strategy feasible has been followed by an even steeper decrease in public tolerance for destruction and collateral damage. The 2006 invasion of southern Lebanon by Israel proved that Dan Haloutz's application of Warden's strategy destroyed the center of ISRAEL's five-rings model rather than Hezbollah's.

I agree that Israel mis-used Wardens model in Lebanon, and certainly discrimination is important. IMHO, one of the big problems with Israel's efforts is that they didn't discriminate adequately between Lebanon and Hezbollah when they did their systems analysis... and so ended up hitting targets that were used by Lebanese civilians. I think that Warden would argue that they failed to adequately find and target the leadership ring, and ended up hitting fielded forces and infrastructure too hard.

As Warden points out, the big issue is time... the quicker a war, the less likely there is to be civilian casualties and the less likely public outrage is. Certainly the "baby milk factory" in Desert Storm and the Chinese Embassy in OAF cost us in the court of public opinion. I think that the actual effects of public outrage are somewhat overrated, however, due to the media and politicians views of them.

This raises a deeper question that goes more to Fuch's grand strategic arguements... that is, do we have the will to do what it takes to win? Warden argues we shouldn't go to war if we do not. As Ken pointed out, in our current political system, it's tough to get there... politicians like G.W. Bush (whatever you think of him otherwise) who are willing to throw away their careers to do what they think is the right thing are few and far between.

Again, I'm not arguing that Warden's model is the end-all be-all, but that he is misunderstood because people focus on the 5 rings as a prescriptive solution and ignore the other points he is trying to make.

V/R,

Cliff

[Marc]

This raises a deeper question that goes more to Fuch's grand strategic arguements... that is, do we have the will to do what it takes to win? Warden argues we shouldn't go to war if we do not. As Ken pointed out, in our current political system, it's tough to get there.

I am afraid you put the cart before the horse. It is not the politician's job to deliver the political will needed for the application of a certain strategy. It is the strategist's job to develop a strategy within the limitations of his leadership's political will.

[Cliff]

I am afraid you put the cart before the horse. It is not the politician's job to deliver the political will needed for the application of a certain strategy. It is the strategist's job to develop a strategy within the limitations of his leadership's political will.

Marc-

I disagree. In our system of government the politicians ARE the strategists- that is the problem that Ken was pointing out.

Agree that we as the military must strive to recommend strategies that alleviate this - that is why Warden argues for airpower to make wars faster/less bloody.

V/R,

Cliff

[Marc]

Marc-

I disagree. In our system of government the politicians ARE the strategists- that is the problem that Ken was pointing out.

Agree that we as the military must strive to recommend strategies that alleviate this - that is why Warden argues for airpower to make wars faster/less bloody.

V/R,

Cliff

Cliff,

Then we know exactly where we disagree. Democratic politicians ARE NOT strategists (maybe they should be, but they are not). I can recommend two books on the subject:

Dick Morris "Power Plays: Win or Loose - How History's Great Political Leaders Play the Game." (especially Chapter Six: Mobilizing the Nation in Times of Crisis)

and

Erik Claessen "Stalemate: An Anatomy of Conflicts between Democracies Islamists and Muslim Autocrats".

Expecting politicians to take up the role of strategist is a short route to disappointment.

[Entropy]

Interesting discussion so far.

I think the first point I would make is to suggest that a one-size-fits all methodology that biases toward one particular element of national power is, at best, inadequate.

Secondly, a primary problem with airpower-centric solutions is what do you do when you strike all the targets on your prioritized target list and the effects are not achieved? The inevitable temptation is to go further down the PTL into tertiary targets and start hitting everything - hence you get the Israeli's striking an empty Hezbollah office in a populated multi-story building which does nothing to Hezbollah and is ultimately counterproductive. In short, how does one tell when the strategy has failed? In an environment where political concerns limit the use of ground forces, both politicians and the air forces are going to want to "keep going" and hope for some kind of success.

So, ironically, one of air power's great advantages is also a disadvantage.

[Ken White]

Democratic politiciansARE NOT strategists (maybe they should be, but they are not).

Totally agree, even those with some military knowledge or experience have historically been poor as Politicians trying to influence the strategy of their Generals. Clemenceau who coined the ultimate Civilian control of the Military quip was poor at the task -- but he had enough sense to listen to his good Generals (and to know which were good)...

Expecting politicians to take up the role of strategist is a short route to disappointment.

While that is correct, the problem in a Democracy is that Politicians believe they must be seen as doing something. That the something they do is inept, inappropriate and does more harm than good is immaterial. They will meddle, they will screw things royally and only really good Flag Officers will keep them from doing too much damage. Unfortunately, in a system that rewards survival above all else, the number of really good Flag Officers isn't as high as it could or should be.

Regardless, with respect to your initial comment on the topic:

It is not the politician's job to deliver the political will needed for the application of a certain strategy. It is the strategist's job to develop a strategy within the limitations of his leadership's political will.

