UN peacekeeping operations (catch all)

[Tom Odom]

Dave,

I don't think so, although each case where a PK is called for will be treated individually. The real issue is PK C2; who actually "commands" a PK? In the case of UN forces, the individual contingents have their own national C2 channels that overide the UN and the Force Commander. That happened in UNAMIR 1 and 2.

The other issue is the theater; UN missions in the Mid-East are political bandaids and punching bags for both sides. UNIFIL has been pummeled repeatedly;Israel has played a large role in that, using UNIFIL "failures" as a backdrop to Israeli actions. Hizballah has also taken its toll on UNIFIL in of course OGL; MAJ Peter McCarthy Australian Army and COL Rich Higgins USMC were both killed by Hizballah.

As for the 4 UNMOs killed by Israel in this round, I regard Israeli professions of sorrow and/or regretful accidents as pure propaganda. They have over the years made it standard practice to shoot at UN positions--especially unarmed UN positions as a tactic of intimidation, he Israeli head of security in South Lebanon--my student at CGSC--told me that was the case before I went to OGL and the IDF proved in my first evening on OP. Other UNMOs had similar experiences.

It would be very interesting to see what happens to a NATO PK in South Lebanon, especially one with a robust mandate and one equipped with the weapons and C2 to enforce it.

best
Tom

[Mark O'Neill]

Hizballah has also taken its toll on UNIFIL in of course OGL; MAJ Peter McCarthy Australian Army and COL Rich Higgins USMC were both killed by Hizballah.

This is news to most of us in Australia.

Peter McCarthy was killed when his vehicle drove over a landmine. The Australian Army and the Australian War Memorial record his death as such an accident. (see: http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/peacekeeping.htm) . There are literally thousands of landmines in the area where the accident occurred, laid by various belligerants at various times. What evidence is there for the assertion he was killed by Hezbollah?

regards,

Mark

[Tom Odom]

The evidence is the operational zone Peter was killed in had been an area of Hizballah bombings and attacks. As for the thousands of landmines: yes they are there. In Peters case, they were in the middle of a road I had traveled on many times and it appeared at the time there were 2 stacked AT mines or an AT mine with a booster. Amal at the time was not targeting UN personnel; the SLA and the Israelis if the they wanted to target UN personnel used direct fire and indirect fire.

So when I lay it at Hiznallah's door step, I do so as they were the most likely perpetrator. Was it command detonated? No. Was it on a normal LOC? Yes

Was it an "accident"? NO

Best

Tom

[120mm]

The only reasons I can see for the UNIFIL "observers" remaining in the war zone in Lebanon is a) incompetence within UNIFIL. b)UNIFIL is actively siding with Hezbollah by providing "human shields" and intended world reaction when Israel inevitably targets them. or c) a combination of the above. UNIFIL was obviously not "keeping the peace" in the area.

The UN has been demonstrably anti-Israel for some time now. For sure Israel isn't pure as driven snow, but most anti-Israel UN edicts are so transparently designed to "get" Israel as to be laughable.

[Stan]

Greetings SGM !

If memory serves me correctly, the Canadian PKs in Rwanda cruising around in 113s and 114 command posts had M2HBs mounted. I don't know if they considered themselves PKOs or PEOs, but there were belts dangling from the 50's Tom and I encountered.

Just opnion, but I think they could have cared less about the differences in the acronyms considering where they were.

Tom ?

Regards, Stan

[Tom Odom]

The only reasons I can see for the UNIFIL "observers" remaining in the war zone in Lebanon is a) incompetence within UNIFIL. b)UNIFIL is actively siding with Hezbollah by providing "human shields" and intended world reaction when Israel inevitably targets them. or c) a combination of the above. UNIFIL was obviously not "keeping the peace" in the area.

The UN has been demonstrably anti-Israel for some time now. For sure Israel isn't pure as driven snow, but most anti-Israel UN edicts are so transparently designed to "get" Israel as to be laughable.

120

UNIFIL is an armed peacekeeping force in existence since 1978.

UNTSO is an unarmed military observers organization with groups in Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, and Israel. UNTSO was established in 1948. UNTSO Liaison teams serve as scouts and negotiators for UNIFIL.

UN observers and UN peacekeepers are soldiers sent by the governments who agreed to do so. UNTSO has for decades included a US Military Observer Group; I was one of them 1987-1988.

None of the peacekeepers whether armed or not set policy. To ascribe to the idea that UN Observers side with Hizballah or any other group is ludicrous.

