Ukraine (closed; covers till August 2014)

[OUTLAW 09]

The sanctions themselves are a long term threat, but the elite's fear of sanctions is immediate. The motivator in this case is not so much what the existing sanctions have already done as what the economic elite thinks they will lose if further sanctions are applied. Those losses would take time to be realized, but the economic elite are not going to wait for that to happen to make their position known. They don't want to respond to losses, they want to prevent losses, and they will apply whatever pressure they can muster to achieve that goal. How much pressure they can muster is another question, but I'd guess there's a whole lot of talk going on behind the scenes right now.

Comes back to that same question: Putin can't afford to "lose" in the Eastern Ukraine, but can he afford to directly antagonize the business oligarchs?

Dayuhan---he can---Russian internal power is built on four legs, 1) the military, 2) the security services, 3) oligarchs, and 4) the Russian mob and over all of this the Russian Orthodox Church---so it really it just a balancing game for Putin.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---he can---Russian internal power is built on four legs, 1) the military, 2) the security services, 3) oligarchs, and 4) the Russian mob and over all of this the Russian Orthodox Church---so it really it just a balancing game for Putin.

Dayuhan---a solid article concerning the internal debate now among the four pillars of Russia power that I just wrote about.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/wo...-tactics.html?

Dayuhan--this is the core piece of the article and it goes to the information war comments I have been making here--it was focused at the EU, the Ukrainians, but more importantly the Russian themselves.

Putin was able via info war messaging to increase his popularity, influence the mood of the Russian population to support him and his actions, and in fact was able to hold the EU up from further hard stage three sanctions-successfully by the way in holding the EU especially Germany in place-----that info war crashed the day the airliner crashed and they have not recovered to the previous successes of that info war. And the EU has gone to stage three sanctions with promises of more to come if he does not throttle back.

Actually they have lost their own information war and you can sense that in their various press releases which are all over the map especially on the reasons for the crash which was up to 15 different theories.

Putin's most serious mistake was that he had seen how the EU/US responded to Georgia and Moldavia and honesty had assumed the same in the Ukraine--meaning a lot of yelling, teeth grinding and a lot of words flying around and then it would be over and back to business as usual.

His second serious mistake was believing the myth of the power of gas and oil--meaning the EU would stop on anything to avoid less gas but in fact it appears now that Russia is so tied to the needed sales income from the two raw resources he cannot cut gas and oil off without truly destroying his economy for the next 20 years. He simply did not or wanted to not see the economic interdependence.

From the INT article:
More frequent and prominent critics are saying that Mr. Putin and the hard-line leaders in the Kremlin overreached by suggesting that Russia, far more dependent than the old Soviet Union on international trade and financial markets, could thrive without the West.

“They were not anticipating the West to make radical moves, costly moves,” said Nikolai Petrov, an independent political analyst. “What is happening is different from what they wanted and what they expected.”

He and others pointed to the downing of the Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 over embattled southeastern Ukraine on July 17 as upsetting the balancing act that Mr. Putin had managed to pull off to maintain support from the public, hard-line nationalists, the security services, the oligarchs and the more liberal business community.

“Until this catastrophe, Putin’s calculations were pretty good in terms of being able to win any tactical battle,” Mr. Petrov said.

The Kremlin had been counting on its ability to maintain just enough instability in Ukraine to keep the country dependent on Russian good will, while making Europe and the United States cautious about intervening too assertively there.

Dayuhan--this is where the information warfare fit into his strategy.

Right after this weekend, when the likelihood of more serious European sanctions materialized, Mr. Putin met with advisers to say that Russia needed to become self-reliant. He was referring to arms production previously done in Ukraine, but the sentiment echoed in other fields.

[OUTLAW 09]

A new definition for the mercenary looting/stealing at the crash site--kind of goes with the zealous Christian comment.

Not sure what the proper training is for looting/stealing?

3. It seems that since the Kremlin has set itself the task to demonize itself as a fully-fledged “evil empire,” it will no longer deviate from this path (of course, not without help). Covering for and shielding terrorists goes beyond all imaginable limits.

Thus, Russia’s permanent representative at the UN, Vitaly Churkin announced that the DNR fighters, who controlled the Boeing-777 crash site and [who] stole belongings from the deceased passengers, along with the local residents, cannot be called looters. “Why are the locals collecting something? Because it literally falls on their heads,” said Churkin. And the militants, according to him, loot because [they] “don’t have proper training” (presumably, this is the criticism of Russian FSB and GRU training centers where terrorists are being trained).

Obviously, Churkin himself, who doesn’t consider the appropriation of victims’ belongings a sin, used to rob graves during his youth. What is so wrong [about it], when they [the belongings] are “literally” lying under your feet?

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan---he can---Russian internal power is built on four legs, 1) the military, 2) the security services, 3) oligarchs, and 4) the Russian mob and over all of this the Russian Orthodox Church---so it really it just a balancing game for Putin.

