Abandon squad/section levels of organization?

[goesh]

Small group/unit cohesion and bonding that starts with a boot camp platoon should be disrupted by totaling reasigning everyone, completely mixing them up about half ways through and then again in infantry training. Granted, bonding is critical but small group bonding is familial in nature, maternal, and family roles can assume at times importance and status almost equal to the mandates of command and control, doctrine and discipline. You are putting people into an alien environment and they form family roles, very subtle things to understand, and I am only suggesting that C&C, D&D, which is paternal, has to intially take absolute precedent over the hearts and minds of the green weenies. Once they get into the real life of the military and direct application, they will bond with their brothers. 7 is a magic number when it comes to crew size IMO.

[Norfolk]

7 is a magic number when it comes to crew size IMO.

goesh, how would this 7-man element be organized? Somewhat akin to the SEAL squad, or something else?

[Steve Blair]

I believe the standard SOG spike team was a seven-man element as well. Three Americans and four or so indigs (either 'Yards or Nungs) was common, although there were some larger teams and other elements on occasion (CCC tended to make heavy use of Hatchet Force companies if memory serves, although all three Command & Control elements had them).

[Norfolk]

I believe the standard SOG spike team was a seven-man element as well. Three Americans and four or so indigs (either 'Yards or Nungs) was common, although there were some larger teams and other elements on occasion (CCC tended to make heavy use of Hatchet Force companies if memory serves, although all three Command & Control elements had them).

Ah...I see. Steve, how was the SOG team kitted out? My understanding was that they were typically organized for/as Recon (with some exceptions perhaps), so usually "light" on the heavier weapons (typcially no LMGs/GPMGs, etc.)

As I recall, the SEAL squad organization was more akin to a conventional fire-and-movement infantry squad (albeit smaller to fit entirely into assault boats): a squad leader (a junior officer), and two 3-man fire teams, each with an LMG, a grenadier, and a rifleman. Two such squads made up a SEAL platoon (the senior squad leader commanding the paltoon, the junior squad leader as 2i/c). Of course that was a few years ago now, and things may have changed.

[Steve Blair]

SOG teams tended to travel fairly light (so you're correct there)...basic weapon was the AK or CAR-15/XM-177E2. The Hatchet Force was obviously heavier and did carry LMGs. SOG did have tons of air ordnance on call, so that to a degree offset their light organic weaponry (note that it's to a degree, but their basic mission was recon/targeting).

During Vietnam the SEALs tended to operate in teams ranging from 3-7 men, if memory serves. They had heavier weapons, in part due to their use of the Stoner system that allowed for a fairly light LMG-type weapon. SEALs didn't tend to do tons of long range patrolling, so they could go heavy on weapons and light on other stuff. Platoons tended to break into two sections for operational purposes...one "on" and one "off" if memory serves (although I could be suffering from CRS, so any corrections are appreciated).

On a related note there was a fascinating article that came out a couple of years ago (don't remember the journal title, but I do have a copy of it in the files) that involved a conference of old SOG 1-0s (team leaders) meeting with current SF personnel at Bragg. Some very interesting "compare and contrast" stuff in there, including the SOG guys feeling that they had much more control over mission planning than units do today.

[Norfolk]

On a related note there was a fascinating article that came out a couple of years ago (don't remember the journal title, but I do have a copy of it in the files) that involved a conference of old SOG 1-0s (team leaders) meeting with current SF personnel at Bragg. Some very interesting "compare and contrast" stuff in there, including the SOG guys feeling that they had much more control over mission planning than units do today.

Hmmm...Steve, that last is rather intriguing...if you had time, some time, to dig it up and either post it or PM/E-Mail it, I would be most grateful.

OH PLEASE, PRETTY PLEASE, WITH SUGAR AND A CHERRY ON TOP!

[Steve Blair]

Hmmm...Steve, that last is rather intriguing...if you had time, some time, to dig it up and either post it or PM/E-Mail it, I would be most grateful.

OH PLEASE, PRETTY PLEASE, WITH SUGAR AND A CHERRY ON TOP!

I'll dig it up. They didn't go into tons of detail because it was an unclassified forum, but there was some sweet stuff in there.

The sad part is that no one had bothered to do this until only a few years ago. Some of the 1-0s indicated that no one had EVER talked to them in an attempt to gather some lessons. And these are guys who were running the Trail at the height of the Vietnam War....

