What Are You Currently Reading? 2007

[Steve Blair]

I'm working on my dissertation, so I'm reading a lot, but here are the highlights:



Oliver Knight, Life and Manners in the Frontier Army


In the queue...

Agostino Von Hassell, Military High Life: Elegant Food Histories and Recipes

Mary Massey, Ersatz in the Confederacy



.

The Knight book you have in the list is very good, if you haven't read it before. The Frontier Army's one of my big research "things," so I've read it more than a couple of times now.

Current reading?
After Tet by Spector (re-read)
A series of SAMS monographs on cavalry in the UA, MOOTW, and so on (for a paper)
Low Level Hell by Mills (for the same paper - this is a re-read)
Setup by Tilford (for an article project - also a re-read)
Chasin Ghosts by Tierney (about 3/4 of the way through and not impressed)
waiting in the wings:
Taking Haiti by Renda
Masters of Death by Rhodes

[SteveMetz]

The Knight book you have in the list is very good, if you haven't read it before. The Frontier Army's one of my big research "things," so I've read it more than a couple of times now.

Current reading?
After Tet by Spector (re-read)
A series of SAMS monographs on cavalry in the UA, MOOTW, and so on (for a paper)
Low Level Hell by Mills (for the same paper - this is a re-read)
Setup by Tilford (for an article project - also a re-read)
Chasin Ghosts by Tierney (about 3/4 of the way through and not impressed)
waiting in the wings:
Taking Haiti by Renda
Masters of Death by Rhodes

Butch Tilford will be ecstatic to know he still has readers. He teaches history at Grove City College now.

[Steve Blair]

Butch Tilford will be ecstatic to know he still has readers. He teaches history at Grove City College now.

Earl Tilford's book is one of the most insightful I've seen regarding both the AF's role in Vietnam and its operational culture (along with The 11 Days of Christmas, although it is focused on Linebacker and LB II). I'm usually pointing our cadets in its direction so they can get a different view on the AF in Vietnam, as the MAS syllabus tends to trot out the "company line." And since it's a free pdf download from the AU I'm hoping at least a couple of them will eventually read it.

[SteveMetz]

Earl Tilford's book is one of the most insightful I've seen regarding both the AF's role in Vietnam and its operational culture (along with The 11 Days of Christmas, although it is focused on Linebacker and LB II). I'm usually pointing our cadets in its direction so they can get a different view on the AF in Vietnam, as the MAS syllabus tends to trot out the "company line." And since it's a free pdf download from the AU I'm hoping at least a couple of them will eventually read it.

In my opinion the Air Force is the service least tolerant of deviation from the company line. Butch retired as a major, in part because he was an iconoclast.

[Steve Blair]

In my opinion the Air Force is the service least tolerant of deviation from the company line. Butch retired as a major, in part because he was an iconoclast.

I would agree with that opinion. Been pondering an article or something along those lines for some time now. And they do themselves no favors with that attitude.

[SteveMetz]

Been pondering an article or something along those lines for some time now.

You're probably familiar with it but the classic work on service cultures was Carl Builder's The Masks of War.

Having spent most of the career working for the Army, I've always liked the fact that it tolerates loyal iconoclasts (even though it doesn't promote them to flag rank). Krepinevich, MacGregor, McMaster, and Vandergrift come to mind. I was worried that under GEN Shinseki, the attitude seemed to be spreading that the Air Force routinely trounced the Army in budget battles because it "spoke with one voice." So the Army appeared to be moving in that direction. Luckily it was a passing fad.

[Steve Blair]

You're probably familiar with it but the classic work on service cultures was Carl Builder's The Masks of War.

Having spent most of the career working for the Army, I've always liked the fact that it tolerates loyal iconoclasts (even though it doesn't promote them to flag rank). Krepinevich, MacGregor, McMaster, and Vandergrift come to mind. I was worried that under GEN Shinseki, the attitude seemed to be spreading that the Air Force routinely trounced the Army in budget battles because it "spoke with one voice." So the Army appeared to be moving in that direction. Luckily it was a passing fad.

The Marines seem to have a similar philosophy, and the Navy at least lets them ramble in the pages of Proceedings. Sadly, with the AF it's more a matter of "burn the heretics" than it is anything else. Or they let them write interesting papers for the Air University and then shuffle them away.

I took a course from Don Vandergiff last year. Very interesting guy. I just missed MacGregor when he had the Quarterhorse at Fort Riley, which is something I regret. He was seriously interested in the squadron's history and really pumped his troopers up with it.

[Sargent]

Earl Tilford's book is one of the most insightful I've seen regarding both the AF's role in Vietnam and its operational culture (along with The 11 Days of Christmas, although it is focused on Linebacker and LB II). I'm usually pointing our cadets in its direction so they can get a different view on the AF in Vietnam, as the MAS syllabus tends to trot out the "company line." And since it's a free pdf download from the AU I'm hoping at least a couple of them will eventually read it.

