State Department Systematic Failures
State department types are concerned with who gets invited to what cocktail party and how to quickly get out of whatever strategically critical "hole" they findthemselves in and more to a comfortable "hole". Those that do stay at the "hole" and may go "native". IMHO this is Zero value added at best, contrary to American interests at worst.
When we needed them most, they have failed utterly.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 03-30-2010 at 09:41 AM. Reason: Tone and language toned down, plus further posts where post quoted and PM to author.
You know, I'm really starting to wonder about State. That said, while I am generally cynical, I suspect Sylvan's comments take it a bit too far.
However, I know a couple folks who recently did the FSO oral exam. Their impression was that nobody in their groups were offered a slot in the next A100 class. If any did get slots, I suspect it was very, very few. Many of those candidates were people on their 2nd, 3rd, 4th attempts at it - some on their 6th or 7th (that's crazy, imo). And the descriptions of these people suggest that they are fairly capable. Why all of this selection nonsense? If this game is really that ridiculous, then I'm seriously considering not bothering with the oral exam. Why spend the time and money to fly down there, get an overpriced hotel room, and waste an entire day dicking around with their BS if this is how they play their game? Aren't they short handed? Aren't they woefully incapable of meeting the demands of any "whole of government approach"? But they're also not hiring because they're not willing to recruit people who, for whatever reason, don't seem to fit some ideal mold according to the personnel who administer the oral exam? What sense does that make?
I exagerate, but not much.Originally Posted by Schmedlap
In zabul we had one state department rep for a critical southern province providing mentorship to a state level governor.
The first was a public affairs officer. Not a governance expert or diplomat.
The second was a former Marine officer in his first state department gig. You may remember his name. Matt Hoh.
There are maybe 10 provinces in all of Afghanistan who are strategically critical to our fight. How many people work for State? Yet in the most critical areas where we need our civilians in the fight, State can't be bothered.
Everyone with a brain has correctly identified that the military should be secondary in our overall strategic strategy. Yet no one BUT the military has stepped up to provide the leadership required to execute our national strategy. And no one has failed greater in that regard that State, who fails to even recognize they HAVE failed.
State Department
The issue of attracting and deploying State personnel of the quality and quantity necessary is certainly recognized. The recent White House / NSC 1055 report noted this same problem:
The argument of missing leadership can be taken a step farther, or rather in a different direction outside the Executive Branch entirely. In Congress, with the notable exception of Sen. Lugar (and the ascending Sen. Kaufman), attention to the issues of public diplomacy and strategic communication are coming from the Congressmen and Senators on the Armed Services committees, not the foreign relations (or foreign affairs as it's called in the House) committee. The money issue last year was from the defense appropriators (recall the late Rep. Murtha's comments) and not from the foreign ops appropriators (the committees, House and Senate, that fund State). With the exception of Lugar, proposed legislation to fix SC/PD comes from SASC/HASC members. Members of SASC/HASC, not SFRC/HFAC, are paying attention to the gagging effect of the modern interpretation of the Smith-Mundt Act.(d) how best to expedite revitalizing and strengthening civilian department and agency capabilities, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to enable them to effectively execute these programs and activities.
Notably, SASC successfully inserted into the NDAA a $55m authorization for State activities (which I would have loved to see the defense appropriators fund, but alas, they ignored it). This is the VOICE Act (see here for more) includes $30m for BBG and more for State proper. To be fair, HFAC (House Foreign Affairs Committee) doesn't have real power to accomplish much and few in SFRC (Senate Foreign Relations Committee) really care about these issues, except for perhaps three Senators. These three are Lugar and the only two Senators to attend the SFRC hearing that heard from four Under Secretaries of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (three past + current). Notably, the two that were present, Kaufman and Wicker, are also on SASC.
By the way, at the hearing, a prior U/S of PD/PA noted that it took 5-7 years to get a PD person online. This issue has not gained the attention it needs.
I think that your frustration (and yeah, it's mine at times too) stems from a peculiar dynamic. State was not fully behind the invasion of Iraq, so its performance at doing state work reluctantly makes sense, from the whole psychology of it all.
As for OEF, well, perhaps the distinct difference of opinions that exist between the "let's play whack-a-mole" CT advocates, and those advocating reconciliation and reintegration, and a focus on governance, will cause similar dragging of feet.
