The Warden Collection (merged thread)

[Marc]

Marc-

I disagree. In our system of government the politicians ARE the strategists- that is the problem that Ken was pointing out.

Agree that we as the military must strive to recommend strategies that alleviate this - that is why Warden argues for airpower to make wars faster/less bloody.

V/R,

Cliff

Cliff,

Then we know exactly where we disagree. Democratic politicians ARE NOT strategists (maybe they should be, but they are not). I can recommend two books on the subject:

Dick Morris "Power Plays: Win or Loose - How History's Great Political Leaders Play the Game." (especially Chapter Six: Mobilizing the Nation in Times of Crisis)

and

Erik Claessen "Stalemate: An Anatomy of Conflicts between Democracies Islamists and Muslim Autocrats".

Expecting politicians to take up the role of strategist is a short route to disappointment.

[Entropy]

Interesting discussion so far.

I think the first point I would make is to suggest that a one-size-fits all methodology that biases toward one particular element of national power is, at best, inadequate.

Secondly, a primary problem with airpower-centric solutions is what do you do when you strike all the targets on your prioritized target list and the effects are not achieved? The inevitable temptation is to go further down the PTL into tertiary targets and start hitting everything - hence you get the Israeli's striking an empty Hezbollah office in a populated multi-story building which does nothing to Hezbollah and is ultimately counterproductive. In short, how does one tell when the strategy has failed? In an environment where political concerns limit the use of ground forces, both politicians and the air forces are going to want to "keep going" and hope for some kind of success.

So, ironically, one of air power's great advantages is also a disadvantage.

[Marc]

In short, how does one tell when the strategy has failed?

Good point, and an important test for every strategy. Hitler's strategy failed in 1942 (Stalingrad and El Alamein), but he needed three more years to understand it. Are we smarter?

[pvebber]

Cliff, thanks trying to penetrate my thick seawater soaked brain!

I’ll try to give some specific responses as I get the chance. Some general philosophical differences we seem to be having:

The “why wouldn’t you want” argument. Your interpretation of Warden seems to be “given Warden might be right, why wouldn’t you want that to be the case”? This is a an increasing spillover from political debate to defense debate that I find very troubling. If you didn’t have to “choose 2” between quick, cheap and effective why wouldn’t you? Well because there are these things called the Laws of Physics and Economics… I don’t want to minimize your good arguments by painting them with that broad brush, but a warning from the school of hard knocks

The “if it’s necessary, why not aim for sufficient”? A variation on the above that I think is at the heart of what many find off-putting to Warden’s arguments. For a Navy guy I’m considered almost an airpower heretic. I have probably read more Airpower doctrine and concepts than I’ve read Navy doctrine and concepts (of course there is so much MORE of it…shame on my Navy brethren for their paucity of operational thought…). I have some rather radical notions of Air-Sea Battle that get at changing how we think about “Fleet Power” (or more broadly to the Air-Sea partnership “Expeditionary power”). I just don’t see what the problem is that makes “airpower is necessary AND sufficient to achieve strategic ends” a desirable goal?

Definition of “strategy”. I have a copy of Military Strategy by Wylie on my desk. I find it the most personally influential single source on the subject. Its purpose is stated as :

“One purpose of this book is to try and demonstrate that it is possible to study warfare, and be both fundamental and practical about it, without dissecting a battle or counting bullets or tracing the route of the nth division on a large scale map. What is necessary is that the whole of the thin, all of war, be studied. The fragments of war, the minor parts of strategy, the details of tactics are quite literally infinite. We know from the hard experiences of the physical and social sciences that if the parts are not ordered in some prior way, are not held up to some broad concept, all we can do is remain the prisoner of raw data.”

So I am receptive to the notion of transcending ‘battle’ as a concept but leery of Wardens desire to “replace it” with some as yet undisclosed ‘vocabulary”. This could just be semantics, but there is a difference to between eliminating the notion of battle, and getting beyond it to understand concepts at a higher level of abstraction.

Wylies preferred definition of Strategy is:

"A plan of action designed in order to achieve some end; a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment”.

Note that it places ends first, and “war” and “means” do not appear in this definition. Also, as someone previously stated, it is something that transcends the purview of the military.

So two issues of definition: First is the apparent assumption Warden makes that the airpower strategist should formulate the ends. This is argued from a “why wouldn’t you want” point of view rather than acknowledging that at least some, if not most of the time, the desired end state is given to the military strategist by politicians, war being the “extension of politics by other means”. So there is an implied control over the end state in Wardens definition of strategy that is desireable but unrealistic.

