Iraq catch-all: after Operation Iraqi Freedom ended

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Iraq’s Kurds have been making waves both domestically and internationally recently. Kurdish Regional President Massoud Barzani has been in an extended political dispute with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki over the distribution of power within the state. The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has attracted major energy companies to invest in its oil industry, and has talked about building its own pipelines to neighboring Turkey. Those events have raised the question of Kurdish independence. Dr. Denise Natali holds the Minerva Chair at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. She is the author of The Kurdish Quasi-state: Development and Dependency in Post-Gulf War Iraq and The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, and has researched, lived, and worked in the Kurdistan region since 1992. What follows is an interview with Dr. Natali about the Kurds’ political and economic strategy, as well as the internal situation within the KRG. She believes that talk of Kurdish independence is unrealistic, because the Kurdistan Region is economically dependent upon Baghdad, has no clearly accepted territorial boundaries of a Kurdish state, and has no regional support for its political ambitions, including from Turkey.

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Iraq’s insurgents are in the midst of their summer offensive. June 2012 saw a string of deadly attacks as a result. Despite all the press that generated, two out of three groups that recorded casualties in Iraq last month noted a decrease showing that there is not always a correlation between security incidents and fatalities. More importantly, recent events highlight the current deadlock in the country’s security situation. On the one hand, Al Qaeda in Iraq is trying to re-assert itself. On the other, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have returned to being a reactive, and often times repressive force. Neither side has the ability to win this struggle meaning that Iraq will continue to witness this level of violence.

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Starting in 2005, the United States began accusing Iran of supplying weapons to Iraqi militants. This included assault rifles, machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, explosives, mortars, and rockets. The deadliest device was the Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs) that were capable of destroying Coalition armored vehicles. The Americans would routinely hold press conferences on the topic, and take journalists to see arms caches allegedly full of weapons from Iran. Some were skeptical of these accusations since Washington failed so badly on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, and believed that the claims against Tehran were just an attempt to expand the conflict to another country. Below is an interview with Galen Wright who runs the blog The Arkenstone that specializes in Iranian military affairs, which goes through some of the major claims made about Tehran’s arms shipments to Iraq.

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Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki lived in exile for over twenty years, while Saddam Hussein was in power. As a member of the outlawed Islamic Dawa Party, he felt like his life was in danger, and ended up fleeing to Syria and Iran. During his years living abroad, he was in a world of intrigue facing internal divisions within Dawa, having to deal with government and intelligence officials from Tehran and Damascus, and the other exile opposition parties. Back in Iraq, Dawa was conducting an armed struggle against the regime, leading to constant round-ups and executions, meaning that Maliki was always under threat from Baghdad’s agents. Those long years away from home, shaped Maliki, and how he saw politics. After the U.S. invasion in 2003, Maliki returned to Iraq mistrustful of others, and with a conspiratorial mind, which has played a large role in how he has governed as premier.

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Moderator's Note: See Post 87 for the video, it was removed by you Tube

ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ VIDEO: Islamic State of Iraq Gunmen In Disguise Attacking Several Checkpoints

ISI fighters dressed as SWAT teams with vehicles and uniforms attack checkpoints throughout Anbar, executing guards

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...o-islamic.html

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davidbfpo,

Turkey is pretty much concerned about any action Iran takes these days in Iraq. That being said, Iran has been shipping weapons and supplies to Syria for decades. They don't need a base in Kurdistan now to facilitate that. What was in the Stratfor video appears to be just what Turkey has been doing, which is to place some troops along the border area to counter the PKK/PJAK.

Any negotiation with Iran at this point would be about as useful as was any deals made with Hitler in the 1930`s. How would I know this? Many would agree that it is the "hand writing on the wall." I really feel bad to be such a cynical person. RAB

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In December 1998, the United States and England launched the largest attack upon Iraq since the 1991 Gulf War. Dubbed Operation Desert Fox, the campaign turned out to be a short one of just four days of bombing and missile strikes. The cause was Saddam Hussein’s continued refusal to cooperate with the United Nations’ weapons inspectors, who withdrew from the country shortly before the operation started, and would not return again until the end of 2002. At the time, Desert Fox was highly controversial within the United States, because it came on the heels of the Monica Lewinsky scandal. Many politicians and analysts derided the attack as being a diversion from American domestic politics, and ineffective due to its short duration, and because Iraq was left to operate with no inspectors in the country. Supporters said it almost caused a coup. After the fall of the regime, investigators found that the program ended Iraq’s hopes of rebuilding its chemical and biological weapons operations. In the end, Operation Desert Fox proved to have far more effects upon Iraq than initially thought.

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The Islamic State of Iraq/Al Qaeda in Iraq video of attacks upon checkpoints in Anbar is back up. ISI fighters dressed as SWAT teams with vehicles and uniforms attack checkpoints throughout Anbar, executing guards

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...o-raid-on.html

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In November 2005, an American military unit found a secret prison in an Iraqi Interior Ministry building in Baghdad. It contained over 170 prisoners, many of which showed signs of torture. U.S. and Iraqi officials knew that abuses were taking place within the country for quite some time, but had said little about it beforehand. Human rights groups had also noted mistreatment, but gotten little coverage. The detention center however, received worldwide attention, and let the world know that Iraq had not progressed much when it came to human rights despite the fall of Saddam Hussein.

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Since the United States withdrew its military in December 2011, Iraq’s insurgents have grown bolder and deadlier. Press reports of large scale attacks in 2012 would seem to point to this turn of events, but the number of deaths and security incidents are largely unchanged from 2011 to 2012. It’s only upon closer examination of the number of casualties per attack and the fact that Shiite Special Groups have largely ceased their operations that the turn in security can be deciphered. This largely undermines hopes that the insurgency would be fading now that foreign forces are out of Iraq.

