Air Power in the New COIN Era

[120mm]

As for the USAF caring, I'm sorry you feel that way. I know the folks who I work with are well aware and all do care- almost every unit has someone deployed to the AOR. One of my two NCOs got mortared twice yesterday at Balad.

You make my point about the USAF "not caring". The USAF has put those NCOs into a position to get mortared not because their core mission required it, but because they are trying to make a "statement" by putting personnel in harms way.

There is not a single place on Anaconda where an USAF personnel should legitimately be, doing a valid USAF mission where mortars should be an issue. I calculated the sightlines myself, back in 2003, when we occupied it. (Rockets, on the other hand, can range the airfield, but not accurately)

While we're at it, the USAF fought tooth and nail not to even be IN Balad. They wanted to occupy BIAP, and intentionally bombed Balad SE runways(which was abandoned pre-war) in order to deter the Army from occupying it. I saw the freaking target lists, both before, and after we attempted to coordinate with the Air Force to form Balad SE as the Corps air hub.

[Cliff]

You make my point about the USAF "not caring". The USAF has put those NCOs into a position to get mortared not because their core mission required it, but because they are trying to make a "statement" by putting personnel in harms way.

My NCO is in the desert based on orders from SECDEF - the AF had no input. He is not "making a statement".

You would rather not have AF folks there helping? The result would be increased deployments for your Army troops - I guess that is "caring" for your people?

I understand you dislike the Air Force, but that doesn't make everyone in it evil and uncaring.

[120mm]

My NCO is in the desert based on orders from SECDEF - the AF had no input. He is not "making a statement".

You would rather not have AF folks there helping? The result would be increased deployments for your Army troops - I guess that is "caring" for your people?

The AF "help" is insubstantial, relative to numbers. It IS a PR move. And every time an AF supporter brings it up, I am reminded of that subordinate who suddenly starts bringing me coffee the week before his OER/NCOER.

I understand you dislike the Air Force, but that doesn't make everyone in it evil and uncaring.

Not true at all. If I disliked the Air Force, I wouldn't be so passionate about wanting them to do the right thing.

The thing I don't "get" is how incredibly effective they can be in getting what they "want", but the things they don't "want" are suddenly a bridge to far, or "We in the Air Force just do what we're told."

[120mm]

Before we get too involved in who can pee the farthest, this current discussion is indicative of what happens when you have two (or more) self-interested and separate groups competing for limited assets.

I work as a scenario writer at JMRC Hohenfels, and traditionally, the different groups would make their best attempt at a plan, separately, and then come together and hammer out their differences on the first day of an exercize. That was typically pretty bloody, and I doubt our effectiveness using this method.

The last rotation we ran, we made the unprecedented move of collaborating directly, between 3 different contractor groups, the Army, Air Force, and the UK Army from the beginning. Not surprisingly, we had the best rotation I've witnessed.

I think competing services are much more effective/less ineffective in conventional war. I also think that competitiveness between services is not conducive to winning COIN/unconventional warfare.

[Entropy]

The AF "help" is insubstantial, relative to numbers. It IS a PR move. And every time an AF supporter brings it up, I am reminded of that subordinate who suddenly starts bringing me coffee the week before his OER/NCOER.

I guess I don't quite understand how DoD ordering the USAF and USN to pony up manpower for tasks outside of their doctrinal missions is a "PR move." And if the numbers are "insubstantial" then why do ILO/IA requirements exist in the first place? The AF has about 6.300 people in these positions and the Navy about 8,000. What number is "substantial" and how many additional personnel are required before the reasoning ceases to be a "PR move?"

I think competing services are much more effective/less ineffective in conventional war. I also think that competitiveness between services is not conducive to winning COIN/unconventional warfare.

Partially agreed. I think a limited amount of competitiveness is usually a good thing - for questioning assumptions as much as anything else - but cooperation should be the norm. I'm a big, big fan of jointness and interoperability. Of course, the biggest service fights really boil down to money and the budget and I don't have much good to say about our current procurement process. If the budget rivalries could somehow be eliminated (I can't think of how that might be achieved) that would go along way to improving relations in other areas IMO.

Rank Amateur,

Essentially, the F-22 with it's sensor suit, stealth design, and supercruise capability allows it to penetrate the 100nm+ engagement envelopes of the new SAM systems that are beginning to proliferate and deliver weapons to kill the key nodes in those systems. It will have the ability to DF threats, image those areas with its SAR for target coordinates (for mobile and semi-mobile systems), and then pass those coordinates to a weapon - probably a small-diamter-bomb variant. It can also receive target information via datalink from other F-22's and a variety of other ISR platforms.