Second, while Warden argues that means should be left out of the discussion, the fact that “airpower” is invoked implies means. It seems he wants to have it both ways, he wants strategy to be elevated beyond means to the realm of ideas, just so long as those are AIRPOWER relate ideas.

He almost makes the reduction absurdum jump, but pauses at the brink in his historical discussion about unlimited mobility changing the nature of land power and battles. Lets replace “airpower” with “transporterpower”. Taken to the extreme his argument appears to be that the ultimate form of strategy would be to think in terms of “beaming effector things instantly wherever you wanted”.

When you want to compel an adversary to do your bidding, you analyze his “system” you create a set of exactly appropriate “effectors” and you simultaneously “beam” them into precise locations in his system to so that the adversary is compelled to do what you say. If your method of compulsion is to “collapse his system” then that would be possible. The problem is, as we saw in Iraq, does “collapsing his system” actual get you to a desirable end state? If you only partially collapse the system, how do you know that your “pulse of power” is going to exceed the tipping point of coercion and not just piss the adversary off and cause an undesired vertical or horizontal escalation? This gets to teh unrealistic assumptions behind the "parallel is always cheaper" argument - a problme of not knowing what you don't know, not of "well 5 is cheaper than 6 is cheapre than 9". How do know to pick 5 for your only pulse of power?Where is the “theory of action” that actually links the “transport plan” to desirable strategic end states other than “collapse” or “paralysis”?


The “what alternative do we have” argument. Thanks for pointing out I grabbed an old JP 3-0. The newer one brings up the idea of “design”. I knew there are many that think the ideas of design are implicit in good operational art. I tend to agree, but to the extent it helps folks understand good operational art, the design metaphor has value as an alternative to overpromising on the limits of planning.

I would say to those who say “he doesn’t really mean to be as wedded to prediction and determinism as you make it sound”; if that is true than he should avoid making statements like: “It also opens another very exciting possibility: conflict with little or no unplanned destruction or shedding of blood.”

Positing that as a “possibility” is only possible if one assumes a level of predictability about the future that is known to be unattainable.

More later...

[slapout9]

Still busy, but pvebber instead of "battle" think Ambush or as the Army says create an "Overmatch" or a "Mismatch" between weapons systems or tactics. That is what he means by avoiding "Battle" or equal forces fighting each other.


Also, "bloodless" means killing who you want to kill..... but only those that you want to kill. Precision killing if you will. To make it current instead of a No-Fly Zones we should create a "No Qaddafi Zone"! Instant,precise vaporization of the problem child and his strange offspring


Gotta Go!

[pvebber]

Note the focus on forces in the above paragraphs- that is what Warden is arguing against. Additionally, I would say that joint doctrine is not always (or even often) neccessarily followed. Additionally, the JFC is normally an Army commander, and the Army doctrine is very force centric.

Joint doctrine is written from the operational level point of view - that of orchestrating ways and means to achive an end that is often (usually?) given. Some of Warden's fire appears to be aimed to bypassing the operational level and linking tactical action to strategic ends. The reference to force is about means in the strategic construct of "ends, ways, means". Do you think when he talks of "battle" that is really about the need to orchestrate ways and means against the adversary ways and means (ie the campaign?) and just skip to tactical action for strategic purpose?

If part of the solution Warden is proposing is to "chang ethe vocabulary" that comes by changing doctrine. Whether we follow it is immaterial, it is the source of "vocabularly" for any discussion.

The Army is only the JFC for land campaigns. With the exception of Iraq and Afghanistan, I think just about all the other CJTFs are Navy or Air Force?

Current doctrine in general tends to be "force centric becuase its aabout employinghte means we currently have.

It have been better for me to have invoked Joint concepts instead of Joint doctrine?

Again, Warden isn't saying that land or naval power won't work, or can't help- he is saying that airpower can be more effective in many situations. The fact that airpower can work doesn't mean that land or seapower can't.

Warden's argument seems to be that airpower alone has the ability to attack multiple CoGs in Parallel.

"Only within the last 75 years has airpower made it possible to attack multiple centers if gravity in parallel. Can there be any question that we desperately need to rethink war?"

