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Thread: Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict - Military Commentary

  1. #61
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    In short, Javelin is good but it is not a "magic bullet" by any means. If you control the rugged terrain beforehand (which Georgia did not), you can do a Hezbollah and gopher into the hillsides along the only usable routes for tanks, but Georgia did not have that option here. You may be able to get a few hunter-killer teams into place despite all of this via some serious mountaineering, but the size and bulk of the Javelin system means that they couldn't bring many in, they'd be able to take out a few tanks at best, and the Russians would just push the burning tanks off the road into the gorge and keep going.
    I'm not sure I follow. What does the size and bulk of the Javelin have to do with anything, especially bringing in many systems? You can move them in the back of a pickup truck if you have to.

  2. #62
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post
    Not to contradict a rising star such as yourself, but my take is that when there are only a handful of roads, you know the lines long before the war starts and you can also place EFPs long before the war starts. Maybe it wouldn't have worked in S. Ossetia, but the Russians didn't stop there.

    Relevant, because there are only a handful of roads through the mountains between Iraq and Iran. Also, I believe Hezbollah was able to take out some tanks with EFPS/deep buried IEDS placed before the war started/ (From memory; I could be wrong.)
    The bottlenecks were all north of T town. South of T town were almost Ukraine-like lowlands agricultural areas.
    Seriosu mountaineering could have been avoided by helicopter insertion from the rear slope.

    The firing position choice for ATGM teams would have been delicate, though.
    Forward slope would have been suicidal.
    The ridges were apparently mostly without concealment, probably too easily dominated by helicopters. And rear slope is not for Javelin employment, at best for waiting.

    I believe it comes down to quite the same success factors as in comparably slow lowlands warfare;
    - keep enemy air power away and
    - keep enemy artillery suppressed or at least seriously hindered by counterfire.
    Some LRRPs could have guaranteed effective artillery fire without much high-tech for the Georgians, but I guess that's just like a raid on the tunnel something that the Georgians simply forgot to do.

  3. #63
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default That's the problem...

    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post
    ...I believe Hezbollah was able to take out some tanks with EFPS/deep buried IEDS placed before the war started/ (From memory; I could be wrong.)
    'Some' being the operative word. 'Some' doesn't work, it has to be most...

    Not that easy.

  4. #64
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    Javelin is much more flexible.
    ..and Spike more so. The video is a bit out of date, but the FO guidance is just scary.

    I have been shown a video from the Lebanon where they flew the missile over a village to hit a rocket truck on the other side, that had been picked up by a UAV.

    Yes, Spike has small war-head but when you can target a tank hatch, that's a bit academic.

    ...so IMO, with good tactics and the right equipment, you should be able to turn Georgia into an MRD grave yard... and vice versa.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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  5. #65
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    ..and Spike more so. The video is a bit out of date, but the FO guidance is just scary.

    I have been shown a video from the Lebanon where they flew the missile over a village to hit a rocket truck on the other side, that had been picked up by a UAV.

    Yes, Spike has small war-head but when you can target a tank hatch, that's a bit academic.

    ...so IMO, with good tactics and the right equipment, you should be able to turn Georgia into an MRD grave yard... and vice versa.
    As a tanker, long range, high powered, top attack, fire and forget ATGM's scare me. I'll admit it. And there's no good countermeasure, although the Russians claim some. Fortunately, the only armies that have them in bulk are friendly to us.

    Agreed, with the right tactics and employment, it could do a lot of damage to a numerically superior mechanized force.
    "A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball, Kelly's Heroes
    Who is Cavguy?

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    Fuch said

    The ridges were apparently mostly without concealment, probably too easily dominated by helicopters. And rear slope is not for Javelin employment, at best for waiting.
    Strix mortar round would be good alternative.

