MAJ Ehrhart - Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afgh.

[JMA]

Or he's out of his mind pissed off that he's risking being shot to walk across the battlefield screaming at someone to get down so he doesn't get hit.

Schmedlap hit it in that the modern Army dismounted teams are trained enough to know when to get down and/or find cover without being told.

There are references above to companies being pinned down. I'm not sure from what war those references are from, because the US Army (and I'm thinking the Marines also) haven't maneuvered companies in a situation to be pinned down in a very long time.

I asked the question earlier somewhere as to whether "crack and thump" demonstrations are a regular part of training and the answer was for the best units yes, for the rest maybe.

So now in a situation where whole raw units are brought in at the same time for a 'tour of duty' it is likely that the vast majority of the soldiers have had no combat experience. So how would they have the experience to know what constitutes 'effective enemy fire' and what constitutes the odd stray or way off target round passing overhead?

It must surely be a concern that raw troops can decide for themselves when to take cover or even open fire (when not at very close range) ... and yes that IS the corporals job being to command his section and not just look after himself. Surely?

[Ken White]

What would be the typical purpose of a vehicle patrol?

To get from point A to point B without walking? To send a unit to conduct a reconnaissance of a designated area? Raid? Troop insertion? Strike on a high value target? Dozens of reasons...

I believe that the families of troops killed by IEDs should explore their legal options...

Your prerogative. I think you're quite wrong and it seems speaking without full knowledge -- unless you in ZA have better sources than I do which includes a son with a tour in Iraq and two in Afghanistan and friends and neighbors who are there now.

It is seldom up to the 'kids' to change things that lies with the generals and the colonels. The question is how many 'kids' must die before the generals and the colonels to ring the changes?

Wrong. Generals and Colonels are captives of their pasts. LTCs and below not so much; they, the Kids, have have always been the bringers of military change, only rarely does a talented General rise above the mediocrity that is demanded of them in order to survive in a highly competitive environment.

As a former 2d Lieutenant once said: "It did not take long for us to get a list of possible camps from these recce pilots and would visit them one by one with the fire force to tick them off one way or the other."

Fortunately for the kids -- I'm almost 80, so all those 50 year old Colonels and Sergeant Majors are kids to me -- we now have UAVs to do that aerial recce bit. The system works. Imperfectly as always and in every Army the world has ever seen due to human fallibility -- but it works.

In any war, in any terrain, in any theater it is surely poor/weak/incompetent leadership not to select lines of advance so as to avoid 'danger areas' and if unavoidable to use appropriate tactical maneuver to prevent troops being caught in open ground by enemy fire.

Again we agree. I have seen no evidence that is not the case in Afghanistan. Do you have evidence to the contrary or is all this based on partial information and speculation?

I asked the question earlier somewhere as to whether "crack and thump" demonstrations are a regular part of training and the answer was for the best units yes, for the rest maybe.

Er, no, that's incorrect. What I said was: "Dunno, probably not. I told you our training was marginal..."

So now in a situation where whole raw units are brought in at the same time for a 'tour of duty' it is likely that the vast majority of the soldiers have had no combat experience. So how would they have the experience to know what constitutes 'effective enemy fire' and what constitutes the odd stray or way off target round passing overhead?

It must surely be a concern that raw troops can decide for themselves when to take cover or even open fire (when not at very close range) ... and yes that IS the corporals job being to command his section and not just look after himself. Surely?

You take a lot of standing broad jumps at wrong conclusions. Probably about half the Privates in most units rotating to Afghanistan will have a previous combat tour, possibly two. Virtually all the NCOS and Officers above 2d LT will have at least a tour, many will have several -- some folks with six tours are there now.

The US army doesn't use Corporals, the Marines do. Both services use Fire Teams led by a Corporal in the Marines, A Sergeant in the Army. Those Teams are assigned to a Squad (= UK section) led by a marine sergeant or Army Staff Sergeant. Most Fire Team leaders will hav a tour or two, some will have more. The average Squad Leader probably has three or four combat tours (7 months for Marines, a year for the Army).

Our training isn't great (In my opinion) but it is adequate; you asked about crack and thump training -- in US usage that is purely a technique for range estimation. It was taught in WW I and until post Viet Nam -- the ranges in Viet Nam were so short and the number of weapons being fired in most fights made it ineffective. It is often be taught in units and as you inferred, good units will do it and as units go through cycles due to personnel turnover, most are good at one time or another. It may be taught in institutional training now, they've added a bunch of stuff in the last few years. I doubt it, a real fire fight doesn't pose much need for it though it is handy for scouts and to estimate range to artillery or mortars.

So you asked about an esoteric technique which has some value but not enough to warrant spending initial entry time on it for the value derived.

What you did not ask about was live fire training, of which we do a great deal, in initial entry institutional training, in unit sustainment training and heavily in pre-deployment training as well as in refresher training conducted in theater. I suspect US troops fire far more than most armies and there's plenty of training wherein the troops learn to diffrentiate near and far misses from the thud of a hit -- even if they don't do crack and thump routinely to ascertain the approximate range to a fired weapon...

It is not a concern to me that troops can decide for themselves -- occasionally with a little NCO assistance -- to seek cover; in fact, I wouldn't have it any other way. You have to give troops responsibility, no need to treat them like children. We tend to value life so we encourage taking cover then deciding whether one needed to do that. It takes about two firefights for the average person to sort that out properly. As they say, it isn't rocket science . It would concern me a great deal if NCO direction was constantly needed on that and other basic skills. In a real firefight, there's way too much noise and confusion for commands to be heard so the troops have to know what to do. We do generally get them to that point before deploying them.

