It's the Tribes (merged thread)

[tribeguy]

hmmm... That's a bit of a stretch. Your point?
My initial contention was....

Thus my initial point, that given Hezbollah's political objectives, - the ones they further by violence, - the tribal dimension is probably of little importance - especially as Hezbollah emphasises it's support and following from both Druze and Christians. See my point?

Stretch?

Let's see here - Hezballah exists in order to establish a caliphate. Caliphates must be ruled by direct descendants of Muhammad the prophet. Noble tribes are descendants of Muhammad the prophet. Noble tribesmen feel that they have a right and religious obligation to rule. Their supporters feel the same - it's the shari'a that compels them, and their pride. You can throw up the Israel thing as being Hezballah's raison d'etre, but it aint. They want power - and they'll either take it through the democratic process or through violence - whatever is easiest. And the Musawi tribe (vis a vis Nasrallah) is the prime beneficiary.

The insurgent organizations in Iraq, both Sunni and Shi'ite, are fighting to establish their versions of the Caliphate. What we see as sectarian violence is also a tribe war between the Sunni and Shi'ite noble tribes. It's an identity thing - they are both motivated by the same idea that their noble tribesmen have the right and obligation to rule the caliphate, should there be one.

The activities of the Luhayb are documented by scholarship - it's an example meant to drive home the point of the need to INVESTIGATE further. Since you are an Arabic speaker, I hope that it follows that you are an Arabic reader, as well. With this proficiency, I suggest diving all the way into the subject. Since neither one of us knows for sure, it requires that. However, I wouldn't be amazed if found that the majority of Hezballah's members come from the poorest Shi'ite Arab tribes in Lebanon, and that their recruitability stems largely out of economic need, perhaps MORE than the sectarian appeal. I hate to say it, but there is a social marxist theoretical application here that requires further exploration as well. Knowing the history of Lebanon and the concurrent "oppression" of shi'ites therein, this has to be a factor.

I see your point, but I don't concede it - not until the investigation of this issue is done. Such an investigation would require knowledge of what Hezballah's constituency looks like on a person by person level. It would then also require a thorough breakdown of Lebanon's tribal system using Lebanese scholarship.

Any Beiruti will tell you that there are no tribes in Lebanon. For Beirut, where there is relatively more government presence and effectiveness, this might be the case. But in the countryside, tribalism becomes more and more important. Where do you suppose Hezballah is strongest? Ibn Khaldun might suggest that if Hezballah is strong in the city now, then it is because they displaced those who were there before them.

For the sake of social dialectics, I'll conclude that tribalism as it pertains to Hezballah is more important than you suppose, and less important than I would guess. I place a lot of importance on the noble tribes as being key drivers of instability in the Middle East. As Nasrallah comes from the ((Al-Musuwi)) tribe, which claims nobility through Musa Al-Kadhim, who was a descendant of Imam 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib, and such Musuwis are important throughout the rest of Iraq as being high level leaders of insurgent organizations such as JAM, special groups, et al - I'm fairly certain that tribalism is an overlooked aspect in Lebanon's Hezballah, but not because it is irrelevant. It's because we drink too much progressive pan-Arabist kool aid, and because we are lazy and too prone to think that our Lebanese counterparts are "just like us." As if Hezballah is really just a political organization in modern clothes that isn't trying to get their version of a caliphate established...

Interesting subject - us Americans are just beginning to start studying tribes. The Brits were better at it 100 years ago, but they are as bad as we are now.

Regards,

tribeguy

[Rex Brynen]

Let's see here - Hezballah exists in order to establish a caliphate.

Not so much--being Twelver Shi'ites their views derive from their notion of the occulted/hidden Imam, and their support for the notion of Vilayat-e Faqih expounded by Khomeini. Unlike Sunni Salafist groups, they don't really call for the establishment of global Caliphate.

Caliphates must be ruled by direct descendants of Muhammad the prophet. Noble tribes are descendants of Muhammad the prophet. Noble tribesmen feel that they have a right and religious obligation to rule. Their supporters feel the same - it's the shari'a that compels them, and their pride. You can throw up the Israel thing as being Hezballah's raison d'etre, but it aint. They want power - and they'll either take it through the democratic process or through violence - whatever is easiest.

The "Israel thing" is big for Hizbullah, and I don't really know any major analyst (or, for that matter, member) of the organization who thinks otherwise. As for power, they want veto power in Lebanon so as to protect their interests, but actually refrain from maximizing their claim to either parliamentary or cabinet seats because it better serves them to not take on a major governing role. They certainly recognize that, given the sectarian complexity of the country, they will never be in a position to seize complete and direct power. This is why the brief May 2008 display of armed power, followed by Doha, the elections, and the 15-10-5 (with one of the 5 leaning towards the 10) cabinet formula works so well for them.

However, I wouldn't be amazed if found that the majority of Hezballah's members come from the poorest Shi'ite Arab tribes in Lebanon, and that their recruitability stems largely out of economic need, perhaps MORE than the sectarian appeal. I hate to say it, but there is a social marxist theoretical application here that requires further exploration as well. Knowing the history of Lebanon and the concurrent "oppression" of shi'ites therein, this has to be a factor.