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When talking about the relationship between Iraq and Syria, the conventional wisdom seems to be that Baghdad is backing Damascus at the behest of Iran. Syria has been one of Tehran’s closest allies in the region. It is therefore threatened by the possible fall of President Bashar al-Assad. Many also see Iraq as being under the influence of Iran now that the United States military is out of the country. This assumes that Iraq cannot act independently, and is basically a proxy of Tehran in the Middle East. This theory overlooks the security concerns of the Iraqi government, which is the driving force being its Syrian policy.

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In an interview with Musings On Iraq, Dr. Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy pointed out that violence in Iraq has become increasingly localized. Between provinces and cities within the country there are great variations in the level of attacks and deaths. For instance, in places like Baghdad and Mosul there are on average a 100 a more attacks per month. That compares to places like Kut in Wasit province where an incident may only happen every few months. Even within cities there are differences. Mosul per capita, is the most violent urban area in Iraq, but even there 100 attacks spread out across a 10 mile area with around 1.8 million people means most only hear or read about an explosion or gunfire rather than actually witness it. This all points to the complicated nature of security in Iraq at present. Press reports of mass casualty bombings, especially now with the insurgents carrying out a summer offensive, give the impression that the whole nation must be on fire. A study of casualties across 30 cities shows that militants are in fact greatly limited in where they can carry out their deadly work.

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Immediately after the 2003 invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) did not think a new Iraqi army was necessary. Many American officials in Iraq believed that a strong military would bring back memories of Saddam Hussein amongst the Kurdish and Shiite populations. Even when the CPA finally began to see the errors of their ways they still wanted a small and light force. As security quickly deteriorated in the country, the U.S. was forced to recognize that a new military was needed to take on the insurgents and militias. Still, the effort was done in a haphazard way. The ultimate goal was to stand up a Iraqi forces so that the American troops could withdraw. Again and again this plan was shelved as violence grew in the country. It wasn’t until the middle of 2004 that the U.S. finally put in place the organizations that would eventually create a new Iraqi security force. It would still take years for this to be anything close to an effective institution, and the effort suffered from many setbacks.

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At the beginning of October 2012, Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki went on a diplomatic mission to Russia and the Czech Republic. After meeting with each country’s leaders, the premier signed two large arms deals for jets, helicopters, and ground-to-air missiles. These will be used for both internal and external defense, with the latter being a high priority as the nation lacks any real air defense at this time. As with most major decisions made by Baghdad, these contracts got caught up in domestic politics as the Kurdish Coalition criticized them. Iraq has traditionally bought weapons from Eastern Europe, and has done so in recent years, and will likely to continue to do so in the future, regardless of what the Kurds have to say about it.

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Iraq saw a bloody summer this year as insurgent groups launched their annual offensive. In three out of the four months during the season, there were double-digit deaths per day. That now appears to have ended with a large reduction in casualties in October 2012.

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Keith Mines is not your typical Foreign Service Officer. He is a former soldier in the 82nd Airborne Division and 7th Special Forces Group with service in Central America. He then joined the State Department, and served around the world, often in conflict and post-conflict nations. Some of the places he has been posted include Israel, El Salvador, Haiti, Sudan, Somalia, and Hungary. Recently he worked on counternarcotics in Mexico, and is now serving his second term in Afghanistan. From August 2003 to February 2004, he was the top Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) officer in Anbar province. There he saw all of the early hopes and problems with the United States’ administration of Iraq. Below is an interview with Keith Mines about his work in Anbar and for the CPA.

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Today, the Iraqi Army and the Kurdish peshmerga are facing off across the disputed areas of northern Iraq, while politicians in Baghdad and Irbil are in a heated war of words. The point of contention is the new Tigris Operations Command created by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The recent events are almost an exact replay of 2008 when the central government confronted the Kurdish parties in Diyala province. Both appeared aimed at shoring up the premier’s standing with the electorate before provincial elections. Regional President Massoud Barzani also benefited as he rallied the Kurdish parties behind him. On the outside these confrontations looked like they could escalate into open warfare, but they were more political theater than anything else.

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During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the West was both shocked and amused by the announcements made by Iraq’s Information Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf, better known as “Baghdad Bob.” He repeatedly claimed that the Americans and British were being thrashed, and that Iraq was winning the war. These comments were incomprehensible in the West as their news was reporting a quick and deadly thrust by the U.S. led Coalition, which reached Baghdad in only a matter of weeks. In fact, Minister Sahaf’s pronouncements reflected what Saddam Hussein’s government was actually hearing from its military and officials. This was due to the environment the Iraqi dictator created based upon Iraq’s history, and his conspiratorial mind.

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Iraq’s military confrontations with the United States largely shaped the Saddam Hussein’s view of America. Each time Iraq did something provocative in the 1990s the White House would usually respond with a few cruise missiles, which did not have much affect. The Iraqi dictator believed that the U.S. was therefore wed to air power rather than the use of its ground forces. America’s defeat in the Vietnam War, and its experience in Somalia and Serbia seemed to solidify Saddam’s opinion. For all of those reasons, Baghdad did not believe that the Bush administration was serious about going to war in 2003.

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Today, the reign of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria is teetering in the face of a popular uprising. His Baath Party, which used to administer the state, has collapsed giving way to a quasi-Assad family-military rule. The security forces and intelligence agencies are faltering in their attempt to suppress the rebels as well. A look at how the Syrian regime has been run shows close similarities to the rule of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Both ran their governments not through institutions, but with family. The two Baathist dictators were also afraid of coups, and therefore undermined their own militaries and intelligence agencies to protect themselves. The shortcomings of such strategies are now all to apparent as Assad is expected to eventually fall from power.

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