Most US politicians have little will for much other than getting reelected and have definite constraints on the amount of will they will be allowed to exert by the vagaries of Congress and party politics. Add the fact that to most US domestic political concerns far outweigh foreign policy concerns and you have a recipe for military power to be misapplied, misused and wasted by trying to do too little with too few.

While your approach is the way we have done it in this country since 1950 (and before on occasion), that does not mean that it is correct or even sensible. A quick look at recent history will show where that approach has placed us...

Thus this "...It is the strategist's job to develop a strategy within the limitations of his leadership's political will" is saying that the "strategist" should collude and shave points. That's illegal in sports -- and war is more important than any sport. Regardless, Franks did that, so to an extent did Westmoreland and there have been others. The issue should be whether or not that is in the interest of the nation.

[pvebber]

Cliff,

Great points. I hope to be more responsive to them this evening, but to make sure I don't put words in your mouth or build a strawman, what do you think are the key points Warden is making that are new in this most recent paper?
What do you think is being misunderstood about his other points?

What I argree with him on are:

Strategy provides the framework for finding the best means to attain objectives.

This is true almost by the definition of strategy. The issue becomes what is the best approach to strategy and comes down to Jomini vs Clauswitz which at its root gets back to Plato vs Aristotle...

The objective of a conflict is to achieve a future picture, not to kill and destroy.

One must have a 'desired end-state' that one wants to achieve. The issue comes becomes how tightly coupled cause and effect are in the 'systems' involved.

As we consider conflict, we should explore bloodless-force options exhaustively before reverting to traditional war and battle.

Almost a throw away given a desire for "just war", but important not to take to the extreme. The rub is in how you define "bloodless - force"...


What I disagree on:

The best approach to strategy starts with a future picture, determines the systems and centers of gravity that must change to realize that picture, takes into account the impact of time, and preplans an exit.

We should focus on direct, strategic centers of gravity to the maximum extent possible.

Presupposes the existence and determinability of "direct, strategic centers of gravity" and linear cause and effect relationships between them and the desired outcomes. In Real Life, there are few "strategic centers of gravity" that can be determined (implying determinism...) and the cause and effect chains between them are not identifiable, or linear.

Our conflict vocabulary flows from ancient times and traps us mentally and physically into concepts that no longer make sense, so our vocabulary must change.

How does our vocabulary invalidate any of our current Joint Concepts? Which of those concepts no longer make sense and why? How does changing vocabulary (to what, that of business and return on investment?) enable different concepts. Capabilities enable concepts, not vocabulary.

If we want to change our opponent as a system to conform to our objectives, then the most direct approach entails affecting opponent centers of gravity closely related to the objectives.

Assumes not just a linear Newtonian world-view, but one that presupposes relationships between the enemy system and our desires. Who defines "closely related"? Have not seen enough cultural mismatches in our recent wars to put this sort of thinking to rest?

Fast action and short conflicts are imperative and far less expensive than slow, long ones.

There is a missing consideration of intensity. The reductio adsurdum is that all war should then be nuclear because it is the fastest and shortest conflict.

“Battle” is at best an expensive and risky means to a distant end, and we should almost always avoid it.

THis is perhaps where I disagree with Warden the most. "Battle" is used almost pejoratively, but in its barest sense means "competition". To remove "battle" from the vocabulary of conflict is to remove "competition" because what is a "battle" really, but a constrained competition between two or more adversaries?

By removing "battle" from his vocablary, Warden attributes to Airpower the power to act unilaterally and without the "enemy getting a vote", as though our recent abaility to establish and maintain dominance of the air is a given in any future conflict.

If the other guy has an the capability to compete with you in your desire to apply airpower, how can you assume away "battle"?

And this leads to the ultimate hubris:

It also opens another very exciting possibility: conflict with little or no unplanned destruction or shedding of blood.

and no mention of the "5 rings"

[Cliff]

Cliff,
what do you think are the key points Warden is making that are new in this most recent paper?
What do you think is being misunderstood about his other points?

I outlined most of what I think the key points are elsewhere, but his summary is:

• Strategy provides the framework for finding the best means to attain objectives.
• If we want to change our opponent as a system to conform to our objectives, then the most direct approach entails affecting opponent centers of gravity closely related to the objectives.
• Fast action and short conflicts are imperative and far less expensive than slow, long ones.
• As we consider conflict, we should explore bloodless-force options exhaustively before reverting to traditional war and battle.
• “Battle” is at best an expensive and risky means to a distant end, and we should almost always avoid it.

Finally, he is arguing that:

we should at least begin with the presumption that airpower can carry out any military task... After careful consideration of a problem, we may decide that airpower will not work. That is an acceptable answer—for now.

In other words, airpower can do much more than some would have us believe, and we should keep trying to make it work rather than writing it off.

He closes with a plea to folks in the airpower community to work to sell their case, based not on technological promises but actual perforrmance.

One must have a 'desired end-state' that one wants to achieve. The issue comes becomes how tightly coupled cause and effect are in the 'systems' involved.

