The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

I can track along with CvC's theory not being rendered invalid by populace-based conflict; but I believe the leap of logic to concluding also that ways and means that are effective in defeating another state are also effective in resolving a conflict with one's own populace is both too broad, and unsubstantiated by historical fact.

What is a "populace based conflict?"

I only ask as all Wars are about political outcomes. It's the authority to which the people defer and obey, which is the issue, not they themselves. That is the same for all human conflict.

In those terms, fighting the Taliban is no different from fighting the Waffen SS. The prize was not the German people, no more than the prize is the "Afghan" people. The prize is someone exercising a useful degree of authority over them.

The nature of the fighting however, may have to be different, for POLITICAL reasons, as Clausewitz explains.

[jmm99]

Just a couple of little points.

from Takio
Close, he actually used the example of Tartar tribes as transnatinal non-sate actors.

Depends on how you translate the Tartar passage from Bk 8.3B:

Die Tatarenschwärme suchen neue Wohnsitze. Sie ziehen mit dem ganzen Volke aus, mit Weib und Kind, sie sind also zahlreich wie verhältnismäßig kein anderes Heer, und ihr Ziel ist Unterwerfung oder Vertreibung des Gegners. Sie würden mit diesen Mitteln bald alles vor sich niederwerfen, ließe sich damit ein hoher Kulturzustand vereinigen.

I'd translate "dem ganzen Volke" as "their entire Nation"; and "Die Tatarenschwärme" as the "The Tartarhordes" (literally, it's "The Tartarswarms"; but the later Tartar political entities usually are called "Hordes" - e.g., the "Golden Horde").

I may be influenced by reading Gabriel's bio of Subotai. The historical facts are that when the Tartars "ziehened aus", they were very much a nation-state (with geographic bounds as they chose to define them; and a clear governance structure). They also a very organized military structure (part and parcel of their government). So, legally, I'd class them as a nation-state (albeit living in tents); and their soldiers as regular combatants (brutal, but regular).

The Germanic tribes who crossed into the Roman Empire seem more akin to Transnational Violent Non-State Actors - not nation-states; and their troops more akin to irregular combatants. Which period of German history you pick makes a difference. The Germanic groups named by Tacitus (ca. 100ce) had defined boundaries, a governance structure, etc. By 400ce, that had been disrupted by pressure from the East, resulting in the Rhine Crossing, etc.

I think Wilf is more factually on point with this:

from Wilf
CvC was very aware of the Catholic and Protestant "insurgencies" and Wars within Europe, including the Hussites. These are all basically "trans-national" or "non-state".

Agreed factually - and good examples of pre-Westphalian non-state actors in armed conflicts. However, did CvC discuss them ? I did a search through the On War I downloaded (Graham trans.); and had no hits for Catholic, Protestant, Hussite or religious. Anyway, if someone could supply a CvC reference to those armed conflicts, if it exists ?

[Taiko]

In regards to Jim99 point about CG I was not happy with my original conclusions. So I went back to Mao and my trinitarian definition and would like see if my new conclusions makes sense especially in regards to Bob's World points.

In Mao's 'Selected Military Writings' he goes into great detail about how PoW and the general population should be treated. I would argue that in many respects this can be pivotal in winning a revolutionary war. If CvC's trinity cannot account for it then the theory loses its validity in explaining the nature of war in all its variations.

So after some tossing and turning last night I think I have found how the trinity can be used to explain it. Focusing on the first half of the trinity Clausewitz argues that the level and intensity of violence is determined by three intervening variables:

(Violence) purpose, hostile feelings/intentions, chance and probability

I would contend that how you treat PoWs (GC) and the populace (domestic law/custom) can specifically be accounted for in shaping the hostile feelings/intensions that go towards determining the level and intensity of violence. Metz, for example, explains how after 'shock and awe' the proto-insurgencies focused on exacerbating the anger of the population, against the US, by targeting basic infrastructure. They were attempting to shape the level and intensity of the violence via controlling/manipulating the hostile feelings of the Iraqi people.

Another example from the US is the change in how they treated PoW and combatants. As in the case of Mao, this was a major psychological operation that was specifically aimed at the moral of the opponents fighting force and a way to shape the hostile feelings/intentions of it. When the Red army captured enemy soldiers, they "re-educated" them and let them go. In Iraq the same process was implemented in the prisons by the US to "de-radicalize" combatants through the introduction of moderate clerics. In terms of the general population the key to shaping and controlling the hostile feelings/intentions lead to a shift in search and seizure operations to take account of local customs/law. Just as paying compensation was used to pay for damages or the death of a family member using the tribal customs.

