Leading infantry tactics theoreticians/experts today

[William F. Owen]

My earlier musings as to whether the civilian tactical law enforcement community might have anything to offer in this area--despite your stipulations against "MP experts"--was based on two assumptions/suspicions. The first was that tactical LE TTP might have some (limited) application for infantry-work within a population, particularly if that population was limited in scale, such as a building, a complex, a block, etc. ... Can't say that line of inquiry or thought worked out, but it was an idea.

The second was that there might be some gendarme/peacekeeper theorists out there, which would blend infantry and police (small "p") thought and practice. An SWJ article on "expeditionary law enforcement" this morning captures the spirit of latter possible research direction, in my opinion. I offer it here for your consideration.

I think you are broadly correct and I share your interest in that thought. The challenge is the blend, AND the distinction. There's a time for the LE type TTP and a time to be more aggressive/kinetic approach. You must be able to do both.

I have spent a great deal of time studying a lot of US LE-SWAT minor tactics, most of which make no sense and promote process over effect. All seem to focus on dancing around in rooms in very complicated ways, so there is still some considerable human, rather then technical or even tactical challenges in this area.

[Ron Humphrey]

I have spent a great deal of time studying a lot of US LE-SWAT minor tactics, most of which make no sense and promote process over effect. All seem to focus on dancing around in rooms in very complicated ways, so there is still some considerable human, rather then technical or even tactical challenges in this area.

Welcome to Form over function in it's many splendored glory

[PhilR]

I'm not sure if it isn't too limiting to be discussing only infantry. The modern battlefield, and the advances made, are about combined arms, or at least combined arms principles. I would recommend Robert Leonhard's Art of Maneuver and offer his discussion of combined arms theory (complementary principle, dilemma principle and Alcyoneus principle) as a good theoretical lens for discussing tactics (the attached link provides a decent summary: http://www.operations.dns2go.com/ops...ned%20Arms.htm).
It seems to me that the history of infantry tactics through the 20th century has been to give smaller and smaller infantry units an organic combined arms capability (LMGs, suitcase ATGMs, marrying up with APCs, etc.). The new paradigm, call it distributed or whatever, is to increase those small units combined arms capabilities through greater reachback via networking to firepower and support (UAVs, JTAC training, blue force tracker, etc.). Additionally, the recent emphasis on COIN and Stabilization is about bringing more civil-military skills and tools down to the lower levels. The "strategic corporal" concept merits recognition here, along with Special Forces Unconventional Warfare theory. I would also add VADM McRaven's Spec Ops book as good theory for special operations as they apply to raids and direct action.

[William F. Owen]

I'm not sure if it isn't too limiting to be discussing only infantry. The modern battlefield, and the advances made, are about combined arms, or at least combined arms principles. I would recommend Robert Leonhard's Art of Maneuver and offer his discussion of combined arms theory (complementary principle, dilemma principle and Alcyoneus principle) as a good theoretical lens for discussing tactics (the attached link provides a decent summary: http://www.operations.dns2go.com/ops...ned%20Arms.htm).

I would offer that Combined Arms is only relevant in that it is about supporting the infantry. Infantry remains a critical and mostly under studied area of tactical thought. Correctly trained and equipped infantry is the basis for the vast majority of land combat power. My personal opinion is that Manoeuvre Warfare provides nothing useful to infantry theory and science. I would recommend Robert Leonhards "Principles of War for the Information Age" in that regard.

[Fuchs]

Quick-firing guns with contact-fuzed shells and machine guns enforced a tactical revolution in infantry tactics early in the 2th century.

Now we know about comparable changes; extremely scary sensor capabilities approaching to "Star Trek" levels, enormous wireless communication capabilities, artillery shells that can hit a single field observation post from 40 km afar with a single round and small arms so powerful that being seen for a couple of seconds almost equals being dead against a competent foe.

The tactics generation born in WW1 and updated for APCs, IFVs, anti-tank infantry weapons and assault rifles CANNOT be up to date under these circumstances.

There NEEDS to be a new infantry tactics generation in use in the next war against competent and well-equipped enemies (the last one ended in 1945) or we'll see disasters as were seen in 1914-1917.

Old treatises on infantry tactics from WW2 and Vietnam don't help much. They can still tell us about the psychology of combat and some ruses, but not much about tactics.
Small war experiences like Afghanistan and Iraq highlighted some shortcomings and added some minor capabilities, but many of the lessons are 180° wrong simply because the enemy is not modern and not competent. A soldier can wear a heavy vest and patrol, day after day, and survive for months.
He'd be dead within minutes if he did that in a high intensity conflict against competent enemies. The whole armour protection rally of the past years is probably 180° off.