Anyway, to sum up based on what everyone's said it looks like there are four primary things to make the Air Force and air forces in general more effective in COIN:

1. Attitude: More AF humility and deference on COIN matters.
2. ISR: More, more, more
3. Airflift: More, more more
4. CAS: Better integration with the ground force and ??? not sure what else.

Thanks everyone for an interesting and lively debate!

[selil]

4. CAS: Better integration with the ground force and ??? not sure what else.

The way this bullet is stated exemplifies part of the problem. There can not be "better" integration with ground forces for close air support (CAS). There can only be perfect coordination. In CAS it is not the jet jockey who is sitting in the firing line of torrential hell and pain. If the Air Force took CAS seriously it would not allow any jet jockey to do CAS until they had been a forward air controller with grunts. Then again that is assuming that the Air Force takes CAS seriously and doesn't assign the bottom of the air plane driver class to A10's and other pretty things...

[Entropy]

The way this bullet is stated exemplifies part of the problem. There can not be "better" integration with ground forces for close air support (CAS). There can only be perfect coordination. In CAS it is not the jet jockey who is sitting in the firing line of torrential hell and pain. If the Air Force took CAS seriously it would not allow any jet jockey to do CAS until they had been a forward air controller with grunts. Then again that is assuming that the Air Force takes CAS seriously and doesn't assign the bottom of the air plane driver class to A10's and other pretty things...

Ok, three things. First the vagueness of that bullet was in large part due the general complaints here about CAS with an almost complete lack of specifics. Vague, generalized criticisms about not being "serious" are, to put it charitably, not very helpful.

Secondly, sending 10000 plus aviators (no mention of the Navy?) to "work with grunts" is a solution looking for a problem. It's the JTAC/JFO that needs to understand the various types of fires, capabilities and how to employ them in a particular situation. This was formalized a few years ago, in case you hadn't heard.

Finally, the comment on A-10 pilot selection is frankly an insult to the many outstanding Hog pilots out there and furthermore is 100% incorrect. A-10's are part of the same training track as fighters and bombers, which usually get the top 25% of candidates depending on AF needs, pilot desires and other factors. And in that top quartile, it's actually easier to get an F-16 than an A-10 and the B-2 is the most difficult.

[selil]

Ok, three things. First the vagueness of that bullet was in large part due the general complaints here about CAS with an almost complete lack of specifics. Vague, generalized criticisms about not being "serious" are, to put it charitably, not very helpful.

So some specific complaints about CAS being done by the USAF.

1. The ground troop mission is not fully understood by the air crews and the CAS mission for air crews is an added mission rather than a primary mission.

2. Most debate around CAS seems to be an organizational issue rather than a tactical or capability issue centered on unity of command. A personal opinion is that the troops on the ground in close proximity to the most lethal weapons on the battlefield should be controlling the release of those weapons.

3. The Marine Corps was specifically left out of the discussion as until recently Marine Aviators and Naval Aviators do operate under a unified command system and rarely (in comparison) have the issues that the Army USAF and Marine USAF have in CAS.

4. There are examples of artillery and now UAVs being used for supporting missions that when employed rarely have the issues of fratricide CAS has involved.

Oh, you don't have to believe me because the Air Force said it all first.

Secondly, sending 10000 plus aviators (no mention of the Navy?) to "work with grunts" is a solution looking for a problem. It's the JTAC/JFO that needs to understand the various types of fires, capabilities and how to employ them in a particular situation. This was formalized a few years ago, in case you hadn't heard.

Relying on absurdity to counter a point is rarely relevant on the discussion. First only those dedicated to CAS should be required to train and understand the infantry position. Except the USAF has few dedicated CAS specialists. Further, deploying a single USAF Major to a battalion for coordination of all elements on the ground has to reach cognitive saturation rapidly.

Finally, the comment on A-10 pilot selection is frankly an insult to the many outstanding Hog pilots out there and furthermore is 100% incorrect. A-10's are part of the same training track as fighters and bombers, which usually get the top 25% of candidates depending on AF needs, pilot desires and other factors. And in that top quartile, it's actually easier to get an F-16 than an A-10 and the B-2 is the most difficult.

The comment though meant to be funny has an element of truth in it as several A10 drivers at Peterson recounted some hilarious tales about the first Gulf war and being pulled out of other air frames to drive the beast to me personally. You obviously know since you stated "pilot desires" that few pilots are interested in driving a relatively slow, high risk, platform when the big cheese is in fast movers countering other fast movers.

I have my personal USAF peeves. Once upon a time a long time ago the former commander of Peterson AFB and I were having lunch. Along came the topic of the state of the Air Force. I told him then that unless he could make a case for separating armor from the Army, submarines from the Navy, I could not see why the USAF should exist as a separate service based simply on a type of weapons platform.

