What will our expedition to Afghanistan teach us?

[Bob's World]

Every "lesson learned" I have seen so far coming out of our involvement in this conflict has been extremely tactical in nature. "How do we do the wrong thing better."

The lessons not learned, however, are:

1. Punitive Expeditions work.

2. "King Making" has been obsolete for at least 100 years, it is time to retire that COA.

3. "Fixing" some foreign culture where one has no legitimacy to undertake such a program is hubris and folly. Particularly when the concept of what "fixed" looks like is based upon the history, culture and perspective of the fixer, rather than the fixee.

I could add more, but those are my top three.

[slapout9]

Here is a link to "Top Secret America" a PBS report that covers everything not just A'stan. But it is worth watching the first 15 or 20 minutes to see how clearly the CIA understood we were fighting a Terrorist System not a Country and what to do about it. In large part the American military did not get it and still doesn't! Which is why we could have a carbon copy of the USA in A'stan and it would still not stop Terrorist attacks as we found out recently in Boston. I think that is the real lesson that needs to be learned and we can either learn it and adapt or not learn it and keep on getting attacked all the while wasting unbelievable amounts of money!
Here is the link:http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontl...secretamerica/

[Bob's World]

Slap,

More accurately, I believe "the enemy" is a symptom, much more than "a system."

There is much friction to the US approach to propping up and sustaining systems of governance and specific individuals and families in power when and where we believe doing so is the best way to secure our interests in some particular place. When the people who live in those places and suffer under those governments grow frustrated with how that manner of US support appears to be either enabling such governments to continue on with some status quo of governance, or particularly when the US is actively contributing to the suppression of popular revolt, we make ourselves a target for acts of international terrorism.

A certain level of such violence is normal. The cost of doing business for a powerful country such as the US. But when this violence grows and and becomes connected between many diverse parties arising out of many equally diverse populaces, it is much more than a cost of business, it becomes a metric. The clear message we should have taken from the events of 9/11, and the subsequent flow of foreign fighters to Iraq, and from the subsequent Arab Spring, etc, etc, is that our approach to foreign policy designed for the Cold War is out of touch with the realities of the world we live in today.

Credit for President Obama for attempting to break from many of those outdated habits, but it is not clear that the current administration has a clear grasp on a new way forward. So we are abandoning the past without a plan for the future. I picture a circus trapeze act where one turns loose of one bar without planning for a new one to be present to grab onto. In real life, there is no net to land on.

But this in not something done to us by some "enemy," system or otherwise. This is a self-inflicted failure to anticipate and adapt to the world around us, and clinging too long to comfortable practices that were clearly in need of major overhauls long ago. The Clinton Administration largely ignored these changes and was reactive rather than proactive. The Bush Administration interpreted these changes through an obsolete lens, and saw beating up on Afghanistan and Iraq as solutions for a problem clearly centered in Saudi Arabia. The Obama administation saw doubling down on Afghanistan as key and was "surprised" by Arab Spring.

None of this is either surprising or unpredictable. The world is telling us we need a new strategy. We should listen. It will be cheaper to implement than our current approach and should cause far less friction. But giving up control is hard...

[jcustis]

But when this violence grows and and becomes connected between many diverse parties arising out of many equally diverse populaces, it is much more than a cost of business, it becomes a metric.

Some folks would also call it a clue.

[Bob's World]

Yes.

[slapout9]

Slap,

More accurately, I believe "the enemy" is a symptom, much more than "a system."

There is much friction to the US approach to propping up and sustaining systems of governance and specific individuals and families in power when and where we believe doing so is the best way to secure our interests in some particular place. When the people who live in those places and suffer under those governments grow frustrated with how that manner of US support appears to be either enabling such governments to continue on with some status quo of governance, or particularly when the US is actively contributing to the suppression of popular revolt, we make ourselves a target for acts of international terrorism.

Oh it is a System alright, make no mistake about it. I agree with the fact that our actions are a "symptom" of our inability to understand and adapt to the System and the new Larger Environment that we are operating in.

But when this violence grows and and becomes connected between many diverse parties arising out of many equally diverse populaces, it is much more than a cost of business, it becomes a metric.

That is my point, that is the very definition of a a System!!!!! Diverse elements with a common purpose.

The clear message we should have taken from the events of 9/11, and the subsequent flow of foreign fighters to Iraq, and from the subsequent Arab Spring, etc, etc, is that our approach to foreign policy designed for the Cold War is out of touch with the realities of the world we live in today.

Again I don't disagree. As JCustis says it's a clue but more importantly it is a System metric(not a target metric) and it is showing that our actions are increasing the Energy of the System has not decreasing it! Very bad!!

Credit for President Obama for attempting to break from many of those outdated habits, but it is not clear that the current administration has a clear grasp on a new way forward. So we are abandoning the past without a plan for the future. I picture a circus trapeze act where one turns loose of one bar without planning for a new one to be present to grab onto. In real life, there is no net to land on.

