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Thread: Storming the Beach

  1. #21
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    It is the USMC vision that concerns me - thus my reference to EFV & V22. The justification for these platforms always comes back to some very contestable assumptions.
    Kind of.. But in the back & forth that I've read and fr/the Marines I know on the outer fringes of this at Quantico, its not concern being voiced by Gates.

    He's in the process of setting the tone for the future of the DOD.. Drawing the lines of who's doing what & when those lines are crossed. At the end of the day, as far as the overall direction each service takes, the decision is his.

    He hears the Marines stubbornly standing their ground & railing for what they see as necessary & has basically said this:
    [paraphrased] In the priority of threats both present & near future, & the Budgets & structure that I'm setting to address them we don't agree & I don't see you getting what you want.



    But its helpful to start at the beginning where Gates & HQMC disagree
    , not in the middle w/the programs.

    Gates sees the USMC taking a prominent role in future Irregular Conflicts.

    HQMC has said yes, we agree.. but we're a Two-Fisted Fighter so we're going to need XY&Z to remain Predominant across all boards we touch.

    Gates counters; for the foreseeable future (threat wise), those items in the #s you've projected, are unlikely & impractical b/c your primary role & most likely mission in the structure & vision I have set will be IW.

    HQMC counters, these items are Dual suited & will revolutionize how we conduct both IW & HIC.

    Gates says while these items will be an advancement.. they will not be as significant as to offset my overall (across all services) plans & projected budgets.. your current load out will suffice for any near threats.



    And thats where it currently stands. Its not that this Marine Program is bad or that, they just don't fit. But in all fairness by comparison to Multi-billion $ FAILURES like:
    -Future Combat Systems (FCS) or Land Warrior
    -The Air Force's Tanker deal
    -or the Navy's numerous ship debacles

    The USMC's programs are well ahead of the curve & a drop in the bucket monetarily.

    But what seems to be totally left out of this Debate is that SECDEF Gates has AGAIN left the "gate" open for the Marines to convince him to adjust his plans.
    Last edited by COMMAR; 06-08-2010 at 08:52 PM.

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    The Marine Corps Gazette, for subscribers, had an article in February by a retired AAV Gunny, "Do We Really Need the EFV?" He seemed to think its electronics would be too sophisticated and fragile to stand up to heavy copmbat.

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by COMMAR View Post
    Gates sees the USMC taking a prominent role in future Irregular Conflicts.

    Well, in his (Gates) mind how does he see the USMC doing IW without some newer systems added to inventory? Especially since IW in the future may include the Hy-Brid warfare scenario where you have civilians operating fairly Hi-tech weapons systems as opposed to guerrillas with just small arms.

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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    Well, in his (Gates) mind how does he see the USMC doing IW without some newer systems added to inventory?
    What is the point of this thread?? Gates has shot down HQMC's justifications for their big ticket items, that's been clearly discussed. So what is the point of your question?

    If your asking a legitimate question lets expand on it. If your going to be the little kid that asks why after every statement then that's stupid.

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    Quote Originally Posted by COMMAR View Post
    What is the point of this thread?? Gates has shot down HQMC's justifications for their big ticket items, that's been clearly discussed. So what is the point of your question?

    If your asking a legitimate question lets expand on it. If your going to be the little kid that asks why after every statement then that's stupid.
    In another post you said Gates had a certain veiwpoint of what the Marines should be/do? I raised the question to try and get a clearer understanding of what he (Gates) is after/wants.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by COMMAR View Post
    Kind of.. But in the back & forth that I've read and fr/the Marines I know on the outer fringes of this at Quantico, its not concern being voiced by Gates.
    OK, but the issues with EFV and V-22 are part of the problem. Neither should exist, because while technically possible, neither are a required capability.

