Why democracies don't lose insurgencies

[Ken White]

...For that matter, changing the definition of "democracy" invalidates your thesis:

"...The country is alleged by many historians to have been nothing more than an American-backed puppet government, but many others claim that it was genuine democracy (or, at the least, a patriotic movement with genuine concern for the Vietnamese people). An individual's views on the matter generally correspond closely to their views on the Vietnam War in general - supporters of the war often believe that South Vietnam was a democracy, and thus worthy of defence, while opponents of the war often believe that South Vietnamese democracy was a sham.[/URL]

stupidity in the discourse on Viet Nam. It was emphatically a democracy but one in the Asian model; an oligarchy at the top, elected politicians below -- particularly at Province and local level. The leaders responded to the populace. Anyone who contends it was a puppet government in verging on idiocy. The Viet Namese ran their country, took little to no advice from the Americans (unless we offered a healthy bribe; even they'd demur frequently) and did what they wanted to -- frequently stymieing US goals.

To echo Ron Humphrey on your later comments:

OK, then to completely disagree with Wilf, my concern would be that if everything depends on how you define things, it might be hard to gain a lot of insight.

Doesn't almost everything depend on how one defines things? Acknowledging that 'one' is human and we are infinitely variable.

All inquiry starts with a postulation, not the postulation...

To carry it further, if you're carrying an assault rifle, no matter what happens, some people will never believe it was voluntary.

Oh, I dunno, I carried a rifle for years, it was purely voluntary. Still do on occasion; still voluntary. As an aside, 'Assault Rifle' is a term invented by the mostly ignorant popular media and perpetuated by even more ignorant Congroids who banned all "Assault Rifles" except those they didn't ban. A rifle is a rifle, not really any such thing as an 'Assault Rifle' (other than in the eyes of the US Congress. I rest my case...). That also excuses people who carry just pistols or who carry SMGs, MG, RPGs and such, I guess...

If, OTOH, as opposed to what you said, what you meant was if someone carrying a weapon was strolling about, any changes in the local milieu brought about by the elements that person represents will not be viewed as voluntary by some observers in the population of the locale where said weapon carrying soul then I'd say you're correct. I'd also suggest that the number so viewing that issue in that light will depend on many things and that for the most part, there will always be some nervous, whiney types who will see danger in anything but that most people have enough sense to judge things based on reality instead of ideology.

For example, the Gendarmerie in France has been wandering about with Rifles, Pistols and SMGs for years and a few people in France see that as threatening -- most of the French nation and its visitors, however, do not.

[Rank amateur]

It was emphatically a democracy but one in the Asian model

Didn't the insurgents win that one?

A rifle is a rifle

I suspect that if anyone asked you to carry one of these around Vietnam, you may have had a slightly different opinion.



but to keep the conversation on topic, weapons obviously matter: both physically and symbolically.

[reed11b]

I find this whole thread misleading and dangerous due to the vast assumptions going on to fuel it. One, a true democracy of "one person, one vote" is essentially mob rule and where the majority is in violent opposition to the minority then there is strong fuel for insurgency. If the minority is either, by coalition, a larger force then the nominal majority or has better support and resources, then they can "win". period. Too assume otherwise is foolish. Second it assumes that a democracy is what everyone really really wants in there hearts of hearts and if only they could truly experience it, the world would be better. The insurgencies that we face today are often fueled as much by international ideology, particularly radical Islamic ideology as they are by national or sub-national concerns. Don't get to hung up on the west vs. Islam either, because that can change just as quick too. Third it assumes that terrorism and insurgency are unique and cleanly separate from each other, they are not, terrorism is a means or technique of insurgency. Focus on the realities of the fight you are in, instead of trying to develop a COIN master plan because in order to do that you have make assumptions, and when you assume it makes an ass out of u and me.
Reed

[Ken White]

I find this whole thread misleading and dangerous due to the vast assumptions going on to fuel it.

Your prerogative. Couldn't you say so without being confrontational?

One, a true democracy of "one person, one vote" is essentially mob rule and where the majority is in violent opposition to the minority then there is strong fuel for insurgency.

There are several places where that isn't entirely true; the mob rule aspect, I mean. As for the other, did you mean where the minority is in violent opposition to the majority?

If the minority is either, by coalition, a larger force then the nominal majority or has better support and resources, then they can "win". period.

Can you validate that with examples? I can't think of any right off hand but since you mention it, I'm sure you can provide a couple of examples.

Too assume otherwise is foolish.

