John,

MG Dunlap speaks for himself and not the USAF. Do some in the USAF share his views? Yes, but many do not, particularly those who've done sandbox rotations in the last decade. Some of those people have written on how the Air Force can better support joint operations, but they don't seem to get the notice that MG Dunlap does. As Ken notes, MG Dunlap makes some valid points in his articles, but they are largely ignored in favor of his more controversial positions.

1. AF commitment to CAS is less than whole hearted.
There is some legitimate historical truth to that, but I don't think it applies at all today. Part of the conflict comes from differing viewpoints of how CAS is best provided. I think the Army has come around to the Air Force's view more than the reverse. I think the Air Force has proven that a low-slow aircraft using the Mk1 eyeball for targeting is not necessarily the best way to deliver CAS. One reason for the A-10C upgrade was that it was an inferior CAS platform in many situations because it lacked the capability to guide, deliver and integrate modern precision weaponry. It seems to me many critics of AF CAS don't understand that technology significantly changed CAS and the result is that platform matters a lot less than it used to.

I think we also need to consider training. Bad blood prevented the Air Force and Army from working together on CAS doctrine and training which resulted in poor operations in OEF and OIF. By contrast, the SoF forces, with embedded combat controllers who did a lot of training, performed CAS very well using bombers in the opening stages of OEF.

The fact is that despite what some detractors continue to claim, most USAF aircraft are capable CAS platforms. If we didn't have the A-10, we'd still be providing pretty decent CAS (note: I love the A-10 and don't want to see it go away - it serves important niches). So I think a lot of CAS detractors continue to live in an idealized past where CAS is platform dependent and I think they needlessly point to real or perceived wrongs by the USAF that occurred 20, 30, 40, 50 years ago that don't automatically apply today.

So, I don't think CAS is an issue today at all, based on the AAR's I've read over the past few years. I think most of the Army understands that the AF way of doing CAS, with precision weapons and sensors, is equally good if not better than the idealized vision of a CAS-only platform. In most cases, CAS is not a platform-dependent activity.

Who knows what will happen in the future and it's possible the Air Force will take a wrong turn with CAS, but I doubt it. Either way, we will find out and I, for one, will defend it as an important AF mission. I think the biggest factor will be training. Air-ground coordination is difficult and both services need to put the effort in to maintain, if not increase, the level of proficiency we have now.

2. The prevailing attitude within the AF is that air power alone can win wars.
Again, I think this is an historical anachronism. Undoubtedly there are some who believe that, but I think they are a minority. The AF does see it's role as very important, indeed critically important. A lot of ink is spilled debating what element of power is "decisive" or the most important in a particular campaign. I find most of those arguments silly. The fact is that the air, land and naval components are interdependent.

3. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that the AF was not being allowed to bring its full capability to bear in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.
You'll have to explain what you mean here and provide some evidence. "Full capability?" What does that mean?

3.a. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that civilian casualties aren't a negative factor, and may be a positive factor, in COIN.
Totally untrue. There is some hand wringing due to the fact that it's the Air Force that usually takes the blame when civilians are killed despite the fact that 99% of the time it's the land forces that ordered and authorized the strike. There have actually been times when the CAOC overruled the ground commander for fear of civilian casualties. As Cliff says, the AF takes "collateral" damage very seriously, probably too seriously in some cases. The Air Force understands that civilian casualties have a negative strategic effect and try to limit it as much as possible. His comment about lawyers is accurate.

4. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that the conflict in Iraq would have ended sooner if the AF had been allowed to inflict more damage and casualties.
This is something else you'll have to explain and provide some justification. First of all, which conflict? The MCO portion of OIF, or something later?

Ken,

Thus even though that was then and this is now, you, Entropy and a few others have to come 'round every few months and rise to the defense of that AF as it gets slammed for past transgressions, bad purchasing and equipping decisions and poor PR skills.
I defend the Air Force against attacks that I think are unwarranted. I think I've said a few times now how completely incompetent AF purchasing/procurement is, and we've both discussed and criticized the Air Force's defensiveness, lousy PR and inability to competently put forth its viewpoint on various matters. There are a lot of cultural and other problems in the Air Force that don't get discussed much because the same sheet of music gets played over and over. I'm not defending any of that, but what I believe are common misperceptions about the Air Force, particularly among Army personnel. Note John's bullet points above. They are all about perception and attitude. If I think the perception and attitude are wrong I'm going to speak up about it.

Let me give you another recent example about perceptions:

A couple of months ago on the INTELST forum a topic came up about this aircraft program. The immediate reaction was quite predictable - shock and anger about the Air Force trying to muscle in on the Army's territory by developing a manned tactical ISR system, one that can't even plug into the AF's big, expensive PED architecture! Everyone bought into their own preconceived notions about the Air Force and it's hidden agenda and thought it was a blatant ploy to grab airborne ISR away from the Army. After a day or two of this, the moderator comes on and tells the rest of the story, which I paraphrase here: This project was forced on the Air Force because the Army couldn't execute it on the SECDEF's timeline.

This is the kind of thing I see all the time Ken - a lot of assumption and jumping to conclusions based on bias and not evidence. The underlying subtext is that there is a hidden agenda at work. I don't think there's anything wrong in challenging those assumptions and what I see as false perceptions and I will continue to do so.