Very few Shi'ites in urban Lebanon think of themselves in tribal terms (hamula is likely to be more important), although you'll certainly find it in the Biqa. Hizbullah has traditionally recruited from among the poorest segment of the population precisely because it positioned itself as a movement of the downtrodden--a point that everyone recognizes--although today I would say that their support is probably relatively constant across all socioeconomic strata.

I'm fairly certain that tribalism is an overlooked aspect in Lebanon's Hezballah, but not because it is irrelevant. It's because we drink too much progressive pan-Arabist kool aid, and because we are lazy and too prone to think that our Lebanese counterparts are "just like us." As if Hezballah is really just a political organization in modern clothes that isn't trying to get their version of a caliphate established...

If anything, Hizbullah is probably Lebanon's only functioning meritocracy. This isn't to say that kinship linkages don't have some effects, but it is to say that they do not play a substantial role in policy development and implementation within the organization with regard to important matters.

[William F. Owen]

Interesting subject - us Americans are just beginning to start studying tribes. The Brits were better at it 100 years ago, but they are as bad as we are now.

I don't know how bad Americans are, but I can tell you that having travelled or lived in Algeria, Tchad, Niger, Jordan, Israel and the Sinai, from 1984 to the present day, you'll find Brit Anthropologists researching tribes.

As I am sure you know, the largest Archive of English Language Research into Arab Tribes in the Middle East is in Jerusalem - and far outstrips that recorded in any other language - and 90% of it done by Brits, and still being done!

Hezbollah:
As Rex, - someone extremely familiar with Hezbollah - notes, the tribal issue is almost certainly a "so what." If indeed you can trace a tribal structure to Hezbollah, where does it get you?

Extended family structures seem to have pretty thin within the PLO and PFLP. Yes, certain families/Clans backed the PLO at certain times, but I never spoken to anyone who has ever reference those affiliations within the organisation. - Rex may add to that.

- now Clans and extended families are extremely important in the "internal politics" of the West Bank - and to some extent Gaza - but again not really relevant to that part of thier politics that cause a problem - opposing Israel.
If they were not fighting Israel, they would and some days do, kill each other in quite large numbers.

[Tukhachevskii]

I was mulling this over. Given the ethnic and sectarian bases of Hizballah's power base I am sure that the tribal network is useful in terms of the vetting of potential recruits, information sharing and counter-intelligence. Much harder to break into Hizballuh if you have no-one to vouch for you. That said, I think the tribal issue is peripheral to Hizballah's internal political/military structure or system of mobilisation but that doesn't mean it doesn't have a role to play.

[William F. Owen]

I was mulling this over. Given the ethnic and sectarian bases of Hizballah's power base I am sure that the tribal network is useful in terms of the vetting of potential recruits, information sharing and counter-intelligence. Much harder to break into Hizballuh if you have no-one to vouch for you. That said, I think the tribal issue is peripheral to Hizballah's internal political/military structure or system of mobilisation but that doesn't mean it doesn't have a role to play.

Absolutely concur and very much supported by the Israelis utilisation of studying extended families within the Middle-east.

[Fuchs]

The whole "tribal warfare" thing irritates me a bit.
I know "tribal warfare" as warfare composed of raids for loot, done by semi-permanent warbands that are led by a charismatic leader.

It shouldn't be difficult to identify those who benefited of loot or to identify a well-known charismatic leader.

It shouldn't be very difficult to make raids less profitable.
Actually, I don't see where there's loot to be had in attacking outposts and burning fuel trucks.

So maybe it's not as much tribal warfare as it is about highwaymen (taxation of civilian truckers at checkpoints), racketeering and smuggling (drugs, weapons, whatever) that keep the enemy (note I don't wrote 'Taliban') up economically?

Wouldn't "Mafia" be a better description than "tribe"?

[M-A Lagrange]

So maybe it's not as much tribal warfare as it is about highwaymen (taxation of civilian truckers at checkpoints), racketeering and smuggling (drugs, weapons, whatever) that keep the enemy (note I don't wrote 'Taliban') up economically?

I do not know how it works in Afghanistan, but in Sudan, the tribes conduct razzia to exchange cattles against weapons from Somalia and Erithrea...
It is the youth that conduct such actions without any elderly support. The trick is that they need to proove the are men and warriors.
Also, the business men from Kenya are in the loop. Most of the razzia are done with already someone to purchase the cattle heads.
You mix that with politics... And you have endless stories.
If the situation in Afghanistan as the same characteristics concerning the razzia, then you may have an impact on the economical ressources of the ennemy. But you have to be carefull on the political aspect.

[tribeguy]

Absolutely concur and very much supported by the Israelis utilisation of studying extended families within the Middle-east.

And that doesn't have any application to Hezballah?

[William F. Owen]

Sir, it gets you secular lines of communication and influence over those who are working for extremist thugs.

I think you can connect the dots from there.