UN policy toward Israel is in a word "convoluted" and all sides--including Israel--use it to their advantage.

Tom

[tequila]

Tom Odom, I had no idea you were actively siding with Hizbullah. Shoudn't you then be posting in the "Indigenous" board?

James Dobbins writing for RAND is instructive as to the U.N. record in peacekeeping/nation building, both in terms of both faults and successes.

[Tom Odom]

Tom Odom, I had no idea you were actively siding with Hizbullah. Shoudn't you then be posting in the "Indigenous" board?

James Dobbins writing for RAND is instructive as to the U.N. record in peacekeeping/nation building, both in terms of both faults and successes.

Hmmm maybe so...I hope some day that the thugs who kidnapped Rich Higgins stand against a wall.

In many ways my service as a UN observer in Lebanon and losing friends on the ground prepared me for Rwanda and some of the failures there. It also allowed me to understand just how hamstrung a Force Commander like MG Romeo Dallaire or MG Guy Tousignant could be. Dallaire's book catalogs all of that well when discussing UNAMIR 1; Shahyar Khan--the Senior Rep for the UN Secretary General and senior civilian for UNAMIR 2--does the same for the reborn UNAMIR in his book.

As a US DATT I worked closely with both UNAMIR 2 and the new Rwandan government--especially the military. Sometimes that was much like being a UN observer in Lebanon again; both sides saw you as suspect or sympathetic to the other side. The latter was certainly true because I did sympathize with both sides and sometimes one had to choose.

In the case of Kibeho and the massacre in April 95, my role was to report what I saw as accurately as possible and report the views reported or held by all sides. MG Tousignant and I differed on casualty counts; he was reporting as a UN officer based on what he got from below. I did the same but I did my own assessment. Later when we talked, he told me that he recognized that our agendas could not always be the same. In the case of Kibeho, the divergence was one of perspective; he was the FC charged with a mandate (one defunct before his troops deployed) to protect persons at risk. That gave him an immediate perspective on Kibeho. And he rightly violated UN orders when he put troops in the middle of the camp and kept them there. The Aussies and the Zambians did the best anyone could do. My perspective was longer, predating his as I saw what was happening in Kibeho as a direct extension of the civil war and genocide. In my view what happended was tragic and largely unavoidable because it was inside Rwanda. The greater tragedy was that Kibeho heralded what was going to happen in Zaire and none of us--Tousignant, Khan, David Rawson, Bob Gribbin, and I--could get that message across or perhaps could stimulate the proper responses from the greater international community.

Lebanon is both the same and different. Conflicting agendas just like Rwanda abound and have their effects on those on the ground. The big difference is the attention that Lebanon draws routinely versus the attention that Rwanda (and the larger Congo War) drew by exception.

The RAND report is quite interesting.

best

Tom

PS

As an inveterate table of contents and bibliography scanner, I downloaded the RAND study and looked at it. My initial assessment is that it sets high goals and fails to meet them. For example:

The UN missions selected are relevant; many that were not selected are more relevant. There is no mention of UNAMIR 1 or 2; both missions were involved in nation building.

I studied the 1960s Congo operation in depth when researching and writing LP 14; the scholarship shown in this study on the Congo is remarkably shallow. Brian Urqhart and Conor O'Brien's books are not in the bibliography. Urqhart's book on UN peackeeping is seminal; he was by the way that British intelligence officer who dared question the wisdom of OP Market Garden and was relieved for "exhaustion."

I will add more as I finish the study.

[120mm]

Tom, I didn't mean to imply the observers set the policy. Perhaps it is the "convoluted" nature of the UN chain of command that required that they stay where they were, despite a full-out shooting war going on.

This thread gave me some food for thought last night. I have never been a big fan of "peacekeeping" missions. They always strike me as kind of like the guy who plugs the relief valve on his pressure cooker because it keeps going off.

[Tom Odom]

120MM,

I hear what you are saying and it is quite true: the policy chefs ignore the pot and the staff cleans up.

That aside, I often pose the question about alternatives to UN PKOs: simply who else will do it?

We struggle right now with the question of filling needs in Iraq for a war we essentially decided was necessary. Elsewhere in the world, conflicts go on most don't even hear about. I put Carl's Congo Sitreps on here because they offer insights into the insane world of MONUC--the largest PKO in history.

Darfur in Sudan continues to befuddle Western and African efforts to unravel. Faulty or not, the UN is often the only venue for action.

best

Tom