Is that fact or your opinion?

Second it assumes that a democracy is what everyone really really wants in there hearts of hearts and if only they could truly experience it, the world would be better.

I did not see or assume that. Why do you think so?

The insurgencies that we face today are often fueled as much by international ideology, particularly radical Islamic ideology as they are by national or sub-national concerns. Don't get to hung up on the west vs. Islam either, because that can change just as quick too.

Probably true.

Third it assumes that terrorism and insurgency are unique and cleanly separate from each other, they are not, terrorism is a means or technique of insurgency.

Why do you say that? I do not see such a linkage in the postulation.

Focus on the realities of the fight you are in, instead of trying to develop a COIN master plan because in order to do that you have make assumptions, and when you assume it makes an ass out of u and me.

That's all very well for a COIN Master Plan -- but the man said he was doing it for his Graduate School Thesis -- a very different thing. Thus, I'm not at all sure why you're objecting to it...

[UrsaMaior]

De Gaulle and Liddell-Hart met deaf ears. Surprisingly, Guderian and Tuhachevski were only listened to in the world’s two most oppressive political systems.

[reed11b]

Your prerogative. Couldn't you say so without being confrontational?

Yes, I'll blame low blood sugar and apologize.

There are several places where that isn't entirely true; the mob rule aspect, I mean. As for the other, did you mean where the minority is in violent opposition to the majority?

It may not be always true, but without protections for the minority built into the body of law, it is a very real possibility. Iraq in 2005 could be considered an example of this, as for the other, either way it still is true, right?

Can you validate that with examples? I can't think of any right off hand but since you mention it, I'm sure you can provide a couple of examples.

I'll get back to you on this one, but would not most insurgencies be led, at least initially by a minority population?

Is that fact or your opinion?

Opinion, but it is based on the opinion that underestimating your opponent is dumb, likely a shared opinion with many would be my guess.

I did not see or assume that. Why do you think so?

Did not say you did, it is a response to the many "global community" theorists I have read and seem mentioned in this council, I disagree with them, but I can't put my thumb on a good enough example to communicate it very effectively yet.

Why do you say that? I do not see such a linkage in the postulation.

More on this later, while I figure out how to communicate it well.

That's all very well for a COIN Master Plan -- but the man said he was doing it for his Graduate School Thesis -- a very different thing. Thus, I'm not at all sure why you're objecting to it...

Can I go with low blood sugar again?
Reed
P.S. Please do not respond to my posts line by line anymore. It is a pet peeve of mine and it is almost impossible to respond without sounding defensive. I always appreciate your feedback, but please do it the conventional manner

[Ken White]

...It may not be always true, but without protections for the minority built into the body of law, it is a very real possibility. Iraq in 2005 could be considered an example of this, as for the other, either way it still is true, right?

True -- but a lot of nations have that protection and obey their laws -- just as some do not. Point was that was sort of a sweeping statement. On the 'either way' -- if you mean that the majority is oppressing the minority forcefully causing them to rebel, then it's possible.

I'll get back to you on this one, but would not most insurgencies be led, at least initially by a minority population?

Or by a neighbor who stirs up that minority and leads them or by an outsider like Guevara in Bolivia a who tries and fails. Such outside 'leadership' or incitement is not at all unusual and was very prevalent during the Cold War...

Opinion, but it is based on the opinion that underestimating your opponent is dumb, likely a shared opinion with many would be my guess.

To assume much of anything when discussing warfare can be foolish. Size does not always win, usually, yeah but not always. See the Confrontation in Malaysia for an example -- or Mao in China.

Did not say you did, it is a response to the many "global community" theorists I have read and seem mentioned in this council, I disagree with them, but I can't put my thumb on a good enough example to communicate it very effectively yet.

I didn't see any global theorists positions mentioned in the thread, either. My question was why you mentioned it in view of that, no more.

More on this later, while I figure out how to communicate it well.

No terrorism stipulation in the thread; you can of course pop it in a as a new thread but I don't see that it's germane to this one.

P.S. Please do not respond to my posts line by line anymore. It is a pet peeve of mine and it is almost impossible to respond without sounding defensive. I always appreciate your feedback, but please do it the conventional manner

Sorry, to me it's logical way to respond; someone makes a specific statement; I respond to that with a specific comment or question. I'm not sure I see it as an attack or necessitating a defensive answer but I will suggest that if one makes a statement, one should be prepared to defend it or otherwise address the issue head on. As for conventional, to me that is the conventional way to respond, it seems better to me than a big paragraph that touches on five or more topics which makes it hard to pull the thoughts to address. We're all unique and do things differently and that should be generally okay, particularly on a public board where a lot of varied people are going to do things their way.