One argue that seapower has had the ability to attack multiple CoGs for considerably longer than that, it depends on what you consider a CoG. We may well have been able to starve japan into submission in WWII had more attention been played to strangling her SLOCS rather than incinerating population centers (er, strategic sources of wartime labor).

Airpower is unable to reach many CoGs in the required capacity without seapower, so one could make many of the same arguments with seapower rather than airpower as the "effector of greatest economy".

Similarly, there are CoGs that you can't appropriately affect by breaking and instead requires a human being on the ground to appropriately influence. Airpower can't have tea with a tribal elder and convince him to plant alfalfa instead of poppys.

The arguments Warden makes are necessary ones, but the zeal to make them also sufficient to all cases is what rankles parochial hackles.

Warden argues that strategy should start at ends, then work backwards. The Joint Ops Planning Process starts at the ends and theoretically works backwards.

So what is he arguing with. He's won that battle! Why harp on it so much in the paper? IF its about Iraq and Afghanistan, well those were political wars whose ends were political animals that evolved over time for political reasons. Its almost like Warden is arguing that we should only fight wars that fall into the category he is himself defining. Sorry but military folk do get to put constraints on politicians in this country. And war is not always a matte of choice. The adversary gets a vote, and will endeavor to orchestrate situations that are outside Wardens' nice tidy "war box".

We are already so dominant militarily that there are only a handful of potential military rivals who would take us on militarily and in many cases the militaries of those countries are essentially "sacrifical anodes" that will be sacrificed on the alter of puplic spectacle for the express purpose of NOT letting us fight Wardens sort of sterile, bloodless war.

Warden would say that control drives us to strive for decisive battle to seize control of terrain, when we might be able to achieve our objectives by influencing the enemy's will. Subtle differences, but Warden is saying that attrition and battle are a part of our basic mentality in the US military.

The requirement to establish control and provide order to a state after we "Collapse it" is arequirement of international law. We can't just "break" a country, and then point our finger like Ming the Merciless and chide for their impertanane not giving us what we want. As we have seen in Iraq, the other side may decide to "collapse" on a schedule other than the one we plan for just to leave us in a quagmire and transition the battle to an irregualr playfield. Again Warden seems to imply a degree of predictability (you need predicatability in to to plan to the level Warden implies) than is possible.

It is not control that drives us to battle, but competition with the adversary. Warden ascribes to airpower (as many airpower theorists have done) an irresitibility to airpower. Based on what does airpower get to magically avoid enemy attempts to stop it? Last time I checked we did not transpporter bombs and despite the desire to avoid talking 'means' airplanes and missiles, though fast, are still requred to transit through increasingly capacble IADS systems and deal with adversary elements of airpower. Most consider those encouners to be "battles" and they can't be wished away.

In other words, the COA is developed based on the enemy forces expected actions. Again, the Army tends to drive most joint planning because they are most of the people involved.

Agin this is becasue of the pesky reality that the adversary has a strategy, and ways and means that are used to oppose us. When you have means, and the other guy has means, they will bump into each other in the execution of strategy. Despite the desire for immunity, airpower for the foresable future must engage in battles with enemy airpower just llike seapower and land power must.

Service drivers to palnning is very AOR specific. The Navy dominates PAC AOR planning.

True. Humans are complex. But you can still determine ways to affect them.

But how they will respond is unpredictable. For a test case, tell your wife that you are going use Warden's strategy to get here to do what you want.

Then again... don't

more later...

[slapout9]

Joint doctrine is written from the operational level point of view - that of orchestrating ways and means to achive an end that is often (usually?) given.

pvebber, Warden doesn't believe in Joint Warfare as in everybody gets a piece of the pie. He believes in the designation of a "Key Force" similar to what the Marines believe in Maneuver Warfare, the designation of the "Main Effort".

[Cliff]

The “why wouldn’t you want” argument. Your interpretation of Warden seems to be “given Warden might be right, why wouldn’t you want that to be the case”? This is a an increasing spillover from political debate to defense debate that I find very troubling. If you didn’t have to “choose 2” between quick, cheap and effective why wouldn’t you? Well because there are these things called the Laws of Physics and Economics… I don’t want to minimize your good arguments by painting them with that broad brush, but a warning from the school of hard knocks

Agree that it is difficult... Warden's arguing to keep trying, though. Reality right now is effective and quick are possible but cheap the USG doesn't seem to be able to do. It will be very interesting to see what happens with the USAF's new Long Range Strike systems, as they are supposed to be affordable based on limiting requirements.

