Time for a FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency Update

[Bob's World]

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010..._r=1&ref=world



This is one recent example of hundreds available. Warfare is about power, not good governance. No about CMO, IO, economic development in a situation like this will distract from those who hold coercive power. The military has a very valid role to play in COIN, and they a need a FM that tells provides guidance on how to be good at applying military force against these insurgent groups.

Some argue we're doing the same old thing, but I would argue we forfeited the use of effective military force starting in 2002, and then in 2004 in Iraq. We became overly focused on winning hearts, not convincing the populace that we held the most coercive power and intended to win.

Bill,

I don't say the military has no role in helping to resolve insurgency; my point is simply that I believe much of the GWOT violence aimed at the US is due to perceptions of populaces in primarily Muslim countries where such insurgent movements are active or growing is that the blame for much of their current grievances with their governments lies with the US. Be that a co-option of natural legitimacy processes; be it the concerns that media-delivered US "culture" is eroding Islam in dangerous ways, etc.

For the US to go from insurgent spot fire to insurgent spot fire and assist the government there suppress the insurgent element of their populace through military force, while at the same time enabling those same governments to avoid engaging in meaningful talks with their own people and addressing the very real issues fueling these insurgencies primarily serves to make these GWOT-feeding perceptions WORSE.

We're chopping up starfish and throwing them back into the sea with our current military-led approach.

Bringing this back to my two points: The conventional wisdom (of governments, btw) is that insurgency is "caused" by insurgents, ideology, or some external actor drives our current approaches. I simply suggest considering, just for a moment, what if that planning assumption is wrong, and in fact that causation is something that comes from governmental domestic policy for nationalist insurgencies; and for the US/GWOT, from governmental foreign policies? If the military is the cure, then one should turn the military on the government (which sadly, too often happens). But no, the military is part of the government. The military is often as much part of the problem as it is part of the solution as the military too often becomes the lead face of the government with the populace as insurgency worsens. This will always be true due to the security concerns. The key then, is the military merely reinforcing and enforcing the same domestic/foreign policies that are the causal root of this problem, or is the military reinforcing and enforcing the new policies crafted to address the real and (material to insurgency) concerns of the populace??

Next time you sit down to do planning for an OEF-P way ahead, have one group do a COA that:
1. Adopts the planning assumption that insurgency causation comes primarily from the government of the Philippines and their domestic policies toward the south; and that the risk of those groups supporting acts of terrorism against the US and our interests derives its causation from US foreign policy in general, but more specifically toward Muslim governments/populaces globally, and to the governments/populaces of SEA.

2. Assume the current insurgent groups are largely symptoms of this causation and that ideology is merely an essential component of any such movement.

3. Include honest best effort assessments of how we think the populaces these groups emerge from feel about the role of US foreign policy on Philippine, Indonesian and Malaysian domestic policies.

4. Also assess popular perceptions of the legitimacy of their government at all levels, any institutionalized biases or discrimination, any disrespect of those who deserve respect, and finally how much voice the people feel they have to effectively address any of these concerns short of insurgency.

5. Consider fully if the most critical issues are best addressed through military-led approaches in the south, or if they are best addressed through diplomatic approaches in Manila? (not saying one does not exist currently or that one needs to go away entirely, just if they are properly understood, balanced, prioritized and resourced).

Does that change the proposed approaches? (And OEF-P is the one OEF where we the least abusive of the rights, authorities and legitimacy of the local government; and the most respectful of lives and property of the populace.)

100% of responders to this thread think the current COIN manual needs a re-write. One has offered substantive changes for consideration. I'll even come out and work as a consultant with this group to help them work through the nuances of these issues and to face the full range of challenges to developing such a perspective. Happy to work with the Leavenworth team as well, even if as a red cell to a main effort that is looking at much more moderate adjustments to the manual.