China's Emergence as a Superpower (till 2014)

[Ray]

The Indian submarine Arm is pretty good and we have experience on western and Russian subs including nuclear subs.

[Ray]

U.S., Vietnam Hold Talks Amid China Concerns

HANOI: Former foes Vietnam and the United States on Aug. 17 stepped up cooperation by holding their first high-level defense dialogue, amid concerns over China's military build-up.

Robert Scher, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia, met Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh, Vietnam's deputy minister of defense, for talks in Hanoi on ways to enhance cooperation by the two sides, they said.

The talks - 15 years after normalization of diplomatic relations - represented "the next significant historic step in our increasingly robust defense relationship which is based on mutual trust, understanding and respect for independence and sovereignty," Scher told reporters.

Previous security talks, which started in 2008, were held at the foreign ministry and State Department level.

"I did share at the meeting our impressions of Chinese military modernization," Scher told reporters at a joint news conference with Vinh.

On Aug. 16, the U.S. Defense Department, in an annual report to Congress, said China was ramping up investment in an array of areas including nuclear weapons, long-range missiles, submarines, aircraft carriers and cyber warfare.

The report predicted China may step up patrols in the South China Sea, an area where Vietnam and China have conflicting territorial claims.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton last month said resolution of those territorial disputes - which also involve other nations - was "pivotal" to regional stability.

A U.S. Navy destroyer last week became the latest U.S. warship to dock in Vietnam since the war ended in 1975.

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.p...t=va&aid=20674

[Surferbeetle]

In Rise and Fall of China’s Bo Xilai, an Arc of Ruthlessness, By MICHAEL WINES
Published: May 6, 2012, NYT

As recently as January, Mr. Bo was aiming for the pinnacle of Chinese political power, a seat on the nine-member Politburo’s Standing Committee, when the Communist Party’s leadership begins a generational turnover this autumn. He was a fixation for the news media and foreign leaders, the handsome convention-flouter who was breaking the calcified mold of China’s leadership caste.

Today, Mr. Bo’s fall has transfixed the world. He is suspended from the Politburo, under investigation for “serious violations” of Communist Party rules and being held incommunicado at an unknown location. His wife, Gu Kailai, long known for her own zealous ambition, stands accused by party investigators of murdering a British family friend, Neil Heywood, in a dispute over money. Neither Mr. Bo nor Ms. Gu have been given an opportunity to defend themselves publicly.

For all his success, the seeds of Mr. Bo’s destruction were evident long ago to many of those who knew him. He was a man of prodigious charisma and deep intelligence, someone who not only possessed the family pedigree and network of allies that are crucial in Chinese politics, but who had also mastered the image-massaging and strategic use of public cash that fuel every Western politician’s rise.

But Mr. Bo’s undisputed talents were counterbalanced by what friends and critics alike say was an insatiable ambition and studied indifference to the wrecked lives that littered his path to power. Little is known about career maneuvers in China’s cloistered leadership elite, but those who study the topic say that Mr. Bo’s ruthlessness stood out, even in a system where the absence of formal rules ensures that only the strongest advance.

“Nobody really trusts him: a lot of people are scared of him, including several princelings who are supposed to be his power base,” said Cheng Li, a scholar at the Brookings Institution in Washington. The so-called princelings — like Mr. Bo, offspring of China’s first revolutionary leaders — remain a powerful, though fragmented, force in China’s internal politics.

[Dayuhan]

Bob's World pretty much said the same when he wrote,

US influence rises on the tide of Chinese power.

I'm not actually sure that US influence is rising in the area. Certainly many of the players are trying to influence the US, with varying and generally limited degrees of success, but where has US influence gained... at least if we define "influence" as the ability to get people to do things that you want them to do that they would not have done on their own? Over whom has our influence grown?

In many ways we're on new ground (or waters), and it is dangerously misleading to assume these incidents don't have new meaning in today's world. China's actions, more than any others that I can currently discern, have prompted a regional arms race. Maybe that is good for those who produce the arms, and maybe the arms race will result in more stability rather than less. If you need to deal with a state that has a credible military, then diplomacy usually becomes more appealing.