Mark Clodfelter also does a very good job examining the air war in Vietnam. He makes one of the best points to counter the critics of the early air war -- the argument that it was too restrained, particularly the interdiction piece -- by pointing out that there simply were not enough targets. The predominant force in the early years was the VC/NLF, and they managed to fight on 35 tons of supplies per day. That translates into 7 deuce and a half trucks -- but probably more like a couple of hundred bicycles -- and such targets are not well-suited to air delivered ordnance, or interdiction of any sort.

This also explains why the air war was more successful under Nixon -- the decimation of the VC/NLF after Tet means more is coming from the North, and they are shifting to a more conventional form of war -- plus, Nixon is dealing with China, so the latter's support to the North is waning a bit. (At the other end, the early campaigns against the North _help_ that regime -- helps them to get assistance from the Soviets and the Chinese -- NVN GDP rises during Rolling Thunder.)

He also argues that the AF would not have conducted the air campaign much differently if it had been in charge.

[Steve Blair]

Mark Clodfelter also does a very good job examining the air war in Vietnam. He makes one of the best points to counter the critics of the early air war -- the argument that it was too restrained, particularly the interdiction piece -- by pointing out that there simply were not enough targets. The predominant force in the early years was the VC/NLF, and they managed to fight on 35 tons of supplies per day. That translates into 7 deuce and a half trucks -- but probably more like a couple of hundred bicycles -- and such targets are not well-suited to air delivered ordnance, or interdiction of any sort.

This also explains why the air war was more successful under Nixon -- the decimation of the VC/NLF after Tet means more is coming from the North, and they are shifting to a more conventional form of war -- plus, Nixon is dealing with China, so the latter's support to the North is waning a bit. (At the other end, the early campaigns against the North _help_ that regime -- helps them to get assistance from the Soviets and the Chinese -- NVN GDP rises during Rolling Thunder.)

He also argues that the AF would not have conducted the air campaign much differently if it had been in charge.

Yeah, I've read Clodfelter as well. Both had good points, although I really enjoyed Tilford's tales about the AF and truck-busting.

Nixon also had the advantage of being able to target large conventional forces (Linebacker and the whole Easter Offensive). Once the PAVN decided to come across the borders with heavy conventional forces they played right into the hands of the airpower guys. Nixon also benefited from political conditions that helped cut certain supplies to the North (like SA-3s).

In terms of stuff coming from the North, I believe it was Tilford who suggested (though I've seen this in other place as well) that the interdiction effort actually hurt itself because it forced the Vietnamese to break the Ho Chi Minh Trail down into smaller and smaller pieces. NVA divisions (until the conventional Easter Offensive) still required a very small amount of supplies, and those smaller trails could handle the bikes, coolies, and trucks that kept the divisions going. More trails equaled less concentration, more possible hiding places, and huge targeting problems for the AF. One road with five trucks is easier to target than ten roads with five trucks.

[Sargent]

The Knight book you have in the list is very good, if you haven't read it before. The Frontier Army's one of my big research "things," so I've read it more than a couple of times now.

Current reading?
After Tet by Spector (re-read)
A series of SAMS monographs on cavalry in the UA, MOOTW, and so on (for a paper)
Low Level Hell by Mills (for the same paper - this is a re-read)
Setup by Tilford (for an article project - also a re-read)
Chasin Ghosts by Tierney (about 3/4 of the way through and not impressed)
waiting in the wings:
Taking Haiti by Renda
Masters of Death by Rhodes

I zorched through the Knight book early in my research, to get the lay of the land, and am now going through it in detail for use in the diss. Of course, I think Coffman's Old Army is great for this period as well. The chapter on the families in the post-Civil War period is a hidden treasure. I think most probably skip it -- who wants to read about the families? -- but I could swear that Coffman suggests that Libbie Custer and Bill Hickock had an affair -- she certainly seemed to know how to have a good time. Greene's Ladies and Officers of the US Army (or Army Aristocracy) is another good one, though he is in an obvious snit about all of the partying, and is very critical of any wife who is not on her best behavior.

I have a memory of reading Mills, for my MA thesis, but I read so many VN memoirs I could just be making it up. What is the paper?

Cheers,
Jill

[Steve Blair]

I have a memory of reading Mills, for my MA thesis, but I read so many VN memoirs I could just be making it up. What is the paper?

Cheers,
Jill

Working on an idea for using cavalry as a reaction force for UW efforts. It's something I've been kicking around for a while, and the class gives me a nice excuse.

[SteveMetz]

Working on an idea for using cavalry as a reaction force for UW efforts. It's something I've been kicking around for a while, and the class gives me a nice excuse.