It is okay with me...

[Ken White]

Didn't the insurgents win that one?

No. More ignorance. The insurgents were severely tromped and almost totally ineffective before the last US troops left in 1973. The North Viet Namese Army won it in 1975 -- with a conventional invasion, not an insurgency.

I suspect that if anyone asked you to carry one of these around Vietnam, you may have had a slightly different opinion.

Since I carried an M16 and there was little difference between that and your pictured weapon, I don't see a problem. A .22 is a .22...

In any event, as the Actress said to the Bishop it's not what you have...

but to keep the conversation on topic, weapons obviously matter: both physically and symbolically.

Physically, of course. Symbolically, not nearly as much as you appear to believe. There are a lot of areas in the world where weapons are routinely carried -- there, they tend to look askance at those who do not have a weapon.

If I may, you seem to be judging everything from a western perspective. We westerners account for about 25% of the world population -- the other 75% don't think like we do and to judge their responses by our thought processes is dangerous (See Viet Nam, to use your favorite whipping boy ).

[Cavguy]

Reed,

It's for a graduate Security Studies/PolSci major. Thus, the terms I am using are those related to that academic field, and not the colloquial or subjective use of the terms which you seem to be confusing them with.

In the intl relations fields, the definitions of government types are generally accepted (one can always argue fringe cases) based on characteristics - not moral value. Hence, a democracy in this academic context is usually defined as a government freely elected by the people (either representative or direct), with high degrees of political, press, and economic freedom, and conducting regular elections of some sort, driving turnover. Also, the electorate must be inclusive to the population of the country.

There is a huge body of literature based on the emperical observation of the "Democratic Peace" - i.e. that from 1945 forward democracies have not gone to war with each other or generally initiated wars. The argument as to why (casual and structural arguments) has burned up more journals and books than I care to count. I tend to come down on the structuralist side, but that is neither here nor there.

I have uncovered an emperical observation concerning insurgencies, as separated from terrorist groups and civil war. For an my version of what constitutes a terrorist group vs. insurgency vs. civil war, see below:

Why Insurgency?

Insurgency is a unique type of conflict encompassing a wide range of political, military, social, and economic factors. (Galula 1964) The term “insurgency” is defined by the United States Military as “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.” (Department of Defense 2008) The US Government Interagency definition is a little more expansive, saying, “Insurgency is a protracted political-military campaign conducted by an organized movement seeking to subvert or displace the government and completely or partially control the resources and/or population of a country through the use of force and alternative political organizations.” (Department of State 2007) The nature of insurgency is primarily political waged against a constituted government with an objective of regime change or secession. Insurgences often occur against the influence of a foreign occupying power or for regional/local autonomy.

From a combat standpoint, insurgency is distinctly guerilla in character, involving small bands of partisans operating within the population against the existing regime. It places a high value on political mobilization, drawing its fighters, supplies, intelligence, and refuge from the population of the involved country. (Trinquier 1964) Many insurgencies receive support from outside forces, whether states or non-state organizations. Because of their military weakness and lack of heavy forces, insurgencies seek to attack a regime’s weakness and avoid open conflict with organized military forces unless a clear military or political objective can be obtained. Victory is usually achieved through “wearing the enemy down” rather than through military conquest, or through coup-like action. Some insurgencies manage to field organized military forces in the end stages, escalating the conflict to civil war.

Insurgency is distinct from civil war. US Army Field Manual 100-20 provides the definition of civil war accepted by the United States military. Five criteria exist for a conflict meet the standard of civil war – control of territory, functioning government, foreign recognition, regular armed forces, and capability to engage in major military operations. (Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force 1990) Some academics are less demanding, defining civil war as, “Sustained military combat, primarily internal, resulting in at least 1,000 battle-deaths per year, pitting central government forces against an insurgent force capable of effective resistance, determined by the latter's ability to inflict upon the government forces at least 5 percent of the fatalities that the insurgents sustain.” (Henderson and Singer 2000). What is common between the two definitions is an emphasis on conflict internal to a state conducted largely with organized military forces. Because insurgents often organize in highly irregular groups and cells without clear chains of command, not all civil wars meet the criteria of insurgency. Insurgents usually do not completely control the terrain they operate in, and thus operate in a non-linear method against the established government. Therefore, civil wars are different in character from insurgencies, and require a different approach by the government to control. The distinction is imperfect, and there will always be overlap between civil war and insurgency.

