The Helmand Province (merged thread, not UK or USMC)

[Bob's World]

"Clear-Hold-Build" is a fundamentally flawed concept.

It is like driving one's arm into a tub of water, and believing that the space their arm occupied will remain free of water once the arm is removed.

Until we get to a more intellectually honest appreciation about what insurgency is in general, and why insurgency exists in Afghanistan, we are unlikely to develop and adopt policies for foreign places that our military can actually enforce.

For the military, we defined this mission in the context of what we in the military do, and while that is a natural response of most institutions (USAID, State, DEA, and NGOs have done the same), it does not lead to an approach that is very helpful for Afghanistan getting to some degree of natural stability.

So long as the governance in Kabul (and at lower levels as well) is perceived as fundamentally illegitimate by many who live there (primarily those who had patronage power under the Taliban and now suffer under those who have it under the regime we put into power), there will be revolution.

So long as foreign forces occupy Helmand (and Afghan forces from the north operating in Helmand are perceived as being nearly as foreign as British and US forces operating there), there will be resistance.

This is natural. This is human nature. This is really not much about advancing some "Taliban" system of governance as the West envisions - but more about revolting against a system of governance the West imposed, and resisting those forces sent to enforce that il-formed policy decision.

[Bill Moore]

"Clear-Hold-Build" is a fundamentally flawed concept.

It is like driving one's arm into a tub of water, and believing that the space their arm occupied will remain free of water once the arm is removed.

Until we get to a more intellectually honest appreciation about what insurgency is in general, and why insurgency exists in Afghanistan, we are unlikely to develop and adopt policies for foreign places that our military can actually enforce.

For the military, we defined this mission in the context of what we in the military do, and while that is a natural response of most institutions (USAID, State, DEA, and NGOs have done the same), it does not lead to an approach that is very helpful for Afghanistan getting to some degree of natural stability.

So long as the governance in Kabul (and at lower levels as well) is perceived as fundamentally illegitimate by many who live there (primarily those who had patronage power under the Taliban and now suffer under those who have it under the regime we put into power), there will be revolution.

So long as foreign forces occupy Helmand (and Afghan forces from the north operating in Helmand are perceived as being nearly as foreign as British and US forces operating there), there will be resistance.

This is natural. This is human nature. This is really not much about advancing some "Taliban" system of governance as the West envisions - but more about revolting against a system of governance the West imposed, and resisting those forces sent to enforce that il-formed policy decision.

You're conflating issues, tactically clear and hold works, but to do it effectively like Chang did in China against Mao (until the Japanese intervened), the Brits did in Malaya, and French in Algeria, it can require a high degree of brutality, which runs against our moral grain. If it is going to be employed it must be done in a logical manner, not random acts of securing a village here and there, while insurgents have freedom of movement to maneuver around the village.

I'm not advocating a clear and hold approach, but in fact that is what we're attempting with the VSO program. We're currently in a long war of attrition, which in our case isn't sustainable politically and our adversaries know it.

I actually agree with your points, but at the end of the day they're irrelevant to the guys on the ground who have been asked to achieve objectives that will generate continued resistance as you correctly pointed out. Assuming we're going to have that resistance, and that those on the ground can't change the policy ends, we can at least discuss a better tactical approach, without it always delving into the policy realm. We're stuck with the policies we're given, or more accurately since we're both out of uniform now, our uniformed members are stuck with the policy ends they have been told to pursue using military force. From that optic what would you recommend to Battalion commanders and below?

[Bob's World]

"...ours is but to do and die"? Ultimately Bill, you are right, at some point the military has to simply do the best they can to enforce the policy decisions of our civilian leadership.

But this does not somehow validate the stupidity of the frontal assaults of the Somme; nor the stupidity of Clear-Hold-Build in Helmand.

As I recall Mao prevailed in China, as his tactics supported a valid strategy. Chang was run off of the continent.

In Malaya the British military tactics bought some time and space, but it was the British policy decisions to give up on dreams of restoring the Colony, giving up the political control once vested in the Colonial Office; working to extend political and economic opportunity beyond the Malays to the ethnic Indian and ethnic Chinese populations equally; and to help establish a new sovereign member of the Commonwealth that made those tactics stick. We did none of that in Vietnam. All tactics, no strategy. (kind of like a cowboy who is all hat and no cattle).

Likewise the French only suppressed insurgency and defeated insurgents for short periods of time in Algeria with their military approach to attempt to prop up improper and unchanging policy.

So, no, my points are not "irrelevant to the guys on the ground." Because the Generals are part of those guys; and while generals do not like to advise policy makers we cannot continue to give the generals sanctuary under that auspice from their responsibility to inform civilian leadership that no acceptable, suitable, feasible military solution exists to enforce what they are seeking to impose (coupled with suggestions of alternative policy approaches that history indicates may actually be supportable by our military action).

Even at Battalion level, commanders have a tremendous degree of latitude as to "how" they pursue the missions they are given. I saw Brian Petit do this every day in 2010 RC-South as we conducted the big push to clear Marjah and were preparing to do the same outside Kandahar. But you are right. We cannot fix this at the Battalion level. Our strategic failures are occurring much higher than those conducting tremendous tactical effort in support.