    About military geography. Why Russians moved to town Gori? This is out ot LO borders, this is out of OSCE conflict zone borders? My humble opinion is that here starts the huge plain terrain until Tbilisi. It's easier to fight possible Georgian counter-attack. If this is the rationale, then tail wags dog or how the saying is.

    About Finnish plans.

    http://www.mil.fi/perustietoa/julkai...nglanti_02.pdf

    About T-90

    Moreover, because of design differences between the domestic and export versions, the small batches of tanks ordered for the Russian army are expensive to produce. For example, the price of a T-90 rose from 42 million rubles in 2006 to 58 million in 2007 – an increase of 38%. This level of inflation can hardly be matched by similar increases in defense budget allocations, so a massive armored forces capability increase is highly unlikely.
    http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/1-2008/item2/article4/

    Destiny of 1 Georgian squad.

    http://vasi.net/2008/08/14/gruzinska...jj_osetii.html
    Last edited by kaur; 08-16-2008 at 07:46 AM.

  7. #67
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default Infantry versus Armour

    Infantry attempting tank killing is actually well covered in concept terms. The Soviets developed the Corps level Machine Gun Artillery Battalions, and you also have the all the English and Simpkin stuff written in the 1980s.

    While I am a fan of guided weapons in terms of infantry fire support I don't think infantry companies should aim to fight units of armoured vehicles, while dismounted. I think it requires highly mobile, well trained Formation level Guided Weapons Companies.

    You have to be more mobile than the MBTs they are taking on, or else they can simply be evaded. I am also unsure of how useful the term "ambush" is. "Attack on a moving enemy" is useful, but lurking in a wood hoping the enemy is nice enough to drive by, is not the acme of tactical skill.

    - yes you can hope that they are ordered to do something stupid, as in the Lebanon, but once they understand what you are doing, you are dead in you bunkers.

    Yes I think there is a for dismounted infantry when taking on armoured formations, but I don't see it as being the decisive one.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    'Some' being the operative word. 'Some' doesn't work, it has to be most...
    Depends on your opponents aversion to causalities. By any definition, Hezbollah conducted a successful defense. But if the point you're making is that Georgia was stupid getting into a war with a much bigger, better armed opponent, your point is well taken.
    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    You have to be more mobile than the MBTs they are taking on
    Good point. If the Georgians could move in and out of ambush position - or whatever you want to call them - the Ruswsian "blast everything" tactic is less effective.

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Yes I think there is a for dismounted infantry when taking on armoured formations, but I don't see it as being the decisive one.
    Georgia will never be able to decisively defeat Russia. Constant "little cuts" until the Russians decide it ain't worth it is the best they could hope for. As I said before, the Russians would probably respond by flattening Tbilisi, so rolling over and showing their belly was probably the Georgians best option. Not very manly, but it works for my dog.
    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Sometimes it takes someone without deep experience to think creatively.

  10. #70
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post

    Georgia will never be able to decisively defeat Russia. Constant "little cuts" until the Russians decide it ain't worth it is the best they could hope for. As I said before, the Russians would probably respond by flattening Tbilisi, so rolling over and showing their belly was probably the Georgians best option. Not very manly, but it works for my dog.
    I concur. I was referring to decisive action at the tactical level, without which you tend to loose lots of folks, though you may win the war.

    I do think that Georgia could exhaust Russia by attrition over time, to allow the diplomatic means to kick in. An all out 14-day effort is not beyond asking, in terms of an achievable capability.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Default Finnish plans (if such a thing exists)

    from kaur
    Destiny of 1 Georgian squad.
    Not nice stuff - should be required viewing for all politicians who would lightly send men off to war.

    from kaur
    About Finnish plans.
    Booklet is a good summary of FDF overall; even though as 2002 document (so, based on 2001 White Paper), it is before 2004 White Paper.

