Ukraine (closed; covers till August 2014)

[AmericanPride]

AP--in many ways Russia currently as it stands acts as a criminal rouge state with two raw resources as does as the cartels in Mexico with drugs again only with nuclear weapons. To be a superpower requires three things---economic power, military power, and political power and the power to project all three.

During the Soviet years they really only had military power and political power evolving out of that military power---they never did have true economic power.

How does a "criminal rouge state" act? What behaviors or characteristics define a "criminal rouge state"?

That is one definition of superpower - but that's a definition that has a perception of power as absolute. But since it's more important to measure relative power, the status of superpower should be reserved for the state or states that occupy a preeminent position relative to the other states. According to a quantitative study I started, there are in fact four super-powers today (in order): U.S., China, Russia, and Japan. The political, military, and economic capabilities have these states are statisically significant from other states. Russia's strength relies on, as you have noted, their military power, and it still does today.

The dismantling of the USSR of course severely damaged Russia's economic power, and here is the problem: Russia's economic power has in fact improved significantly between 1991 and 2014. But that's not the metric used by Russia's elite; the reference point is in fact the perception of the height of the USSR's power (early to mid 1980s). And the insecurity created by this dissonance between the ascribed and desired status of Russia in large part defines the framework of the state's foreign policy.

Putin defines his image of the world, Putin defines his image for his own population, Putin defines the reactions to that image, Putin really does not care what the west thinks as he is as anti west as his hardliners are and he views the west as basically weak and decadent and seriously does not believe in the "values" thing. And he has voiced that a number of times since his return to power.

And that's an interesting evolution in Putin's policy: remember, he virtually inherited the presidency from the liberal faction when Yeltsin handed him the keys to power and for a time, he continued Yeltsin's approach with the West. Putin pushed for closer relationships with the West and championed Russia's inclusion into the World Trade Organization. In the opening phases of the War on Terrorism, he also offered to join the campaign since Russia has its own internal problems with Islamist terrorism. But what happened between 2001 and 2014? Bulgaria, Estonia, Lativa, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia all joined NATO. The Bush administration pushed for missile defense in Europe and abandoned its arms control agreement with Moscow. That was the start of the breach, and it was promptly widened further by other factors like the Iraq War, the war in Georgia, and so on.

Of course Putin is "anti-West". The U.S. is the preeminient power in the world tody. In the context of Russia's internal politics, with the aching for a restoration of Russia's power, defining oneself in opposition to the U.S. is sure to be political gold. The U.S. and Russia share responsibility in the collapse of bilateral relations; it's been a cycle of escalation for many years now. The question is how this development in the dyadic relationship will impact the international system and subsequently, international security. At what point was Russian intervention in Ukraine inevitable and what chain of events got us to that point?

The only example of complete Russian capitulation to the demands of a foreign power was World War I - and that was the Provisional Government after the failure of a military campaign in the midst of a domestic revolution. The U.S. may "win" Ukraine, and it may strengthen its political credibility among its European allies, but I doubt that will dissuade or deter Russia from pursuing actions contrary to U.S. interests. Sanctions and deploying U.S. troops to eastern Europe will serve as a signal that the U.S.-Russia conflict is now institutionalized, and it will facilitate further confrontation in the future when Russia responds in kind (and they will).

[AmericanPride]

So again--what is Russia to the world? Right now Russia is in fact as isolated as never before even during the Soviet days.

This is why I asked you what you meant by "the world"? Is Russia relatively more isolated from the handful of countries that make up "The West"? Yes. In a narrow political definition, you could define "The West" as "the world" insofar that the West is largely responsible for the construction and maintenance of the current international system.

But the international system is always in flux. Russia is not isolated from the absolute majority of states - and it is not isolated from contenders for international power outside of the West, including China and India (and to a smaller extent, Iran and some South American states). Statistically speaking, Russia is a major economy (ranked #8 in the world), and after the U.S., has the largest capability for military power projection. And, since 1991, its track record in conflicts has been comparable to the U.S. (approximately 70% ending in favor). So why is Russia perceived as a failed or second-rate state?

Is it because the U.S. 'won' the Cold War? If so, that conflict ended more than 20 years ago; that's an increasingly irrelevant reference point in measuring Russia's current capabilities. That's not to say that Russia does not have its own vulnerabilities - it still has a number of political stability issues to sort out, as well as weaknesses in the structure of its economy. Between the late 1940s and 1980s, the USSR was one of the leading industrial and scientific states after the U.S. That potential still exists in Russia but that might require giving the technocrats more power in government (not sure if that's political feasible given the state of affairs).

The conflict in Ukraine must be analyzed in this context, and it must also further be analyzed with the long-view in mind about what U.S. interests are towards a Russia that is increasing in its capabilities, confidence, and disenchantment with its international status.