We need to stop reading history with rose colored glasses; and we need to stop giving our Flag-level commanders a pass for failing strategically simply because they are effective tacticians. In short, we need to change our military culture if we hope to be more successful in the strategic environment we live in today. Perhaps that will be done by the frustrated junior leaders coming off of today's battlefield for tomorrow; just as it was done by the frustrated junior leaders coming out of Vietnam.

[Bill Moore]

Mao would have likely been defeated if the Japanese didn't invade, but we will never know. I agree our strategy is deeply flawed, and the generals are partly partly to blame. On the other hand generals who addressed strategy flaws under both Clinton Bush administrations were not treated well. Not too long ago a civilian in OSD told 4 star he had no business developing strategy, his job was to implement it. It seems that the only time civilians want military input is after their strategy fails.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

This is the challenge of the current strategic environment. The problems the military is being sent out to "fix" or "defeat" are by and large NOT MILITARY PROBLEMS.

We are at a point in our strategic analysis where most communities, civilian and military alike, will admit that the strategic environment has fundamentally changed and continues to change at a nearly exponential rate. Then, in nearly the same breath, espouse some version of "therefore, business as usual - but I need more stuff if you want success."

We need to get to the point where we recognize that we must fundamentally change as well; and that we cannot simply use the military as some sort of "little Dutch Boy" to go stick our proverbial fingers into any number of proverbial dikes that are crumbling around us. It appears that the military can not only buy time and space for civilian leadership to succeed. We can buy time and space to allow it to fail as well. Did not the Roman Legions conduct a delaying action as the Barbarians made their way to Rome?

What we do today is not much different; and likely will end in similar fashion if we fail to shift from comfortably studying and applauding our tactics, and do not begin spending a great deal more time getting uncomfortable as we confront the realities of our policies and strategies.

I actually see a glimmer of hope in what I suspect is happening in Syria and Iraq. But then I may be assuming things that are not there, and giving credit where none is due - but I remain an optimist.

As to taking shots from civilians who feel like some individuals or aspects of the military are imposing on intellectual turf they arrogantly believe is uniquely theirs, I have two words. Moral Courage. We need more of it.

[AmericanPride]

I agree with Bob about the need for moral (and I'd add intellectual) courage.

My thought is that an unquestioningly obedient general officer corps undermines the democratic institution of the country. If the military is only responsible to the executive (and narrowly only accountable for the execution of predetermined policy), then that leaves no room for conversation about the most effective means when the executive more or less has the power to pursue military operations without Congressional input. DoD needs to adopt the slogan "See something, say something" into its values system. Even if the goals were unattainable, that does not excuse the senior military leadership from accepting it without question.

[davidbfpo]

I have long thought when the Afghan state decide on their national strategy, even their survival, keeping large numbers of ANSF in Helmand Province will evaporate within a short time. Before 2006 it was of marginal importance to them, one weak ANA unit in the provincial capital and little else (plus a US SOF unit and protective infantry).

Yes there is an income from the heroin trade, but I'd wager most of the profits go south, as does most of the product. Ah, goes west to to Iran too.

Now the terrain of the 'Green Zone' may account for a small part of the province, but it is where the people are. From my reading in the fighting season - when it is green - it is not a good place to fight in (when using ISAF ROE).

There are more important places for GIRoA.

[Bill Moore]

I agree with Bob about the need for moral (and I'd add intellectual) courage.

My thought is that an unquestioningly obedient general officer corps undermines the democratic institution of the country. If the military is only responsible to the executive (and narrowly only accountable for the execution of predetermined policy), then that leaves no room for conversation about the most effective means when the executive more or less has the power to pursue military operations without Congressional input. DoD needs to adopt the slogan "See something, say something" into its values system. Even if the goals were unattainable, that does not excuse the senior military leadership from accepting it without question.

I am aware of specific situations where Generals did push back against prevailing strategic ideas put forth by administrations, but personalities close to the president were still able to push their flawed strategies through despite professional military advice recommending against it. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz come to mind as self appointed experts who could influence the president to ignore advice to the contrary. It didn't help that general Frank's wasn't much of a strategist.

There is a tension sometimes between being a good citizen and a good soldier. Both want to the right thing for the nation, but in the same light a good soldier, as a good citizen, wants to ensure the military remains subordinate to civilian leadership. That can be a very gray line sometimes. Yes we have senior officers who look after their career above all else, but they don't reflect the whole. Too many comments are made with too wide of brush.

[Bill Moore]

Bill,

This is the challenge of the current strategic environment. The problems the military is being sent out to "fix" or "defeat" are by and large NOT MILITARY PROBLEMS.

We are at a point in our strategic analysis where most communities, civilian and military alike, will admit that the strategic environment has fundamentally changed and continues to change at a nearly exponential rate. Then, in nearly the same breath, espouse some version of "therefore, business as usual - but I need more stuff if you want success."