Defining terrorism versus insurgencies is also important so as not to confuse all insurgencies with terrorist groups. Terrorism is described as, “… the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence the pursuit of political change.” (Hoffman 2006) Thus terrorism is primarily a tactic employed for political ends, and can be used in almost any dispute context. Terrorist groups in many cases may be insurgencies, or simply political organizations seeking recognition of their cause. Regardless of the objective, it is clear that while not all terrorist groups are insurgencies, most insurgencies use terrorism as a tactic against either the population or the government to achieve their political goals. (Hoffman 2006)

So while examining 89 cases of insurgencies identified by RAND (vice 600 terrorist groups in the same period), There were 26 insurgent victories. Of those 26, none were against democracies, even though 20 of the 89 cases were against democratic regimes.

The scholarly question becomes - why are democratic governments less likely to fall to insurgencies? The point of this thread was to see if any of the experts lurking or present here could demonstrate selection bias - cases I ignored which may discredit the empirical observation I am preparing to write the thesis on - a qualitative and quantitative examination of why this may be so. At this point, I don't know if it is luck, economics, governmental inclusion, military competence, etc. The point is that I don't have a conclusion, just an empirical observation and some data points.

That is what this thesis will test, and attempt to draw potential conclusions and inferences from. It will also hopefully provide avenues for others to research in more quantitative or qualitative detail.

So yes, this isn't a muddy boots thesis, but it may (or may not) have muddy boots implications. Remember, I'm writing for an academic committee.

[Bob's World]

No. More ignorance. The insurgents were severely tromped and almost totally ineffective before the last US troops left in 1973. The North Viet Namese Army won it in 1975 -- with a conventional invasion, not an insurgency..

Ken,

You've raised this point at least a couple of times that I am aware of, and while you are factually accurate, the grand design of Maoist Insurgency is to culminate in a conventional force that seals the deal. So to say that the insurgency did not win is not really fair, they simply followed the full program to its logical conclusion, moving up and down between phases I and II, attempting III prematurely and backing down to II again, and finally, as you state, in 1975 being able to pull off the phase III conclusion.

I am quite confident that if that attack had been defeated, things would have simmered down in phase II for a while until they felt the conditions were right to try a phase III operation again.

Which goes to the point of insurgency: So long as the underlying conditions that gave rise to the insurgency exist, you can suppress it, but you can not stomp it out. The government must ultimately answer to its populace; either at the end of a bayonet, or by simply doing their job and addressing the legitimate concerns and grievances (or getting out of the way and allowing a governance that will do so) before it comes to that.

[Ken White]

You've raised this point at least a couple of times that I am aware of, and while you are factually accurate, the grand design of Maoist Insurgency is to culminate in a conventional force that seals the deal. So to say that the insurgency did not win is not really fair, they simply followed the full program to its logical conclusion, moving up and down between phases I and II, attempting III prematurely and backing down to II again, and finally, as you state, in 1975 being able to pull off the phase III conclusion.

And by that time well over 90 plus percent of the original insurgents were dead. I'm aware of Mao's Phases -- even more aware of Giap's (who was about twice as smart as Mao) plan.

I am quite confident that if that attack had been defeated, things would have simmered down in phase II for a while until they felt the conditions were right to try a phase III operation again.

Probably true.

Which goes to the point of insurgency: So long as the underlying conditions that gave rise to the insurgency exist, you can suppress it, but you can not stomp it out. The government must ultimately answer to its populace; either at the end of a bayonet, or by simply doing their job and addressing the legitimate concerns and grievances (or getting out of the way and allowing a governance that will do so) before it comes to that.

Not really true with respect to Viet Nam -- most of the populace just wanted to be left alone. Some insurgencies are started and run by very dedicated folks who take the semblance of a problem, elevate it to a casus belli and go for broke.

I usually object to comparisons of Malaya and Viet Nam because the efforts were so very different -- but they do have one thing in common; in both cases an outside power (China in the first case, North Viet Nam in the second) took some social ills and raised them to start insurrections. Both were effectively stopped by a combination of good COIN tactics (very belatedly in VN) and political fixes. The big difference was that China was in no position to elevate to Phase III.

So yeah, it was a three phase effort -- but the insurgents didn't win they were mostly Southerners who did not necessarily want to hew to Ho. Another nation's fighters did win -- and the North had manipulated the VC almost as badly as they did the US.

