I still think that, in the early days, Lind was a necessary component who shook some things up. I'm also not as inclined as some to discard maneuver warfare theories out of hand. They have their place, but like most ideas they were carried into areas that they were not suite for, and Lind bears some responsibility for that. He's clearly outlived his usefulness.
All Lind is doing is rehashing the Stalingrad scenario. Period.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I don't discard MW. I just think that what it claimed to be and how it was suppose to be achieved, was based on a collection of ill thought out ideas, that were not challenged or identified as such because people did not read the source material, and if they did, failed to grasp the essential subtleties contained there in.Originally Posted by Steve Blair
I was an MW junky, groupie, promoter, and pretty annoying chap all round, until my faith in MW was shattered by studying EBO, and then re-reading Clausewitz and the R.L. Wing translation of "The Way of Strategy". The nail in the coffin was the infamous "Once and Future Army" article by R.N. Bryson, that caused me to read Foch.
If I taught "Military Thought," I would require all my students to have a thorough understanding of the MW concept, as it would provide the antithesis for everything else. - thus I submit that this is it's true utility.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Posting Permissions
Bookmarks