Somehow you've arrived at a number of erroneous conclusions it seems...

[Schmedlap]

Not disagreeing with any of that, just throwing one thought out there...

I suspect US troops fire far more than most armies and there's plenty of training wherein the troops learn to diffrentiate near and far misses from the thud of a hit -- even if they don't do crack and thump routinely to ascertain the approximate range to a fired weapon...

Crack thud? I can't recall a single engagement (in Iraq) that didn't sound like really loud popcorn. Near miss was the one that struck something within an arm's length from you. Far miss was the one that didn't. Range approximation was simplified to "within hand grenade range" or "not within hand grenade range."

Regarding Afghanistan specifically (where I have not been - I am speaking solely to videos), the engagements appear to be similar, but from longer distances. Units in static positions being attacked from predictable locations - often repeatedly; units taking fire from likely locations while conducting dismounted patrols in the vicinity of populated areas; units taking fire from relatively short distances while in built-up areas; units taking sniper fire while negotiating danger areas in mountainous terrain. The latter seems the only occasion where crack thud has any serious utility. The rest appear to be mostly traveling overwatch situations where, "hey, that suspected enemy position is firing at us."

[JMA]

To get from point A to point B without walking? To send a unit to conduct a reconnaissance of a designated area? Raid? Troop insertion? Strike on a high value target? Dozens of reasons...

Well one would have thought that with the IED death rate of 61% of all casualities http://www.icasualties.org and from the Brits side at 80% of all casualties (quoted on TV in "Ross Kemp in Afghanistan") that alternatives to non-vital road and predictable foot movement would have been implemented by now.

It borders on rank incompetence across the board.

Generals and Colonels are captives of their pasts. LTCs and below not so much; they, the Kids, have have always been the bringers of military change, only rarely does a talented General rise above the mediocrity that is demanded of them in order to survive in a highly competitive environment.

Captives of their pasts to the extent that they are happy to sit back and watch the carnage continue to escalate? It is quite criminal.

As a former 2d Lieutenant once said: "It did not take long for us to get a list of possible camps from these recce pilots and would visit them one by one with the fire force to tick them off one way or the other."

Yes, but the list of possible camps was from the recce pilots that 2Lt had no hand in it other than to help by agitating that when all was otherwise quiet we should systematically check the identified sites out.

Fortunately for the kids -- I'm almost 80, so all those 50 year old Colonels and Sergeant Majors are kids to me -- we now have UAVs to do that aerial recce bit. The system works. Imperfectly as always and in every Army the world has ever seen due to human fallibility -- but it works.

The system is not working... soldiers are dying needlessly because their commanders don't have the smarts to out think the IED threat to both vehicles and foot patrols. 62% of all Afghanistan casualties are largely preventable. Incompetence never 'works'.

Again we agree. I have seen no evidence that is not the case in Afghanistan. Do you have evidence to the contrary or is all this based on partial information and speculation?Er, no, that's incorrect. What I said was: "Dunno, probably not. I told you our training was marginal..."You take a lot of standing broad jumps at wrong conclusions.

I believe it is counter productive to protect incompetence.

The question should be asked of every commander as to what counter measures he has implemented (or recommended the implementation of) in the face of the IED threat. As this accounts for at least 60% of all casualties if there is no clear and coherent answer supported his own units casualty stats he should his butt on the next plane home.

Probably about half the Privates in most units rotating to Afghanistan will have a previous combat tour, possibly two. Virtually all the NCOS and Officers above 2d LT will have at least a tour, many will have several -- some folks with six tours are there now.

Well if you don't mind we need to get some better stats than that. The reports of chaotic fire fights does not indicate widespread previous combat experience... or worse still enough tactical nous.

The US army doesn't use Corporals, the Marines do. Both services use Fire Teams led by a Corporal in the Marines, A Sergeant in the Army. Those Teams are assigned to a Squad (= UK section) led by a marine sergeant or Army Staff Sergeant. Most Fire Team leaders will hav a tour or two, some will have more. The average Squad Leader probably has three or four combat tours (7 months for Marines, a year for the Army).

Thanks for clarifying that. You can take it when I use ranks I use the Brit system.

(reply split over two replies)

[JMA]

Our training isn't great (In my opinion) but it is adequate; you asked about crack and thump training -- in US usage that is purely a technique for range estimation. It was taught in WW I and until post Viet Nam -- the ranges in Viet Nam were so short and the number of weapons being fired in most fights made it ineffective. It is often be taught in units and as you inferred, good units will do it and as units go through cycles due to personnel turnover, most are good at one time or another. It may be taught in institutional training now, they've added a bunch of stuff in the last few years. I doubt it, a real fire fight doesn't pose much need for it though it is handy for scouts and to estimate range to artillery or mortars.

So you asked about an esoteric technique which has some value but not enough to warrant spending initial entry time on it for the value derived.

Not sure mediocrity should ever become acceptable... under any circumstances.