Then again, perhaps it isn't deliberate or all that well-thought out after all. Perhaps the problem is so deeply rooted culturally (and something that history has shown us before) that we really should not be surprised.
This is not to say that there isn't good work being done...just that your frustrations imply a deliberate process of ignorance or nose-thumbing, when it may be more basic than that.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 03-30-2010 at 09:43 AM. Reason: Original quote replaced with edited edition.
Foggy
The debate is misplaced.
State is all about reporting, and message in very challenging and precise circumstances. It needs collegiality and rule-following. Careful control of lines of operation. Bureaucracy and procedure is paramount.
The debate is whether an organization with that mindset and structure can, in fact, organize itself to accomplish reconstruction.
As an American, I am grateful for the contributions that foreign service officers make to go out all over the world (and routinely to some pretty nasty places) to do what they are trained and focused on doing.
Having said that, stability and reconstruction has been an abysmal failure, and they have not, to date, found any will or strategy to rise to the challenge.
I do construction, reconstruction, conflict stuff in the states. It is a messy challenging and hard-nosed affair that requires people taking a risk, and pushing for change. When I was recruited for Iraq, it was for those skills, and my orders were to go into that broken system and expressly challenge it. Nothing about winning friends and influencing people.
Of the dozen or so Senior civilian reconstruction advisers that went into Iraq in December 2007, most (like me) self-selected to be outside of State, either with MNC-I/MNDs where the juice and action was, or with the applicable ministries or UN. Some broke free to EPRTs. Few that stayed in the State PRTs accomplished much.
The inherent conflict with our work assured that, in Afghanistan, our types would not be welcome at that party. So, the big lesson learned by State? Don't change. If you bring in outsiders, and especially experts, make sure they are very tangential.
The alternative strategy of reflagging former military like Hoh collapses when, once inside, they see how dysfunctional it is. So, they are out,too.
What do you think that "Whole of Government" thing is about---just stable federal employees with careers on the line, and ever-rotating SCRS three and six month assignments.
In my field, planning, it is a function done before and outside of line operations (but with interaction to it) in order to guide and direct line operations. Despite that, even in Iraq, I was deployed as a line function, but none are deployed in Afghanistan. If planning isn't going on "before" a line deployment, how can you expect the deployment to accomplish much?
Having said that, the reality is that I was only able to function effectively in Iraq because there was something to plan with and around, Iraq being a very different level of development. Moreover, the resources to make me effective were huge (movement, security, intel/mapping, contacts, engineering/construction support, computers/software). I was begging borrowing and stealing GIS and engineering assets at all turns (mostly military). How, in Afghanistan, were none of these resources exist in such depth, could I effectively function at a district level where there are no pre-existing resources or systems?
A senior reconstruction engineer sitting in a tent with no adequate support, systems, or resources is just an extra and dysfunctional burden. They would need to be "flying squads" to connect resources to line units and not line deployed.
How to cut the Gordian knot?
A recent strategy page comment from March 25:
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htu.../20100325.aspx
PRTs have had problems with bureaucratic roadblocks created by different Department of Defense, State Department and USAID agendas. The State Department, when told to send people to work with PRTs, responded by providing very junior folks, with little experience in anything. The Department of Defense has people there to provide security and is, technically, not involved in nation building. But the troops can take over in an emergency, because they are, after all, in charge of security. But in active areas like Iraq and Afghanistan, the military is really running the show. Combat needs come first, and everything else, including nation building, is support. When it comes to nation building, the Department of Defense wants power, but not responsibility. Same thing with the State Department, and neither Defense or State wants to take orders from USAID.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 03-30-2010 at 09:11 PM. Reason: Add quote marks
Ps
In other threads, Schmedlap, Surfbeetle, Dahayun and other, have really tried to tear this thing to shreds, and build a way forward.
I believe that, in Afghanistan, there are two critical elements:
1. Someone needs to make a strategic decision as to how governments should function. National down to Governate? Governate to District? My guess is that the answer is complex: certain structures for certain areas (Example: Rural vs. Urban schools, with rural schools as a different, more expeditionary management structure and operation than traditional urban schools). Now, we have Adm. Mullen being asked to provide universities down to Marjah to train engineers, doctors and lawyers. Are we just making this up?
