David,

Agree part of this is not on topic, but still necessary to put things in context. There are few places that AQ would be welcome in urban areas. You can't compare them to the Leninists, but people do inappropriately compare them to the Maoists, so you can't win in that regard.

The Brits had to deal with a very tough IRA problem that appeared to those of watching from the outside to be mostly urban. From that problem set a number of useful urban fighting tactics (not to be confused with strategy) we're propogated throughout the West (and perhaps beyond). We now have our own lessons that we can teach in this regard, but the key in my mind is not to confuse teaching tactics with helping the partner get their strategy right.

Long way of saying I think we're quite capable of helping a nation through FID with urban security problems (especially AQ), but we haven't overcome our own deficiencies in getting the strategy right. This generally seems to be area of friction. A local government may have the right strategy, but the wrong tactics, and we show up and often teach good tactics, but push the wrong strategy based on our view of how the world works. Probably taking this down a path you don't want to this thread to go down, but I think it is relevant. If we get the strategy right (more accurately those we're assisting get the strategy right), and communicate it effectively, is likely the forces we help train will fight more effectively. There are a lot of reasons those we train often don't fight well, and one of the intangibles is they often don't believe in the cause and method. The whole world can see it on u-tube, Frontline, National Geographic, and other news specials where the media accompanies our guys into battle with their Afghan counterparts. The most interesting parts of those shows are when they translate the discussions between the Afghan forces and the locals and the Afghan forces apology for the tactics, but say right now they're being forced by the coalition to act this way. We're not good at listening, so I doubt many in our nation focus on those cues, but instead focus on the boastful U.S. NCO or officer explaining how inept the Afghan security forces are because they don't act like us.

Back to your point, what significant change and challenges do you think we would face with our FID doctrine if the focus shifted from the rural to the urban? I think I'm still missing your point.