Is there a "regional arms race"? Who's racing? The Vietnamese have been spending steadily for a long time, but they aren't really in an "arms race" with China. The Philippines is one of the lowest military spenders on the planet (as % of GDP), even with two significant insurgencies to deal with. Elsewhere in SE Asia I don't see anything resembling an arms race. Most of the countries in the region have been modernizing their militaries to some extent, but not to a greater extent than similarly emerging nations do anywhere else in the world.

The only SE Asian country that seems to be gearing up for potential conflict with China is Vietnam, understandable given the history. Even there, it looks like they aim not to be able to go head to head with China, but to convince the Chinese that conflict would be more costly than it's worth. The subs are the most visible item, but the Vietnamese have also invested heavily in land-based missile systems that could be a real threat to Chinese shipping in the event of conflict.

I don't have a crystal ball, but the future will not solely be determined by U.S. or China policy, a lot of other nations have a vote.

Very much true; this is not about the US facing off with China and others taking sides.

The US Vietnam naval exercise produced caution on China.

If that is not help, what is?

Did anything produce caution on the part of China? Who said the Chinese were being cautious? I thought they were being reckless and engaging in brinksmanship? Can't be both...

I doubt that the Chinese are much concerned over US/Vietnamese joint exercises, any more than they are concerned with US/Philippine exercises. They know the US isn't going to take sides on SCS territorial claims; the US has said so many times.

Nothing wrong in siding with the US.

As I said above, I don't see anyone "siding with the US". The US is a rather peripheral player in this picture; it's not like there's a "US side" and a "China side" and nations have to line up with one or the other. A few countries are trying to maneuver the US into taking their side, but the US doesn't seem keen on doing that, understandably.

Now that is interesting. It raises the question of how good the Indian Navy submarine service is. Ray, do you know?

If even a fraction of what we read about the state of the Russian Navy is true, the Vietnamese are likely better off learning from the Indians.

Even as all this goes on, we see one possible approach to energy exploration issues...

http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx...bCategoryId=63

Philex eyes Chinese partner in Recto Bank

MANILA, Philippines - The group of businessman Manuel Pangilinan is negotiating with one of China’s biggest firms for possible oil and gas exploration in Recto Bank, which is near the disputed Spratly Islands.

Highly placed sources said Pangilinan flew to Beijing a few days ago to meet with officials of the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corp. for a possible joint venture in Recto Bank in Western Palawan. CNOOC is China’s biggest offshore oil and gas producer.

The Pangilinan-led Philex Petroleum is also in talks with other foreign oil industry giants for the development of the resource-rich Recto Bank. Sources also said prospects for a China project are high for Philex-controlled Forum Energy Plc....

[carl]

Here is a Bill Gertz article describing dueling viewpoints concerning Red China's rise in power. The duel is between the accommodate Red China at all costs people because they are basically reasonable people and those who view Red China's motivations and intentions a bit more skeptically.

http://freebeacon.com/panda-war/

The article Surferbeetle cited is one reason I don't trust those guys. Their internal politics are cutthroat, literally. They kill each other. I don't see how they can act one way at home and not act the same way when dealing with foreigners when things get a little tight.

[tequila]

They kill each other. I don't see how they can act one way at home and not act the same way when dealing with foreigners when things get a little tight.

Note that the U.S. does not act the same way overseas as we do at home with our domestic politics. We often do not hesitate to attack or kill foreigners who disagree with us, especially post WWII, but we behave differently at home.

China, OTOH, behaves very circumspectly in the foreign arena. Also note that Chinese politics has become far less bloody nowadays than in the days from 1948-1978, when bloody purges and imprisonment were commonplace. The reason why the Bo Xilai case has blown up in the international media is because it looks a bit like a throwback to those days, despite the fact that the actual body count is tiny, even if you assume that all of corruption targets in Bo's tribunals were innocent.

[Ray]

I'm not actually sure that US influence is rising in the area. Certainly many of the players are trying to influence the US, with varying and generally limited degrees of success, but where has US influence gained... at least if we define "influence" as the ability to get people to do things that you want them to do that they would not have done on their own? Over whom has our influence grown?

I would say that the US has made a great impression and has totally influenced India. The US influence is palpable. Hardly anyone talks of socialism or are enamoured by the legatees of the USSR i.e. Russia!

The Indian Communist parties which were the second largest at one time, has been reduced to such a state that they might lose the status of being a recognised national party! If that is not US influence, I wonder what is!