The insurgency in VN, BTW, does not meet your definition of bad underlying conditions; the South was in better shape than the North on that score in the early 60s an people in both nations knew that.

[reed11b]

The insurgency in VN, BTW, does not meet your definition of bad underlying conditions; the South was in better shape than the North on that score in the early 60s an people in both nations knew that.

Is this considered nessecary to be defined as an insurgency? What about where ideological or political differences are the drive behind armed resistance, such as the religious conflicts in the ME, or the Chechan revolt?
What about the Kurdish attempts to build there own homeland, this fights across multiple nation borders and would they still fight eben if they were financialy well off? I feel that they would if some one sold them on the concept of greater Kurdistan effectivly.
Reed

[Cavguy]

Is this considered nessecary to be defined as an insurgency? What about where ideological or political differences are the drive behind armed resistance, such as the religious conflicts in the ME, or the Chechan revolt?
What about the Kurdish attempts to build there own homeland, this fights across multiple nation borders and would they still fight eben if they were financialy well off? I feel that they would if some one sold them on the concept of greater Kurdistan effectivly.
Reed

I think the definitions my above post (USG and DoD) answers your question.

There is no "hard" standard for categorization. Some subjectivity is involved.

[Ken White]

Is this considered nessecary to be defined as an insurgency?

Bob's World whose position my response that you quoted was directed to; to me; or to Cav Guy whose thread this is?

In any event CavGuy answered and did it well IMO. As for the position Bob's World states, he didn't restrict it to economic or social matters so the religious difference or just an ideological difference as well as ethnic and other differences are covered by his conditional requirement.

I believe that all those things you mention and more in the two Viet Nams in the early 60s were roughly in balance with slightly better industry and more efficient government with less corruption in the North but better economic, religious and ethnic / individual freedom conditions in the South. It was IMO better than a draw with a fair edge to the South, thus my response to him.

[Bob's World]

And by that time well over 90 plus percent of the original insurgents were dead. I'm aware of Mao's Phases -- even more aware of Giap's (who was about twice as smart as Mao) plan.Probably true.Not really true with respect to Viet Nam -- most of the populace just wanted to be left alone. Some insurgencies are started and run by very dedicated folks who take the semblance of a problem, elevate it to a casus belli and go for broke.

I usually object to comparisons of Malaya and Viet Nam because the efforts were so very different -- but they do have one thing in common; in both cases an outside power (China in the first case, North Viet Nam in the second) took some social ills and raised them to start insurrections. Both were effectively stopped by a combination of good COIN tactics (very belatedly in VN) and political fixes. The big difference was that China was in no position to elevate to Phase III.

So yeah, it was a three phase effort -- but the insurgents didn't win they were mostly Southerners who did not necessarily want to hew to Ho. Another nation's fighters did win -- and the North had manipulated the VC almost as badly as they did the US.

The insurgency in VN, BTW, does not meet your definition of bad underlying conditions; the South was in better shape than the North on that score in the early 60s an people in both nations knew that.

Ok Ken, now I have to comment on your supporting argument that N.Vietnam was an outside power that instigated and manipulated and sustained a S. Vietnam insurgency. This is whole idea of a "North" and "South" Vietnam is just another aspect of the Western Colonial influence imposed on one populace. Vietnam had enjoyed some 900 years of independence from China prior to being subjected to about 100 years of French occupation and colonization. Upon successfully defeating that occupation the country was artificially divided into North and South states for purely Western political purposes. Did China and Russia support the Vietnamese movement to liberate themselves from this Western influence? Absolutely. Was North Vietnam somehow an "outside power" because a group of white men thousands of miles away drew a line on a map? Hardly.


This goes to a key aspect of my Populace-Centric theory. (Not controlling the populace, as in Kilcullen's population-centric tactics applied in Iraq; but in focusing on the needs, desires, perspectives and will of the populace as one engages through their government. To seek to meet our own interests in ways that are not counter to the interests of the populace; and to be, where necessary, an enabler of better relations between a populace and its governance and not a wedge to the same.)

We ignored the will of the Vietnamese populace writ-large by first reinstating the French occupation, and then by enforcing the artificial border through the heart of their homeland as part of our Cold War hedge against the Soviets.

I'd hate to see us make the same (similar) mistake in Afghanistan / Pakistan where a historic populace is also in revolt and we are preparing to commit tremendous energy once again to enforce a border created by white men thousands of miles away that cuts through the heart of the Pashtu homeland to reinforce states that reflect Western interests more than the interests of the Populaces they encompass.