Yes well I should have elaborated. Yes the basic 'crack and thump' takes you only so far. (probably as far as the fieldcraft manual envisaged). Here is what the Canadian fieldcraft manual states:

CRACK AND THUMP

24. When a bullet passes near, one hears two noises: first, the crack of the bullet passing, then the thump of the weapon being fired. The crack is heard before the thump because the bullet travels faster than sound. The thump indicates the direction of the weapon. The
distance to the weapon can be estimated by timing the interval between the crack and the thump. The further away the weapon, the longer the interval between the crack and the thump. The time between the crack and thump at the following ranges is:

a. 300 metres — 2/3 of a second;

b. 600 metres — 1 1/3 seconds; and

c. 900 metres — 2 seconds.

25. Judging the distance to an automatic weapon is slightly more difficult. The last crack and the last thump must be picked out in order to establish the correct automatic weapon range. If the distance is great and the bursts are short, all the cracks of one burst will be heard, followed by the thumps.

Now having found that we needed to train troops in understanding and correctly reacting to the 'crack' we had to take this a stage further and beyond what the fieldcraft manual narrowly envisaged.

Follow this quote from Nick Downie - Brit SAS trained turned war TV camera man. (Who incidentally worked with Lord Richard Cecil the journalist killed while covering operations in Rhodesia:

The standard tactic when 'assaulting' a known or suspected guerilla position is the sweep-line method described above. The advance is carried out at a slow walk, with little or no prophylactic fire, and, unless there is a particularly sinister-looking piece of scrub, the men depend on good observation and fast reactions. If anything moves, or they glimpse a patch of clothing, they will fire perhaps five or six aimed shots, or, in the case of a machine-gunner, a one-second burst. These contacts take place at a range of between two and ten yards. The killing is usually done by one man alone, although occasionally the next man in the line will join in if he too can see the target. As someone opens fire, everybody else pauses. The ones nearest the firing may flinch at the sudden noise, but most of the others do not even turn their heads.
The sweep-line waits while the body is checked and the weapons removed, and the advance then continues at the same measured pace. Once an enemy presence is confirmed, the Rhodesians continue sweeping back and forth until they are certain that all the guerrillas are either dead or have escaped.

Look at the bold type. It was important for all troops to be absolutely comfortable with the type of 'crack' and when the 'crack' indicated something personal. Clearly we could not accept ever man jack deciding when he felt like taking cover and opening fire. It was all about control and discipline and the stick commanders from L/Cpl to Lt had to enforce that. When more than one stick was joined together to sweep an area (normally under a sgt or officer) it was even more important to keep the line straight and maintain the impetus of the advance.

How did we carry out this training? I can only speak for myself.

The textbook crack and thump dem was carried out under basic training to teach first the crack and thump sounds and then to judge distance to weapon based on the interval and then to try to locate the shooter by the location of the thump. That was done.

What we needed to our troops to be able to differentiate between was the differences of crack from our weapons and theirs AK / RPD. Easy lie on the shooting range or in the bush and have those weapons fired over your head. This with the variant of shooting from very close but not directly over ones head to note the difference (in other wards note yes a weapon has been fired at close range but not at you.)

To indicate when it had really become personal we fired over the heads of troops at probably not more than two foot. Starting with high shots and working down closer until the 2 ft 'experience' when yes the soldier could start to dance around without having been ordered to do so.

OK, so part one, to differentiate between their weapons and ours. Two, at close range is the fire in your direction or in someone else's. If not in your direction hold your ground. And three when it moves from a sound to a 'sensation' then he can take the appropriate action.

To us on Fire Force where contact was made at extremely close ranges this training was vital, as said, to keep the line straight and maintain the impetus of the advance.

This training however would be valuable to all infantrymen likely to come into contact with the enemy.

What you did not ask about was live fire training, of which we do a great deal, in initial entry institutional training, in unit sustainment training and heavily in pre-deployment training as well as in refresher training conducted in theater. I suspect US troops fire far more than most armies and there's plenty of training wherein the troops learn to diffrentiate near and far misses from the thud of a hit -- even if they don't do crack and thump routinely to ascertain the approximate range to a fired weapon...

I made a note to avoid this topic with you because of the comment you made which seemed to accept a 1-2% casualty rate during training.

Yes there will be some unintended positive consequence arising from live firing exercises. (depending on the type of firing done)

I my case It was a specific outcome that was required and therefore the training was tailor made to achieve the desired aim.

Which unit, which army shoots more or less is unknown to me. We shot a lot despite being continually on operations and enjoying plenty of action.

It is not a concern to me that troops can decide for themselves -- occasionally with a little NCO assistance -- to seek cover; in fact, I wouldn't have it any other way. You have to give troops responsibility, no need to treat them like children. We tend to value life so we encourage taking cover then deciding whether one needed to do that. It takes about two firefights for the average person to sort that out properly. As they say, it isn't rocket science . It would concern me a great deal if NCO direction was constantly needed on that and other basic skills. In a real firefight, there's way too much noise and confusion for commands to be heard so the troops have to know what to do. We do generally get them to that point before deploying them.

That is obviously a personal opinion.

I couldn't find the US doctrine online and wasn't prepared to pay for a copy of the Brit manual so I settled for the Canadian manual which is available online.

Lets go to Section Battle Drills : Battle Drill Two - Reaction to Effective Enemy Fire (page 5-2-4):

Execution. Effective enemy fire in this situation is enemy small arms fire which would cause casualties if the section continued on its course.