India, BTW, does have some influence in the region and that matters to the US.

The fact that Vietnam is making friendly overtures to the US is no small indication of the US influence spreading.

Influence is not only the ability of getting people to do things you want, it also means getting people not to oppose what you wish to achieve. That is the subtle difference.

Is there a "regional arms race"? Who's racing? The Vietnamese have been spending steadily for a long time, but they aren't really in an "arms race" with China. The Philippines is one of the lowest military spenders on the planet (as % of GDP), even with two significant insurgencies to deal with. Elsewhere in SE Asia I don't see anything resembling an arms race. Most of the countries in the region have been modernizing their militaries to some extent, but not to a greater extent than similarly emerging nations do anywhere else in the world.

The Chinese interest spilling into the Indian Ocean to ensure that her trade routes are sanitised automatically hyphenates the Pacific region with the Indian Ocean rim.

In the Pacific Indian Ocean region, there definitely is an arms race. Modernising militaries automatically leads to an arms race. Modernising militaries in volatile regions can never be taken as routine or altruistic!

There is nothing like low spending or high spending for defence. It depends on the Threat and the money available in the Exchequer.

Did anything produce caution on the part of China? Who said the Chinese were being cautious? I thought they were being reckless and engaging in brinksmanship? Can't be both...

I doubt that the Chinese are much concerned over US/Vietnamese joint exercises, any more than they are concerned with US/Philippine exercises. They know the US isn't going to take sides on SCS territorial claims; the US has said so many times.

The fact that high level of hostilities including cutting cables and ramming shipping is no longer taking place is indicative that caution has been enforced. Ramming shipping and cutting cables that they were doing surely is not only reckless, but downright haughty and stamping its hegemonic pursuits in the area.

I will not keep reproducing links, but if you had seen them, you would have seen that China not only undertook shrill indignation and protests, but also gave lessons on piety and morality to the US on exercises being undertaken by the US in the area.

If the US was not taking sides, why have exercises with the two Nations who were in confrontation with China on SCS? If that type of display of military might and solidarity is not taking sides, then what is? Of course, you will say it was all routine. Are the areas where these routine exercises took place the same? That should also be routine so that it does not send a wrong message. And, why did the US exercise with Vietnam? Was that also routine?

I daresay US is ever going to say that they are taking sides. Though it is axiomatic that US had to take sides with the Philippines because they have a Treaty. The very Treaty is indicative of 'taking sides'.

Why move a token force to North Australia? Why not in the deep South in Tasmania if it were an innocent move?

As I said above, I don't see anyone "siding with the US". The US is a rather peripheral player in this picture; it's not like there's a "US side" and a "China side" and nations have to line up with one or the other. A few countries are trying to maneuver the US into taking their side, but the US doesn't seem keen on doing that, understandably.

I wonder if you read President Obama speech on US strategic interests moving to the Pacific Asia rim.

Countries are not trying to manoeuvre anyone, to include the US. It is just that their national interest are converging.

[davidbfpo]

Just a thought concerning recent incidents in SCS, which involved Chinese non-military vessels IIRC; using the label maritime safety / fishery protection etc. Is it possible that the actions are not politically directed, nor ordered via the military command structure?

Having read a couple of blog-sites comments sections there is clearly a vocal nationalist streak, which could enable non-naval captains to take individual action aware that criticism, let alone disciplinary action is unlikely.

[carl]

Note that the U.S. does not act the same way overseas as we do at home with our domestic politics. We often do not hesitate to attack or kill foreigners who disagree with us, especially post WWII, but we behave differently at home.

China, OTOH, behaves very circumspectly in the foreign arena. Also note that Chinese politics has become far less bloody nowadays than in the days from 1948-1978, when bloody purges and imprisonment were commonplace. The reason why the Bo Xilai case has blown up in the international media is because it looks a bit like a throwback to those days, despite the fact that the actual body count is tiny, even if you assume that all of corruption targets in Bo's tribunals were innocent.

If you mean by "disagree", those who attack us or our allies (the invasion of Iraq being an outlier [I figure I should use a with it buzz word once in a while] case) I would agree with your first paragraph. But they normally, normally mind you, have to attack us first.