Horse cavalry? (I suspect Huba wass de Czege would love that!).

If so, I remember that the original Small Wars manual does offer some useful advice on how to pack a mule.

[John T. Fishel]

From my vantage point here on Rancho La Espada I can argue that horses DO provide some real advantages in terms of mobility - especially in insurgent warfare. BTW, both the Small Wars Manual and Callwell's Small Wars discuss the use of horses and mules.

During the El Salvador war, one of the major problems faced by the ESAF was pursuit of guerrila units. The standard G tactic was to drop anti-personnel mines on the trail to discourage direct pursuit from getting too close. Indeed, most ESAF casualties were caused by mines. One obvious solution was increased use of helicopters but the US was not going to supply more helos in the significant numbers required.

Meanwhile, in the Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD) we had a countermine program going with the ESAF. It involved a combination of off the shelf metal detectors, blast chaps and booties from Natick labs, and a c-m training program. I tried to sell my boss on using horses to substitute for the helos that were never going to come. One cultural problem was that the ESAF cavalry (like most horsemen) really loved their horses and such a program would put them at risk. So, I proposed calling these folk "Mounted Infantry" and mounting them on cheap little horses that could be had for about $150 each. My idea was a mounted pursuit platoon with a remuda of 5 horses per rider. The point man would be equipped with the blast chaps and booties. His horse would trigger the mine - the animal would be destroyed but the rider would be safe - and a second equally equipped rider would take point. The first guy would mount a new horse and follow on. Meanwhile, there would be no slowing of the pursuit.

Needless to say, I failed to convince my boss but it was still a good idea.

BTW, SF has used horses both in Afghanistan and, more importantly, in JTF 6 on the border with Mexico in the "Drug War."

[SteveMetz]

From my vantage point here on Rancho La Espada I can argue that horses DO provide some real advantages in terms of mobility - especially in insurgent warfare. BTW, both the Small Wars Manual and Callwell's Small Wars discuss the use of horses and mules.

During the El Salvador war, one of the major problems faced by the ESAF was pursuit of guerrila units. The standard G tactic was to drop anti-personnel mines on the trail to discourage direct pursuit from getting too close. Indeed, most ESAF casualties were caused by mines. One obvious solution was increased use of helicopters but the US was not going to supply more helos in the significant numbers required.

Meanwhile, in the Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD) we had a countermine program going with the ESAF. It involved a combination of off the shelf metal detectors, blast chaps and booties from Natick labs, and a c-m training program. I tried to sell my boss on using horses to substitute for the helos that were never going to come. One cultural problem was that the ESAF cavalry (like most horsemen) really loved their horses and such a program would put them at risk. So, I proposed calling these folk "Mounted Infantry" and mounting them on cheap little horses that could be had for about $150 each. My idea was a mounted pursuit platoon with a remuda of 5 horses per rider. The point man would be equipped with the blast chaps and booties. His horse would trigger the mine - the animal would be destroyed but the rider would be safe - and a second equally equipped rider would take point. The first guy would mount a new horse and follow on. Meanwhile, there would be no slowing of the pursuit.

Needless to say, I failed to convince my boss but it was still a good idea.

BTW, SF has used horses both in Afghanistan and, more importantly, in JTF 6 on the border with Mexico in the "Drug War."

I hope PETA doesn't monitor this board. You're going to end up with a bunch of unshaven protesters outside Rancho La Espada. Of course, the idea is not without precedent. The Navy used to train dolphins to blow up underwater mines. But I think it gave up because it was so hard to convince the dolphins to wear that white silk headband before a mission.

[Steve Blair]

Horse cavalry? (I suspect Huba wass de Czege would love that!).

If so, I remember that the original Small Wars manual does offer some useful advice on how to pack a mule.

Not so much horse (although I'm not opposed to that at all). I'm looking at the Vietnam-era division cavalry squadron as the framework. That said, I'm sure that horse mounted elements could be worked in, and they certainly have a role to play in some situations.

[Granite_State]

Working on an idea for using cavalry as a reaction force for UW efforts. It's something I've been kicking around for a while, and the class gives me a nice excuse.

Can you throw a post up when this gets published and is available on the internet? My PhD stuff covers similar territory, about eighty years back though, and I'd love to read it.

[Steve Blair]

It's for a class, so it might not make it to the internet (at least not initially...if it's solid enough I'll look at shopping it out). But I'd be happy to send you a copy once it's over and done with.

[Sargent]

All --

My husband just read David Danelo's Blood Stripes. I thought you might enjoy his comments.