9. Sections must continue the advance in spite of the noise of fire directed at someone else and regardless of stray rounds amongst them. Most soldiers instinctively drop to the ground when under fire. This action is generally wrong because the enemy usually opens fire when a target is in a place offering little or no cover. The best course is to react effectively, as taught in this battle drill.

So it is then agreed (subject to confirmation through sight of the US doctrine) that the 'every man for himself' any time he likes is generally not a good idea. We on the same page now?

I could go on here Ken but I do believe that it is you who is out of step with the doctrine.

To turn your other argument on its head we had a very low casualty rate with a very high kill rate. The doctrine worked, it was not negotiable and the young kids were able to hold their nerve.

[JMA]

Not disagreeing with any of that, just throwing one thought out there...



Crack thud? I can't recall a single engagement (in Iraq) that didn't sound like really loud popcorn. Near miss was the one that struck something within an arm's length from you. Far miss was the one that didn't. Range approximation was simplified to "within hand grenade range" or "not within hand grenade range."

Regarding Afghanistan specifically (where I have not been - I am speaking solely to videos), the engagements appear to be similar, but from longer distances. Units in static positions being attacked from predictable locations - often repeatedly; units taking fire from likely locations while conducting dismounted patrols in the vicinity of populated areas; units taking fire from relatively short distances while in built-up areas; units taking sniper fire while negotiating danger areas in mountainous terrain. The latter seems the only occasion where crack thud has any serious utility. The rest appear to be mostly traveling overwatch situations where, "hey, that suspected enemy position is firing at us."

I have responded to Ken's comment in post #145

How would you from which "suspected enemy position" the fire is coming from?

[82redleg]

Well one would have thought that with the IED death rate of 61% of all casualities http://www.icasualties.org and from the Brits side at 80% of all casualties (quoted on TV in "Ross Kemp in Afghanistan") that alternatives to non-vital road and predictable foot movement would have been implemented by now.

It borders on rank incompetence across the board.

Captives of their pasts to the extent that they are happy to sit back and watch the carnage continue to escalate? It is quite criminal.

The system is not working... soldiers are dying needlessly because their commanders don't have the smarts to out think the IED threat to both vehicles and foot patrols. 62% of all Afghanistan casualties are largely preventable. Incompetence never 'works'.

I believe it is counter productive to protect incompetence.

The question should be asked of every commander as to what counter measures he has implemented (or recommended the implementation of) in the face of the IED threat. As this accounts for at least 60% of all casualties if there is no clear and coherent answer supported his own units casualty stats he should his butt on the next plane home.

Well, almost 100% of the casualties to the D-Day assault waves were caused by German defensive positions on the beach, that we knew about. Those generals and colonels should be sued for incompetence, too, right?

Come on, its a war. You have to do some things that you know are going to cause casualties. It sucks, but it needs to be done, so you do it, and do your best to minimize casualties.

In the "Considerable casualties..." thread, JMM99 quoted some statistics that said over 50% of IEDs are found and cleared, and 20% are ineffective (total, 70%), while only 30% cause either casualties or damaged equipment. Some of these (thanks to the equipment we have fielded) total vehicles with everyone inside effectively walking away with bumps and bruises- I don't have any #s to break those incidents out of the 30%. To me, 70%+ success in the face of people that are doing their best to kill you is pretty damn good.

[JMA]

Well, almost 100% of the casualties to the D-Day assault waves were caused by German defensive positions on the beach, that we knew about. Those generals and colonels should be sued for incompetence, too, right?

Wrong. The general staff planned the invasion of Europe and selected the best place to breach the defences and had the staff tables to calculate the estimated casualties they would take during each phase and by unit type and made a provision for the evacuation and medical treatment (not to mention the reinforcement of to be depleted units) and then went ahead with Overlord.

Also nobody knows where the IEDs are other than they are on the roads yet we keep driving down the roads. Yes there are engineers (brave men) who find 50% of the IEDs but hey 50% is a coin flip so lets keep on using those roads. Russian Roulette has never been such fun... especially because other idiots children are taking the chances.

Come on, its a war. You have to do some things that you know are going to cause casualties. It sucks, but it needs to be done, so you do it, and do your best to minimize casualties.

Sure its a war. Sure if you attempt to close with and kill the enemy there will be casualties (the number of which will depend on your understanding of the enemy and of the terrain and the tactical skill of your junior commanders)...

...and here comes the killer line "do your best to minimize casualties".

What I am saying is that this last bit is not being done. Clearly.

You tell me please how a commander who sends his troops out day after day by vehicle on roads where they have a coin flip chance of hitting an IED or out on foot patrols where they have a coin flip chance of tripping an IED can be in compliance with your statement?

Who is doing his best 'to minimise casualties'?

In the "Considerable casualties..." thread, JMM99 quoted some statistics that said over 50% of IEDs are found and cleared, and 20% are ineffective (total, 70%), while only 30% cause either casualties or damaged equipment. Some of these (thanks to the equipment we have fielded) total vehicles with everyone inside effectively walking away with bumps and bruises- I don't have any #s to break those incidents out of the 30%. To me, 70%+ success in the face of people that are doing their best to kill you is pretty damn good.

OK so your son can take point every day and when he loses out on the flip of the coin one day we can say to you "get over it, after all its a war"?

[William F. Owen]

Well one would have thought that with the IED death rate of 61% of all casualities http://www.icasualties.org and from the Brits side at 80% of all casualties (quoted on TV in "Ross Kemp in Afghanistan") that alternatives to non-vital road and predictable foot movement would have been implemented by now.