The “if it’s necessary, why not aim for sufficient”? A variation on the above that I think is at the heart of what many find off-putting to Warden’s arguments. For a Navy guy I’m considered almost an airpower heretic. I have probably read more Airpower doctrine and concepts than I’ve read Navy doctrine and concepts (of course there is so much MORE of it…shame on my Navy brethren for their paucity of operational thought…). I have some rather radical notions of Air-Sea Battle that get at changing how we think about “Fleet Power” (or more broadly to the Air-Sea partnership “Expeditionary power”). I just don’t see what the problem is that makes “airpower is necessary AND sufficient to achieve strategic ends” a desirable goal?

My Navy bro keeps telling us how the Navy doesn't have a lot of doctrine or planning processes... the contrast with the Army doctrine taught at CGSC is impressive from what he says. Air-Sea Battle will be very interesting... and I think it will involve a lot of airpower - which again is NOT (necessarily) Air Force. By Warden's definition, the Aegis is an airpower system, since it has the ability to control the air.

So I am receptive to the notion of transcending ‘battle’ as a concept but leery of Wardens desire to “replace it” with some as yet undisclosed ‘vocabulary”. This could just be semantics, but there is a difference to between eliminating the notion of battle, and getting beyond it to understand concepts at a higher level of abstraction.

A lot of discussion would probably be neccessary... and I agree that the heart of the matter is getting to the higher levels.

Wylies preferred definition of Strategy is... Note that it places ends first, and “war” and “means” do not appear in this definition. Also, as someone previously stated, it is something that transcends the purview of the military.

I think that someone was me. Although I must admit that Ken said it first. Right or wrong, the politicians own the grand/national strategy level.

So two issues of definition: First is the apparent assumption Warden makes that the airpower strategist should formulate the ends. This is argued from a “why wouldn’t you want” point of view rather than acknowledging that at least some, if not most of the time, the desired end state is given to the military strategist by politicians, war being the “extension of politics by other means”. So there is an implied control over the end state in Wardens definition of strategy that is desirable but unrealistic.

Hmm, this isn't the way I read it. He says that we must decide what we want the future to look like... but I don't see where the "we" has to be an airpower person. I agree that it will come from higher - I think the point is that once the end state is known, we should work backwards from there.

Second, while Warden argues that means should be left out of the discussion, the fact that “airpower” is invoked implies means. It seems he wants to have it both ways, he wants strategy to be elevated beyond means to the realm of ideas, just so long as those are AIRPOWER relate ideas.

Hmm. I think that is not the point... the point is that if we start with ends first, we likely will end up selecting airpower much more often than we have in the past:

This methodology allows us to select the most appropriate centers of gravity and then apply airpower (if appropriate) to produce direct strategic results. It

Obviously Warden is an airpower advocate, and as I have pointed out this article is aimed at folks who are involved in airpower. So yes, it is advocating increased use of airpower. But I think we need to take Warden at his word - he admits that airpower may not be used in all cases - but is asking that airpower professionals should keep working to make it more effective.

He almost makes the reduction absurdum jump, but pauses at the brink in his historical discussion about unlimited mobility changing the nature of land power and battles. Lets replace “airpower” with “transporterpower”. Taken to the extreme his argument appears to be that the ultimate form of strategy would be to think in terms of “beaming effector things instantly wherever you wanted”.

Yes, he is arguing that increased mobility increases effectiveness.

When you want to compel an adversary to do your bidding, you analyze his “system” you create a set of exactly appropriate “effectors” and you simultaneously “beam” them into precise locations in his system to so that the adversary is compelled to do what you say. If your method of compulsion is to “collapse his system” then that would be possible. The problem is, as we saw in Iraq, does “collapsing his system” actual get you to a desirable end state? If you only partially collapse the system, how do you know that your “pulse of power” is going to exceed the tipping point of coercion and not just piss the adversary off and cause an undesired vertical or horizontal escalation? This gets to the unrealistic assumptions behind the "parallel is always cheaper" argument - a problem of not knowing what you don't know, not of "well 5 is cheaper than 6 is cheapre than 9". How do know to pick 5 for your only pulse of power?Where is the “theory of action” that actually links the “transport plan” to desirable strategic end states other than “collapse” or “paralysis”?