Obviously this is just a basic summary. However, I think I have a handle on the first part of the trinity. The second part of the trinity, in relation to how this effects the intervening variables that determine political power I'm still working on. In terms of my explanation for the first part I would appreciate any thoughts from SWC members.

Good point about the Tartar's Jimm99 and the Hussites Wilf. Looks like its back to the drawing board in looking at transnational non-state actors. Although I think the second part of the trinity (politics) government, people, military, will be able to account for it. Its just a matter of finding the write words.

So keep CvC in your rucksack as a good source, but continue to seek other sources to fleshout how something that can appear and act so similar in so many ways can also be so different and require very different approaches; both in general, and certainly by case.
I guess we could say that war is like women. War is war and women are women -- but while the similarities are obvious, it is a foolish man indeed who disregards or disrespects their differences... Either way, us guys are quite likely to make a mess of it.

Well put, the last part made me laugh Although I have been working on a diagram that might have some utility and would mean you need not hump CvC's book around.

[jmm99]

This Wiki, Chinese Civil War, has an interesting set of stats:

KMT Strength

4,300,000 (July 1945)
3,650,000 (June 1948)
1,490,000 (June 1949)

CPC Strength

1,200,000 (July 1945)
2,800,000 (June 1948)
4,000,000 (June 1949)

Just as the radio broacasts of the Truman-Dewey results were my first introduction to politics (where I had an idea of what was going on), the 1948-1949 news broadcasts were the first war results I could intelligently follow.

My recollection includes entire KMT armies switching sides. So, when I saw the Wiki stats, I thought Mao made a lot of converts in a hurry. Was my recollection correct ? Yup, in Google Books, The Chinese Third Revolutionary Civil War, 1945-49, by Christopher Lew, which takes you to p.133. You can scroll up to p.132, where four KMT Armies (5th, 15th, 16th & 20th) defected within a month.

So, looking at the CPC "conversion" program is as or more important than looking at its kill or capture programs - at least for that phase of that armed conflict.

And, the book confirmed my distant recollections. Now, if someone can tell me where I left my vehicle (which one is it ?), I can try to find my way home.

-------------------
PS: Even if CvC did not discuss Hussites in particular (Wilf has yet to chime in on that), that would not invaldate application of On War's basic substance to situations involving non-state actors employing irregular combatants. CvC did not claim to write a Bible (or a cookbook), did not claim to have covered all historical examples (see Bk 2.6 On Examples, last two paragraphs), and did not claim a crystal ball to predict the future. To paraphrase Darrow (aka Henry Drummond): On War is a good book, but it is not the only book.

[Taiko]

There is currently an academic proposal outlining a proposal to develop a 'De-sacralising Information Strategy'. As the name suggests the aim is to "articulate, accelerate and intensify doubts and tensions amongst those considering or already associated with Extremists groups". The method being to target 'schismatic asabiyya' by "injecting, and then continuously reinjecting, the most vivid available insiders' awareness of the ugly, decidedly non-sacred realities of groups devoted to religiously inspired violence, into the internal and external conversations of: potential extremists, their extended families, and friends".

If interested please PM me for a copy.

[William F. Owen]

Agreed factually - and good examples of pre-Westphalian non-state actors in armed conflicts. However, did CvC discuss them ? I did a search through the On War I downloaded (Graham trans.); and had no hits for Catholic, Protestant, Hussite or religious. Anyway, if someone could supply a CvC reference to those armed conflicts, if it exists ?

I think CvC just didn't bother. He must have been aware of it, and I think it falls within the construct he uses. Point being, CvC was concerned with War as the use of Armed Force. Rebellions of that time and previously, had to raise and field Armies. That was the Warfare. His observations on War, all still stand.

Modern Insurgencies still do the same thing, in order to become a military threat. If an irregular force cannot be a military threat, it cannot win, unless there are some other powerful circumstances in play (Spain and the Madrid bombing). "Terrorism" has been remarkably indecisive as an instrument of gaining political goal.

[Bob's World]

What is a "populace based conflict?"

I only ask as all Wars are about political outcomes. It's the authority to which the people defer and obey, which is the issue, not they themselves. That is the same for all human conflict.

