Afghanistan ROE Change

[slapout9]

Going to play devil's advocate here -

Is it always necessary to pursue and finish the fight, usually ending w/ a bomb?

I was in a firefight once, had insurgents in a house. Wounded one of my guys. Decided to charge in after supression, got one of my guys killed and another wounded. Wound up bombing the house. Killed about half of a family next door too.

A few weeks later council member Tankersteve was in the same situation about a klick away. He surrounded the house until the insurgent gave up.

I'll pick his solution. I have seen it often where we resort to firepower when other, less lethal options, would do.

I'm not saying it's good for every case, but often our firepower has replaced the use of good tactics and innovative thinking to solve problems. As FM 3-24 says, "sometimes the best action is to do nothing". Keyword "sometimes".

Another way to think about it - should the cops level your house because criminals take refuge in it?

Just feeling contrary tonight.

Like I keep saying the most important TTP's for COIN are how LE handles situations.

Good Example from above. 1st your surround them and tell them to surrender just like TV, then gas them LE can do this but LOAC forbids this....dum.... change the law,then flashbang dynamic entry as a last resort. And you always have the option of a Tactical withdrawal. Often with better Intelligence about how to do something at another time and place for a better result.

But our Forces are not trained that way or equipped that way or have enough manpower to do this if they were trained and equipped to do this.

Good LE organizations are trained to be assertive NOT aggressive and they are trained to DE-escalate not Escalate. Soldiers are not generally trained that way.

We need a 5 pound grenade that can be dropped from 30,000 feet and hit just where we want it to.

[J Wolfsberger]

Along the lines Tom Odom and Cavguy have been following. The "terrain" of interest, where we win or lose, is the civilian population. The tactic of choice for AQ and the Taliban in this conflict is terror.

Does AQ/Taliban care whether they kill civilians or get us to do it for them? In fact, given the choice, wouldn't they deliberately structure the situation to force us to kill civilians?

[slapout9]

Sting Ball Grenades......ever try any of these?

http://192.139.188.71/index.asp?id1=125

[Blackjack]

Sting Ball Grenades......ever try any of these?

http://192.139.188.71/index.asp?id1=125

40mm Stingball

These could work too. You know, I come from an extremely agressive military culture that is not risk adverse. Even I can see the benefits of these LE tools applied to military operations.

LE does not by any means have all the answers, but they sure have the market cornered in LTL products and their application. Also, these sting balls would probably leave some serious welts. It could be a good way to identify suspected Taliban later on, and aprehend them. The exploding dye packs of the battlefield if you will.

[Cavguy]

I would love the ability to use non-lethal rounds.

When I was last in Iraq 2006-2007 we were prohibited from using them by the lawyers. The legal reasoning was that sometimes these rounds can kill. Therefore, you can only use them in situations where you would have justification to use lethal force. In said situation, better to use the lethal force than use a non-lethal round that accidentally kills.

I didn't agree then and don't now, but that was the reasoning. Love the lawyers.

[jmm99]

The legal advice is exactly on point given the ROEs that were in effect. The lawyer was protecting you from a possible manslaughter charge.

I'd prefer ROEs that would leave decisions like that to the field commander (you). Then I could say that your legal options are A, B and C. Which one you select is a military decision, not a legal decision.

But, as you have already said, field commanders were calling in too much heavy stuff; so, top-down ironclad rules are laid down which try to fit everything into neat little boxes.

[slapout9]

Now you guys understand why LE feels the way we do about lawyers
Soldiers should be looking at counter lawsuits because they were denied appropriate capabilities to do there job thus having to escalate to deadly force.

Dye marking has a lot of potential, there are a lot of options with stuff like that

Also I would want lots of snipers (precision guided bullets) and the surveillance ability they have.

Also need the ability to take of your uniform OFF and grow some HAIR like plain clothes officers. If you have to blend with the environment and the environment is the people......You know real camouflage.

Which you know..... we keep talking about a new kind of warfare,hybrid,4GW,etc. but nobody is looking at the RULE set we force our military to fight under that could be changed to help level the field some.

[J Wolfsberger]

... precision guided bullets...

We could do that.

What's your budget?

[carl]

Also need the ability to take of your uniform OFF and grow some HAIR like plain clothes officers. If you have to blend with the environment and the environment is the people......You know real camouflage.

That sounds like what Frank Kitson did in Kenya long ago.

[jcustis]

Sting Ball Grenades......ever try any of these?

http://192.139.188.71/index.asp?id1=125

Haha..they hurt...a lot .

[jcustis]

Haha..they hurt...a lot .

so, top-down ironclad rules are laid down which try to fit everything into neat little boxes.

I don't view ROE as ironclad, nor do I view them aa restrictive. Fail to train your troops properly in their execution, and they can be. For the most part they are permissive from my experience.

I will admit that in my prearation for three deployments in support of OIF, the option of fixing, cordoning, and waiting out has NEVER been discussed, trained to, or published as a potential solution.