Everyone is focusing too much on the kinetic effects... which Warden is not:

Warden:

The strategic approach gives us the freedom to consider and mix every conceivable way to change a center of gravity—a bribe, an aerial bomb, a hack, a proxy, a conference, an award, assistance funding, or a thousand other possibilities.

The “what alternative do we have” argument. Thanks for pointing out I grabbed an old JP 3-0. The newer one brings up the idea of “design”. I knew there are many that think the ideas of design are implicit in good operational art. I tend to agree, but to the extent it helps folks understand good operational art, the design metaphor has value as an alternative to overpromising on the limits of planning.

Sorry, I am a nerd for pointing that out... only noticed because your excerpt had MOOTW, and I have had the MOOTW pounded out of me (so to speak) over the last year. Design is an Army concept that was all the rage about a year ago... my impression is that it is still important, but a little less emphasized. We had a few lessons on it at CGSC, but it wasn't emphasized. From FM 5-0, 26 Mar 10, page 3-7:

Three distinct elements collectively produce a design concept as depicted in figure 3-1. Together, they constitute an organizational learning methodology that corresponds to three basic questions that must be answered to produce an actionable design concept to guide detailed planning:
�� Framing the operational environment—what is the context in which design will be applied?
�� Framing the problem—what problem is the design intended to solve?
�� Considering operational approaches—what broad, general approach will solve the problem?

The interesting thing to me is that the problem frame and environmental frame are not all that different from the models used in EBO - a way of understanding a complex problem. It does not stress the casuality as much, but it is not as different as many think.

I would say to those who say “he doesn’t really mean to be as wedded to prediction and determinism as you make it sound”; if that is true than he should avoid making statements like: “It also opens another very exciting possibility: conflict with little or no unplanned destruction or shedding of blood.”

Positing that as a “possibility” is only possible if one assumes a level of predictability about the future that is known to be unattainable.

Again, Warden is saying that speeding you attack reduces the ability of the enemy to react, and thus makes him more predictable (see his figure 3).

In my opinion, Warden is talking about how to plan... we have to have a plan, and try to reduce even complex systems to something we humans can understand. We then need to try and affect those systems... but the fact that Warden advocates a certain plan doesn't mean that's the end of it... once the plan is executed, there will inevitably be changes made and adjustments based on the enemy.

V/R,

Cliff

[Ken White]

I realize everyone knows this but one item above hit a nerve. Speed and aggressiveness are needed at times and certainly have a place but they are not always beneficial. From Cliff:

Warden is saying that speeding you attack reduces the ability of the enemy to react, and thus makes him more predictable (see his figure 3).

Boyd said somewhat the same thing. Both were fighter pilots and both understood the laws of physics and aerodynamics. One's experience can color one's thinking in subtle ways...

Aircraft must react in rather predictable ways (I would never say Airmen -- and Soldiers, Sailors and Marines -- tend to also do that ) but people, units, governments are far less predictable and can even be erratic...

My observation has been that on both a tactical and strategic levels, and with respect to efforts in war and other than war, that statement is far from universally true. In fact, speedy action aimed at creating a set of reactions can fail in its intent due to a variety of circumstances, nor least failure to successfully achieve your aim. Politics can intrude and delay effects...

The other guy can interfere. A fair example is our old bete noir, Saddam. He told us what he was going to do; give weapons to all, release the prisoners from the jails and wage unrestricted guerrilla warfare. He gave Medals to two Russian Generals (who advised him to do that) and we completely ignored or missed all that even though our admittedly kinetic action was rapid. Shock and Awe it was not...

There is also nothing wrong with deliberately not being speedy to entice the competitor or opponent to overextend. Subadai did that repeatedly 800 years ago and he also at the time loosely controlled large Armies literally hundreds of miles apart (without GPS and Satcom, no video ). That doesn't mean it is a technique not still useful, particularly at the strategic level...

[slapout9]

pvebber, before we go any further is this where the idea came from that Warden believes that everything has to be knowable? Is this what you perceive as the the original argument?