[Rifleman]

On a related note there was a fascinating article that came out a couple of years ago (don't remember the journal title, but I do have a copy of it in the files) that involved a conference of old SOG 1-0s (team leaders) meeting with current SF personnel at Bragg. Some very interesting "compare and contrast" stuff in there, including the SOG guys feeling that they had much more control over mission planning than units do today.

I wonder if CSM (Ret.) Samuel Hernandez was one of them. CSM Hernandez was with both B-52 Project Delta and MACVSOG CCN. I know he was on RT Florida for the first HALO jump. I don't know what other teams he went "over the fence" with.

I'm just asking out of curiosity, since he was my battalion CSM from '84-'88, both at Ft. Bragg and Vicenza.

[Steve Blair]

I wonder if CSM (Ret.) Samuel Hernandez was one of them. CSM Hernandez was with both B-52 Project Delta and MACVSOG CCN. I know he was on RT Florida for the first HALO jump. I don't know what other teams he went "over the fence" with.

I'm just asking out of curiosity, since he was my battalion CSM from '84-'88, both at Ft. Bragg and Vicenza.

I'm actually not sure. The article didn't go into much detail, and didn't discuss the 1-0 participants in terms of names. It's certainly worth a read, though. Some very good stuff.

[Ken White]

talks to those guys, the even more devastating item is your comment that I highlighted below. The trend is, apparently in the direction of OVER control -- when it should be just the opposite.

Sad.

...
. . .
... Some very interesting "compare and contrast" stuff in there, including the SOG guys feeling that they had much more control over mission planning than units do today.

(emphasis added / kw)

[William F. Owen]

I believe the standard SOG spike team was a seven-man element as well. Three Americans and four or so indigs (either 'Yards or Nungs) was common, although there were some larger teams and other elements on occasion (CCC tended to make heavy use of Hatchet Force companies if memory serves, although all three Command & Control elements had them).

SOG Teams, as concerns OPS-35 Ground Studies Branch, were entirely task organised, and there was no standard configuration. I interviewed 12 SOG patrol leaders for my novel (Blackfoot is Missing), and I discussed this particular issue with them at some length, as it was dear to my heart. Smallest "recon" team I know of was 4 men, (done only once) and the largest recon team I heard of was 12-13.

Dirty little secret - SOG OPS-35 Ground Studies Branch was the model for my Patrol Based Infantry concept - so while I understand all the reservations folks have posted, getting up to speed on SOG operations between 1965 and 71 may give some clues as to where I am coming from. - should anyone really care and I am amazed that some of you do!!

[Rifleman]

SOG Teams, as concerns OPS-35 Ground Studies Branch, were entirely task organised, and there was no standard configuration. I interviewed 12 SOG patrol leaders for my novel (Blackfoot is Missing), and I discussed this particular issue with them at some length, as it was dear to my heart. Smallest "recon" team I know of was 4 men, (done only once) and the largest recon team I heard of was 12-13.

Dirty little secret - SOG OPS-35 Ground Studies Branch was the model for my Patrol Based Infantry concept - so while I understand all the reservations folks have posted, getting up to speed on SOG operations between 1965 and 71 may give some clues as to where I am coming from. - should anyone really care and I am amazed that some of you do!!

Wilf,

Point taken; however, I'm still not convinced that it's the way to go for standard infantry. Both flexibility and modularity have advantages, of course, but so does habitual association. Where to strike the balance?

The very experienced Special Forces NCOs leading Nungs and Montangnards in SOG made flexibility work to their advantage. But then again they finished the conflict with more Medals of Honor, per capita, than any other unit in Vietnam. That's a tremendous testimony to their ability. Do we think that most green 2d Lieutenants could or would be capable of operating that way?

It's also worth noting that some other SF projects like Popular Forces, Mobile Strike Forces, and Mobile Guerrilla Forces pretty much stuck to a traditional infantry organization.

I'll have to order a copy of Blackfoot is Missing. By the way, did you happen to interview retired Command Sergeant Major Samuel Hernandez? He was a one-zero at CCN and made the first HALO jump in Vietnam with RT Florida. John Plaster's book SOG mentions him. He was also my Battalion Command Sergeant Major from 1984-1988.