The Red Chinese have behaved circumspectly in the foreign area, if you don't count all the shoving and pushing at sea, the buildup of military might-at a high rate-in the absence of any threat and all the tough talk. What circumspection they have shown is in my view, a result of simple lack of power. Now that they have power, I don't think they will be so circumspect.

That ChiCom politics has become less bloody is not reassuring. It is still bloody and nobody knows exactly how it works. And Red Chinese politics aren't confined to internal party struggles for power. You have to include the treatment of people, millions, who incur the displeasure of those in authority, local, regional and national. Not kindly treated they are.

The problem is you have a brutal police state with a power and the power is growing. Looking back on the history of brutal police states with power, I don't see any good reason for optimism.

[tequila]

If you mean by "disagree", those who attack us or our allies (the invasion of Iraq being an outlier [I figure I should use a with it buzz word once in a while] case) I would agree with your first paragraph. But they normally, normally mind you, have to attack us first.

Not always the case. See Guatemala, Iran, Chile, etc.

The Red Chinese have behaved circumspectly in the foreign area, if you don't count all the shoving and pushing at sea, the buildup of military might-at a high rate-in the absence of any threat and all the tough talk. What circumspection they have shown is in my view, a result of simple lack of power. Now that they have power, I don't think they will be so circumspect.

One could ask what the existential threat exists for the United States to maintain the world's largest military establishment by a factor of five, I suppose. The U.S. also supplies plenty of "tough talk" to go with actions like the invasion of Iraq and aerial campaigns against Libya, Serbia, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, etc.

This is not to say that the Chinese are wonderful peaceniks and the U.S. is an aggressive warmonger. Simply noting that the idea that the state of domestic political debate within a country is not always a good marker of violent aggression in foreign policy.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Dayuhan,

Is there a "regional arms race"? Who's racing?

Many disagree with you.

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/...-race-in-asia/

Asia is in the “early phases of an arms race,” with many nations increasing their military forces as dangerous disputes on land and sea pose potential flashpoints, Australian Ambassador Kim Beazley warns.

Mr. Beazley noted the ongoing tensions in the South China Sea, where Beijing is claiming vast expanses of ocean as its territorial waters and challenging claims by other nations.

“Every single country in Southeast Asia has a maritime dispute with its neighbor,” he said.

http://www.project-syndicate.org/com...ning-arms-race

Indonesia’s President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has perhaps been the most assertive. In addition to becoming more active in world diplomacy, Yudhoyono will meet Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow this month to discuss buying Russia’s newest fighter jets. Indonesia is seeking to form an air-defense squadron of 12 jets, with eight Russian fighters to complement the two Russian Su-27SK’s and Su-30MKM’s that it has already bought.

Elsewhere in the region, Singapore has apparently opted to purchase 12 new F-15SG fighter aircraft from the United States. Thailand’s Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, met Putin late last year and tentatively agreed to purchase 12 Su-30MKM’s. Malaysia has agreed to buy 18 Su-30MKM’s over the next two years, while Vietnam has purchased 36 SU-27SK’s, 12 of which are already in service.

[Fuchs]

A couple countries in the region have come to new prosperity, that's likely a major driver of whatever "arms race" happens in East Asia.

For some irrational reason, the supposed need for military expenditures does not correspond so much with actual threats (that's mostly lip service), but with fiscal strength.

Just look at Greece - suddenly 25% less need for national defence expenditures.

[Firn]

Note that the U.S. does not act the same way overseas as we do at home with our domestic politics. We often do not hesitate to attack or kill foreigners who disagree with us, especially post WWII, but we behave differently at home.

China, OTOH, behaves very circumspectly in the foreign arena. Also note that Chinese politics has become far less bloody nowadays than in the days from 1948-1978, when bloody purges and imprisonment were commonplace. The reason why the Bo Xilai case has blown up in the international media is because it looks a bit like a throwback to those days, despite the fact that the actual body count is tiny, even if you assume that all of corruption targets in Bo's tribunals were innocent.

We humans and our institutions are pretty handy at compartmentalizing. All in all I do agree with you, it is very important to keep the proportions in mind. For Chinese standards this is a big fish but a quite lonely one.