Under these circumstances, morale was to the physical as three is to one. In fact, the physical was largely the "physical" of the individual soldier and it was almost impossible to separate the intangibles like morale, friction, and fog from the physical. Today the situation is significantly different; the individual fighter has become a director of large things like tanks, aircraft, artillery pieces, and ships. Fighters are dependent on these things, these physical things, to carry out the mission. Deprived of them, the ability to affect the enemy drops to near zero. Whether the equation has changed to make the physical to be to the morale as three is to one is not clear. That the two are at least coequal, however, seems likely. The advent of airpower and accurate weapons has made it possible to destroy the physical side of the enemy. This is not to say that morale, friction, and fog have all disappeared. It is to say, however, that we can now put them in a distinct category, separate from the physical. As a consequence, we can think broadly about war in the form of an equation:
(Physical) x (Morale) = Outcome

In today's world, strategic entities, be they an industrial state or a guerrilla organization, are heavily dependent on physical means. If the physical side of the equation can be driven close to zero, the best morale in the world is not going to produce a high number on the outcome side of the equation. Looking at this equation, we are struck by the fact that the physical side of the enemy is, in theory, perfectly knowable and predictable. Conversely, the morale side the human side is beyond the realm of the predictable in a particular situation because humans are so different from each other. Our war efforts, therefore, should be directed primarily at the physical side.

copied from "The Enemy as a System" by Colonel John Warden

[Ken White]

However, I think it's important to emphasize this item of which you are both aware. It's from Slap's Warden quote:

"...we are struck by the fact that the physical side of the enemy is, in theory, perfectly knowable and predictable..."

Not to take that out of context, I agree with the statement as well as what goes before and comes after. Warden's a smart guy. He uses the words "in theory."

Fighter Jocks are great folks. One of my best friends was once one, many good acquaintances are or were. However, most pilots suffer from two minor problems as war fighters (IMO, obviously...); they're conditioned to using checklists and what they do relies on knowledge and acceptance of the theory and laws of Physics. Problem with that is you cannot develop a checklist for people activity and war fighting is an art, not a science. A rather lawless art at that...

Back to the "in theory" bit. That's the rub -- theory and actuality often differ, intelligence is rarely adequate to the degree he envisions and that entails making assumptions. That's always dangerous and the Intel guys won't ordinarily do it, they're rather -- excessively, some say -- cautious that way.

That leaves the final stategery up to the decider -- who will decide based upon his gut feeling and his assumptions rather than on the precision that Warden's strategy demands for best execution. We have literally seen that in operation several times over the past ten (20 ? Back even unto DS/DS?) years when several decision makers had the power but not the knowledge to make decisions (and that in a system that strongly militates against disagreeing with the Boss).

Warden's theories have merit, his process is sensible in some situations. Neither his nor any other 'system' has the route to the always best solution. Nor is anyone likely to develop a better idea because, as he said: "Conversely, the morale side the human side is beyond the realm of the predictable in a particular situation because humans are so different from each other..." Totally true. Might work better if every 'implementer' (and every opponent...) was another Warden -- they have not been and will not be.

His follow on to that last quote: "Our war efforts, therefore, should be directed primarily at the physical side" goes circular -- we're back to needing quite accurate physical Intel. We've almost never had that and are even more unlikely to do so in the near future...

[pvebber]

we are struck by the fact that the physical side of the enemy is, in theory, perfectly knowable and predictable.

Yes that and several things in the Prometheus Process.

Also from "Battlefield of the future" Chap 4 on Airpower Theory for the 21st century (which contains a great many of the points in Warden's current article) looking from the other direction:

When we want more information, we pull out subsystems like electrical power under system essentials and show it as a five-ring system. We may have to make several more five-ring models to show successively lower electrical subsystems. We continue the process until we have sufficient understanding and information to act. Note that with this approach, we have little need for the infinite amount of information theoretically available on a strategic entity like a state. Instead, we can identify very quickly what we don’t know and concentrate our information search on relevant data.

Which indicates that while we don't need information about everything, relatively simple decomposition will provide all the information one might need. Getting to what Ken brings up, this is a very Newtonian, mechanistic view of the world, which only applies to a small subset of physical systems, like electrical grids.

[slapout9]

Getting to what Ken brings up, this is a very Newtonian, mechanistic view of the world, which only applies to a small subset of physical systems, like electrical grids.

Oh NoI should have known, you are one of those Quantum Physics guys. Till tomorrow.

[slapout9]

Especally with the Backward planning always using the worst case scenario quote you put up somewhere that I can no longer fine

Back to the "in theory" bit. That's the rub -- theory and actuality often differ, intelligence is rarely adequate to the degree he envisions and that entails making assumptions. That's always dangerous and the Intel guys won't ordinarily do it, they're rather -- excessively, some say -- cautious that way.

Ken, further down he also says this about modeling sounds like pvebber tag line.