So, that's the problem that I see. I can only hope that those people who work and think behind confidentiality barriers (that I cannot penetrate well) are working hard and well on the challenge. I hope they are not working on just incrementally advanced WW2 tactics.

I fear that's not the case, as the indicators for this are rare.

The camouflage efforts that I see in Western armies are like placeholders, signals that camouflage was not forgotten entirely. Electronic combat is in my opinion vastly under-rated, battlefield sensors are not available in the necessary quantities, software-defined radio development is too slow, TO&E are still pretty close to the 50's, hard-kill defenses for heavy combat teams are not widespread yet, experiments in the field are rather rare.

Our armies should be busy with experiments and professional ideas exchanges even beyond the language barriers.
We should have tenders for idea development just like we have tenders for hardware development.

[Randy Brown]

There NEEDS to be a new infantry tactics generation in use in the next war against competent and well-equipped enemies (the last one ended in 1945) or we'll see disasters as were seen in 1914-1917.

Old treatises on infantry tactics from WW2 and Vietnam don't help much. They can still tell us about the psychology of combat and some ruses, but not much about tactics.

Small war experiences like Afghanistan and Iraq highlighted some shortcomings and added some minor capabilities, but many of the lessons are 180° wrong simply because the enemy is not modern and not competent. A soldier can wear a heavy vest and patrol, day after day, and survive for months. He'd be dead within minutes if he did that in a high intensity conflict against competent enemies. The whole armour protection rally of the past years is probably 180° off.

So, that's the problem that I see. I can only hope that those people who work and think behind confidentiality barriers (that I cannot penetrate well) are working hard and well on the challenge. I hope they are not working on just incrementally advanced WW2 tactics.

I fear that's not the case, as the indicators for this are rare.

I don't disagree with your observations and arguments, but I think there are a couple logic-tripwires somewhere down this trail:

If your premise is that we're in danger of "fighting the last war," what with all of the current focus on Counterinsurgency and Small Wars and the like, and are in danger of intellectually disarming ourselves for any potential High-Intensity Conflict, roger and amen. (Although, as a user, it seems to run philosophically askance of the SWJ website mission. Perhaps it's more of a question for a notional Big Wars Journal?)

To say that Low-Intensity Conflict lessons are 180° wrong, "simply because the enemy is not modern and not competent," seems to invite the same criticism, however. The operational military-political realities faced since the 1960s and for the conceivable future (25 years?), dictate that most theory and practice be focused on LIC, not HIC. To this amateur historian, lessons from the likes of Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq prove that: You can pick your friends, and you can usually pick your fights, but you can't pick your enemies--or how they fight.

That may mean that the infantry now works in a theoretically/tactically topsy-turvy world, but it doesn't mean it's wrong. Consider the following anecdote shared by Schmedlap in a current SWJ thread on defining Information Operations (IO).

Someone gave an example H&I fires and asked, "is this PSYOP?" I don't know if it is PSYOP, but purely kinetic operations can and do have effects that many normally assume to be IO. My favorite example occurred in OIF III when residents actually complained that we were too soft and weak because we took well-aimed shots, rather than firing indiscriminately at insurgents. They were truly angry with us, claiming that the insurgents were humiliating us and showing their strength. The support for their argument was that Kent the insurgent was slinging an entire magazine at us, while Stan the rifleman was only firing back with 3 well-aimed shots. We explained that we were trying to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage, but this did not resonate with the city-folk.

Soon thereafter, we adopted a slightly different approach: we returned fire with 40mm, AT-4's, and 25mm, as appropriate. Hellfire strikes became more common, as did the occasional visit from an M-1. The effect was that we killed/captured no more insurgents than we were killing/capturing before, but the PERCEPTION was that we were routing them. Suddenly the city-folk were expressing satisfaction with our work. One man said, "thank you for fighting back." We weren't before? Thereafter, IEDs and direct fire attacks began to plummet and we got significantly more intelligence and cooperation from locals. No IO annex required.

Bottom-line: We've gotta keep our collective heads in the current fight, stay intellectually flexible, always do the right thing, generate theory from practice*, vaccinate ourselves against next-war-itis, all while keeping the proverbial Big HIC Stick in our back pockets.

* Yes, got my own intellectual tripwire there. File under "schoolhouse vs. lessons-learned world-views"; cross-reference under "religious conflicts."

