Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[Bill Moore]

I cannot see how an external intervention to safeguard the Syrian state's stockpiles of chemical and other weapons can be separated from the wider context.

Sounds more like an excuse to justify force structure. Deploying thousands of troops will most likely be ineffective, while a much less expensive and probably more effective method would be for our intelligence assets to start making deals for the powers that be and will be in Syria (pay offs and other deals) to secure the chemical and alleged biological weapons. I agree if we make WMD the issue while turning a blind eye to the overall context we're going to make bigger mess that will undermine our interests far more than a few chemical weapons.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I am curious if anyone thinks that the US, Britain, and France could back out of the corner that they have painted themselves into and support, or at least not violently oppose, Assad remaining in power.

Or do our interests in remaining closely tied to the Saudis and contra to anything Iranian trump any interest we actually have in Syria.

[Rex Brynen]

I am curious if anyone thinks that the US, Britain, and France could back out of the corner that they have painted themselves into and support, or at least not violently oppose, Assad remaining in power.

I don't think any of the three feel they are in a corner. The almost universal consensus is that Asad is going down. Western countries are happy not to be in the driver's seat on this one (or be left responsible for the post-Asad reconstruction), and will let the Saudis, Qataris, and Turks do the not-so-covert arming of the opposition.

Sure, policymakers wish it would happen faster, worry about spillover and blowback (arms, radical jihadists), and worry about CW stockpiles. Generally, however, I think the view is that this will prove to be a gain in the end, and produce a Syria that will (eventually) be more friendly to the West and more responsive to its population than the Ba'thist dictatorship was.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I don't think any of the three feel they are in a corner. The almost universal consensus is that Asad is going down.

Perhaps among the Western powers. I don't think that is as inevitable as they would like to believe.

Sure, policymakers wish it would happen faster, worry about spillover and blowback (arms, radical jihadists), and worry about CW stockpiles. Generally, however, I think the view is that this will prove to be a gain in the end, and produce a Syria that will (eventually) be more friendly to the West and more responsive to its population than the Ba'thist dictatorship was.

I am not so confident that the result will be a better Syria, or even a better Middle East. Anyone interested in getting involved here is doing it based on their own interests not those of the Syrians (us included). Assad may have been a dictator but he kept a lid on things. I am not positive that letting those existing hatreds fed by outside interests is a better path.

[Dayuhan]

Perhaps among the Western powers. I don't think that is as inevitable as they would like to believe.

Possibly not, but I don't see that as a reason to try to stop him from falling. He'd be a first-class liability to anyone who intervened on his side, IMO.

I am not so confident that the result will be a better Syria, or even a better Middle East.

I'm also not that confident of those things... but again, it's happening and we're not going to un-happen it. Most likely Syria and the Middle East will be neither better nor worse, just different, with different opportunities and threats. What the parties involved do with and about those threats and opportunities will define whether things go better or worse.

Anyone interested in getting involved here is doing it based on their own interests not those of the Syrians (us included).

This of course is true, but it might be added that those who are not interested in getting involved are also acting according to their own perceived interests. There seems to be a pretty general disinterest in getting involved in any way beyond peripheral engagement with minimal commitment, suggesting that most parties do not see commitment as compatible with their interests.

Of course there are risks involved in letting things play out and dealing with whatever emerges, but there is no risk-free course of action, and I can see why decision makers would think that course of action presents less risk than any commitment to trying to direct the outcome.

Assad may have been a dictator but he kept a lid on things. I am not positive that letting those existing hatreds fed by outside interests is a better path.

A better path than what? Assad is clearly no longer able to keep a lid on things, and I see no point in trying to restore his ability to keep a lid on things... even in the unlikely event that we could do that, why would we want to? Not like he was ever any friend of ours.

It's not always up to us to dictate outcomes, and trying to dictate outcomes can get us into an epic load of mess.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Rex

It is a lot more than a few, covert deals aren't really possible, and the concern is genuine (even if one feels it is misplaced). I don't think massive ground intervention is a terribly likely outcome, however.

Covert deals in that part of the world are always possible, but of course not guarunteed. A lot of things are genuine concerns, and chemical weapons is one of them, but it must be viewed in the overall context of the situation to evaluate if it is worth the potentially much larger political risk to our interests if we put a large U.S. or coalition presence on the ground. We can't afford to get tunnel vision and simply see the chemical weapon warning light.

Most importantly it doesn't take thousands of troops to secure facilities unless you're defending them against large conventional forces. I think the assumption is enough troops to secure the site(s) long enough to neutralize, not park thousand of troops in country indefinitely.

We consistently fail when we attempt to prevent a group from getting weapons whether small arms, IEDs, and WMD (except for a successful operation that stopped the Nazi's from getting the bomb). It is almost equivalent to stopping the flow of illegal drugs. While oversimplifying for purpose of making a point, guns don't kill people, people kill people. The same line of reasoning applies to IEDs, WMD, etc. We can't simply focus on the weapon, we need a strategy for mitigating the threat (the people that will use it), which get backs to my larger point we have to appreciate/understand the larger context or we may make the threat worse.

[Dayuhan]

I don't envy any American politician who decides he needs to sell a military intervention to neutralize Syrian WMD to the American public. The old adage about boys crying "wolf" does come to mind...

[TheCurmudgeon]

Of course there are risks involved in letting things play out and dealing with whatever emerges, but there is no risk-free course of action, and I can see why decision makers would think that course of action presents less risk than any commitment to trying to direct the outcome.

Any action (or inaction) we take present risks AND by its very nature, constitute an attempt to direct an outcome (or at least prevent other outcomes). The question is more how much are we willing to risk for which desired outcome.

A better path than what?

A regional war that we would get sucked into.