Domestic politics are always a balancing act, and the balance points can shift very quickly. Multiple pillars don't always have identical weightings, and there are sub groups within each of these groups with divergent opinions. I doubt that any of us are in a position to accurately evaluate the domestic power balance. The ball is in Putin's court, and we'll see what move he chooses to make.

[AmericanPride]

Dayuhan,

I think your line of argument opens questions about the long-term consequences for Russia's internal situation. Are sanctions and destabilizing Russia's economy more important than dominating in Ukraine? Is it in the U.S. interest to destablize Russia?

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan,

I think your line of argument opens questions about the long-term consequences for Russia's internal situation. Are sanctions and destabilizing Russia's economy more important than dominating in Ukraine? Is it in the U.S. interest to destablize Russia?

AP---outside of them holding nuclear weapons and having intercontinental ballistics missiles and outside of being a raw resource provider of two resources and he know how raw resource only countries have in the past developed, we have seen them block the attempts on Syria, blocked the attempts on getting an Iranian agreement, not having fulfilled the OSCE disarmament agreements they signed, and violating the Reagan signed INF, now the Crimea and now eastern Ukraine., and in the past Georgia and Moldavia.

A provocative question turning around the question---does in fact the world need Russia? If so for what and why?

It appears from just released polling Russians seem to be content in remaining isolated from the West as they blame the West for everything so why is it necessary to engage?

The idea of the land of great investments and money to be made has turned out to be just another fig leaf for the Soviet style economy, the lack of a political will to modernize and to restructure the Soviet industry mindset, and companies doing business there seem to see a risk factor now developing.

So again why the need to engage?

And yes the EU approached Russia a number of times to discuss Russian association with the EU--no comments came back from Putin and company.

So again why the need to engage?

[AmericanPride]

AP---outside of them holding nuclear weapons and having intercontinental ballistics missiles and outside of being a raw resource provider of two resources and he know how raw resource only countries have in the past developed, we have seen them block the attempts on Syria, blocked the attempts on getting an Iranian agreement, not having fulfilled the OSCE disarmament agreements they signed, and violating the Reagan signed INF, now the Crimea and now eastern Ukraine., and in the past Georgia and Moldavia.

A basic component in IR theory is the 'spoiler', which is the role Russia is playing given its (increasing) alienation from the West combined with its resurgent capabilities. IR is about relative power, and this is the most effective strategy for Russian to challenge the U.S. Historically what has kept Russia (or the USSR) together was its military power and centralized political control. Quantitatively, Russia is #2 behind the U.S. in military power and #10 economically. For those reasons, I think it's a mistake to ignore or dismiss Russia. And - as you mentioned - it has a large stockpile of nuclear weapons.

I've made the argument before that I do not think Russia qualifies as a 'traditional' Westphalian nation-state. Instead, I think Russia is better politically defined as an imperial system. In an imperial system, a political center dominates the subordinate peripheries without regard to ethnicity, nationality, etc. Principles of the Westphalian system such as territorial integrity and political sovereignty are not norms within the imperial paradigm. I think that goes a long way in explaining the vastly difference perceptions between Washington and Moscow.

A provocative question turning around the question---does in fact the world need Russia? If so for what and why?

What do you mean by "the world"?

[OUTLAW 09]

A basic component in IR theory is the 'spoiler', which is the role Russia is playing given its (increasing) alienation from the West combined with its resurgent capabilities. IR is about relative power, and this is the most effective strategy for Russian to challenge the U.S. Historically what has kept Russia (or the USSR) together was its military power and centralized political control. Quantitatively, Russia is #2 behind the U.S. in military power and #10 economically. For those reasons, I think it's a mistake to ignore or dismiss Russia. And - as you mentioned - it has a large stockpile of nuclear weapons.

I've made the argument before that I do not think Russia qualifies as a 'traditional' Westphalian nation-state. Instead, I think Russia is better politically defined as an imperial system. In an imperial system, a political center dominates the subordinate peripheries without regard to ethnicity, nationality, etc. Principles of the Westphalian system such as territorial integrity and political sovereignty are not norms within the imperial paradigm. I think that goes a long way in explaining the vastly difference perceptions between Washington and Moscow.



What do you mean by "the world"?

AP--in many ways Russia currently as it stands acts as a criminal rouge state with two raw resources as does as the cartels in Mexico with drugs again only with nuclear weapons. To be a superpower requires three things---economic power, military power, and political power and the power to project all three.

During the Soviet years they really only had military power and political power evolving out of that military power---they never did have true economic power. With the destruction Yukos they attempted to resolve that problem by using Gasprom now a state not private company to achieve those economic power aims through a series of gas cartels that dictated price and supplies. They even penalize countries and companies for not taking the assigned amounts in the contracts---thus now the EU cartel fines that are coming to the tune of over 10% of their yearly earnings from 2008-2012.