    The idea that they are needed keeps flowing back to a very doubtful set of assumptions, which almost never seem to challenged. The idea that the EFV skims in from over the horizon, just to be totalled by 20kg bar mine lying 1m above the high water mark seems to be a product of focussing on the wrong problem.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by Granite_State View Post
    The Marine Corps Gazette, for subscribers, had an article in February by a retired AAV Gunny, "Do We Really Need the EFV?"
    GySgt. J. C. Oster,Do we really need the EFV?, Marine Corps Gazette, Feb, 2010
    Last edited by Tukhachevskii; 06-09-2010 at 09:54 AM. Reason: guess.....yep, links

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    Of course Gate's opinion is only one opinion and while he's the executive over the DoD, he actually has comparitively little say about force structure and equipment when compared to Congress. Gates may have a vision but it won't amount to a hill of beans unless he can get convince Congress to go along...it's usually Congress that "wins" these disputes.
    Supporting "time-limited, scope limited military actions" for 20 years.

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    OK, but the issues with EFV and V-22 are part of the problem. Neither should exist, because while technically possible, neither are a required capability.
    What then are the required capabilities regarding a new Marine APC or IFV? I do think the ability to deploy vehicles to shore without the use of LCs is a useful capability, not just in the very unlikely context of "storming the beach" but in the case of a whole range of potential low-intensity conflict settings.

    That being said, the EFV may well be over-engineered with capabilities that it doesn't need.
    They mostly come at night. Mostly.


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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    In another post you said Gates had a certain veiwpoint of what the Marines should be/do? I raised the question to try and get a clearer understanding of what he (Gates) is after/wants.
    Sure, I understand your point.

    A point of clarity.. I've watched this back & forth for awhile now, watched nearly every speech or interview Gates has given on the subject & watched Conway or MCCDC counter and until Gates' speech @ the Navy League & maybe 1 before that its all been very subtle, point/counter-point.

    I respect & read every opinion on here but the fact is it was losing focus of what Gates was actually saying. He never said this Marine Acquisition or that was garbage or a P.O.S. but that he agrees with NO scenario, so far presented, that justified the expenditure.

    My point was to bring the conversation back to what he & the Marine Corps are actually debating.

    He doesn't see a likely(keyword) scenario where we'll be Hydroplaning APCs fr/over the horizon, & etc. down the line of issues. HQMC has counter pointed, but he's still unconvinced... but yet still open.

    Go back & listen to the speeches, reread the articles. He's obviously against continuing the programs but hasn't yet, why...? That's the real story.

    He has canceled many other programs both large & small thru-out the DOD, yet he has still left the door open to the Marines.

  11. #31
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    Quote Originally Posted by COMMAR View Post
    He doesn't see a likely(keyword) scenario where we'll be Hydroplaning APCs fr/over the horizon, & etc. down the line of issues. HQMC has counter pointed, but he's still unconvinced... but yet still open.
    That was what I was looking for or what I was missing. I understand it better from the stand point of he (Gates)is not against storming the beach so much as he is against the concept of what they used to call Forced Entry Operations.

    How ever I think the expense is still justified from the standpoint of and if we ever pursue a Raiding type Strategy as opposed to invade,occupy,nation build Strategy we are using now. And SPEED is the essence of raiding IMO. If you can simply do something faster than the other guy can react to it you are likely to win. That is a scenario that I think justifies the expense, if anything they should get more money to make EFV faster than what is . And to build on that further we need a jet powered Tilt-something that can go super sonic.
    Last edited by slapout9; 06-09-2010 at 08:33 PM. Reason: check stuff

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    OK, but the issues with EFV and V-22 are part of the problem. Neither should exist, because while technically possible, neither are a required capability.

    The EFV maybe.. maybe not. But the V-22 I can't agree with.

    If your basing this assessment by looking at the USMC's present mission, land lock in a static conflict, then its easy to say X-Helo would be a much better choice.

    In a Static Conflict the Helo is King, however the USMC is not a static force. Expeditionary is more than just a title, every decision, every acquisition, everything is designed around being expeditionary.. b/c thats the Primary mission.

    In an Expeditionary environment the Helo is limited.. Fixed wing is limited. A platform the merges the two is King.

    In the 1st 6mths or so of Afghanistan the V-22 would've been god. No staging in neighboring countries, making unfavorable treaties to launch small scale missions & raids. No flying in troops as close as possible fixed wing to transfer to helos for the rest of the way.

    No.. there could've been multiple Beach Heads like the 1 the Marines built overnight at Rhino, run a weeks worth of missions & move on, while simultaneously collapsing the time & distance of the Battle Space, enveloping the enemy on a much larger scale w/its speed.

