Organization & Distance

[Distiller]

If you go cross-country in a more-or-less flat landscape it's ok. But how do you apply those principles to a, say, present day cavalry unit in an undulating suburban ops area, that is forced to move in less than optimal tactical formation?

I think the approach is too static, but e.g. doesn't factor in combined weapons and airpower enough. With precision engagement equipment of FACs the potential "arc of fire" even a small unit can controll is quite larger than what the C3 capabilities of such units realisticly allow for.

Even with micro UAVs for situational awareness those C3 limitations dictate your dispersion, not your weapons range, I think.

[William F. Owen]

Even with micro UAVs for situational awareness those C3 limitations dictate your dispersion, not your weapons range, I think.

You only disperse if it gives you benefit. It's a balance of security and activity. There is no point in expending resources detecting the enemy, unless doing so gains you something by doing it. EG- When you find them, you must be able to tell someone.

In my experience the biggest factor effecting dispersion is the ability to effectively concentrate fires in time and space.

Also don't forget that weather tends to have far greater effect on that than many realise. What looked good at 18:00hrs can be blanked off by mist and cloud at 05:30hrs the next morning.

[krsna]

You only disperse if it gives you benefit. It's a balance of security and activity. There is no point in expending resources detecting the enemy, unless doing so gains you something by doing it. EG- When you find them, you must be able to tell someone.

In my experience the biggest factor effecting dispersion is the ability to effectively concentrate fires in time and space.

Also don't forget that weather tends to have far greater effect on that than many realise. What looked good at 18:00hrs can be blanked off by mist and cloud at 05:30hrs the next morning.

one is prone to be techno-mesmerised but remember the boots on ground dictates the end result. got to get dirty eventually. technology gives one the edge in area of interest and area of influence but area of control is where organic capability comes in. you got to control the area post C4I advantage by quick closing in, defeating the enemy and then retaining the area wrested for whatever duration necessary. a general in washington can see what a sergeant is looking and can direct fires but he still needs boots on ground. conventional wars turn to uncoventional in no time. days of WW 1 are back sooner than you wish despite your asymmetry in surveillance, communications, firepower and mobility.

[krsna]

If you go cross-country in a more-or-less flat landscape it's ok. But how do you apply those principles to a, say, present day cavalry unit in an undulating suburban ops area, that is forced to move in less than optimal tactical formation?

I think the approach is too static, but e.g. doesn't factor in combined weapons and air power enough. With precision engagement equipment of FACs the potential "arc of fire" even a small unit can controll is quite larger than what the C3 capabilities of such units realistically allow for.

Even with micro UAVs for situational awareness those C3 limitations dictate your dispersion, not your weapons range, I think.

further to your comment. i read your earlier submissions today. thumbs up for excellent analysis. some of your argument stems from mobility and balance from the C4I capability of mobile forces. in today's environment, none stays mobile forever. the modern technology disperses an entity away from other entities as well as from its control HQ but it has limits on intra-entity dispersion. Americans and Australians gave up the Soldier Modernization Pro gramme (SMP) induced 24x7 SATA capability of a soldier since ultimately human being wants assurance of physical support at a psychological level. thus the dispersion is limited also by human needs to be together unlike rambos who like to work alone. same is for vehicles where limited FOV restricts inter vehicle dispersion despite technology. the buddy system operates at the lowest to highest level.

[William F. Owen]

Krsna, please go to this (if you haven't already) link and tell us something about yourself.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1441

[Geoff]

I've read through most of this thread and seen a lot of informed comment, but the salient point should be not about organising around weapon systems, they change - we need to think terms of interoperable teams.

If. as was stated earlier the ideal base team is 4-5 then organise around that, build up your structurre from the base. When it comes to weapon systems, design them around your teams and the tasks that you have them perform. You have to be able to operate in a variety of theatres, but your recognition as to what is required for weaponry is driven by the task that people are expected to perform.

It will never be perfect, because the enemy will not do what you want them to do - it is not in their best interests, so we need to focus on well trained people who can react to a changing situation and sieze the initiative and thus dictate the pace and tempo of the battlefield around them.

[krsna]

History of war dates to duel between two unsocialised animals called Homo Sapiens. Has the society imposed the 4-5 limit on base as you suggest? Buddy system is the base of organised combat (Synergy of the twins, as against rivalry of twins-Kane and Abel). You can build anything upwards on this. Think about it.

[William F. Owen]

There are actually two issues at play here.

a.) The optimum team size for a complex and stressful task.
b.) Span of Control - not Command as is commonly expressed.

A lot of discussion assumes they are the same thing. I suggest they are not, thus I view task organisation as being the balance of those two items. Under great stress the span of control shrinks and can shrink down to two! However a team trying to accomplish a task, gets less effective as it gets smaller. This is why I argue so much for flexible and/or modular Platoon and Company groupings.

[Timothy OConnor]

However a team trying to accomplish a task, gets less effective as it gets smaller.

I think it really depends on the task at hand.

For example, conventional wisdom held that sniper teams should be very small to enhance their ability to avoid detection. But in Iraq American sniper teams have discovered that too small a team is easy pickings once discovered. As a result they've been working with larger teams to enhance security.

But, they've also discovered that if too large their ability to remain undetected truly is compromised such that they become ineffective as the bad guys avoid them. Thus the team is unable to meet its intended purpose if too large.

So, it all depends...