In those terms, fighting the Taliban is no different from fighting the Waffen SS. The prize was not the German people, no more than the prize is the "Afghan" people. The prize is someone exercising a useful degree of authority over them.

The nature of the fighting however, may have to be different, for POLITICAL reasons, as Clausewitz explains.

This is a phrase I use to differentiate between a state seeking a political objective from another state through war (state-based conflict) and a populace seeking a political objective from its own government through warfare (populace-based conflict)

My position being that how I resolve my differences with my own populace MUST be very different to how I resolve my differences with the government of some other state. I may well want and need to crush the will of the populace of that competitor state in order to defeat their government; but if a government needs to crush the will of its own populace in order to sustain itself in power, that is probably a governemnt that is so failed it needs to be replaced.

Some would quibble that a good COIN effort is only out to crush the will of some narrow segment of the populace...this is a slippery slope. Far better to ensure the dissident populace has a voice and to work to effect changes where appropriate and to keep the COIN as much in the lanes of law enforcement as possible in dealing with the criminal elements of the movement; while bringing the majority of the group back into the fold of good citizenry.

King George could have crushed the American Revolution with few simple reforms and an apology. Instead he sent the most powerful Army and Navy in the world and initiated the demise of his Kingdom. There are lessons to be learned from the mistakes of others.

[William F. Owen]

My position being that how I resolve my differences with my own populace MUST be very different to how I resolve my differences with the government of some other state. I may well want and need to crush the will of the populace of that competitor state in order to defeat their government; but if a government needs to crush the will of its own populace in order to sustain itself in power, that is probably a governemnt that is so failed it needs to be replaced.

...but that's the point. You do not need to crush the will of the people of the opposing state. You merely need to crush the will of their leadership, and/or destroy their military means. The same objective should be central to defeating insurgents, and was to every successful UK COIN campaign.
The COIN failures, (Ireland and Israel/Palestine) left in place a military capability and a functioning leadership - which both went on to create states!

...same with the Americans!

King George could have crushed the American Revolution with few simple reforms and an apology. Instead he sent the most powerful Army and Navy in the world and initiated the demise of his Kingdom. There are lessons to be learned from the mistakes of others.

Not once it became a military problem, and Kings do not apologise! (Passion, reason, chance etc) If they do, they have no political authority! - thinking 1770's, not 2010's.

[slapout9]

I have a question for any students of CvC. CvC lists 6 or 7? ways (6 offensive and 1 defensive) that a military can use to defeat an enemy. One he called "operations against the political object"......what exactly did he mean by that? I don't think he ever brings it up again after listing it.

[Taiko]

I have a question for any students of CvC. CvC lists 6 or 7? ways (6 offensive and 1 defensive) that a military can use to defeat an enemy. One he called "operations against the political object"......what exactly did he mean by that? I don't think he ever brings it up again after listing it.

I would like to have a crack at this one using the Paret/Howard translation if I may. What CvC was referring to with "operations that have direct political repercussions" was the balance of power between the states of Europe. As such, operations were design to "disrupt the opposing alliances, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene etc". The operations are aimed at the opposing policy-makers calculations of probability in terms of the cost and benefits of the outcome of initiating or continuing military action in gaining a political objective, as it was at direct military action and defeating the opponents army.

Its very similar to Sun Tzu's observation that:

The superior military cuts down strategy
Its inferior cuts down alliances
Its inferior cuts down the military
The worst attacks walled cities

From my reading of the text, the passage you refer to specifically looks at how a state can bolster its military capacity via the formation of alliances. This will have a direct effect on the balance of power and would have to be taken into account before the first shot is fired (cutting down strategy). I am not sure why he calls them "operations", unless he was referring to the establishment of military ties with other nations via inter military exchanges. An alternative reading could interpret it to say that after the first shot has been fired, when conducting a campaign you choose who and when you fight carefully in order to defeat the weaker members of an alliance quickly, and propose terms for them to either join you or surrender (cutting down alliances). In many respects you could interpret this as a strategy of attrition (cutting down the military), in so far as you are trying to create a political outcome by first attacking your opponents allies, rather than direct confrontation with the opponents main, and one would assume larger, military (attacking walled cities). If you read some of the examples he gives of Napoleon's campaign he does talk about this particular style of operation. Specifically when Napoleon faces two or more armies fielded by different states. CvC goes into some detail as to which army should be engaged first and uses that passage to argue why. Although I can't cite were they are in the book off the top of my head.