Another not nearly related article starting on Page 28.. Specifically page 30 talking about the failure of precision munitions.

[VMI_Marine]

The way this bullet is stated exemplifies part of the problem. There can not be "better" integration with ground forces for close air support (CAS). There can only be perfect coordination. In CAS it is not the jet jockey who is sitting in the firing line of torrential hell and pain. If the Air Force took CAS seriously it would not allow any jet jockey to do CAS until they had been a forward air controller with grunts. Then again that is assuming that the Air Force takes CAS seriously and doesn't assign the bottom of the air plane driver class to A10's and other pretty things...

I don't think that is a realistic fix. The Marine Corps does not require pilots to perform a FAC tour before flying CAS missions. In fact, (speaking as a non-aviator JTAC) one of the reasons that aviators retain their place as SMEs in the ground combat element is their knowledge of CAS tactics in the air. The ground piece is relatively straight forward, the difficulty comes from things such as airspace management that aviators are much smarter on.

[Cavguy]

"You old guys need to get over that s—t."
- Young Marine to Marine Sergeant Major when asked how he felt about fighting alongside an Army unit in Al Anbar, Iraq.

I feel compelled to defend the USAF some. The USAF is undoubtedly making significant contributions to the conflicts in Iraq/Afghanistan. A soldier in theater can be assured of an armed CAS aircraft overhead to support in less than a half hour (often much less) when he gets into trouble. That makes them the "QRF" for many units.

I was on the receiving end of this support - both on the ground in combat and as a coordinator for a BCT's worth of assets. They never failed to show up and support the ground commander. There was sometimes some friction/difficulty, but no more than any other asset.

While I have signifcant disagreement with the USAF's approach to COIN as articulated by MGen Dunlap, (and for those who say it's only his opinion - name a serving USAF GO who has publically disagreed with him - therefore, he speaks for the USAF by default), many of their lower level guys "get it".

The JFO issue remains a problem to get "enough" to the force to support everyone who needs supporting. There are fixes in the pipeline. It was a major topic of the III Corps CALL collection I just attended.

The UAV issue is a self-inflicted wound IMO, and a failure to anticipate the growing demand for UAV's versus who should fly them. I'm not a pilot, so I won't say whether a pilot is needed to support the strategic UAV's or a highly trained WO/Enl. It does seem they're making efforts to fix.

This also applies to the supported/supporting relationship of the CAOC to the theaters requesting support - there is still some friction there to be addressed so too many cooks don't spoil the ATO and CAS pot.

Finally, the F-22. We must retain air dominance for the future. We lose that, I'm up Sh*t creek. I don't know whether it could be performed at lesser cost by another aircraft, and I doubt we need 380 F-22's versus other airframes. We can't affort to let anyone else control the skies.

I'm tempted with the USA and USMC to pull the biblical admonition - "Pull the stick out of your own eye (though the USAF has a stick too)"

I'm more concerned with the articles and speeches emerging from USAF thinking Airpower and PGM's can win a COIN fight than anything. It just defies reality as practiced the last few years. The IAF thought it could defeat Hizbollah using EBO, when it failed the Israeli army was left holding the (unprepared and untrained) bag. Listening to the USAF, they seem to hold similar views to the IAF in 2006 regarding airpower, EBO, and low intensity wars.

[Laxman]

The way this bullet is stated exemplifies part of the problem. There can not be "better" integration with ground forces for close air support (CAS). There can only be perfect coordination. In CAS it is not the jet jockey who is sitting in the firing line of torrential hell and pain. If the Air Force took CAS seriously it would not allow any jet jockey to do CAS until they had been a forward air controller with grunts. Then again that is assuming that the Air Force takes CAS seriously and doesn't assign the bottom of the air plane driver class to A10's and other pretty things...

I'll tag on a little bit to what Entropy has said.

If the Army (not all, just the majority) was a little smarter in doing business, or understood what CAS actually does for it, then CAS integration would become a lot easier. Prejudice inhibits full integration and the prejudice is propagated within its training plan. Also, please find one RCO/BCO that fully understands what a JFO actually brings to the table. More often than not, a JFO usually ends up a cook or is staring at maps in the 2 shop, not out forward where they should be. The Air Force does not help itself with a lack of leaders that deal directly at the DIV / Corps level and help Army COs make sound decisions. The only service that truly has integration with land and air components is the Marines.

[Ken White]

...please find one RCO/BCO that fully understands what a JFO actually brings to the table. More often than not, a JFO is usually ends up a cook or is staring at maps in the 2 shop, not out forward where they should be.