    Follow-up reading would be that 2004 paper and defense projection to 2025, at MoD:

    http://www.defmin.fi/files/311/2574_...er_2004_1_.pdf
    http://www.defmin.fi/files/674/Secur...ategy_2025.pdf

    ---------------------------
    For those that don't know, Finland Proper (Turku region) owes its original settlement (a few 1000 years ago) to people from Estonia, who crossed the gulf by ship. Or, in the view of one a bit drunken Karelian, "Estonians are Finns who didn't learn to swim." Since I'm Ostrobothnian, I had to disagree, of course.

    One ancestor, Pahwals Pass (and his two brothers) were from, or of ancestry from, the island of Runö. Family story from ca. 1500 - so, not easy to prove (although it is plausible).

  12. #72
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Well, yeah - and no...

    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post
    Depends on your opponents aversion to causalities.
    Not really, loss of vehicles means more than casualties, it means a loss of combat capability. With the Russians (and there are others) who don't care about casualties, their own or anyone else's, the casualty factor is not a significant issue -- but combat capability has to be one...
    ...By any definition, Hezbollah conducted a successful defense.
    Possibly true -- that it was successful obviously owed a very great deal to Israeli incompetence and miscalculation, so the 'credit' is not all due to Hezbollah. It is quite dangerous to assume that a tactic that works in a particular geographic, state of training and cultural setting (and all are very important) can be universally applied. Not to mention that whenever someone pulls off a successful offense or defense, every military guy in the world studies it in an effort to develop a counter -- usually successfully...
    But if the point you're making is that Georgia was stupid getting into a war with a much bigger, better armed opponent, your point is well taken.
    Now that's true -- but I suspect there's a lot more to it than that. On both sides. Russia's op was a FSB op with the well prepped and rehearsed military as an instrument. What was Georgia's?

  13. #73
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    @Kaur:
    STRIX has a terribly small footprint. I don't remember the correct data, but it's so small that a single target should better not move.
    To aim at a road when a coluimn is passing might be promising, but some self-guided munitions have a tendency to not lead enough on fast moving targets afaik.

    You have to be more mobile than the MBTs they are taking on, or else they can simply be evaded. I am also unsure of how useful the term "ambush" is. "Attack on a moving enemy" is useful, but lurking in a wood hoping the enemy is nice enough to drive by, is not the acme of tactical skill.
    Hmm, actually that's one of the methods that produced the best kill ratios in the past afaik.
    The art is to choose the right place and time, and to pull it off. It's nice to get away and repeat it elsewhere, of course.

    The emphasis on mobility is a bit questionable imho. Getting away is important, but any emphasis on being faster is probably misleading.

    The mobility-emphasizing tank destroyer concept of WW2 was not the expected success, whereas the StuG concept (always inferior in mobility to its major enemy T-34) that rested much of its AT tactics on old field artillery ambush tactics was a success (different environments and generally difficult to compare, but the opinions about the TD concept are afaik still rather negative).

    The other reason is less military history than OR-like.
    What does "more mobile" mean? It's terrain negotiability aspect is irrelevant in many terrains (not quite in mountains) because MBTs can already negotiate most terrains.
    The speed aspect is the one that convinces me the least.
    - not the tank's speed counts, but the tank unit speed
    - 40-75 km/h depending on surface/type and depths of probably 5-15 km before the tanks do a lot of harm:
    How much time does that give for leading an AT unit into a favourable position, probably more than once? Consider that the AT teams don't dictate the direction of the attack, they have time lags because they have to react.

    A success in an AT mission requires imho either well-prepared ambushes, a lot of brute fireower or a combination of enemy mobility degradation and own mobility.
    The MBT's speed is imho quite uninteresting. It's the unit's speed that counts, and that's under influence by some external factors (real and fake minefields, ECM against radio comm, intimidation by multi-spectral smoke walls - who wants to move into the unknown?).

    Btw, what did you mean with "or else they can simply be evaded"?

  14. #74
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    @ Hmm, actually that's one of the methods that produced the best kill ratios in the past afaik.
    The art is to choose the right place and time, and to pull it off. It's nice to get away and repeat it elsewhere, of course.