As I stated in a previous post. I think this has direct implication in small wars, the Anbar Uprising is a good example of fostering alliances and using them against your opponent. From how I read it, the fact of the matter is A'Q is dependent on alliances in order to operate and survive. The same could be said of the Taliban and its need for developing military and political alliances with the Afghan population. So I think CvC has a valid point to make at the strategic level in regards to the current conflicts in Iran and Afghanistan, specifically when choosing who and when you fight, how and why. Which is what strategy is all about at the end of the day.

For any nation to defeat the United States, if all they do is occupy DC and defeat our military, they are probably about 20% of the way to their ultimate objective.

Now this is an interesting argument in relation to CvC and his criticism of Napoleon's strategy against Russia. He was very critical in how Napoleon conducted the campaign. Specifically, the push to take the capital without defeating the army, and the subsequent 'asymmetrical campaign' the Russians conducted using both militias and regular army to push Napoleon out of Russia. There are a number of examples within this campaign of how a countries territory can provide the strategic depth to make time a decisive factor in defeating an opponent in my opinion. I think studying that campaign still has value today.

Nor do we kill our enemies in the sense you write. The Mothers of America, the Intelligentsia and the chattering classes generally do not approve of that approach today. Unfortunate IMO but that's the way it goes.

I agree with your point on principle. However, would it be fair to argue that if a conflict has a direct and lasting impact on the civilians quality of life then the situation would be radically different? The Cold War would be a good example in the context of the general US populations acceptance of the need to use or threaten to use force on a large scale. The point being, if the territory of the population is under direct threat then they would expect the government to do whatever it is in their means to safeguard it and the population.

[Ken White]

I agree with your point on principle. However, would it be fair to argue that if a conflict has a direct and lasting impact on the civilians quality of life then the situation would be radically different? The Cold War would be a good example in the context of the general US populations acceptance of the need to use or threaten to use force on a large scale. The point being, if the territory of the population is under direct threat then they would expect the government to do whatever it is in their means to safeguard it and the population.

Not funny 'ha-ha,' funny peculiar -- they're fickle. With respect to your question re: quality of life, I suspect there are many variables and regardless the 1/3 Rule will almost certainly apply.

The cold war was an extremely artificial period in history and little that occurred offers examples of value, not least because most of it is shrouded in myths. For example, many Americans believed that a Nuclear War would likely mean the end of the world as we knew it, thus the issue was not quality of life for many but of life itself, so destroying the USSR first was an acceptable figurative alternative.

However, threatening and actually using force are two different things. My thought is that most in the west are not unwilling (which is not the same as being willing) to use force but are repelled by excessive force. To defeat the enemy, if that is possible, is fine, to humiliate and degrade that defeated enemy is a different thing and that will usually draw the fire of the chatterers et.al.

By the same token, defending the hearth and visiting destruction in a distant land are two different things; as in Bob's World's point on the Stranger versus the Neighbor versus the Son -- all impose different constraints in varying degrees. Kill' em all to safeguard the Clan -- but don't be mean to that poor man who surrendered. Yet and contrarily, people can be vindictive...

All in all, absent specifics, it's quite difficult to predict how a population might react. Even with specifics, they'll fool you often as not. Populations are not only fickle, they aren't very consistent (purposely redundant)...

[slapout9]

I would like to have a crack at this one using the Paret/Howard translation if I may. What CvC was referring to with "operations that have direct political repercussions" was the balance of power between the states of Europe. As such, operations were design to "disrupt the opposing alliances, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene etc". The operations are aimed at the opposing policy-makers calculations of probability in terms of the cost and benefits of the outcome of initiating or continuing military action in gaining a political objective, as it was at direct military action and defeating the opponents army.

You are probably right on this, but I was wondering could he have meant direct operations against sovereign political leaders such as the Strike against Qaddafi of Libya? More or less bypassing the military force and going to the political COG with Military means?

[Taiko]

You are probably right on this, but I was wondering could he have meant direct operations against sovereign political leaders such as the Strike against Qaddafi of Libya? More or less bypassing the military force and going to the political COG with Military means?