    But that's the past. In the near-future.. No matter if their called SCMAGTFs or ECOs or EMOs the Expeditionary Corps will move to a MEU & up to 4 virtually mini-MEUs ringing each Theater Command. Not nearly as equipped like MEUs they'll be Light Reinforced Rifle Coys w/Support & C2, sending out reinforced Plt-sized Dets regionally for a variety of short-duration missions; HA, Bi-Lats, FID, Piracy, etc.

    The value the V-22 brings across a T-Comm in speed & efficiency is not additive or in multiples but Exponential. Pick them up where ever you want, travel as far as you want, & put them down where ever you want, repeat continuously for a full 6mth Deployment.

    The Corps has & will run 100s of missions outside of Iraq & A'stan that more fit the traditional Expeditionary Nature of the Corps & the V-22 is 100% necessary.
    Last edited by COMMAR; 06-09-2010 at 11:23 PM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    That was what I was looking for or what I was missing. I understand it better from the stand point of he (Gates)is not against storming the beach so much as he is against the concept of what they used to call Forced Entry Operations.
    I basically agree w/everything you said, but

    I wouldn't say he's against FE-Ops.... What I really think is maybe he is challenging the Corps to innovate & give him something more.. to maybe do it in a potentially more efficient way.

    I'm not sure if he really doesn't agree or if in his time he's learned that Marines work best under pressure. But he is subtly sparring w/them over Ideas in public.

    Maybe the Corps vision & the equipment needed is the Round wheel & he just hasn't grasped it yet...

    Maybe if he forces them to Brainstorm they might fit a tire on it...

    What is clear is he's not yet convinced but the debate is still open.

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    Quote Originally Posted by COMMAR View Post

    I wouldn't say he's against FE-Ops.... What I really think is maybe he is challenging the Corps to innovate & give him something more.. to maybe do it in a potentially more efficient way.

    Maybe thats an opportunity. The Assault Seaplane idea has always intrigued me, seems strait up the Marine Corps alley to. I don't know how feasible it really is but the CL-130 is basically an adaption of existing equipment that could bring a real punch to such Forced Entry operations. General Gavin was intrigued by this for future Airborne operations but the idea never went beyond a concept stage as far as I know.

    http://www.g2mil.com/c130seaplane.htm

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Not a good idea due to the stern ramp. However,

    this worked:

    LINK
    Last edited by Ken White; 10-27-2011 at 01:20 AM.

  16. #36
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Ken,yea that would work or modify the nose of the CL-130. Standard platform with many new apps as my granddaughter would say. She has been trying to update me because she thinks I am growing obsolete...actually she thinks my cell phone is. She calls it a single purpose platform with few apps(I think that is new speak for applications), what I need is a standard Multi-purpose platform with many apps. She swears there are even some that old people would like. So the USMC needs some type of standard platform to attack across the shore, very fast with the capability to add new apps as they come out.

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    Default An all MV-22 fleet would be nice, but it's too expensive

    COMMAR, I'm a MV-22 fan, but also a believer in helicopters. A mix of both might be more mission and cost effective for the Marines.

    A UH-60M costs around $3,000 per hour of flight time. A MV-22 around $10,000.

    A little back-of-the-envelope calculation leads to these estimates:

    • MV-22: $72 million upfront flyaway cost and $10,000 per flight hour x 60 hours/month in theater = $600,000 per aircraft per month

    • UH-60M: $18 million upfront flyaway cost and $3,000 per flight hour x 60 hours/month in theater = $180,000 per aircraft per month

    Multiply these figures by each MV-22 squadron yields $7.2 million monthly cost for 12 MV-22, and $2.16 million for 12 UH-60M PER MONTH.

    Sure, Marines need speed and unrefueled range to go ship-to-shore and for some distant area of responsibility flights. But for shorter flights, why wouldn’t Marines be better off using more capable than UH-1N helicopters already in use by Navy brothers?

    Similarly, a Marine Expeditionary unit might need just 12 MV-22s to get to shore repeatedly for any assault whereas 12 UH-60s would make the ship-to-shore trip once and then support locally at a fraction of the cost/logistics (360 gals per fill-up for a UH-60 vs. over 1200 gals top-off per V-22).