It borders on rank incompetence across the board.

I think that is overly harsh and not correct. Twice this year I have lectured to British Army units, comprising rooms full of men with 2-3 tours under their belts. They are not incompetent.
However they are often being presented with mission and operations where their options are limited. There is something wrong. I'm not sure that it is at the unit level, and it get everybody nowhere to tell folks it is. My opinion based on talking to those at the coal face.

The standard tactic when 'assaulting' a known or suspected guerilla position is the sweep-line method described above. The advance is carried out at a slow walk, with little or no prophylactic fire, and, unless there is a particularly sinister-looking piece of scrub, the men depend on good observation and fast reactions. If anything moves, or they glimpse a patch of clothing, they will fire perhaps five or six aimed shots, or, in the case of a machine-gunner, a one-second burst.

Context. Yes that worked then against those folks. That might have failed badly against the NVA in Laos. It may also not be suited to conditions found elsewhere on the planet.

[Steve Blair]

Let's all be careful to attack the message and NOT the messenger, shall we? Some comments are drifting very close to the latter mark.

[JMA]

I think that is overly harsh and not correct. Twice this year I have lectured to British Army units, comprising rooms full of men with 2-3 tours under their belts. They are not incompetent.
However they are often being presented with mission and operations where their options are limited. There is something wrong. I'm not sure that it is at the unit level, and it get everybody nowhere to tell folks it is. My opinion based on talking to those at the coal face.

Context. Yes that worked then against those folks. That might have failed badly against the NVA in Laos. It may also not be suited to conditions found elsewhere on the planet.

Yes a correction is necessary and that is that I meant incompetence across the board at unit command and above. Down at company, platoon and section level they are merely captive to the policy.

There is no question we would have serious problems against NVA sappers but what we had to do was adapt to our enemy and that meant in many cases throwing the old doctrine out the window.

Now what I'm trying to say is that one must be flexible to apply doctrine and tactics and whatever to fit with the enemy and terrain factors. And if that means throwing out some holy cows then sobeit.

[Ken White]

Well one would have thought that with the IED death rate of 61% of all casualities http://www.icasualties.org and from the Brits side at 80% of all casualties (quoted on TV in "Ross Kemp in Afghanistan") that alternatives to non-vital road and predictable foot movement would have been implemented by now.

It borders on rank incompetence across the board.

You assume that nothing has been or is being done and you cite that percentage yet seem unaware of the total casualty rate from all causes. That's quite low, compared to the wars of even the 70s...

The system is not working... soldiers are dying needlessly because their commanders don't have the smarts to out think the IED threat to both vehicles and foot patrols. 62% of all Afghanistan casualties are largely preventable. Incompetence never 'works'.

You're entitled to your opinion. Forgive me if I listen to people who've been and are there in lieu of relying on uninformed media reports and thus believe your statement is a major oversimplification.

I believe it is counter productive to protect incompetence.

I agree. Where we differ is that I also think it counter productive to allege incompetence based on flawed assumptions. I say that as one who routinely castigates senior officers for dumb mistakes...

Well if you don't mind we need to get some better stats than that. The reports of chaotic fire fights does not indicate widespread previous combat experience... or worse still enough tactical nous.

If you're gullible enough to accept news reports without a little probing, I suppose that's correct.

...I use the Brit system.

Yeah, I'd noticed...

Not sure mediocrity should ever become acceptable... under any circumstances.

Probably not -- however, the existence of mediocrity in all fields of human endeavor is reality. To deny it seems to wish for the unattainable; a better solution is to identify it and try to work around it IMO.

So it is then agreed (subject to confirmation through sight of the US doctrine) that the 'every man for himself' any time he likes is generally not a good idea. We on the same page now?

Nope. Not at all. We're not even close. In a big fire fight every man 'has to be for himself' as you put it -- My version is they have to know what to do. Leaders often cannot be heard or seen, they get killed, units become separated -- the Troops have to KNOW what to do -- that's the goal of training; not control...

I believe you're stuck on a page based on partial information and experience in one war that does not seem to translate well to other situations. Here are two links for you. This one (LINK {.pdf}) is FM 21-75, a manual for individual soldiers. For movement under fire -- It says indirect but applies to direct fire as well; it also says to move away from the fire but, situation dependent, troops are told and trained to move toward it -- you can see Page 3-4 of the Manual / page 49 of the .pdf. The manual is old and is being revised, unfortunately, this edition was produced at a time when civilian academics were used to write and revise manuals and they had a bad tendency to 'dumb down' the content not having much faith in Joe who didn't have their educational attainments. Newer manuals are better, still excessively wordy but a slight improvement. In many cases, the hard won knowledge of WW II and other wars has been elided as not politically correct. As I said , ALL Armies have problems.

The second LINK {.pdf} is for Field Manual 3-21.8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. Movement is covered in Chapter 3.

I could go on here Ken but I do believe that it is you who is out of step with the doctrine.

Nah, not really -- I'm not in agreement with some doctrine; I know it, just know it was written by guys who were sitting in air conditioned offices so it is a bit suspect. I am in step with what actually happens and while I sure do not have all the answers, I've been in enough wars and fire fights in enough different countries and terrain types that I know what works under most circumstances. I also know American troops who differ from their foreign counterparts in several ways -- and I've fought with the Australians, Belgiques (in both Korea and the Congo in that order), Brits, Canadians, French, Korean, Thais, Turks and Viet Namese among others. Also trained with a host of others including in the ME and south Asia. Doctrine is simply a start point to combat effectiveness, it is never the be all and end all.