The Five-Ring Model
To make the concept of an enemy system useful and understandable, we must make a simplified model. We all use models daily and we all understand that they do not mirror reality. They do, however, give us a comprehensible picture of a complex phenomenon so that we can do something with it. The best models at the strategic level are those that give us the simplest possible big picture. As we need more detail, we expand portions of our model so that we can see finer and finer detail. It is important, however, that in constructing our model and using it, we always start from the big and work to the small.

copied from "The Enemy as a System" by Colonel John Warden


I am beat..... you guys will just have to wait till tomorrow.

[Fuchs]

intelligence is rarely adequate

War is about breaking will - especially breaking the will of the opposing leaders. They're also known as government / cabinet / head of state. Intelligence on these should be available.

The Warden stuff and generally most U.S. air power strategy stuff is still conditioned by the WW2 trial and error story when the U.S.A.A.F. fought against governments with an unusually extreme determination and struggled to get its targeting right (ball bearings maybe? no, aircraft factories maybe? no, steel production maybe? no. Hey, targeting the fuel industry did the charm!).

The American way is too much about targeting and understanding targets. These strategies don't look enough at the leadership's character, which should be step #1.

For example, we didn't need a five rings or other method in 1999, but a Russian prime minister who told Milosevic that Russia will not intervene and some near-constant (and rather unacceptable) pressure on the government of Yugoslavia. The actual targeting did not decide about the outcome, or the duration of the conflict's hot phase - it was only decisive for the extent of material and human damages.

[pvebber]

We all use models daily and we all understand that they do not mirror reality. They do, however, give us a comprehensible picture of a complex phenomenon so that we can do something with it. The best models at the strategic level are those that give us the simplest possible big picture. As we need more detail, we expand portions of our model so that we can see finer and finer detail. It is important, however, that in constructing our model and using it, we always start from the big and work to the small.

This view represents a reductionist view that one can understand how a system works by dismantling its parts and isolating the causes and effects of each.

Not all systems are reducible in this way because of system-wide interactions that are lost when you isolate component systems. So there is fundamental disagreement about the viability of his "best" model description.

Oh NoI should have known, you are one of those Quantum Physics guys. Till tomorrow.

YEs, my GS series is actually 1310 "physicist"

I feel like we are refighting the Bohr-Einstein dabates over the nature of quantum mechanics or the Copenhagen vs Many Worlds interpretation arguments more recently.

[Cliff]

Fighter Jocks are great folks.

Aww, shucks... I didn't know you cared, Ken!

One of my best friends was once one, many good acquaintances are or were. However, most pilots suffer from two minor problems as war fighters (IMO, obviously...); they're conditioned to using checklists and what they do relies on knowledge and acceptance of the theory and laws of Physics. Problem with that is you cannot develop a checklist for people activity and war fighting is an art, not a science. A rather lawless art at that...

These are problems? Just kidding. I agree about the checklists. I also agree about the physics. Disagree about the people... at least where air-to-air folks like Warden (he was a FAC early on but finished up as a F-15C guy) are concerned. One of the awesome parts of air-to-air fighting is that you are constantly faced with a different problem precisely because the other guy is also trying his best to kill you. Good air-to-air pilots understand the human dimension and try to use it to their advantage. There's a good deal of art to it... Not to say that there aren't good TTPs, or that some folks don't use them like cookbooks. I think that's true in any military effort, though- TTPs exist as a starting point, and how far beyond them you get depends on how capable you are at progressing.

Back to the "in theory" bit. That's the rub -- theory and actuality often differ, intelligence is rarely adequate to the degree he envisions and that entails making assumptions. That's always dangerous and the Intel guys won't ordinarily do it, they're rather -- excessively, some say -- cautious that way.

Agree on the intel!

That leaves the final stategery up to the decider -- who will decide based upon his gut feeling and his assumptions rather than on the precision that Warden's strategy demands for best execution. We have literally seen that in operation several times over the past ten (20 ? Back even unto DS/DS?) years when several decision makers had the power but not the knowledge to make decisions (and that in a system that strongly militates against disagreeing with the Boss).

Valid, I think Warden would argue that we should work on this.

Warden's theories have merit, his process is sensible in some situations. Neither his nor any other 'system' has the route to the always best solution. Nor is anyone likely to develop a better idea because, as he said: "Conversely, the morale side the human side is beyond the realm of the predictable in a particular situation because humans are so different from each other..." Totally true. Might work better if every 'implementer' (and every opponent...) was another Warden -- they have not been and will not be.