Did you ever say a mouthful with that statement! And I agree 100% that is what concerns me most we quiting our current Process but we do not have a replacement Process, so we look very,very weak and the Opposing System understands this.....so we get attacked and will continue to get attacked. We are weaker in many ways now than we were after Vietnam.

But this in not something done to us by some "enemy," system or otherwise. This is a self-inflicted failure to anticipate and adapt to the world around us, and clinging too long to comfortable practices that were clearly in need of major overhauls long ago.

Partially true their are most definitely certain portions of the System that are our Enemies.

The Clinton Administration largely ignored these changes and was reactive rather than proactive.

Clinton is a disciple of Quigley a dangerous Globalist and we are paying many prices today for that strange theory. Independence NOT Dependence is what any System needs!

The Bush Administration interpreted these changes through an obsolete lens, and saw beating up on Afghanistan and Iraq as solutions for a problem clearly centered in Saudi Arabia. The Obama administration saw doubling down on Afghanistan as key and was "surprised" by Arab Spring.

Again I agree 100%

None of this is either surprising or unpredictable. The world is telling us we need a new strategy. We should listen. It will be cheaper to implement than our current approach and should cause far less friction. But giving up control is hard...

We are essentially leaderless in a dangerous world where we want to impose some kind of progressive, gay, lesbian ,transgender,tax cuts for the rich,save the banks at all cost, universal rights theory and make the world safe for bunnies,puppies and unicorns. We are floundering for our National survival. Not all of the post war cold war theories were or are wrong. The Soviet Union is gone but Marxist/Lennonism is alive and growing stronger in some cases(its called China with a lot of money and they blood RED Commies at heart) now combine that with radical jihad and well...............gonna be real interesting for a while.

[Bill Moore]

Every "lesson learned" I have seen so far coming out of our involvement in this conflict has been extremely tactical in nature. "How do we do the wrong thing better."

The lessons not learned, however, are:

1. Punitive Expeditions work.

2. "King Making" has been obsolete for at least 100 years, it is time to retire that COA.

3. "Fixing" some foreign culture where one has no legitimacy to undertake such a program is hubris and folly. Particularly when the concept of what "fixed" looks like is based upon the history, culture and perspective of the fixer, rather than the fixee.

I could add more, but those are my top three.

No issue with any of these, and it seems to me that if we would have embraced these 3 lessons as principles to guide our foreign policy we would seen very few or no failures with our interventions. Time for our leaders to stop selling the COIN snake oil.

[KingJaja]

I'm not an expert on Afghanistan (I'm from faraway Africa), but I think the most important lesson, which the West should heed is this:

A nation is a working social contract and US Military might and aid dollars cannot create a working social contract from scratch. You can create the apparatus of a state quite easily, but you cannot create its essence - that is left for the citizenry.

Another thing Americans don't understand is that so many states in Africa and Asia are legacies of colonial rule, they lack working social contracts - and Western aid money, "counter-insurgency efforts" and military intervention CANNOT create working social contracts.

The biggest delusion of the Western foreign policy elite is that "democracy can create a working social contract" - it cannot, classical example is Mali - elections in Mali will do that State no good, it is a nation more in theory than in fact.

The World's many artificial states will have to work out their own "Peace of Westphalia" - and there is absolutely nothing the US can do about it, except try to truncate the process via "intervention".

[Bob's World]

KingJaja - Good points all.

[Morgan]

What will our Afghanistan expedition teach us:
- Hopefully, it will teach us to have a strategy for winning, or at the very least, a clear goal (as many on SWJ have commented about)
- That sometimes a smaller force (SOF-oriented) is better than a huge force (GPF-oriented). Perhaps following the Central America force-cap of 55 is a better model to follow in the future
- That being more senior in rank doesn't necessarily equate to being more experienced or more knowledgeable
- That if hell-bent on executing COIN, then understanding the language and culture are pretty fraking important (I know JCustis will disagree)
- That micromanagement from multiple levels of bureaucracy does more harm than good
- That if all else fails, wearing a yellow safety belt seems to fix everything (seriously!!)

[Bob's World]

First we must redefine "winning" for internal conflicts. For me it is simply this: "Not preserving some regime; not defeating some threat; but rather winning is increasing the percentage of the popolation who perceive themselves to be included in the overall solution."

In Afghanistan we merely flipped the table and expected the ousted 50% to lay down. Afghans don't lay down.

[jcustis]

- That if hell-bent on executing COIN, then understanding the language and culture are pretty fraking important (I know JCustis will disagree)

I'm typically more dramatic about that topic than I probably should be. I should probably temper my distate for the snake oil sales pitch over culture and language by saying that I'd take a sharp, motivated linguist every time, over a lengthy spin-up package delivered by the culture pimps based at the mission rehearsal sites, or Quantico.

The culture pimps are a fleeting nuisance for commanders who are forced to endure the mandatory training before deployment, at a time when their schedules are already crushed.

Linguists can (and usually do) form powerful bonds that are a better return on investment. That's where the cultural immersion and language should come from.