We need to get to the point where we recognize that we must fundamentally change as well; and that we cannot simply use the military as some sort of "little Dutch Boy" to go stick our proverbial fingers into any number of proverbial dikes that are crumbling around us. It appears that the military can not only buy time and space for civilian leadership to succeed. We can buy time and space to allow it to fail as well. Did not the Roman Legions conduct a delaying action as the Barbarians made their way to Rome?

What we do today is not much different; and likely will end in similar fashion if we fail to shift from comfortably studying and applauding our tactics, and do not begin spending a great deal more time getting uncomfortable as we confront the realities of our policies and strategies.

I actually see a glimmer of hope in what I suspect is happening in Syria and Iraq. But then I may be assuming things that are not there, and giving credit where none is due - but I remain an optimist.

As to taking shots from civilians who feel like some individuals or aspects of the military are imposing on intellectual turf they arrogantly believe is uniquely theirs, I have two words. Moral Courage. We need more of it.

Bob,

Interesting thoughts as always. I can't recall who wrote this, but I read a book a while back that two things are likely to prevent change. One is legalistic (policy, regulations, laws, etc.), and the other is tactical success. I think we're impacted by both, and would add to that the impact of our culture and our bureaucracy, which by definition is resistant to change.

The impact of the current security related challenges related to Syria, Iraq, Israel, the election crisis in Afghanistan, the mass migration of Latin American children to the U.S., Russia's activities in the Ukraine, the disputed territorial claims in East Asia, and the many challenges throughout Africa seem to indicate that what we once perceived as the norm for the world order no longer applies. We're in the midst of change, and as the world's only superpower we desire to shape it (much better us than China or Russia in my opinion), but so far have been largely ineffective, which in itself should be a cause for deep self-reflection on why.

Unlike you I'm not optimistic, but I do see opportunity for U.S. leadership, which is lacking at the moment. It isn't about supporting the doves or hawks, but developing an entirely new approach for the ways we pursue our ends, and re-examining what those ends should be. Some ends will employ the full spectrum of DIMEFIL to pursue because they're critical to us, other ends are what we would like to see, and those are the ones we need to stop relying on the military to pursue.

When will the new National Security Strategy be published?

[AmericanPride]

There's a couple of things going on here, some with counter-vailing impacts on the others.

First, structurally, the United States is committed to maintaining its hegemony in the short-term. This is represented in its fiscal priorities: defense expenditures represent approximately half of all discretionary spending; this number increases with the addition of the expenditures for the VA and Homeland Security (and other security or intelligence functions). Investments in infrastructure, innovation, education, and health are relatively minor. The largest social spending programs (Social Security and Medicare) are dedicated to improving the living conditions of the elderly. Of the already meager international aid budget, 25% goes to the top four recipients: Israel, Egypt, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The U.S. also leads in global arms sales, making this a primary source of revenue as well as a linkage to other governments. This means that institutionally the United States is geared towards maintaining its position in a specific strategic environment: one that requires the exercise of military force and wide-ranging security programs to sustain superpower status. The decline in U.S. military purchasing power also means that a greater amount of fiscal resources will be required to sustain a diminishing return on security effects. Without change, this means that the U.S. will eventually retreat from previous strategic priorities since it will not be able to sustain its security committments and will suffer from the consequent loss in credibility.

Second, absolute power is not as important as relative power. U.S. absolute power remains two to three fold ahead of the next competitor in military capabilities (Russia). However, there is a perception that (1) U.S. military capabilities are slowing in development relative to competitors and (2) U.S. military capabilities are either insufficient or inappropriate in their application. This explains the crisis in foreign policy debates about U.S. decline. But it also is empowering to elites in Moscow and Beijing; reference dependency is important. Moscow has two: the Soviet era and the Yeltsin administration, so current conditions (Russia has lost 1 war in 10 since 1991) give Russia confidence. The steady growth of China's capabilities is not revolutionary but methodical; but in the context of changings in U.S. relative power, that suddenly becomes a threat. This is similar to the situation prior to World War I when German and Austrian elites felt severely insecure about the long-term threat of Russia, even though Russia was decades behind in military development. It was the rapid growth of military and economic capabilities relative to Germany and Austria that produced the fear, not the absolute power.

Third, Russia is clearly dissatisfied with its position in the international community, while China's view is less clear (in my opinion). Russia will continue to openly challenge the U.S. while it appears that Russia's power is on the ascent relative to American power. In this situation, the declining power has no good options: as its strength declines, time works against it in restoring the status quo (and note, the status quo is always referenced as the apex of power, not the actual current conditions). Because potential losses are always more weighted than potential gains in measuring risk taking in policy decisions, there is an inherent incentive to preserve the remaining capabilities and not risk a hegemonic war, even though continued trends means that the prospect of a favorable outcome actually declines over time.

So, the U.S. is stuck in this paradigm that defines the parameters of its strategy options, even as its options become increasingly irrelevant and/or ineffective over time because the paradigm itself is changing. The U.S. needs to recapitalize on the generators of power itself (i.e. development, innovation, health), not the materialization of that power (i.e. military capabilities).