[jmm99]

for pointing to the Bill Gertz article, which is based on Michael Pillsbury (not previously mentioned in any SWC post before this one). Pillsbury is certainly qualified to speak to Sino-American issues - Wiki and His Story - snip from the latter (emphasis added):

Born in California in 1945, Pillsbury was educated at Stanford University (B.A. in History with Honors in Social Thought) and Columbia University (M.A., Ph.D.). Major academic advisers to Pillsbury at Columbia were Zbigniew Brzezinski and Michel Oksenberg, who later played key roles in the Jimmy Carter administration on policy toward both China and Afghanistan. Pillsbury studied the art and practice of bureaucratic politics with Roger Hilsman, President John Kennedy's intelligence director at the State Department and the author of Politics Of Policy Making In Defense and Foreign Affairs. At Stanford, Pillsbury's academic mentor was Mark Mancall, author of two books on the influence of ancient traditions on Chinese foreign policy.

His website (in Publications) has a number of items for free downloading - two books and the RUSI report are:

China Debates the Future Security Environment (2000).

Chinese Views of Future Warfare (1998).

China and Taiwan - The American Debate (2009).

Pillsbury is not without his detractors: e.g., Soyoung Ho (Washington Monthly assistant editor), Panda Slugger - The dubious scholarship of Michael Pillsbury, the China hawk with Rumsfeld's ear (2006).

I report; you decide.

Ray makes a good point in this:

Influence is not only the ability of getting people to do things you want, it also means getting people not to oppose what you wish to achieve. That is the subtle difference.

That approach is far removed from the "You're either with us, or against us" approach, which (dispite its biblical, historical and literary precedents) struck me as being a dumb and unrealistic foreign policy when Pres. Bush II said: ""Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." (LINK). To be fair, Ms Clinton said much the same a week before, ""Every nation has to either be with us, or against us." (LINK).

Of course, respect for neutral nations is subject to the laws of neutrality; an exception to neutral status arises where the neutral state is unable or unwilling to deal with armed forces located within and hostile to a third party.

Briefly, back to China and going to one of Mike Pillsbury's books, China Debates the Future Security Environment - Prologue (2000)

PROLOGUE: Ancient Lessons

To reduce the potential for misunderstanding or mirror imaging discussed in the preface, this prologue draws together examples from nine authors in five key research institutes who draw upon concepts from ancient statecraft. Their comments about the future security environment would be difficult to understand without extensive knowledge of the metaphors of Chinese ancient statecraft. The Chinese language is rich in idioms from ancient statecraft. Moreover, Chinese writing about the future security environment describes the future in terms of the Warring States era in Chinese history. (41) The age in which the classics of Chinese statecraft were produced was a time when a multistate competition to become "hegemon" featured stratagems, small wars, interstate conferences, treaties, and what Western scholars of international relations would label "anarchy." One set of "lessons" (among many) was how to become a hegemon; another was how to survive destruction at the hands of a predatory hegemon.

One specific Chinese premise from the ancient statecraft of the Warring States era seems to influence Chinese authors who write about the United States today--the concept of how to diagnose and deal with a powerful "hegemon" (ba) that seeks to dominate several other less powerful states. The way hegemons conducted themselves during the Warring States period of ancient China forms one of the sources of the classic lessons of Chinese statecraft. Unfortunately, lessons from Chinese statecraft about dealing with a predatory hegemon are little known in the West, and there is no guide for Westerners to the famous stories in Chinese traditional statecraft so well known to all our authors. (42) According to interviews with Chinese military officers, these stories are embedded in Chinese culture just as the West has its own history, its own literature, and its own Bible stories. This prologue selects only one subject among many from the lessons of the Warring States--how China in the future should assess and deal with a powerful hegemon.

41. The Warring States era (475-221 BC) was "the flowering age for the Chinese fable and exerted a definite influence on works of later centuries," according to K. L. Kiu, 100 Ancient Chinese Fables (Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1993), 8.

42. A forthcoming study for OSD Net Assessment discusses Chinese military writings published since 1993 on the contemporary relevance of ancient Chinese statecraft, including the following books: Sanshiliu ji gujin tan (Ancient and modern discussions on the 36 stratagems), Zhisheng taolue--Sun Zi zhanzheng zhixing guanlun (Strategies of superiority--Sun Zi's views on knowledge and action in war), Bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing--Zhongguo gudai xinlizhan sixiang ji qi yunyong (Conquest without combat--ancient Chinese psychological warfare thought and usage), Zhongguo lidai zhanzheng gailan (An outline of warfare in past Chinese dynasties), Quanmou shu--Shujia yu yingjia de jiaoliang (Power stratagems--a contest of losers and winners), Sun Zi bingfa yu sanshiliu ji (Sun Zi's the art of war and the thirty-six stratagems), Zhongguo gudai bingfa jingcui (The essence of the ancient Chinese Art of war), Sun Zi bingfa de diannao yanjiu (Computer studies on Sun Zi's the art of war), and Ershiwu li junshi moulue gushi jingxuan (A selection of 25 stories on ancient military strategy).

