I left active duty in 2004 before the U.S. Army began its intensive focus on COIN techniques and theory. I’m not “trained” in counterinsurgency. I’ve never been to the Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence and I’ve never studied the theoretical luminaries at ILE or the Army War College. I have only my own reading and experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan on which to base my views.

I was part of the QRF that got the call when the initial stages of Operation Anaconda turned into one big FAIL. As a rifle PL, I played a small role in what became a combined arms effort to literally blast our way into Afghanistan's Shah-e-Kot Valley to put an end to the AQ/Taliban resistance there. It was a kinetic fight to the max (to the point that I couldn’t stand having planes fly over me for several years). Throughout that week, there was no thought given to COIN, nor should there have been. It was all about the basics--shooting, moving, and communicating. And aside from the normal combat snafus (like occasionally shooting at each other), we were pretty good at it.

But when I arrived on the outskirts of Hillah, Iraq a year later during the invasion, the situation was entirely different. It was still a kinetic fight—we were still massing forces, utilizing air power and artillery, and aiming to seize and hold ground—but suddenly there were civilians everywhere. To survive and thrive in environment, we had to take the approach espoused by Mr. Owen when he says:

Dead civilians are a political problem, not a moral one.
and

Regardless of the frequency you actually do it, Killing and Capturing, or gain advantage from it's threat, is still your primary function. It's what militaries do.
and

You do not need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win in COIN. Your actions should merely not needlessly create enemies, and you only need to protect those civilians relevant to the mission.
and
It is not armed social work, or summed up with silly expressions like "hearts and minds." It is a form of warfare.
It was all about the mission of “taking Hillah.” We were only concerned with the population insofar as they assisted or inhibited our mission. And that was it.

However, when we arrived in Baghdad a few days later, with tracers still lighting up the night sky, the whole dynamic changed again. 3ID and the Marines had already punched through the cities defenses and the Iraqi Army had dispersed, leaving us to deal with intermittent snipers, masses of looters, and the capture of weapons systems (like all the locked and loaded AAA still positioned throughout Dora). Within 48 hours of my arrival in the city, the physical enemy was no more. Even the sniper attacks stopped. Our enemy had suddenly become a lack of public services.

At this point, our mission transitioned into the one described by CPT Foley when he says:

It is armed social work, and that's the paradigm shift.
I’m sorry, but that’s true. While many of my own leaders didn’t realize it at the time, our mission had quickly become an effort to pacify the population by keeping them happy. Officially, we were tasked with going after Saddam’s HVTs, but those were wild goose chases for the most part. Our real mission was to fill the vacuum left by Saddam’s government—which we attempted to do. Our real mission was preventive.

When you’re in a situation like that, you have to place a priority on the following tasks: 1.) Treating other people as you would have them treat you, 2.) listening to what the locals are saying, 3.) responding to their concerns, 4.) understanding their backgrounds and motivations, 5.) showing genuine empathy for their plight, 6.) and, all the while, somehow maintaining your ability to fight with unparalleled viciousness, should the need arise. It not only keeps you alive, but it also furthers the completion of the mission—which has now become political.

In fact, for the next three months, no one in my battalion fired a weapon. I have a photo that shows a list written on a wall of all the jobs guys in my company did during that time—after we left Baghdad and moved north to Tal Afar. Here’s the list:

1. Infantryman
2. Police officer
3. Gas station attendant
4. Painter
5. Water delivery guy
6. Security guard
7. Repo man
8. Chauffeur
9. Public relations officer
10. Graffiti prevention and removal officer

In Tal Afar and throughout northwestern Iraq, we kept a lid on things. While central Iraq smoldered and grew more violent by the day, aside from one incident in July, the AO of the 101st Airborne Division--under Petraeus--was the safest in Iraq. We didn’t go looking for fights and we focused on being “Officer Friendly.” I spent an entire day helping to coordinate transportation for Iraqi college kids trying to get to Mosul to make up their missed finals. We helped troubleshoot a pump station. We started learning Arabic. I yelled at one of my soldiers for shoving an Iraqi kid. I had one of my NCOs discipline another for throwing a water bottle from a moving truck at some guy’s sheep. We helped set up local elections. We hired locals to feed us and we hired locals to translate for us.

And when an insurgent or terrorist finally killed two of our guys on July 19 on the highway between Mosul and Tal Afar, the people of Tal Afar came out and brought flowers to the front gate of our HQ in the city.

By October, however, the fighting that began in central Iraq was no longer contained to that area. It spread north and, like everyone else, we were sucked into the cycle of violence. Thus, by the time I left Iraq, I had come full circle. My time in combat ended on a street in Tal Afar as it had begun in Afghanistan—in an all-out shooting gallery between combatants.

What I took from this overall experience is that these are three distinct techniques for success that should be applied as necessary. There’s the conventional, kinetic aspect of war, there’s the combination of kinetic operations with civilians on the battlefield—in which COIN techniques must be utilized—and there’s the preventive COIN environment, in which you spend the bulk of your time trying to keep the locals happy and safe—where it is “armed social work” and where you do “need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win," despite what Mr. Owen argues.

So my main question, I guess, is why doesn’t the military think it can train its troops for all three? Do we not think troops are able to adapt? We had never been trained in the differences, yet when placed in those environments, my company—through fits and starts and mistakes—was able to adapt. Why is there this conflict between people like William F. Owen and CPT Foley? The ideas aren’t mutually exclusive. There's a time and a place for both mentalities.