That commanders have employed it as a tool in the toolbox is a testament to that individual's ability to think on their feet, becauseI for sure haven't seen it ever as a bullet on a training slide. I can't speak for the JRTCs, however.

[Dayuhan]

Given the extensive and negative publicity that has been drawn by actual or alleged civilian casualties from air strikes, and given the very public nature of the announcement under discussion here, is it possible that the announcement is aimed less at altering the tactical environment on the ground than at creating or reinforcing a perception of a shift away from the use of air power in environments where civilian casualties are likely?

I have no doubt that Gen. McChrystal wants and intends to reduce collateral damage, but I'm sure he also wants everyone in the picture to be aware of this intention. When a change like this is announced in the mass media before the new rule is even released, it suggests to me that there's a strong "for popular consumption" factor in the picture.

I would certainly agree with those here who point out that if the JDAM is option A and running away is option Z, consideration needs to be given to the options in between - with full awareness that options are restricted by circumstances.

[Uboat509]

IF this is what it appears to be, then it looks to me like another case of "Some are abusing it so we will deny it to everyone." Maybe it's just me, but I hate taking proven tools out of my toolbox. This particular tool probably has been abused and greater controls over its use are probably warranted, but outright removing it doesn't seem like a good idea. CavGuy's scenario is a great one, IF you have the time and IF you have the resources and manpower and IF you can control the terrain. It is definitely a tool to keep in the box but that doesn't mean it will always be the right tool. It also doesn't mean that assaulting the building or even striking it with indirect or CAS is always the wrong answer.

Again, we don't know what the full ROE will be but Ken is right, IF we create areas where our troops are reluctant to engage the enemy for fear of creating civilian casualties then we can virtually grantee that the enemy will be there.

SFC W

[Rank amateur]

Lots of intelligent comments. When you're being population centric, there really is no rush. The population was there in 2001. They'll be there in 2021. It really doesn't matter if the enemy occupies the village today, tomorrow or next week. It only matters whether the enemy is able to reoccupy the village after you guys have cleared it.

As an ad guy, if I were selling the new ROE to the boots on the ground I would say in this one specific situation, if it is safe to do so, treat it as a hostage situation and not a firefight. Part of the safety, of course, is making sure you're not setting yourself up to be ambushed by the hostage takers colleagues. (I don't know the buzzwords for that. "Establish, secure defensible, oversight positions?")

As to the fact this may encourage human shields. Perhaps that's a good thing. people don't like being taken hostage. They don't like their hostage takers. They like their rescuers. After the hostages are rescued, the takers almost always face justice.

[Tom Odom]

My points are that:

- McChrystal should not have to change the rules at any level. We have been in Afghanistan for Seven years and seven months, for chissakes -- or more correctly for seven plus one year or less tours -- that he has to do so is an indicator of institutional failure. The institution really needs to acknowledge that.

- The 'change' as understood thus far is cosmetic -- it attacks the symptom, not the problem. I do not question the need for him to do that; I do strongly question WHY he should have to do that. I also question whether it will achieve his apparent goal though I acknowledge it will temporarily assuage some Afghans.

- Johnny can't think for himself because he belongs to an organization that goes to great lengths to discourage such activity in very subtle ways and allows malfeasance and incompetence to survive as compensation. That is indicative of flawed personnel policies, less than competent professional education and a dangerously skewed value system.

Those things need to be fixed. New rules in one theater will not fix them -- nor, given the pervasiveness of those ills, are said new rules likely to have the desired effect.

Ken

Well said and I agree with all but would say in a case where the alligators have us by the ass we need to pass on draining the swamp. McChrystal has got to start somewhere, quickly.

Best
Tom

[Old Eagle]

I'd like to see exactly what the forthcoming guidance says in detail. Anyone who knows SAM might have a difficult time imagining him issuing a "runaway! runaway!" order.
To a certain extent, we're all commenting on something that hasn't been finalized.

@jw -- based on anecdotal evidence from the Sons of Iraq, Swat Valley, etc., it appears that when the bad guys get abusive, there is pushback from the local population. IMHO, if the balance of violence tips significantly against the Taliban, we will have an opportunity to exploit it. (Keeping in mind that if the central gov't, ANP and other forces of order don't get their acts together, it won't make much difference.)

[Cavguy]

Along the lines Tom Odom and Cavguy have been following. The "terrain" of interest, where we win or lose, is the civilian population. The tactic of choice for AQ and the Taliban in this conflict is terror.

Does AQ/Taliban care whether they kill civilians or get us to do it for them? In fact, given the choice, wouldn't they deliberately structure the situation to force us to kill civilians?

Last fall I was at a training event and a former MARSOC member told me a story along the following lines (can't remember all the details):

Afghanistan, 2007 (ish). MARSOC unit is participating in cordon of several villages in Afghanistan during an operation. Intelligence intercepts confirm that the AQ/Talib in the area plan to engage the overwatch position as soon as the procession gets close. It would then be filmed and used to illustrate Americans attacking peaceful civilians. Suddenly a funeral party emerges from the town, casket an all, headed directly for the Marines' position. As the procession emerges, the Marines send a rep forward to tell the procession they can't proceed. They protest it is a funeral and they must. The marines then offer them a separate route to the local cemetery not crossing their over watch position, but are told they cannot come that way. The villagers return to the village and do not re-emerge. Later, intelligence sources report frustration the Taliban were unable to provoke an incident.