    The UH-60M would have:
    • greater high/hot HOGE and similar payload capability
    • similar external load speeds
    • less brown-out risk
    • more small LZ capability
    • more aircraft in larger LZs (no 250’ separation between)
    • easier and more dispersed shore maintenance
    • closer proximity to forward Marines for aerial QRFs and MEDEVAC…not CASEVAC without onboard care

    At current flyaway costs a notional pair of Marine Squadron with 12 MV-22, and 12 UH-60Ms w/ folding rotors would cost around $1.08 billion to procure. Two squadrons with a total of 24 MV-22s would cost $1.728 billion for procurement. Savings: $648 million for just 24 a/c.

    Similar savings result from the difference in monthly flight hour costs for 1440 hours of $14.4 million for 24 MV-22 vs. $9.36 million for a mix of 12 MV-22, and 12 UH-60M. The savings in recurring monthly cost per hour of flight is over $5 million, or over $60 million saved annually for just 24 aircraft. In a decade you equal the procurement savings.

    In reality, you probably would discover that you could shift more flight hour burden to the helicopter fleet for most shore missions thus saving even more money. Let's say you plan on using 35% of flight hours in the MV-22, and 65%flying the cheaper UH-60M. That ratio would result in a cost per month for 1440 hours equaling about $5.04 million for the 12 MV-22 (504 hrs), and $2.808 million for 12 UH-60M (936 hrs) or about $7.848 million a month vs. $14.4 million for 24 MV-22s flying the same 1440 hours. That is $78.6 million in annual O&M savings.

    And because a mix of 12 MV-22 and 12 UH-60M would use less deck/hangar space aboard Marine ships, several CH-53Ks could fit in the remaining space.

    Sure the UH-60M would carry fewer Marines. But a few more CH-53K per boat would make up for it:
    • 24 MV-22 carrying 20 Marines (heavier body armor/center belly gun/ hot/high) = 480 Marines in one lift.
    • One squadron of 12 MV-22 and another with 12 UH-60M, and just four CH-53K carry 240 Marines in the MV-22, 120 in 12 UH-60M, and 120+ in just four CH-53K for a greater lift of 480+ Marines the first lift.

    Add a 60% MV-22 mission capable rate to the equation and 80% rate for the UH-60M, and 75% for the CH-53K, and suspect the lift per mixed-squadrons-alternative is more than a little in favor of the 12/12/4 mix…with ample taxpayer money not spent, initially and annually. In fact the savings would purchase all the CH-53K fleet and its flying hour costs.

    Just my personal views.

  18. #38
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by COMMAR View Post
    The EFV maybe.. maybe not. But the V-22 I can't agree with..... the V-22 is 100% necessary.
    Beg to differ. It is criminally expensive and ridiculously complex.
    For all that, all you actually get is speed. For the same given payload, helicopters can go just as far, by merely trading payload for fuel.
    It's deck foot print is huge, and IIRC there is no manual reversion on the folding sequence.
    Yes, cost versus relevant capability is not an exact science, but the cost here was squandered on a set of capabilities that are of dubious relevance compared to the operationally proven ones we can get from platforms like EH-101 for example.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    I've also thought that the MV-22's RCS (or radar cross section in case RCS also stands for something else) would be huge during conventional flight ops. Sure it can hover like a helicopter but can it fly NOE when tactically necessary. It's use presumes "totally" effective SEAD; obviously, this is always going to be an operational requirement with any and all air assault operations but we are not always going to be facing kurta wearing Taliban. Is it really worth the cost for a bird with what looks like an awfully limited load area (volume wise) and only carries AFAIK, what, 24 pax comfortably compared to something like the CH-53 (obviously a different class, I know) or even the CH-47?

    On a different note this monograph from the World Security Institute is pretty critical of the entire programme...

    V-22 Osprey: Wonder Weapon or Widow Maker (They warned us. But no one is listening)
    Last edited by Tukhachevskii; 06-10-2010 at 09:54 AM.

  20. #40
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    This article in RUSI Defence Systems bases most of it's criticism on the aerodynamic arguments. Interesting none the less.

    Why on earth the CH-53K wasn't in service 10 years ago, I don't know. It easily could have been.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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