The pop quiz question is what major period followed the Warring States period. Answer: "The Glory of the Hans" 1919 Mao, etc.

Regards

Mike

[carl]

Not always the case. See Guatemala, Iran, Chile, etc.

Well no. If you are talking about Guatemala, there was an insurgency that was perceived to be contrary to our interests in that it would have replaced a gov that existed with one that had been less nice for us to have around. Chile, I figure the Chileans would have done what they did on their own. We were happy to see it though. In neither case did the Marines land.

But arguing over that is pointless because it detracts from the main point.

This is not to say that the Chinese are wonderful peaceniks and the U.S. is an aggressive warmonger. Simply noting that the idea that the state of domestic political debate within a country is not always a good marker of violent aggression in foreign policy.

That is getting closer to the main point. I will grant you that the state of domestic political debate within a country is not always a good marker of violent aggression in foreign policy. However in Red China, we are not talking about political debate, we are talking about a violently repressive police state, where you have a very real chance of getting killed if you cross the authorities. And as Ray noted we are not exclusively talking about violent aggression. A lot of things can be done with the threat of violent aggression. If you play your cards right, all you need is the threat.

The main point is this. Red China is a murderously repressive violent police state. Their gov is directly responsible for more human suffering and death than any other since the end of the Second World War, almost all of those being Chinese, their own people. Those deaths were not accidental. They were the result of conscious and deliberate actions. The entity that made those decisions and carried out the actions that resulted in those deaths is the Communist Party. They are still running the country and will be running the country. That is the history.

I don't trust them to be reasonable people in their dealing with foreigners, not with that history. The history of the 20th century gives some justification for that distrust. Not perfect justification, but enough that I would play my bets that way. Add to this a rising military power not related to any demonstrated threat to their commerce. Add also their claims to a significant part of the world's ocean. Add also the shoving they do.

So that is the problem. You have a police state building up a lot of military power, pushing people around and making great huge claims on part of the high seas. I don't see this as portending a peaceful future for the world. The problem seems an obvious one to me.

[carl]

Just a thought concerning recent incidents in SCS, which involved Chinese non-military vessels IIRC; using the label maritime safety / fishery protection etc. Is it possible that the actions are not politically directed, nor ordered via the military command structure?

Having read a couple of blog-sites comments sections there is clearly a vocal nationalist streak, which could enable non-naval captains to take individual action aware that criticism, let alone disciplinary action is unlikely.

Doesn't that result in a de-facto national policy? If that were true, I am skeptical, the end is the same.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Fuchs

A couple countries in the region have come to new prosperity, that's likely a major driver of whatever "arms race" happens in East Asia.

For some irrational reason, the supposed need for military expenditures does not correspond so much with actual threats (that's mostly lip service), but with fiscal strength.

Just look at Greece - suddenly 25% less need for national defence expenditures.

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f5f1d...#axzz1uKrb7GDV

In a report released on Friday, the committee says: “Despite being Europe’s economic powerhouse, and having a large defence budget in absolute terms, Germany does not pull its weight in military operations.”

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0aab4...#axzz1uKrb7GDV

The IISS noted that Asia was in the throes of a classic arms race between China and other states, reflecting rapid economic growth and the strategic uncertainty that dominates the region.

Most of the Asian nations mentioned have been expanding economically for years, and didn't increase their defense spending until relatively recently. While a lag time between economic expansion and defense spending is reasonable, many Asian nation, like many European nations, have been reluctant to increase defense spending fearing it could impact their economic growth. They, like many European nations, relied on the U.S. and other powers to underwrite security in the region. What changed? Why the surge in defense spending?

East Asian nations apparently don't think they have a partner that will underwrite their security, and/or as the AMB of Australia said every nation in the region has a disputed territorial claim in the South China Sea, so once again this isn't just about China.