True, but you can still try to understand them as a system- ultimately there is a cause and effect, it just may be difficult to understand or predict.

Almost a throw away given a desire for "just war", but important not to take to the extreme. The rub is in how you define "bloodless - force"...

He is simply saying that airpower has the potential to reduce the loss of life.

Presupposes the existence and determinability of "direct, strategic centers of gravity" and linear cause and effect relationships between them and the desired outcomes. In Real Life, there are few "strategic centers of gravity" that can be determined (implying determinism...) and the cause and effect chains between them are not identifiable, or linear.

It may be difficult, but CoGs do exist - you just have to identify the correct ones. This may not always be possible, but again Warden is saying the fact that it is tough shouldn't make us give up. For example, Gadaffi probably has some things he cares about, like his life - and these would be CoGs for the current Libyan govt.

How does our vocabulary invalidate any of our current Joint Concepts? Which of those concepts no longer make sense and why? How does changing vocabulary (to what, that of business and return on investment?) enable different concepts. Capabilities enable concepts, not vocabulary.

His point is the focus on battle and attrition that is very much a part of US doctrine limits our thinking on ways to directly affect enemy CoGs.

Assumes not just a linear Newtonian world-view, but one that presupposes relationships between the enemy system and our desires. Who defines "closely related"? Have not seen enough cultural mismatches in our recent wars to put this sort of thinking to rest?

Again, I think you're taking this too literally. I agree on the cultural mismatches- but I think Warden would argue that we need to understand the enemy as a system prior to picking CoGs.

There is a missing consideration of intensity. The reductio adsurdum is that all war should then be nuclear because it is the fastest and shortest conflict.

Disagree, his stated intent is to reduce loss of life using things like precision...

THis is perhaps where I disagree with Warden the most. "Battle" is used almost pejoratively, but in its barest sense means "competition". To remove "battle" from the vocabulary of conflict is to remove "competition" because what is a "battle" really, but a constrained competition between two or more adversaries?

I think he is decrying the fact that to the US battle means "attrition"...

By removing "battle" from his vocablary, Warden attributes to Airpower the power to act unilaterally and without the "enemy getting a vote", as though our recent abaility to establish and maintain dominance of the air is a given in any future conflict. If the other guy has an the capability to compete with you in your desire to apply airpower, how can you assume away "battle"?

I disagree... the point is to avoid having to fight the enemy's fielded forces through attrition if you can. Yes the enemy gets a vote, but shouldn't we try to deny his ability to act if we can? Again, Warden is saying that our way of thinking pushes us in the direction of thought you are advocating - we're programmed to think about beating the other guy's military.

And this leads to the ultimate hubris:

I guess I don't see what's wrong with trying to reduce the loss of life (on both sides) in combat if we can do so while still achieving objectives...

Again, I emphasive that Warden's point isn't just his 5 rings model... it is that we need to change our way of thinking to avoid being focused on battle. You could say that that focus on battle led us to a bad strategy for COIN in Iraq prior to the surge... because a lot of units were enemy-focused in an effort to defeat them. Just a thought.

Great comments pvebber, looking forward to seeing your response.

V/R,

Cliff

[Ken White]

Unless the parochial response is from the Army, then it's ok, right?

I railed about that stupidity by the Army while I was in it for over 27 years and while working for it for another 18. I did not rail about Marine parochialism during my four years as a Marine -- my excuse; I started that at age 16 and didn't know better -- by the time I got to the Army I saw how terribly counterproductive and stifling that excessive loyalty could be. It also crushes initiative and innovation. Parochialism by all the services -- and by the communities within the services is absolutely stupid. It is also absolutely embedded. It needs a firm hand to rid the institutions of a wasteful emotion.

I also frequently rail about it here -- and on an equal opportunity basis.

Won't argue with you here- again, I think Warden acknowledges this, he just is trying to argue that difficult shouldn't mean impossible.

Hmm. You said that four times...

I don't think anyone is saying that, at least no one here. The issue to me seems to apply the correct solution to a given situation, not to give up -- and applying on solution to all situations is likely to be problematic...

Then there is this:

Do the folks who say you can't understand things as a system advocate a trial and error approach to strategy?

Cannot speak for others but IMO (an opinion shared by quite a few folks I've been around over the years...) is that the interplay of others with your goals and in response to your actions will cause you to have to modify your strategy on a almost constant basis. This will give the appearance in some cases of a trial and error approach, in others, that is exactly what it will be. In still others, both the actuality and the appearance are avoided and it will seem that the Gods smiled.

That latter will generally be due to a fortuitous personage being at the right place at the right time. I will note that the US has in the past produced some of those types and that over the years all three variants have been evident in our 'strategeries.' I will also note that today, the system almost seems to conspire against great competence and that IMO doies not bode well.

...I think part of why Warden is misunderstood is because people see him as so parochial. What folks miss is that a lot of his efforts aren't addressed at outsiders, but the folks inside the USAF who are stuck in old ways of thinking. The message for them gets misread when people think it applies to outsiders...

Yes...