In terms of COG in relation to operations with direct political repercussions. CvC argued, for example, that if Napoleon was facing more than one allied army he should direct his military against the best commanders of the allied forces first. He reasoned that the psychological blow to the allies if Napoleon defeated their most competent Generals would have direct impact on the morale of the military, the political calculations of the monarchs, and the cohesion of the alliance, in terms of their continuing capacity to resist (See for example Book 2 Chapter 5 pp: 159-164 of Paret/Howard translation were he deliberates on the various COG that Napoleon could of used, to show how to apply critical analyses to a General's decision making process). Although, CvC use of COG was determined by a number of different factors including political objective (primary), terrain, number and competency of armies etc. I suspect that if the military operation caused a significant effect in disrupting the cohesion/morale of the military and the psychological state of mind of the policy-makers and, in turn, caused them to re-evaluate the probabilities of success and failure then it could be considered a COG. The importance of targeting the military capacity to wage war directly, or the policy-makers calculations of probability in continuing the war in order to achieve the political objective, would be dependent on time, place, and capability. Having said that, I realize that COG is a heavily debated concept within the US military so I'm sure there will be some who disagree with this assessment.

Edit: One of the problems with specifically trying to target the policy-maker as a COG, Qaddafi for example, is that he/she can in may cases be replaced, a standing army can not be replaced as quickly. An alternative argument would be that A'Qs COG, or any insurgency for that matter, is its ideology CvC called it 'popular opinion', not its leadership. The exception being if the policy-maker holds that much power that the regime would collapse if he/she is removed.

[Bob's World]

I guess this gets to what has been labeled "The American Way of War" (inaccurately, in my opinion).

When Grant assumed command of the Union Army, while he understood that it was very important to defeat Lee's Army and also valuable to capture the Confederate Capital, he also instinctively understood that he needed to crush the will of the Confederate populace, so that the entire Confederate nation would know it was defeated once the war was over. To that end, he positioned himself with Meade to ensure that Meade did not lose his focus on Lee and Richmond; but launched coordinated efforts under his most trusted Lieutenants to crush the will of the South. Sherman in the South, and Sheridan in Virginia. It worked, and coupled with a generous peace the war was over when it was over.

In WWI no such effort against the Axis populace was waged, and the peace was onerous, resulting in no resolution at the end of that conflict as dictated by France and England.

In WWII the war was taken to the people of Japan and Germany. Once their militaries were defeated and capitals captured, their populaces were also fully cognizant of their defeat. Again, coupled with a generous peace, those wars were truly over once over.

For any nation to defeat the United States, if all they do is occupy DC and defeat our military, they are probably about 20% of the way to their ultimate objective. They must crush the will of the American populace to resist to truly win. On the other hand, we have been able to stabilize the growing dissent born of the racial inequities from the slave heritage of our Black populace by "merely" recognizing that the government was wrong and passing and enforcing laws to bring this disaffected segment of the populace into the fold of good governance. It is an ongoing business, this good governance, one clear metric of that being the response of the Black populace to the election of President Obama. Most white Americans didn't think it was a big deal to elect a black man; but for the Black populace it was this huge indicator of validation and citizenship.

Now, we could have dealt with the Civil Rights movement by targeting senior leadership, locating and breaking up networks, and placing increased security on those individuals and facilities targeted by the "rebels." Usually if a segment of your populace is so dissatisfied as to take up arms, or apply more peaceful tactics as those encouraged by Gandhi and King, they have some valid points, and those points must be addressed.

[Ken White]

...coupled with a generous peace, those wars were truly over once over.

It's still too early to state that categorically. All nations do not have the short memory and attention spans of the US...

[Steve Blair]

It's still too early to state that categorically. All nations do not have the short memory and attention spans of the US...

I think Bob'sWorld has a point, although I wouldn't put it in such sweeping terms. One could also argue that Grant's focus on Southern popular will wasn't intuitive...in fact it appears that he came to the conclusion over time, based in no small part on his experiences during the Vicksburg campaign. Most of these things do evolve over time.