You're entitled to your opinions, we're obviously going to differ on all this so best we let it go and stop boring the others.

[Kiwigrunt]

It appears that the disconnect in the last number of posts is indeed here:

JMA:

…we were indeed lucky we probably faced the most incompetent enemy possible…

As Ken, Wilf and others have said, all wars, foes and terrain are different.

To this:

The standard tactic when 'assaulting' a known or suspected guerilla position is the sweep-line method described above. The advance is carried out at a slow walk, with little or no prophylactic fire, and, unless there is a particularly sinister-looking piece of scrub, the men depend on good observation and fast reactions. If anything moves, or they glimpse a patch of clothing, they will fire perhaps five or six aimed shots, or, in the case of a machine-gunner, a one-second burst.

Wilf said:

Context. Yes that worked then against those folks. That might have failed badly against the NVA in Laos. It may also not be suited to conditions found elsewhere on the planet.

Ters allowing a sweep-line to roll them up like that is of course every infantrymen’s dream. I’d like to think that if I was the wearer of that patch of clothing, I wouldn’t be waiting for the sweepline to shoot first. And once that sweep-line becomes established SOP, more competent ters will come up with appropriate ambush techniques.

Also, continuous air support with choppers overhead (and low) is probably not something that many other foes would passively endure, even ignoring availability. Blackhawk Down anyone?

That’s not to devalue your/Rhodesian experiences and tactics. I think I can safely say that most here are fairly impressed with it; I know I am. And there is bound to be a lot that can still be learned from it. But again…..context.

I believe it is counter productive to protect incompetence.

Agree, and added to what Ken and Wilf said, I don’t think that plain incompetence is really the issue in A-stan. There are many complicating factors like ROE, risk adversity (which appears to have become cultural almost more than it is a choice), presence of media and associated (and perhaps skewed) ‘proximity’ and involvement of the home front, and other largely politics driven issues.

And also, it is counter productive to assume incompetence among the enemy based on experienced incompetence with a previous foe. Sure, the TB are not always the most competent, but they are not stupid either.

[82redleg]

Wrong. The general staff planned the invasion of Europe and selected the best place to breach the defences and had the staff tables to calculate the estimated casualties they would take during each phase and by unit type and made a provision for the evacuation and medical treatment (not to mention the reinforcement of to be depleted units) and then went ahead with Overlord.

Yes. And? We've done the same thing. Our medevac status is a conditions check for every patrol. We've got the country covered- working to get every FOB within the "golden hour" is almost if not completely complete.

Also nobody knows where the IEDs are other than they are on the roads yet we keep driving down the roads. Yes there are engineers (brave men) who find 50% of the IEDs but hey 50% is a coin flip so lets keep on using those roads. Russian Roulette has never been such fun... especially because other idiots children are taking the chances.

Not true- we spend 1000's of man hours tracking and analyzing IEDs, where they are placed, how they are triggered, and how we can defeat them, both at the point of attack and earlier "left of the boom" in the parlance.

Sure its a war. Sure if you attempt to close with and kill the enemy there will be casualties (the number of which will depend on your understanding of the enemy and of the terrain and the tactical skill of your junior commanders)...

...and here comes the killer line "do your best to minimize casualties".

What I am saying is that this last bit is not being done. Clearly.

Why is this so clear to you? I'm telling you, after three tours (yeah, I'm a slacker- the war caught me in Korea when it started) and interactions with hundreds of officers from all over the Army, everyone I've met is doing their best to minimize casualties. Almost to the point that I consider us to be too risk adverse, not cavalier as you assume.

You tell me please how a commander who sends his troops out day after day by vehicle on roads where they have a coin flip chance of hitting an IED or out on foot patrols where they have a coin flip chance of tripping an IED can be in compliance with your statement?

Who is doing his best 'to minimise casualties'?

What if you have to move somewhere, and your AO is too large to walk everywhere you need to? In order to accomplish the mission, you have to use scarce aviation assets when you can get them, and drive when you can't. Simply sitting on the FOB and not doing anything is NOT an option. Neither is only executing missions within walking time/distance of your base.

OK so your son can take point every day and when he loses out on the flip of the coin one day we can say to you "get over it, after all its a war"?

I pray to God every day that my son doesn't have to experience the things I have. I don't believe that it will come true, but it can't hurt to ask. If he has to fight, I expect that his future commanders/leaders are as considerate of him and his future brothers-in-arms as I and my peers/commanders have been of their fathers. "If there must be trouble, let it be in my day, that my child may have peace."--Thomas Paine

[Kiwigrunt]

And we are of course moving further and further off topic.

JMA, if I may be so rude as to ask directly, what are your thoughts on the calibre issues, based on your experience? I assume that is FN FAL and MAG 58 versus 7.62 short.
Any thoughts that 7.62 x 51 was overkill/too heavy? Or conversely, that anything less would not have sufficed? Also, what of Bren versus MAG, or whether MAG was essential or luxury at team level?
And, while we're at it, did you use submachine guns?

[JMA]

And we are of course moving further and further off topic.