    @ What does "more mobile" mean? It's terrain negotiability aspect is irrelevant in many terrains (not quite in mountains) because MBTs can already negotiate most terrains.

    @ Btw, what did you mean with "or else they can simply be evaded"?
    @ I am not trying to suggest that anti-armour ambushes have not been historically successful, but that is not the point. As you say right time and place, so ensuring you have the freedom of action to exploit the opportunity is critical. Being on foot with 52kgs of equipment is not a way to lengthen the odds in your favour. If man power and resources are limited, you can't be ready on ever route, and if there are very few routes, the enemy is pretty much going to guess you may seek to deny them those routes and act accordingly.

    @ More mobile means retaining the freedom of action, to move. Speed is only one parameter in that regard. If you can go places he can't, you have greater freedom, and speed may be totally irrelevant.

    @ If he has greater mobility, he can simply bypass you or disengage. What is more, if you lack mobility relative to the enemy, you cannot exploit.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  15. #75
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    What is more, if you lack mobility relative to the enemy, you cannot exploit.
    exploit=pursuit?

    Pursuit is a risyky & difficult activity anyway.
    To destroy a withdrawing opponent requires a lot of excess speed.

    Pursuit was historically probably more about territory gains than destruction - but AT units rarely if ever have the mission to gain ground.

    The whole speed issue loses relevance once one considers a battlefield with many units instead of a unit duel. A tank battalion that evades an AT company might run into another deadly threat.

  16. #76
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    exploit=pursuit?
    Exploit in terms of core functions mean use the opportunity created. Realise the benefit of the strike. It may well mean withdraw.

    Pursuit is risky at the tactical level, which is why the Russians have always taught/ tried to apply it at the operational level.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  17. #77
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Exploit=total destruction

    also......

  18. #78
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    some pictures

    This is apparently a photo from northern SO (north of T town). It might be from Northern Ossetia as well (I cannot guarantee that it's from SO).


    Have a look at the terrain.
    No good opportunities for concealment- neither for those in the valley nor for ambushers on high ground. FO's on high ground and aerial recce would have had perfect conditions, though.

    This is south of T town.


    Excellent mechanized/armoured unit terrain. Terrible terrain for infantry. Terrible terrain for an army under air attack.

  19. #79
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    A T-62 with partial slat armour, part of a late-coming unit (late-coming unit of 19th MRD or from another unit).


    In 2008 probably only useful as a good weather infantry fire support vehicle.
    Nevertheless; it shows that the Russians used some very old equipment (also some BTR-70's).
    I've already seen articles that claim a Russian technological superiority; T-80's and -90's, BMP-2 and -3, Tunguska, BTR-90 - of these were so far only Tunguska and BMP-2 confirmed afaik. Mediocre variants of T-72, BMP-1/2 and BTR-80's were afaik typical, especially for the five advance guard battalions and the peacekeepers (which had teh BMP-1's without ATGM).

    Camouflaged (I think that this could be called "concealed" as well) Tunguska:


    The first photos of the war showed no other camouflage than what the factory had applied. Later in the war appeared some photos of bushes with guns like this and photos of tanks wih marginal foliage for camouflage.
    Maybe they only applied some camouflage materials once they had some longer breaks. They seemed to lack camouflage netting.


    (I had to break this into two replies because the forum software counted 8 instead of 4 photos due to the integral links).

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    Nice pics. Thanks, I learned a lot.

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Not really, loss of vehicles means more than casualties, it means a loss of combat capability.
    The Beirut barracks bombing destroyed very little military equipment, yet lead to a complete withdrawal: like you say, every case is different.

    Back on topic: the fact that the Russians aren't averse to causalities left the Georgians with few realistic options.
    Last edited by Rank amateur; 08-16-2008 at 10:18 PM.
    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Sometimes it takes someone without deep experience to think creatively.

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