[AmericanPride]

Additionally: many of the trends today give credence to the argument that the international system is approaching a possible paradigm shift in global power. What do I mean by paradigm shift in global power? I mean the difference between pre- and post- Congress of Vienna; pre- and post- World War II. Pre- and post- Soviet collapse. Perceptions of relative power often drive the events that lead to the paradigm shift (more often than not, it's sealed by blood through war).

So if the perception is that U.S. relative power is in retrenchment, and Russian (or Chinese) power is increasing, how does that affect state behavior? In my previous posts, I discussed how Russia's historical references points about its past status frames its current decision-making (as opposed to current conditions framing the decisions); so if the U.S. is in retrenchment, and it perceives the power of other states to be increasing, will the U.S. be more or less likely to escalate conflict? As time progresses, the window for the U.S. to act to protect its status closes as other states approach parity. And for the contenders, time works to their advantage. The Russians may be perceiving that this is an opportune time for them to increase their power.

Now, how the U.S.-Russian dyadic unfolds within the context of a U.S. led international system is one thing. But how it affects U.S. interests after a paradigm shift is harder to calculate. For one thing, the triggering mechanism is difficult to assess - it could be the outcome of a major conflict (Napoleonic Wars, World War I, World War II), or it could be a significant political (Great Britain) or economic event (Soviet Union). That's because all of the norms and perceptions taken for granted become irrelevant. That's why it's important to take the long view of the Ukraine conflict - are we setting the conditions for future challenges to U.S. power?

[AmericanPride]

Outlaw,

Lastly, a spoiler in IR is not strong enough to dictate its terms unilaterally except in localized conditions but it is strong enough to obstruct the interests of other states. That's why Russia is relevant to U.S. and international security. It's perceived status is much greater than its ascribed status, and that generates insecurity, leading to confrontational and spoiling strategies. Russia already does not benefit significantly from the current balance of power, and increasing its isolation from the West will only reinforce the incentive to act as a spoiler.

In the long-term, what does a spoiler mean for the U.S.? For one thing, it means that while the U.S. is expending more resources and commiting more capabilities than what would otherwise be necessary, it creates opportunities for other states to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities. This takes us back to power transitions in international systems. The U.S. - Russian conflict benefits Russia to a small extent because it strengthens the domestic credibility of the regime and denies the U.S. increases in its relative gains compared to Russia. But it benefits China the most who will face less U.S. challenges to its interests. So - that is why I have asked (repeatedly), to what extent is Ukraine worth breaking the U.S.-Russian relationship? What good does it do long-term U.S. interests elsewhere? How does it affect the international system, which currently favors the U.S.? So, I'm skeptical of the utility of destroying or significantly destabilizing Russia.

[AmericanPride]

Right now Russia is in fact a rouge country regardless of how one wants to define rouge.

If you don't have a definition, how can you use the label?

[OUTLAW 09]

If you don't have a definition, how can you use the label?

AP--once a rouge country starts down a particular path it tends to repeat it often and over a long period.

Remember how the Georgia event started---via a demand by Russia to bring in peacekeepers which for Russia is a oxymoron since Georgia.

Let's see the path of this rouge country---first Georgia, then Moldavia, the Crimea, and now eastern Ukraine or the "New Russia" and along the way several small regions with no official recognition and Russian troops in these countries so does that strike you as a country willing to play the internal game of rule of law or t is a rouge country marching to it's on drumbeat as it defines that drumbeat. Then let's look at the current small scale insurgencies they are dealing with----- as ethnic Russians have a hard time recognizing other ethnic minorities

http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/07/3...es-in-ukraine/

[AmericanPride]

AP--once a rouge country starts down a particular path it tends to repeat it often and over a long period.

Remember how the Georgia event started---via a demand by Russia to bring in peacekeepers which for Russia is a oxymoron.

http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/07/3...es-in-ukraine/

So - duplicity is a trait of a rogue state?

[OUTLAW 09]

How does a "criminal rouge state" act? What behaviors or characteristics define a "criminal rouge state"?

That is one definition of superpower - but that's a definition that has a perception of power as absolute. But since it's more important to measure relative power, the status of superpower should be reserved for the state or states that occupy a preeminent position relative to the other states. According to a quantitative study I started, there are in fact four super-powers today (in order): U.S., China, Russia, and Japan. The political, military, and economic capabilities have these states are statisically significant from other states. Russia's strength relies on, as you have noted, their military power, and it still does today.