JMA, if I may be so rude as to ask directly, what are your thoughts on the calibre issues, based on your experience? I assume that is FN FAL and MAG 58 versus 7.62 short.
Any thoughts that 7.62 x 51 was overkill/too heavy? Or conversely, that anything less would not have sufficed? Also, what of Bren versus MAG, or whether MAG was essential or luxury at team level?
And, while we're at it, did you use submachine guns?

Yes and I was 95% through a lengthy response when my computer crashed. So Ill try again tomorrow. Sorry.

[JMA]

Ters allowing a sweep-line to roll them up like that is of course every infantrymen’s dream. I’d like to think that if I was the wearer of that patch of clothing, I wouldn’t be waiting for the sweepline to shoot first. And once that sweep-line becomes established SOP, more competent ters will come up with appropriate ambush techniques.

Also, continuous air support with choppers overhead (and low) is probably not something that many other foes would passively endure, even ignoring availability. Blackhawk Down anyone?

That’s not to devalue your/Rhodesian experiences and tactics. I think I can safely say that most here are fairly impressed with it; I know I am. And there is bound to be a lot that can still be learned from it. But again…..context.

Yes and no. The simple point of departure is that the sudden violent envelopment of the contact area by the fire force trapped, separated and maybe isolated the insurgents.

Only the K-Car overflew the contact area at a height of 800-1,000 ft. Sure it was fired on often and often hit but because of the green tracer one was able to get a good idea from where the fire was coming from (or the ground troops could assist with the location). Once located the ‘brave’ man who fired on the aircraft was history in seconds (the 20mm HE saw to that). So by a process of natural selection the ‘brave’ died first and the fleetest of foot and the ones who crawled into a hole and hid there survived. After the initial contact sweeps of the area would locate those hiding away and then it was not always a simple ‘turkey shoot’ if he was seen he was dead. If he fired from very close range when he realised he was about to be found he was dead too, but could take one of us with him. The third possibility was that they just lay there. Dead already from the gunship? Paralysed by fear? I don’t know. All I know is that a desperate man with an AK at 2-5 metres can be pretty lethal.

We tried to keep the trooping-choppers away from overflying the contact area. Where that failed and they overflew a group they would get seriously shot up. One chopper got 56 hits, the tech/gunner took three bullets as did the one other passenger and the pilot protected by his armoured seat got minor Perspex fragments in his face and just made a 'hard' landing back at base.

Often the initial contact was ferocious. With the K-Car engaging opportunity targets and the first callsigns on the ground getting into punch-ups straight away. As I said once all the ‘brave’ guys had been accounted for the sweeps were often merely mopping up the contact area to find those not yet accounted for.

If you listen to that Fire Force tape you will see in part 6 almost two hours into the scene the group is finally cornered by the sweep line and they bolt into a stop group with predictable results. Up to that point the concern was that they had got away.

On Op Dingo (the attack on the Chimoio base housing 4,000) the ten K-cars all had hits from small arms and some from anti-aircraft gunfire with one pilot being shot through his helmet and having his forehead grazed. The pilots stayed on station some joisting with the AAA and others having a turkey shoot. One troop carrying chopper was damaged and limped back to the admin base and the 6 para Dakota aircraft were taken on by AAA while running in for the drop. The book by Group Captain Petter-Bowyer “Winds of Destruction” is essential reading. We got 1,200 kills that day for 2 KIA and six wounded. While in any mans language that is a turkey shoot there were moments when things got pretty hairy.

The bottom line is that the Allouette III chopper could take hits so the crews donned flak jackets, stayed overhead and did the business. We had good days when we had a turkey shoot and then we had bad days when we had to earn our pay and sadly lost some friends along the way.

The other important factor was that we accounted for some 84% of insurgents contacted on fire force. These included virtually all the ‘brave’ guys and didn't leave too many ‘leaders’ left to figure out what to do next time.

[Chris jM]

...the sudden violent envelopment of the contact area by the fire force trapped, separated and maybe isolated the insurgents.

Please excuse my ignorance in this theatre JMA, I have only read Chris Cock's book on the subject and even then have some trouble recalling the way the fire-force tactics worked.

I'm interested in how you guys enveloped a target. A quick internet search tells me that a four man 'sweep' element would be positioned by the K-car as a cut-off. Was this ever done as a standard drill, i.e. a first wave isolates the target by deploying into a cut-off prior to an assault, was this reactive or was the deployment of a cut-off dictated by situation?

[JMA]

Yes and I was 95% through a lengthy response when my computer crashed. So Ill try again tomorrow. Sorry.

The quick answer is that I do not have a strong position either way over this issue based on calibre only.

We used the 7.62 x 51mm and they used the 7.62 x 39mm which we called long and intermediate respectively.

I was not able to carry out or get sight of any test results indicating the wound ballistics differences between the two.

We did some tests with claymore mines some of which were locally made using ballistic clay but to me such tests would be important when deciding on a weapon for use in a theatre. We really did not have much of a choice but I was not unhappy with the hand we were dealt.

In fact the penetration dems we put on from time to time to prove to troops that our weapons were superior were never absolutely convincing to me one way or the other.

To me the knock down effect of the FN was a big plus. You hit him once and know you got him good. None of this ‘he keeps on coming at you’ stuff. Then again our guys when hit by an AK would go down too.