The JFO should be out forward if there were a forward direction and the Bn/Bde was oriented that way. When subordinate units are in dispersed static locations with only sporadic (or even heavy but distributed geographically) contact, where is forward? When units are spread out as in Afghanistan on distributed patrols, which units should the JFO (as opposed to the JTACs. Do we have enough of those yet?) accompany? The JFO is going to be where he and the Cdr agree he can do the most good and have the most flexibility.

Given a war of movement or one of frequent, heavy contact instead of a static low key COIN operation I suspect your complaint would not be a problem.

You might also consider that the Army's lack of smarts about CAS is due to a failure for many years to develop doctrine and to train for it. Both the Army and the AF bear about equal responsibility for that. Consider also that in the current wars, the use of CAS is spotty -- it is not a constant thing for all units in all places, so it is a sometime thing for many in both suits. The important thing is that it's getting better...

The only service that truly has integration with land and air components is the Marines.

Well, yeah. Uh, do you really want to go there?

[120mm]

I guess I don't quite understand how DoD ordering the USAF and USN to pony up manpower for tasks outside of their doctrinal missions is a "PR move."

I guess I just don't believe that the DoD made this move on their own, without USAF and USN input, or even suggestion (I don't accept that the USAF is not politically involved in this). I put it down in the "even if it was forced upon those services, it was the natural result of ignoring/neglecting the future of conflict since 1989" category at the very least. In other words, if the USAF was decisively engaged (and was pushing this fact in its IO) in their core competency in the COIN fight, there wouldn't be the reality or perception that they had airmen available to do the mission.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

that the capabilities that the USAF bring to the fight are the best in the world. However, their senior leadership in the five sided puzzle palace, rather than focus on the fight we're in, tend to advocate for more stuff we don't need at the moment to prosecute the two COIN wars we're eye deep in.

I guess I don't quite understand how DoD ordering the USAF and USN to pony up manpower for tasks outside of their doctrinal missions is a "PR move."

I don't agree either that it was a PR stunt. I think the USAF and USN made a legitimate and sincere offer to close a personnel gap that needed to be filled in the near term. While the typical Airman and Sailor may not be ready to pull on a set of cammies, grab a weapon, and join the fight tomorrow they at least have been through basic training and thus can be brought up to a certain level of tactical ability much quicker that someone who has just entered either the Army or Marine Corps training pipeline.

1. Attitude: More AF humility and deference on COIN matters.
2. ISR: More, more, more
3. Airflift: More, more more
4. CAS: Better integration with the ground force and ??? not sure what else.

I'll chew on these one at a time:

#1: I don't think humility is in order, more like better focus on the Nation's task at hand rather than advocating for future capabilities that have no application to the present situation. All the services have pride in what they do and thus it should be. As to deference to COIN, I'd say it's more along the lines of the USAF has been slow to recognize that the current brouhaha is COIN and accordingly shifted their focus to the fact that COIN takes a long time.

If you hearken back to the last "good war" I do not think that Arnold, Spaatz, Vandenberg, et all were crying "we need the B-36 now, we need a better fighter to deal with ME-262's, we need to be a separate service now,..." They certainly were thinking of those things and as soon as the war was over they shifted gears and pressed hard for all that and more. But while we were in the fight, they stayed focused on the fight. Same should hold true today.

#2: ISR is an important capability within which are UAVs, which should be deployed in greater numbers. Plus, UAV's have slipped slightly out of the ISR lane and are no longer passive sensors, they can bite.

#3: There’s the old hack “amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics.” While I feel that’s way over simplified our strategic lift is second to none and if the USAF was screaming louder for C-17s they might get more sympathy from ground pounders.

#4: USAF CAS is really good but Marine CAS is better (just as USAF air superiority has the edge over the Marines), so part of staying relevant to the fight is to learn from those who do it for a living. Although with the advent of even better PGMs CAS has changed significantly in that the aircraft carrying the weapon is almost irrelevant (yes, predicated on air supremecy). It’s the coordination between the ground user and the airborne deliverer that is most important.

Oh, CavGuy, BTW, I always looked forward to a tour with the Army, better chow for one, and I usually learned some new stuff.

Sometimes while in the Corps I felt there often was an inverse proportion between rank and open mindedness.

[Laxman]

There is not a single place on Anaconda where an USAF personnel should legitimately be, doing a valid USAF mission where mortars should be an issue. I calculated the sightlines myself, back in 2003, when we occupied it. (Rockets, on the other hand, can range the airfield, but not accurately)

I know this statement has been refuted. But to make sure everyone is one the same page, a JTAC/ROMAD/ALO - in other words the TACP, vary in rank from Airman to Col. They do an amazing job with what they are given and can provide an intelligent army commander great infuence on the battlefield.