It is far from irrational to correlate defense spending with defense concerns. Agreed it is hard to spend more on defense when you're broke, but Germany managed to do so prior to WWII, so I think it is a combination of economic ability and strategic concerns.

[tequila]

Well no. If you are talking about Guatemala, there was an insurgency that was perceived to be contrary to our interests in that it would have replaced a gov that existed with one that had been less nice for us to have around. Chile, I figure the Chileans would have done what they did on their own. We were happy to see it though. In neither case did the Marines land.

In the case of Guatemala, I was referring to Arbenz. Though since you feel free to discard the case of Chile, I suppose this is not a valid case study of American use of force either. Ah well.

The main point is this. Red China is a murderously repressive violent police state. Their gov is directly responsible for more human suffering and death than any other since the end of the Second World War, almost all of those being Chinese, their own people. Those deaths were not accidental. They were the result of conscious and deliberate actions. The entity that made those decisions and carried out the actions that resulted in those deaths is the Communist Party. They are still running the country and will be running the country. That is the history.

You could also make the argument that the Communist Party in China has engineered the most successful poverty reduction program in history in the past thirty years, with a correspondingly massive increase in living standards and life expectancy. That is also the history.

http://www.google.com/publicdata/exp...ife+expectancy

I'll go back to my main point being that one cannot prejudge foreign policy goals and methods of a government based solely on how morally backward you believe that regime to be. The proper judgment is based on the cross section of national interest, political/strategic goals, and economic and military capability.

[carl]

You could also make the argument that the Communist Party in China has engineered the most successful poverty reduction program in history in the past thirty years, with a correspondingly massive increase in living standards and life expectancy. That is also the history.

True I guess. But if you go back a few more years you trip over a few million bodies. The people who run the place are a product of the Party, which produced those few million bodies. They managed to change their economic outlook a little bit. They are still unrepentant killers though.

The fact that Red China is richer than before doesn't make them any less a repressive police state and all that means for other countries that have to deal with them.

I'll go back to my main point being that one cannot prejudge foreign policy goals and methods of a government based solely on how morally backward you believe that regime to be. The proper judgment is based on the cross section of national interest, political/strategic goals, and economic and military capability.

No, you can't make perfect predictions about how they will act based upon how morally backward (I prefer to say a bunch of killers but morally backward is good enough I guess) the regime is. But you if you look at what regimes composed of ruthless killers did in the 20th century, and then you look at what the Red Chinese are doing now and then you look at what the Red Chinese say they think is in their national interest and then you look and their economy and then you look at how they are building up their military and then you look at how they are shoving people around, if you look at all that I'd say a proper judgment is that peaceful doings in the South China Sea over the next decade is not portended.

[Dayuhan]

I would say that the US has made a great impression and has totally influenced India. The US influence is palpable. Hardly anyone talks of socialism or are enamoured by the legatees of the USSR i.e. Russia!

The Indian Communist parties which were the second largest at one time, has been reduced to such a state that they might lose the status of being a recognised national party! If that is not US influence, I wonder what is!

Are people turning away from communism because of "US influence" or because communism is a failed ideology that clearly has nothing to offer. Certainly capitalism prevailed over communism in the global ideas race (communism couldn't even finish the race) but I don't see that as "US influence", just as the collapse of an idea that basically sucked from the start.

The fact that Vietnam is making friendly overtures to the US is no small indication of the US influence spreading.

Again, that's less a question of US influence than of Vietnam emerging from its postwar shell and engaging more with other nations across the board, not just with the US. The US and Vietnam may both see it as in their mutual interest to cooperate to some extent on some issues, but that's less the US influencing Vietnam than a simple convergence of perceived interest.

Influence is not only the ability of getting people to do things you want, it also means getting people not to oppose what you wish to achieve. That is the subtle difference.

True enough, but again, I don't see any evidence that the US is causing anyone in SEA to alter policy in any way. Just because someone doesn't oppose something you want doesn't mean you caused them to take that position, it may simply mean that they see a convergence of interests. Nothing wrong with that of course, but I don't think it's valid to assume that such a convergence is orchestrated by the US or is a consequence of US influence.

In the Pacific Indian Ocean region, there definitely is an arms race. Modernising militaries automatically leads to an arms race. Modernising militaries in volatile regions can never be taken as routine or altruistic!