2. A unique civilian system needs to be developed, probably anchored at the RC level, to link systems of reconstruction and resources between national/UN/NGO/Governate levels, and the field, with substantial cross-training and support to make military implementers more effective and coordinated---but based on lots of small, local projects building within a bigger framework---this instead of an Iraq approach where existing systems were simply being reactivated and repaired.
How to make military implementers more effective without embarking on something absurd and ineffective? Plenty of ways that are not being used.
The solution is not on the table today. I am waiting for the right folks to ask the right questions so that answers can be created. Maybe, soon????
Steve
Problems at the Macro level
Two fundamental questions haven't been asked by the State types that are completely hampering our efforts.
1. Is AFghanistan a viable country in a post cold war era?
2. Is the Constitution of Afghanistan a legitimate reflection of the needs of the Afghan people.
We have hitched ourselves to a government founded in a Western European Socialist government Constitution. While lip service is paid to Islam, the list of promises it makes is ridiculous and unfufillable. Combine that with Provincial Governors appointed by Karzai, yet without any monetary carrot or stick to use. They can be blamed for all as governors, yet they have zero ability to influence their provinces.
The Provincial ANP Chiefs report directly to Kabul, despite the regional police headquarters, which have no corresponding civilian leadership.
The ANA work for the Afghan RC Commander. The coalition reports to the ISAF RC. The PRT works for HQ Kabul with coordination to the RCs. Yet the governor stands there as the senior representative of the Kabul Government. He does NOT stand there as the representative of the Province he serves in.
The parliment is toothless and ineffective by both tradition and the Constitution.
The governance at the Provincial level (where you are going to win or lose) is a shake with no foundation and several forces working against that stability. That a governor can be removed on a whim (or allowed to stay against the wishes of the population) just defeats so many basic principles as to be laughable.
The Afghan population can be won. But the current guise of the IGoA is one that I believe will never be supported by the population as a whole.
The Sherzai fiasco really burned our bridges in the South and I think our current troubles in the past few years can be more directly linked to that act of stupidity than any other.
Structure, systems
Sylvan:
Well, that's the $64 Billion issue.
What structure is going to work (and have to be created) for a real and viable Afghanistan?
As a planner, I watch these mounting projects to pave streets, as an example. Anybody in the planning business knows that if you pave a road, you better make sure the sub-base is secure, or you will be re-building it within three years. Even with that, you have to start maintenance right away, do serious crack-filling in five years, and repave every 20 (assuming quality construction and maintenance).
What possible productive purpose could result from paving a road? Short-term road crew work. Lots of contract graft. Lots of action and ego.
How is this thing going to be maintained, and by who?
Among competing priorities that could actually make these people's lives better, was this a wise use of resources?
Without structure and systems (especially a viable economic and revenue system), these types of projects add little to know value. We measure our successes based on western input metrics, but can't understand why there are no eastern outputs.
Afghanistan needs, as a minimum, a very much more complex, realistic, and historically-grounded approach to governance, and not a US Governance Textbook 101 approach. When does that discussion start?
As an aside and not to intrude on a good conversation but
we had a civilian Agency that did development well and cooperated well with DoD elements -- it was founded to do just that following on to the earlier Marshall Plan, FOA and ICA organizations.
US Aid.
Unfortunately, it got subsumed into State under the Clinton administration and destroyed because it was often too good at what it did and was sucking budget dollars away from State. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the really rather effective US Information Agency were likewise emasculated at about the same time for pretty much the same reason. Madeleine Albright has a lot to answer for...
The required fix is to reconstitute US Aid and USIA as separate agencies and adequately fund 'em. Realistically, that's unlikely to happen for several reasons -- not least the venality of Congress. So, we're stuck in Neverland.
We now return to our regularly scheduled program...
It starts when diplomacy is tempered by experience outside the embassy set.
AKA, never.
What diplomat is going to tell a senior official, "Oh, btw, your constitution sucks." Especially when it was largely our dumb butts who helped them craft it.
Last edited by Sylvan; 03-30-2010 at 10:52 PM. Reason: forgot something.
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