[AmericanPride]

I do not think Germany and Japan were offered "generous" peace terms. Not only were they thoroughly destroyed, they were completely dispossessed of their political systems, much of their economic capacity, and of any territorial or colonial ambitions and claims (some of which are still outstanding). They were then made dependent on the victors for their security and stripped of any autonomous means of waging war. Nor do I think the Civil War ended with the surrender of the rebel armies, but it continued through Reconstruction until finally the Federal Government no longer had the political will to address it, giving birth to the 'Solid South' and systematic segregation. Both Clausewitz and Machiavelli advised against a "generous" peace insofar that the intent of war is to strip the enemy of his will or capacity to fight, and that an enemy wounded, but not killed, will strike you again when the time is right for them to do so ("never do a slight injury to an enemy"). So the intent isn't to find "generous" peace terms, IMO, but terms aligned with the political objectives sought in the first place so that the future behavior of the defeated actor is no longer a threat. Sometimes be 'generous', sometimes be harsh.

[Bob's World]

Its also important, I think, to remember that CvC served and studied warfare in a period of major transition.

Prior to Napoleon tapping into the newly unleashed power of a populace empowered Nation of France; warfare in Europe had largely been a game of chess between Kings; defeat an army or navy, take a capital, make it too expensive and win. The populace did not have a true stake in it. Napoleon understood the power of engaging the populace and used it to dominate the continent. Students of Napoleon tend to focus on Generalship and tactics, but his real edge was the mobilization of a National populace to the cause.

Western warfare was clearly different both before and after Napoleon. Not because of Napoleon, but because of the American and French Revolutions. It shifted the COG from the Army or the Capital to the will of the populace. Prior to this Armys and Capitals were extentions of the King's purse. Empty his purse and win. After, they were capitalized by the collective and willing support of the populace, far deeper pockets than any King possesses.

[William F. Owen]

When Grant assumed command of the Union Army, while he understood that it was very important to defeat Lee's Army and also valuable to capture the Confederate Capital, he also instinctively understood that he needed to crush the will of the Confederate populace, so that the entire Confederate nation would know it was defeated once the war was over.

Well that's the medieval way of war. La Grande Chavauche, was riding into the enemies territory and showing complete disregard for the Monarch, by doing or taking what you wanted, and showing the population that you, not the king was in control. Target was the enemy King. I submit the same was true in the South.

In WWI no such effort against the Axis populace was waged, and the peace was onerous, resulting in no resolution at the end of that conflict as dictated by France and England.

Not true. The Allies conducted a catastrophic blockade of Germany which very much contributed to the break down of law and order in 1918. Starving population, forced the leadership to sue for peace. Again, the target is the leadership. The Allied mistake, was no occupation of Berlin, and the creation of the new German Government.

In WWII the war was taken to the people of Japan and Germany. Once their militaries were defeated and capitals captured, their populaces were also fully cognizant of their defeat. Again, coupled with a generous peace, those wars were truly over once over.

That assumes that war is deterministic. Capture captial = sustainable peace. Napoleon captured and burnt Moscow. Did him no good at all. The Sandanista capturing Managua, didn't end the war, or create peace. BTW, the whole Sandanista revolution is text book Clausewitz.

For any nation to defeat the United States, if all they do is occupy DC and defeat our military, they are probably about 20% of the way to their ultimate objective. They must crush the will of the American populace to resist to truly win.

History shows that MOST of the population give up the armed struggle once Government and Army have ceased to represent them/cease to function. Some of the population may continue to fight, but it is almost never decisive by itself. (French resistance - and they had a Government and Army in exile!)

Now, we could have dealt with the Civil Rights movement by targeting senior leadership, locating and breaking up networks, and placing increased security on those individuals and facilities targeted by the "rebels."

No you couldn't. If you had done, you would have created the justification for an armed struggle. Number of US Troops killed by the Civil Rights Movement? Black Panthers? They didn't get very far. Besides, nothing about the US CRM, has ever been shown to me as military problem.

[slapout9]

Now, we could have dealt with the Civil Rights movement by targeting senior leadership, locating and breaking up networks, and placing increased security on those individuals and facilities targeted by the "rebels." Usually if a segment of your populace is so dissatisfied as to take up arms, or apply more peaceful tactics as those encouraged by Gandhi and King, they have some valid points, and those points must be addressed.

That is why on another thread I posted King's letter from a Birmingham jail. In the letter he reveals how he was not afraid of the KKK because they were a minority and he believed that the majority of White People were not racist which is true and something that is usually left out of any discussion of the civil rights movement, just like Obama could not have become President without the White Majority voting for him. It is not politically correct to talk about it but it is a fact and King recognized that and in a since Gandhi recognized that he would win because of the morality and decency of the British people as a whole. That is also why he supported the British during WW2 as he recognized that he could not win with non-violent means against the German Army.