Who's racing? If modernization "automatically leads to an arms race", then the entire world is in an arms race.

There is nothing like low spending or high spending for defence. It depends on the Threat and the money available in the Exchequer.

It's also a question of political priorities. Vietnam and the Philippines have similarly sized economies, but Vietnam spends close to 3% of GDP on its military, the Philippines, despite having two serious active insurgencies, spends less than 1% of GDP on its military. Different priorities.

The fact that high level of hostilities including cutting cables and ramming shipping is no longer taking place is indicative that caution has been enforced.

Maybe the Vietnamese have also cut back on exploration in contested areas. These incidents come and go, and there's little evidence to suggest that any caution has been enforced... you can bet your last peso that another incident will come along soon enough, exercises or no exercises. Certainly US/Philippine exercises haven't enforced any caution at all.

I will not keep reproducing links, but if you had seen them, you would have seen that China not only undertook shrill indignation and protests, but also gave lessons on piety and morality to the US on exercises being undertaken by the US in the area.

Yes, they've always done that. The US has been known to give lectures on piety and morality as well. One of those things big nations do.

If the US was not taking sides, why have exercises with the two Nations who were in confrontation with China on SCS? If that type of display of military might and solidarity is not taking sides, then what is? Of course, you will say it was all routine. Are the areas where these routine exercises took place the same? That should also be routine so that it does not send a wrong message. And, why did the US exercise with Vietnam? Was that also routine?

The exercises are routine, yes. The US and the Philippines have been holding joint exercises for decades, and yes, they often take place in the SCS. I remember watching large numbers of ships and aircraft in exercises off the Zambales coast (near Scarborough Shoal) back in the 80s.

Worth noting, of course, that Vietnam and the Philippines have conflicting claims over the Spratlys and Paracels.

The US has quite explicitly stated that it's not going to side with anyone on the SCS territorial disputes. If there's an incident, the US response, exercises or no, is likely to be limited to urging everyone to resolve issues peacefully.

I daresay US is ever going to say that they are taking sides. Though it is axiomatic that US had to take sides with the Philippines because they have a Treaty. The very Treaty is indicative of 'taking sides'.

The treaty is old, and the wording is very ambiguous. The US has already stated that they would not consider an attack on a disputed area to be an attack on the Philippines, and even if, say, a Philippine ship were fired upon the treaty requires no more than response in accordance with constitutional process.

I wonder if you read President Obama speech on US strategic interests moving to the Pacific Asia rim.

I rarely pay attention to speeches. Actions speak louder.

Countries are not trying to manoeuvre anyone, to include the US. It is just that their national interest are converging.

The Philippines has tried to maneuver the US into making an expanded commitment of support and into providing a wider range of hardware at a lower price. They haven't succeeded with either effort. When you look beyond the rhetoric it looks like the US is maintaining some distance and is more interested in looking involved than in getting involved... fair bit of posturing and flag-showing, but a scrupulous effort to avoid commitment.

Most of the Asian nations mentioned have been expanding for years, but they have not increased their spending on defense previously.

Previously to what? Vietnam's submarine order was placed in 2009, negotiations began a year before that. The Gepard class frigates were ordered in 2006. The most capable surface combatants in SEA belong to Singapore; bidding on that contract began in the mid 90s, the order was made in 2000, the ships were delivered from 2004-2008. None of this is really new, and if you look at spending over time you see that spending increases as economies grow. Many countries have been methodically replacing 70s-vintage hardware as they can, but there's little evidence of a sudden surge in the last few years. I'd have to agree with Fuchs on this one, unless someone can show actual spending patterns as evidence to the contrary.

Much like many European countries, they were relying on others to take care of their defense needs so they could put more money into what you previously called productive activities.

Are European countries relying on tohers to handle their defense needs, or do they not perceive any pressing or imminent threat?

I don't think the Vietnamese have ever relied on others to take care of their defense needs. Overall (not just in SE Asia) there was a post cold war period in which perceptions of threat were very low, not an environment that encourages military spending, although many emerging nations continued spending (though not at exaggerated rates) anyway... pride is involved in these decisions.

Any suggestion that an "arms race" (in the sense of direct competition between or among nations) really needs to be accompanied by some kind of specific evidence.