[Surferbeetle]

Fuchs,

My library is light on tactics and heavy on macro issues. I am not aware of a single 'go-to-guy' for the answer that you are looking for.

"Infanterie Greift An" by Rommel was a fun one. Unlike many here I enjoyed Poole's Tactics of the Crescent Moon. Rommel's Greatest Victory by Mitcham (ISBN 9-780891-417309) was bone dry. Makers of Modern Strategy by Paret (ISBN 0-691-02764-1) is a good reference that I return to often. I have not yet finished Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare (ISBN 0-521-79431-5) but portions of it are useful. The Savage Wars of Peace by Boot (ISBN 780465-0077219) is informative. I am a huge fan of most anything by Robert D. Kaplan; Imperial Grunts (ISBN 1-4000-6132-6), Balkan Ghosts (ISBN 0-679-74981-0), Soldiers of God (ISBN 1-4000-3025-0), & The Coming Anarchy (ISBN 0-375-70759-X). Merchant of Death by Farah & Braun (978-0-470-26196-5), and Licensed to Kill (ISBN 1-4000-9781-9) are light reading. Battle Ready by Zinni/Koltz (ISBN 0-399-15176-1), Imperial Hubris by Scheurer (1-57488-862-5), and Fiasco by Ricks (ISBN 1-59420-103-X) are worth the read.

The hard lessons I learned from a ranger captain who taught me as a young cadet, long distance running, using MILES gear, reading ARTEP 7-17-10 Drill (Battle Drills for Light Infantry, Infantry, Airborne, & Air Assault Platoon & Squad), negotiation skills, a certain amount of judicious ruthlessness, and a fair amount of luck kept me & my guys alive in Iraq.

Bottom line, I am not sure that a book can capture what you are looking for. IMHO it has to be more of an apprenticeship and a trial by fire experience.

Regards,

Steve

[Rifleman]

I would offer that Combined Arms is only relevant in that it is about supporting the infantry. Infantry remains a critical and mostly under studied area of tactical thought.

Wilf,

In light of the above, it seems there should be some lessons (pro and con, of course) to be learned from the Boers. Do you see them as worthy of serious study?

I know they had some artillery, but they were mostly a rifle centric force with great emphasis on marksmanship, mobility, and fieldcraft, correct? Didn't they also have a rather loose (flexible?) organization?

[Fuchs]

Wilf,

In light of the above, it seems there should be some lessons (pro and con, of course) to be learned from the Boers. Do you see them as worthy of serious study?

I know they had some artillery, but they were mostly a rifle centric force with great emphasis on marksmanship, mobility, and fieldcraft, correct? Didn't they also have a rather loose (flexible?) organization?

The Boers were really well-studied before 1914, in fact even more so than the Russo-Japanese war 04/05. Their tactics preceded modern (classical) guerilla tactics and light infantry tactics (they ceased to wage conventional war after a while).

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,

In light of the above, it seems there should be some lessons (pro and con, of course) to be learned from the Boers. Do you see them as worthy of serious study?

I know they had some artillery, but they were mostly a rifle centric force with great emphasis on marksmanship, mobility, and fieldcraft, correct? Didn't they also have a rather loose (flexible?) organization?

Absolutely, and very much so! They kicked our ass and we only beat them by using basically inhumane and barbaric methods.

However, remember the Boers where secular Europeans with access to a first world arms industry, and lead by a highly educated and very smart cadre of skilled military leaders, who created an almost purely military insurgency, who fought and won, stand up "symmetric" battles. Currently, no such similar organisation exists in the world today .

[slapout9]

Absolutely, and very much so! They kicked our ass and we only beat them by using basically inhumane and barbaric methods.

However, remember the Boers where secular Europeans with access to a first world arms industry, and lead by a highly educated and very smart cadre of skilled military leaders, who created an almost purely military insurgency, who fought and won, stand up "symmetric" battles. Currently, no such similar organisation exists in the world today .

Wilf, Rifleman,Anybody, I am not an expert but were they not more like Dragoons (Mounted Rifleman) than anything else??

[Fuchs]

Absolutely, and very much so! They kicked our ass and we only beat them by using basically inhumane and barbaric methods.

However, remember the Boers where secular Europeans with access to a first world arms industry, and lead by a highly educated and very smart cadre of skilled military leaders, who created an almost purely military insurgency, who fought and won, stand up "symmetric" battles. Currently, no such similar organisation exists in the world today .

Tamil Tigers, Hezbollah?