So yes, he absolutely wants to create these "no-win" situations, knowing, as Slap indicated, we tend to escalate rather than de-escalate.

Niel

[Steve Blair]

So yes, he absolutely wants to create these "no-win" situations, knowing, as Slap indicated, we tend to escalate rather than de-escalate.

Niel

Which makes total sense from their perspective. VC/NVA elements used to do that quite often in Vietnam. Fire from village at passing US patrol, knowing full well that the US grunts would call in fire support. Then fade away and let the village get plastered.

[Ken White]

Does AQ/Taliban care whether they kill civilians or get us to do it for them? In fact, given the choice, wouldn't they deliberately structure the situation to force us to kill civilians?

Excellent question -- and I submit they'll try and thereby dissuade us from action on occasion. However, as Old Eagle pointed out and I said earlier:"Could be conjecture; could be a ploy, could be a misstatement of intent (accidental or deliberate). We'll have to wait and see..."

Tom:

Ken, I will disagree with you on this one.

We can disagree, that's okay -- but just as a point of interest, here are the two points I made:

"...Me, too. I'll give it a month or two before it quietly disappears. Not a smart move on several levels... "

"...I suspect the civilians who are nominally innocent will get more visitation by various bad guys and said civilians will not really appreciate the extra attention (nor will they be happy that a small source of income, claiming non-existent casualties, has been removed)."

Note I said not smart on several levels -- not that it was wrong -- and the only level I spelled out was the second quoted paragraph above. Do you disagree with that? What are your other disagreements? (my other concerns are below)

You also said that Blackjack putting it in terms of running away, etc. etc. -- the way I took what he said was that message could be sent to the local populace if it appears you're unwilling to fight.

Wilf said:

"No one should intend to kill civilians, but rewarding the use of human shields may well come home to rest in ways those advocating it, cannot yet see."

To my mind that's the gist of this; the thread has been mutated into a COIN best practice tutorial and I don't think anyone is questioning what best practice is -- and killing ANY excess civilians -- even 1, une, ee, fagat yek, hannah, ichi, mot, ein, uno solamente -- is to be avoided. Tactical efforts to preclude harm to civilians should be constant, no question. I see no one above disputing that.

That's not the issue -- the issue is the possible guidance which none of us has apparently seen and its potential effect on the effort of units in Afghanistan. I specifically raised the issue of second order effects and unintended consequences. I have seen such orders before and have seen them fail and be allowed to die, unenforced. The problem: As Cav Guy said, the US Army habitually significantly overreacts to every order...

The Afghan attitude toward fighting differs from the Arab attitude. What effect will the order have on the population it is designed to aid?

I go back to Wilf's comment: ""...rewarding the use of human shields may well come home to rest in ways those advocating it, cannot yet see.""

We need to see the order but when we do whatever we say will have little to no effect -- however, the issue to me is the tone of the order and potential adverse effects; the positive effects and the possible need go without saying. With a kid likely to be there again soon, I got one a them there vested int'rests...

Oh and Tom, on this

This has been overdue and we have been dancing with the effects for several years now.

I have to ask WHY have we been dancing with a problem like that -- and it is one -- for several years; why has it not been fixed before this?

I know the answer and it's not pretty and that really needs to be fixed. I doubt this order will fix it, it is attacking the symptom...

That said, I understand that need, really do -- but rather than "this," I would have greatly preferred better training. That would have, should have, meant no need for "this."

[Tom Odom]

Tom:We can disagree, that's okay -- but just as a point of interest, here are the two points I made:

"...Me, too. I'll give it a month or two before it quietly disappears. Not a smart move on several levels... "

That is where my disagreement comes in--it was a necessary move and one that we have needed to make for the past few years. It is not being done in a vacum; McChrystal's manning plan to improve command consistency should help in its execution.

You also said that Blackjack putting it in terms of running away, etc. etc. -- the way I took what he said was that message could be sent to the local populace if it appears you're unwilling to fight.

Blackjack used the term flee; that means running. How the population takes such a change depends on what you do. CAV offered a scenario that did not kill civilians nor did it allow the bad guys to escape.

Oh and Tom, on this I have to ask WHY have we been dancing with a problem like that -- and it is one -- for several years; why has it not been fixed before this?

I know the answer and it's not pretty and that really needs to be fixed. I doubt this order will fix it, it is attacking the symptom...

That said, I understand that need, really do -- but rather than "this," I would have greatly preferred better training. That would have, should have, meant no need for "this."

I would agree that better training would greatly help. I also believe that a command level directive was and is necessary as a rudder shift. That seems to be what McChrystal has in mind. Whether the shift lasts or slowly dies remains to be seen.

Tom