When we learn from history, it is important that we take away the right lessons. Just me, but to me the main lesson is that the west can no longer simply expect eastern populaces to accept what we lay out for them, but that we can still achieve our vital interests in these areas by changing our approach to one of reinforcing the will of the populaces of these regions as prioritized over any vestiges of western governmental constructs imposed over the years, or ideas of how we currently want them to behave.

Surely we can be smart enough to find a way to support divided historic populaces around the world without having to destroy the states they reside within. Surely we can be smart enough to support troubled states without having to destroy the historic populaces that are divided by their borders.

My vote is for fighting smarter, not harder. We need a surge of strategic thinking, not a surge of hard young riflemen like my son. As long as we think we are there to "defeat" some threat as opposed to enable a stronger relationship between a populace and its governance we will fail. As long as people seriously think that a Clausewitzian model of warfare based on study of the Napoleonic wars between states applies directly to this type of conflict we will fail.

This is people business. Understand people first; second understand what actions over the years have manifested in the conditions of conflict that exist. Next, sit down and figure out new ways to meet your national interests in that region that are designed not to reinforce the failed system, but to enable a new system that has a chance to work.

(Ok, this is way longer, and went down a path I did not fully intend when I started typing 20 minutes ago, but sometimes you just have to go with the flow. Ken, clearly this is not all aimed at you. I just think you mischaracterize the true Vietnamese populace, but I also understand you have valid reasons for your positions. You earned them, and I have the highest respect for that.)

[John T. Fishel]

Take a bit closer look at El Salvador. One of the major problems there was the existence of sanctuaries - the so-called "blosones" - of disputed territory along the Salvadoran/Honduran border allegedly administered by the UN. That was where the FMLN took R&R and massed their supplies from Nicaragua and points beyond.

Much of the discussion here hinges on different definitions of democracy. Suggest you pick one that corresponds well to your Rand dataset and just stick with it.

Cheers

JohnT

[William F. Owen]

As long as people seriously think that a Clausewitzian model of warfare based on study of the Napoleonic wars between states applies directly to this type of conflict we will fail.

Clausewtiz did not base his understanding of war purely on his experiences of fighting against Napoleonic armies. Clausewitz observations on the nature of war is applicable to any form of armed conflict.

This is people business. Understand people first; second understand what actions over the years have manifested in the conditions of conflict that exist. Next, sit down and figure out new ways to meet your national interests in that region that are designed not to reinforce the failed system, but to enable a new system that has a chance to work.

Well that's exactly what Clausewitz says, except he wrote On WAR, and you are drifting off into National Policy and Strategy, of which WAR is a subset of skills and capabilities.

Warfare is a tool, and a pretty dam good one, when applied to right problem.

[Steve Blair]

Ok Ken, now I have to comment on your supporting argument that N.Vietnam was an outside power that instigated and manipulated and sustained a S. Vietnam insurgency. This is whole idea of a "North" and "South" Vietnam is just another aspect of the Western Colonial influence imposed on one populace. Vietnam had enjoyed some 900 years of independence from China prior to being subjected to about 100 years of French occupation and colonization. Upon successfully defeating that occupation the country was artificially divided into North and South states for purely Western political purposes. Did China and Russia support the Vietnamese movement to liberate themselves from this Western influence? Absolutely. Was North Vietnam somehow an "outside power" because a group of white men thousands of miles away drew a line on a map? Hardly.

Not that this has anything to do with Neil's topic, but....

I have to agree with Ken on this one. There were any number of cultural differences (some major, some minor) between the population in the north and that in the south, as well as the (often ignored) central Vietnam subset (the region around Hue). I would actually characterize the idea of a "unified Vietnamese populace" as another Western fiction that doesn't square well with the reality on the ground. If you dig into any of the literature of the period as well as VC narratives, you'll find that many of them resented the influence of the "foreigners" from the north (ranging from their views on social/moral issues to their harsh accents and different way of doing business - and the dislike was often returned by the cadres from the north who considered their southern counterparts lazy and morally 'loose'). Much of this had to do with the way the Vietnamese people expanded their own influence within the region, but to say that they were the same people because they are ethnically identical (or close to identical) is to ignore the impact that cultural development has on a national or regional identity.

And now back to the thread's topic. I would also agree that it's best to limit this study to the period after 1945, even though I'm personally much more interested in earlier insurgencies. When time and number of available sources are two major considerations, the post-1945 period is hard to beat.