Interesting point on the implementer mattering...

His follow on to that last quote: "Our war efforts, therefore, should be directed primarily at the physical side" goes circular -- we're back to needing quite accurate physical Intel. We've almost never had that and are even more unlikely to do so in the near future...

Good intel is a must. I still argue that knowing the end state you want to achieve should be the starting point... even if you can't know EXACTLY how to get there it is probably best to have a direction.

Good insight Ken, thanks.

V/R,

Cliff

[Ken White]

Aww, shucks... I didn't know you cared, Ken!

I duz -- but it's totally like play-tonic. Not to say you can't get the random kiss to make sure the ungodly are paying attention.

One of the awesome parts of air-to-air fighting is that you are constantly faced with a different problem precisely because the other guy is also trying his best to kill you. Good air-to-air pilots understand the human dimension and try to use it to their advantage. There's a good deal of art to it...

Unquestionably and most of you guys almost certainly do that one on one bit at altitude far better than would I. You even excel at the small groups in conflict thing. The problem I've noted is when multiple groups doing different things on the ground intrude in the air oriented bubble, things sometimes get connfoozed and much the skill set falls into the non productive (sometimes even mildly counterproductive... ) realm. Skill sets have specificity by definition.

I think that's true in any military effort, though- TTPs exist as a starting point, and how far beyond them you get depends on how capable you are at progressing.

Totally true. There are green suiters with skill sets not amenable to close combat or even generic land warfare. To include, regrettably, some in high places.

Interesting point on the implementer mattering...

That's really the only thing that is slightly more important than good or at least adequate Intel -- the wrong guy in the job will almost inevitably make flawed decisions. The Military personnel system with its strong tendency to make like Peas in the Pod militates (bad pun...) a median personna. Mediocrity is akin to median. We need round pegs for round holes -- you can put a square peg in a round hole but it's less than optimum and it'll be smaller than desirable...

Good intel is a must. I still argue that knowing the end state you want to achieve should be the starting point... even if you can't know EXACTLY how to get there it is probably best to have a direction.

And I certainly agree. I suspect Warden, Slap and pvebber can also agree. the issue then becomes which of us is the designated Elector of Directions...

The implementer, acting on the Intel available...

Be careful up there...

[Ken White]

Democratic politiciansARE NOT strategists (maybe they should be, but they are not).

Totally agree, even those with some military knowledge or experience have historically been poor as Politicians trying to influence the strategy of their Generals. Clemenceau who coined the ultimate Civilian control of the Military quip was poor at the task -- but he had enough sense to listen to his good Generals (and to know which were good)...

Expecting politicians to take up the role of strategist is a short route to disappointment.

While that is correct, the problem in a Democracy is that Politicians believe they must be seen as doing something. That the something they do is inept, inappropriate and does more harm than good is immaterial. They will meddle, they will screw things royally and only really good Flag Officers will keep them from doing too much damage. Unfortunately, in a system that rewards survival above all else, the number of really good Flag Officers isn't as high as it could or should be.

Regardless, with respect to your initial comment on the topic:

It is not the politician's job to deliver the political will needed for the application of a certain strategy. It is the strategist's job to develop a strategy within the limitations of his leadership's political will.

Most US politicians have little will for much other than getting reelected and have definite constraints on the amount of will they will be allowed to exert by the vagaries of Congress and party politics. Add the fact that to most US domestic political concerns far outweigh foreign policy concerns and you have a recipe for military power to be misapplied, misused and wasted by trying to do too little with too few.

While your approach is the way we have done it in this country since 1950 (and before on occasion), that does not mean that it is correct or even sensible. A quick look at recent history will show where that approach has placed us...

Thus this "...It is the strategist's job to develop a strategy within the limitations of his leadership's political will" is saying that the "strategist" should collude and shave points. That's illegal in sports -- and war is more important than any sport. Regardless, Franks did that, so to an extent did Westmoreland and there have been others. The issue should be whether or not that is in the interest of the nation.

[Marc]

While that is correct, the problem in a Democracy is that Politicians believe they must be seen as doing something. That the something they do is inept, inappropriate and does more harm than good is immaterial.

Ken,

True. The propensity to do something is an important cause of the difference between policy and strategy. We will probably see more of that in Libya soon.