So in the beginning of the book the author spends some time giving something of a primer on the Marine Corps. Its interesting to read because I've never really stepped back to think about some of the nuances and details. For example he talks about the really junior guys (Pvt-LCpl) and says that basically there are four groups: boots, outcasts, former LCpls, then the giant mass that is the LCpl. Boots are obvious, and as he interestingly noted, are generally viewed as communal property. Everyone else belongs to a particular fireteam / squad / platoon / company, and even if you outrank someone you can't just grab them and tell them what to do. Boots are the exception. Outcasts are those individuals who are former LCpls and were busted down for doing something really stupid or un-Marine like. They aren't boots, but are treated somewhat like them, though they will often try to bully the actual boots. Former LCpls are the guys who were busted down for less critical issues -- usually underage drinking or similar. They are definitely not boots, and retain some respect. They will boss around the boots when they are lumped in with them. Then there is the mass of LCpls. "Being a LCpl is like being caught in a real-life version of Lord of the Flies. Boots survive by doing what they are told. LCpls excel through alpha male characteristics of strength, cleverness, skill, and force of personality. LCpls who possess greater leadership ability ... are promoted into more senior positions, such as SAW gunners. The strongest among them become fire team leaders. They are given omnipotent power by the gods of the Marine Corps over the lives of three other Marines".

He goes on to deconstruct other areas as well. He talks about the umbiquitous "who you with?" question and how the response is almost always just two number (i.e. 3/11) and what that means in the Marine Corps.

There are other areas he goes into, but basically I think he does a pretty good job giving people an introduction into the background and mindset of Marines.

The area I found most interesting is his treatment of the Marine Corps view of Order/Disorder. He talks about how the Marine Corps embraces both incredible detailed Order and fully chaotic Disorder. More specifically how individuals, especially leaders, have to walk a balance between the two while paying respect to both. He brings up the standard rank and file Order down to every squad leader has a list of every item each of his Marines has and their serial numbers. The list go on up the chain, so every platoon / company etc has some massive amount of detail - trying to establish Order. Operations are planned, briefed, rehearsed, prepared for, inspected, etc -- again trying to establish Order. Then however there is the ultimate Disorder - combat - which Marines seem to be able to excel in, and which the Marine Corps tells Marines they have to be able to operate in. On top of that leaders have to establish their own balance between the two for everything. Follow every rule and you'll be know as an unimaginative, uninspired robot and Marines will think less of you and not want to follow you. Flaunt every rule and you'll be know as a loose cannon and not a team player. Marines will think less of you and not want to follow you.

One example -- any squad leader worth his salt will not let another squad leader tell his Marines what to do (except for the communal boots for things like working parties). This, he says, is adherence to order. Trying to make things and authority clear and unambiguous. However that same squad leader, faced with a disciplinary problem within his squad, will shun the orderly and established disciplinary enforcement process. He will prefer, and be more respected for, not following the rules and coming up with his own methods. He will even be given at least tacit approval by the chain of command to do this. In fact, it is almost viewed as a failure to resort to the orderly and established process.

On a broader level he talks about the extreme order and discipline the Marine Corps is known for. Then he talks about how the Marine Corps also prides itself on an 'expeditionary mindset' -- embracing the disorder, and basically saying "just drop us off and we'll figure things out". This leads to things like in 29Palms - hey I need a new radiator hose for my HMMWV. Well I'll put in a request for one, but I know they won't get one here soon, so I'll see if I can scrounge one off of that old truck they dropped off for use as an arty target.

I'm rambling, but I thought it was quite interesting. The Marine Corps own yin/yang concept. I know you think I'm such a big rule follower,* but you should know that in the field I'm known to be more on the disorder side. I always get into a little trouble for being too much of a cowboy about things. Even here. (The latest was not wearing a cover on Camp Fallujah. We come in in full combat attire. We de-gear and walk the 50 yards from our vehicles to the chow hall. I don't see a point in covers, and we don't always know when we are coming in so sometimes we don't have them with us. It irritates the hell out of people because "its a base regulation to wear covers blah blah blah" -- I've been talked to a couple times about me or my guys not wearing covers).

One last interesting tie in. He knows how Marines love the Spartans and their view of things. He brings up that the order/disorder and rules/expeditionary mindset is similar to what the Spartans tried to instill. He brings up the Spartan agoge - the military training all Spartan males had to attend starting at age 7. At the agoge the boys were not given enough food, but they were also drilled on the importance of laws and rules. The Spartans intentionally made it so the boys had to steal food to survive (or at least to thrive in the agoge) even though it was specifically against Spartan law (the thing they were training to protect). The Spartans tried to instill respect for the orderly, but also a resourcefulness and ability to operate within disorder.

* Actually, I chafe because I know that he is a big rule breaker on behalf of his Marines and his mission, but when it comes to his own existence as an individual within the institution he can be a little too "this is the way they do it and I can't change that."