The dismantling of the USSR of course severely damaged Russia's economic power, and here is the problem: Russia's economic power has in fact improved significantly between 1991 and 2014. But that's not the metric used by Russia's elite; the reference point is in fact the perception of the height of the USSR's power (early to mid 1980s). And the insecurity created by this dissonance between the ascribed and desired status of Russia in large part defines the framework of the state's foreign policy.



And that's an interesting evolution in Putin's policy: remember, he virtually inherited the presidency from the liberal faction when Yeltsin handed him the keys to power and for a time, he continued Yeltsin's approach with the West. Putin pushed for closer relationships with the West and championed Russia's inclusion into the World Trade Organization. In the opening phases of the War on Terrorism, he also offered to join the campaign since Russia has its own internal problems with Islamist terrorism. But what happened between 2001 and 2014? Bulgaria, Estonia, Lativa, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia all joined NATO. The Bush administration pushed for missile defense in Europe and abandoned its arms control agreement with Moscow. That was the start of the breach, and it was promptly widened further by other factors like the Iraq War, the war in Georgia, and so on.

Of course Putin is "anti-West". The U.S. is the preeminient power in the world tody. In the context of Russia's internal politics, with the aching for a restoration of Russia's power, defining oneself in opposition to the U.S. is sure to be political gold. The U.S. and Russia share responsibility in the collapse of bilateral relations; it's been a cycle of escalation for many years now. The question is how this development in the dyadic relationship will impact the international system and subsequently, international security. At what point was Russian intervention in Ukraine inevitable and what chain of events got us to that point?

The only example of complete Russian capitulation to the demands of a foreign power was World War I - and that was the Provisional Government after the failure of a military campaign in the midst of a domestic revolution. The U.S. may "win" Ukraine, and it may strengthen its political credibility among its European allies, but I doubt that will dissuade or deter Russia from pursuing actions contrary to U.S. interests. Sanctions and deploying U.S. troops to eastern Europe will serve as a signal that the U.S.-Russia conflict is now institutionalized, and it will facilitate further confrontation in the future when Russia responds in kind (and they will).

AP--would actually argue that the Soviet Union of the 70/80s was not an economic power--was there in 72 for over six weeks camping throughout the SU--if that was economic power then those in the Smokey Mountains were living in luxury.

The reason the SU collapsed as well as the GDR was in fact due to the failure of their economic systems---actually failures created by the Communist Party and the Soviet style of economical measurements of economic success--metric tons, feet of rolled steel, number of ships built and tons of grain produced etc.

The producing elements lied to the next higher and they lied to the highest and that misled the ruling elite to think they were succeeding beyond their wildest dreams. A total Ponzi scheme that started falling apart in the early 80s and even the citizens of the GDR and the SU knew it in the streets--the ruling elite did not though.

Do not forget for a moment that it was Putin as a KGB COL that recruited GDR citizens to potentially take over the GDR in a coup because he and other KGB officers in Dresden felt that Honecker was going weak. Notice the continence of thoughts and actions 38 years later?

Putin's anti west has been around for a really long time not just now.

Right now Russia is in fact a rouge country regardless of how one wants to define rouge.

Putin has his own doctrine now the Putin Doctrine which defines Russian territory to include any territory where Russians reside regardless if in another country---Russians as defined by ethnicity, culture, and language.

Based on that definition Mexico could claim to want to "represent " all "Spanish speakers" in San Antonia, TX based on Putin's definition, smuggle in irregulars and arms--- they would be in fact just be following Putin's led.

So with roughly 300 hotspots around the globe especially in Africa when language/ethnicity are now in play and border poorly drawn- the Putin Doctrine will raise it's head all over again and others will point to him and say he did it so can we.

I disagree--right now Putin needs the Euros/USDs as much as the west needs energy---the problem is this adventure of his will in fact damage an already struggling economy, modernization will be pushed aside, privatization which means really more oligarchs will be delayed if not pushed aside, and new technologies badly needed will not come in. So while the rest of the world develops Russia is going backwards after 1994 and even further backwards now with the sanctions.

On top of this to rebuild the abilities that the Russians have been getting cheap military equipment from the Ukrainians will cost a massive amount and years to replicate as well as a number of other technologies the Ukrainians have been providing at cheap rates much as they did under the SU days.

In some aspects the drive to rebuild the empire that Putin foresees is really the rebuilding of the economic imperialism of the SU where the satellites provided cheap products to the mothership.

You see the inability of Russia/Putin to answer the west sanctions outside of a threat to raise the gas prices and stop fruit and vegetables. Yes they can import the fruit and vegetables from China or other countries but not as cheap as they have been getting it from the EU, raise the gas prices and the EU cartel hammer comes down and the prices for EU goods going into Russia will be higher. And Putin runs the risk that the really hard sanctions on gas come into being driving even further his economy backwards.