What have we learned (2000-2010)?

[Schmedlap]

Fighting a war is a tough slog when you've got no reasonable strategy and the President is incapable of rallying the public behind the effort.

Well, at least I hope we've learned that. It's something we should have already known.

[Ron Humphrey]

Fighting a war is a tough slog

Whether or not

you've got no reasonable strategy and the President is incapable of rallying the public behind the effort.

Well, at least I hope we've learned that. It's something we should have already known.

Though many have, Still not sure those who actually end up making the decisions have completely accepted it as such.

[Starbuck]

Fighting counterinsurgencies in foreign countries is always a tricky proposition. Even the British had trouble maintaining popular support and had competing strategic objectives during the American Revolution.

[Entropy]

We've learned the Air Force and Army can actually work together. Hopefully it sticks, but with budget cuts on the horizon I'm betting there will be a countermarch back to parochialism in short order.

[MikeF]

I can certainly empathize with Global Scout and Ken White's pessimism, and I would suggest that their concern drives a follow-on question,

What should we learn from the last decade?

I appreciate the comments thus far. Here is my summarization of the discussion,

"Good" Habits
-War is difficult and rarely cheap, easy, or simple
-Due to our protracted involvement, GPF forces are relearning how to work as advisors
-Air Force and Army working together
-High-tech solutions are rarely solutions and do not necessarily simplify
-Mission planning requires more than just destroying the enemy

"Bad" Habits
-Some SF units have moved away from advising towards direct action
-Excessive use of contractors
-Excessive reliance on EBO
-Continued struggles with Unity of Effort
-Lack of some leaders to understand the value of coersion, bluffing, and posturing
-Lack of deception and propaganda operations replaced by "narrative"
-Overly focused on Force Protection

Undetermined Positions
- "Good" Governance versus "Military" Solution
- Use of social scientists on the battlefield
- The long term utility of FM 3-24

I'll turn it back over to y'all for critique and continued discussion.

-Mike

[jcustis]

What should we learn from the last decade?

Appropriate investments in the small unit leader, in the way of training, equipment, and education, can make him a force multiplier beyond our wildest imagination. I have seen it in some of the young men who fill billets that I had direct command over during the invasion of Iraq. There is a definite difference between the strategic corporal of then, and now. Can't quite put my finger on exactly what, but it's there.

[Steve Blair]

I think another important question is "how much of this will we REALLY learn?"

I've always looked at this conflict through a slightly different lens when it comes to the inevitable Vietnam comparisons. In this conflict, the military certainly adapted on the battlefield much faster than they did during Vietnam. But I still question how lasting the adaptation was the further away from the battlefield (and the higher in rank) one was.

The Army learned a great deal in Vietnam (some good, some bad...but that's another question for another time), but what was truly fascinating was how quickly those lessons were either shed or buried in obscure training manuals. Even leaders who should have know better turned the majority of their training focus away from the lessons of Vietnam (in terms of small unit tactics and operational practices) and started focusing on Central Europe. This quickly became something of a doctrinal stampede, and we ended up having to relearn everything the hard way (again).

We've also learned (yet again) that some of our core personnel and training systems simply don't work with an all-volunteer force. Will we actually fix it this time?

The interesting thing, to me, is that most of the lessons you've summarized, Mike, could have come from Vietnam as well. The more things change...

[Tom Odom]

Appropriate investments in the small unit leader, in the way of training, equipment, and education, can make him a force multiplier beyond our wildest imagination. I have seen it in some of the young men who fill billets that I had direct command over during the invasion of Iraq. There is a definite difference between the strategic corporal of then, and now. Can't quite put my finger on exactly what, but it's there.

This is what I hope will be the enduring lesson. I fear however because it is neither sexy in terms of procurement nor revolutionary in its inherent truth it will be shelved as too obvious and too simple to excite the collective id of the Big Army.


Tom

[Steve Blair]

This is what I hope will be the enduring lesson. I fear however because it is neither sexy in terms of procurement nor revolutionary in its inherent truth it will be shelved as too obvious and too simple to excite the collective id of the Big Army.


Tom

I really hope you're wrong, Tom, and that they do learn that lesson. However, if history is any guide I think it's very likely that they won't.