Assad is clearly no longer able to keep a lid on things, and I see no point in trying to restore his ability to keep a lid on things...

I don't think it is that clear that he could not have kept a lid on things. He probably had the ability prior to other interested parties providing support. Remember, this has been going on for some time and Assad has only recently resorted to real military might like air strikes. Had Turkey and the Saudis not gotten involved he might have little problem keeping a lid on things.

This is no longer a civil war, it is a proxy war. Containment and damage control are our primary interests. Actions (or inaction) we take should, IMO, be based on those two interests.

[ganulv]

“Machine gun in right hand. Cell phone in left. On duty on the gun-truck’s machine gun, at 80 miles an hour into Aleppo, checking messages along the way.” [LINK]

[Dayuhan]

No one sold intervention in Libya. The American public doesn't care as much as you think.

I'd say Obama made some effort to sell the intervention, ably assisted by media: for a while it seemed like you couldn't look at a TV without seeing a reporter on the ground in Benghazi reporting on the imminent sack of the city and interviewing people who were about to be slaughtered. The lack of a similar media-safe threatened zone is, I suspect, a major reason for the lack of enthusiasm for intervention in Syria. The Anglo/French willingness to take at least a nominal lead role was also critical in the sale.

Any action (or inaction) we take present risks AND by its very nature, constitute an attempt to direct an outcome (or at least prevent other outcomes).

Is the current strategy an attempt to direct an outcome or an acknowledgement that our capacity to direct outcomes is limited?

The question is more how much are we willing to risk for which desired outcome.

I'd also ask whether we have or at any point had an available move that had any meaningful chance of providing our desired outcome. I've yet to see any suggestion that we did, and in the absence of one I'm not inclined to be very critical of the course adopted, which seems to me not unreasonable.

A regional war that we would get sucked into.

That would be an adverse outcome, but what available course would have prevented it? Diving into a mess out of fear that one might in the future get sucked into it seems a course of questionable wisdom.

I don't think it is that clear that he could not have kept a lid on things. He probably had the ability prior to other interested parties providing support. Remember, this has been going on for some time and Assad has only recently resorted to real military might like air strikes. Had Turkey and the Saudis not gotten involved he might have little problem keeping a lid on things.

I'm not sure that fits the chronology very well... seems to me the lid was well and truly off well before any outside parties got involved in any meaningful way, nor is it clear that outside involvement has at any point been a major driver of the conflict... not that the US could at any point have prevented outside parties from getting involved.

This is no longer a civil war, it is a proxy war.

Based on what evidence? Certainly outside parties are involved, on both sides, but I've seen no evidence or suggestion that outside involvement has reached the point where either Assad or those who oppose him could reasonably be said to be anyone's proxy. What's the actual extent of the outside support? Could either side not survive without it? All I've seen suggests that accelerated defections from the armed forces account for more of the rebel's gains than outside assistance. Of course we don't have inside information, but is there any evidence to suggest that outside assistance is a make-or-break factor for either side?

[JMA]

Despite the Brits convincing themselves they had no dog in the fight it appears the law of inintended consequences has crept up and bitten them on the ass:

Syria is now the biggest threat to Britain's security

This could be behind a pay wall for regular visitors, so here is an alternative:

British Syria-radicalized jihadists biggest threat to UK national security

Once again the non-interventionists at all costs have miscalculated. Don't expect a mea culpa though.

[Dayuhan]

Is there any reason to think that British intervention in Syria would have avoided or reduced that threat?

[davidbfpo]

Paul Smyth, a SWC member, has written this piece for CNN and he concludes:

Calls for a NFZ in Syria must not ignore reality. The inconvenient truth is that Syria is not Iraq, Kosovo or especially Libya. The considerable logistic, operational and command challenges faced must not be overlooked or dismissed.
These obstacles may not be insurmountable, but the limitations of a NFZ remain, especially as a means of protecting the Syrian people or bringing the rebels battlefield victory.

Link:http://news.sky.com/story/980758/syr...zone-deception

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to CWOT via Twitter, a short photo sequence and clearly not a "level playing field" in Aleppo:http://www.globalpost.com/photo-gall...-aleppo-photos and a rather grim three minute video clip:http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/n...ren-death-toll

[JMA]

Paul Smyth, a SWC member, has written this piece for CNN and he concludes:

Link:http://news.sky.com/story/980758/syr...zone-deception

David, Paul Smyth appears to be trapped in the historical paradigm of how to take aircraft out of the equation.

He correctly identifies the limitations of trying to enforce a NFZ through the threat of airborne interdiction but fails to apply some simple lateral thinking.

The deterrent of a NFZ is that if aircraft enter the designated NFZ area they will be engaged. This is the problem, to enforce this you need the costly means to instantly react.

There is of course a simpler method.

The response to breach of the NFZ does not have to be targeted at the particular aircraft... does it?

What about targeting the originating airfield? Doesn't have to be immediate. Crater that runway as soon as possible.

Helicopters are a more difficult proposition as are artillery weapons. Again simple.

If helicopters or artillery are used then instead of playing cat and mouse just have a list of military targets which can be dealt with sequentially in response to NFZ breaches or the use of artillery.

Why does the most complicated method always receive the most consideration?

.

[Rex Brynen]

Sounds more like an excuse to justify force structure. Deploying thousands of troops will most likely be ineffective, while a much less expensive and probably more effective method would be for our intelligence assets to start making deals for the powers that be and will be in Syria (pay offs and other deals) to secure the chemical and alleged biological weapons. I agree if we make WMD the issue while turning a blind eye to the overall context we're going to make bigger mess that will undermine our interests far more than a few chemical weapons.

It is a lot more than a few, covert deals aren't really possible, and the concern is genuine (even if one feels it is misplaced). I don't think massive ground intervention is a terribly likely outcome, however.