We had no weight problem with the FN and the ammo that I can remember. The FN weight was fine and we (again my commando) did not allow slings and did “Pokey Drill” (rifle dexterity drill ) everyday after muster parade.

100-200 rounds of ammo was no problem either for young fit and reasonably strong men.

I had no issue with the weight or the length of it but found that we had to make sure that the correct butt length was issue to riflemen.

Can’t remember any stoppage issues either. Maybe when you know you are going to have to use the thing you damn well keep it clean.

I carried a G3 for a short while as a test and had no strong opinion one way or tuther except that it seemed to come in one butt length (or maybe the ones we got for trial did).

I carried an AK on a few special ops and found it a bit ‘light’ after the FN. Also I noted that the change lever (safety catch) was on the wrong side of the weapon and that the first click was auto which may account for why the first shots were uncontrolled bursts going way to high. Seems the thinking is the TB like to fire on auto or is it that they fire after the first click? (which is understandable).

The SAS carried the RPD as the MG of choice so maybe they have more light to shed on the matter which hopefully would be a decision based on more than just the weight issue.

We (my commando) did not want to mix up weapons so as to prevent not being able to identify whether it was friend or foe firing. I have recently seen a photo of other RLI paras before an op where one had an RPD, so clearly not everyone agreed with our position.

We loved the MAG… and the gooks feared it (as a number of interrogation reports confirmed).

If there is any music in war it is the sound of bursts of 2-3 rounds from a MAG with the gas set low.

At twice the weight of the RPD theMAG certainly delivered.

A platoon and in our case a troop was broken down into callsigns of four called ‘sticks’. In 1973 we still had 5 man sticks as the choppers could carry 5 pax. After the added weight of the armoured seat and the fact the Alouette III pulling too much power at the average altitudes they settled on 4 man sticks. So there was no tactical or operational reason for the use of 4 man sticks. (thought that might be interesting).

We carried one MAG per 4 man stick. So the standard 9 man section divided into to sticks one commended by the section commander (corporal) and the other by the lance corporal. The platoon commander and platoon sergeant picked up there sticks from the pl HQ element and any extras from the sections. So theoretically a standard infantry platoon would have 8 MAGs (2 per section and two in Pl HQ – it gets a little confusing with the RAR [Rhodesian African Rifles] as they had the post of Platoon Warrant Officer – a kind of WO3 position.)

The RAR also loved the MAG I remember the case of 5 sticks of RAR being attached to one of the fire forces and out of the 20 that arrived there was 13 MAGs. There we have an illustration of the psychology o that weapon. The positive psychology of that 20 man sweep line having 13 MAGs and the negative psychology of being on the receiving end of that fire power.

In knowing your enemy we knew that when operating against groups of insurgents always outnumbering us we had to take the initiative right from the first seconds through a high volume of fire. The MAG helped to achieve this. With well trained troops when coming under effective enemy fire we tend to take cover and get our heads down. With the other lot when they got freaked out they would jump up and take off. That is exactly what we wanted and those that were not instantly killed became gunship fodder as they ran.

I did training on the Bren in 1973/4 and found it to be fine. The argument I think had by then advanced to being between magazine fed and opposed to belt fed. The decision had already been taken to phase it out so I was not even considered.

In the fire force context the MAG was nearly always fired from the hip unless static in a stop position. Some of the big boys were known to fire it from the shoulder from time to time. One of my gunners a Scotsman (ex-Scots Guards) used to load a 100 round belt (2x50) when on fire force as I used to get him to clear the bush ahead of us when necessary and I suppose also to let any lurkers know what’s coming their way. He wrapped the belt over his left arm somehow.

So effectively we needed the firepower down to stick level.

What if no MAG available per stick? Then I would go for 2 x RPD per stick.

Gunners carried 500 rds as standard and on other ops we would up it and share out the extras. Depending on the type of op we would up it to 800 or 1,000 rds.

Did training on UZI and Sten in 1973 but neither were ever considered a contender. Did see some police carrying them, mainly the UZI, but maybe if needed in house clearing or whatever a folding but AK would have done the trick. (just an opinion)

Finally I had the unfortunate experience when on a scene and was sent to sort a sniper out and the approaching 40 man sweep line had not be warned. As we went into reorg the sweep line took us on and get your head down took on a whole new meaning (10 MAGs firing). Holy s**t! From then on I could understand how and why the gooks just up and took off when under intense fire.

They hit my gunner in the arm but thankfully that was all. That we survived was probably due to the need for those troops in the sweep line to have another Drake Shoot to improve their bush shooting.

That’s it for now.

[JMA]

Please excuse my ignorance in this theatre JMA, I have only read Chris Cock's book on the subject and even then have some trouble recalling the way the fire-force tactics worked.

I'm interested in how you guys enveloped a target. A quick internet search tells me that a four man 'sweep' element would be positioned by the K-car as a cut-off. Was this ever done as a standard drill, i.e. a first wave isolates the target by deploying into a cut-off prior to an assault, was this reactive or was the deployment of a cut-off dictated by situation?

Yes Chris' book is a good troopies eye view of matters.

But this article with a view diagrams will help you to understand things a lot clearer.

http://www.jrtwood.com/article_fireforce.asp

Also once read download this MP3 file and listen to a recording of part of a fire force call out. Only the commander (c/s 39) and the aircraft transmissions can be heard.

http://www.fileden.com/files/2010/4/...rce1976-01.mp3

Enjoy