Putin defines his image of the world, Putin defines his image for his own population, Putin defines the reactions to that image, Putin really does not care what the west thinks as he is as anti west as his hardliners are and he views the west as basically weak and decadent and seriously does not believe in the "values" thing. And he has voiced that a number of times since his return to power.

So again--what is Russia to the world? Right now Russia is in fact as isolated as never before even during the Soviet days.

When a rouge country is offered a number of times an off ramp and does not take it then in fact it has decided to remain outside the world community.

IE---today on Interfax they stated that "see we allowed OSCE observers on our control points so it shows we are trying to deescalate" --but was it not Putin himself on his own national TV who stated that he had given his orders to have "new enhanced secured borders" to both the FSB and the Federated Border Security Service? The only reason he wants them there is the false flag operations that are ongoing-and he needs them to verify the fact that Russia is being shelled. False flag-meaning mercenaries firing into Russia to give Russia the argument ---see it is those "uncontrollable" Ukrainians again so we might need to move into the Ukraine to secure the other side and protect our own citizens.

Was it not the same Russian government that denied it had and is still firing artillery/rockets into the Ukraine which normally is an "act of war" in most countries these days even when satellite photos are released showing the opposite.

Is it not the same Russia that has someone "allowed" some of it's more modern weapons that have never been sent to the Ukraine to "somehow" cross that "enhanced secure border"? Again if the border security is "enhanced" why the need for OSCE observers.

Another tap dance to distract the world. Russia even with the OSCE invite has not allowed the OSCE teams to go to the crossing points nearest the mercenary areas near Donetsk. Why not?

So again a criminal rouge country--why criminal--the Russian mob is just about as powerful worldwide as some western countries these days especially on the cyper side of the house.

[AmericanPride]

AP--in many ways Russia currently as it stands acts as a criminal rouge state with two raw resources as does as the cartels in Mexico with drugs again only with nuclear weapons. To be a superpower requires three things---economic power, military power, and political power and the power to project all three.

During the Soviet years they really only had military power and political power evolving out of that military power---they never did have true economic power.

How does a "criminal rouge state" act? What behaviors or characteristics define a "criminal rouge state"?

That is one definition of superpower - but that's a definition that has a perception of power as absolute. But since it's more important to measure relative power, the status of superpower should be reserved for the state or states that occupy a preeminent position relative to the other states. According to a quantitative study I started, there are in fact four super-powers today (in order): U.S., China, Russia, and Japan. The political, military, and economic capabilities have these states are statisically significant from other states. Russia's strength relies on, as you have noted, their military power, and it still does today.

The dismantling of the USSR of course severely damaged Russia's economic power, and here is the problem: Russia's economic power has in fact improved significantly between 1991 and 2014. But that's not the metric used by Russia's elite; the reference point is in fact the perception of the height of the USSR's power (early to mid 1980s). And the insecurity created by this dissonance between the ascribed and desired status of Russia in large part defines the framework of the state's foreign policy.

Putin defines his image of the world, Putin defines his image for his own population, Putin defines the reactions to that image, Putin really does not care what the west thinks as he is as anti west as his hardliners are and he views the west as basically weak and decadent and seriously does not believe in the "values" thing. And he has voiced that a number of times since his return to power.

And that's an interesting evolution in Putin's policy: remember, he virtually inherited the presidency from the liberal faction when Yeltsin handed him the keys to power and for a time, he continued Yeltsin's approach with the West. Putin pushed for closer relationships with the West and championed Russia's inclusion into the World Trade Organization. In the opening phases of the War on Terrorism, he also offered to join the campaign since Russia has its own internal problems with Islamist terrorism. But what happened between 2001 and 2014? Bulgaria, Estonia, Lativa, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia all joined NATO. The Bush administration pushed for missile defense in Europe and abandoned its arms control agreement with Moscow. That was the start of the breach, and it was promptly widened further by other factors like the Iraq War, the war in Georgia, and so on.

Of course Putin is "anti-West". The U.S. is the preeminient power in the world tody. In the context of Russia's internal politics, with the aching for a restoration of Russia's power, defining oneself in opposition to the U.S. is sure to be political gold. The U.S. and Russia share responsibility in the collapse of bilateral relations; it's been a cycle of escalation for many years now. The question is how this development in the dyadic relationship will impact the international system and subsequently, international security. At what point was Russian intervention in Ukraine inevitable and what chain of events got us to that point?

The only example of complete Russian capitulation to the demands of a foreign power was World War I - and that was the Provisional Government after the failure of a military campaign in the midst of a domestic revolution. The U.S. may "win" Ukraine, and it may strengthen its political credibility among its European allies, but I doubt that will dissuade or deter Russia from pursuing actions contrary to U.S. interests. Sanctions and deploying U.S. troops to eastern Europe will serve as a signal that the U.S.-Russia conflict is now institutionalized, and it will facilitate further confrontation in the future when Russia responds in kind (and they will).