-Tribeguy

So? Exploiting personal relationships for HUMINT purposes? The Brits were doing that in Northern Ireland for 40 years. The same basic understanding works against organised crime for the FBI, NYPD and many others. Exploiting family ties is something we are good at, have done for years and it's far from new.

And that doesn't have any application to Hezballah?

It has application against every individual in the world who has an extended family. I assumed that your point was the detailed knowledge of tribes allowed you to craft policy towards them. - and I agree on that, IF it is relevant to the context of the policy.

I see that as largely irrelevant in Hezbollah's case, because, it does not speak to a policy and they are largely meritocracy - but with strong connections to the Lebanon's organised crime families.

Yes you can look at some Terrorist groups and see their command structure break down along family/clan/tribe lines. Folks have been doing the same with the Mafia for years. This is not insightful. Everyone working in the Africa, Asia and Mid-East has been doing it for 100's of years - and still does.

[Tukhachevskii]

A brief, disjointed, hurried and all round grammatically suspect (but no less reliable) set of field notes regarding tribes and tribal influence from Yemen (c. 2007). Tribes have often been kingmakers especially in Yemen, but they also constitute a shadow/alternative governance structure often at odds with the “legitimate” Government. Saleh owed his power due to the largesse and support of Sheik al-Ahmar (who was also, in tribal terms, Saleh’s superior given that Saleh’s tribe was part of Al-Ahmar’s Hashid tribal confederation). The Yemeni state doesn’t control anything outside the cities and even then places like Aden have a mind all their own (due to it being a Yemeni Socialist Party stronghold). Although to all intensive purposes (King of Queens reference there for all you fans) Ali Abdallah Saleh (be careful how you pronounce that last one) may appear to be a ‘typical’ Arab dictator in fact his power is severely limited to the cities. De facto control in the hinterlands, especially the lawless east opposite the Rub-Al-Khali desert is tribal controlled. The Tribal Shura Council, although lacking legislative authority, wields tremendous power for the above reasons and can rarely be ignored. The GPC / Tribal relationship has often paid dividends in the past (Saleh would never have defeated the South or achieved Union without them) and is currently useful in bolstering his armed forces in the Sa’ada war up north given the unreliability of certain sectors of the army.

However, the relationship is politically volatile especially when it came to Saleh trying to extract funds from the US for his supposed counter-terrorism effort (which the Ttribes saw as betrayal of Islam and which even the Al-Houthi insurgency in the North managed to capitalise on). Saleh cleverly ensured that the Political Security Organisation (’Amn As-Siyasiia) allowed key prisoners to escape thereby satisfying the tribal sense of sharafi’ (honour). This is the same PSO that is now largely staffed by ex-Iraqi Ba’athists! (I believe Iraq wants them back for trial). The relationship has benefitted the tribes in many ways such as when they insisted that Saleh turn the schools over to fully clerical/Islamic control (he had wanted them partially secular) when unification was finally achieved in 1994 (after the tribes helped Saleh destroy what was left of the South and the YSP’ military apparatus which, incidentally, still exists in the form of disgruntled ex-servicemen angry about the non-payment of their pensions which were promised when Saleh threw them out and replaced them with his own sycophants).

The Al-Ahmar led Hashid confederation briefly flirted with parliamentary politics by creating the explicitly Islamic (Hizb Al-) Islah reform party which included a wing led by sometime Bin Laden confidant Sheik Ali Az-Zindani (who is very well respected amongst all of Yemen’s Tribes, bar the Zaiydi’s up north). Even though Islah remains largely dominated by Tribal elders the Al-Ahmar Hashid Confederation is still inclined to throw its support behind whomever it considers useful financially and politically thus acting both constitutionally and extra-constitutionally to derive the most benefits and ensure its demands are met. Given that the tribes are overwhelmingly pious (or fundamentalist, depending upon your angle) Muslims those demands are obvious. Indeed, Zindani’s right wing of the Islah party and Al-Ahmar’s Hashid Confederation (amongst others) supported the creation of an extra-judicial morality police, along similar lines to that in Saudi, to patrol the godless streets of the cities (traditionally Saleh’s sphere of influence) even though, legally, they have no power to do so (the government has not stopped them).

Both Saleh’s presidential party the GPC (General People’s Congress) and the former ruling party of South Yemen (and now Yemen’s real opposition party) the Yemeni Sociality Party flirt with and court the tribes to varying ends; the 2006(?) presidential elections were contested by Islah and YSP in unison even though Shiek Al-Ahmar publically announced his Hashid confederation would “morally” support Saleh. Al-Ahmar died in December 2007 leaving leadership of the Hashid confederation to his son, Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, who is known to hate Saleh but who is pragmatic enough not to break with him entirely in return for largesse and financial rewards which, given the role of tribal levies (10,000+) in the continuing Sa’ada war is going to be substantial.

[tribeguy]

As Rex, - someone extremely familiar with Hezbollah - notes, the tribal issue is almost certainly a "so what." If indeed you can trace a tribal structure to Hezbollah, where does it get you?

Sir, it gets you secular lines of communication and influence over those who are working for extremist thugs.

I think you can connect the dots from there.

-Tribeguy