Blending into the mindset of the Human Terrain

[Coined]

Armies are political instruments. Future conflicts will result from future politics, and nothing else. Resources may be an issue, but there is no evidence that they definitely will be. The same was predicted before 911, and look how wrong that was

We have a very clear guide as to what the future of war looks like and that's 3,000 years of military history. It also is our best guide as to how to fight and win. Call it "stove piped" or "linear" but it works much better than anything else.

Agreed on the first part but let's not go to 9/11.
Europe knew 30 years of IRA in Ireland, RAF in Germany, Red Brigades in Italy, Action Directe in France, ETA in Spain, CCC in Belgium, Red Resistance Front in the Netherlands and that was the left wing part ..... Respecting the many death which was the result of the madness at 9/11, what is the point you want to make with 9/11 ??

For the last part. The only thing I like to stress is that we have to get a broader view at conflicts, the "hardware" aproach is just a (minor) part of conflicts.

Let us go back to rethink the way we can train ourselves and our troops better than we do now.

And dear Ken and William, I would appreciate it that you do not to lift words out of a sentence to react on.

The whole is more than the sum of its parts.

Like some quote's?? http://thinkexist.com/quotations

“A common danger unites even the bitterest enemies”

“Anyone can become angry - that is easy, but to be angry with the right person at the right time, and for the right purpose and in the right way - that is not within everyone's power and that is not easy.”

“The greatest barrier to success is the fear of failure.”

Ahmed Rashid wrote some fine interesting books and an informative site is http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/

Ready for some constructive and additional coments

[William F. Owen]

what is the point you want to make with 9/11 ??

The point is that attempting to predict the nature, location or cause of conflict is mostly pointless.

For the last part. The only thing I like to stress is that we have to get a broader view at conflicts, the "hardware" aproach is just a (minor) part of conflicts.

Let us go back to rethink the way we can train ourselves and our troops better than we do now.

Few of us who take military thought seriously are focussed on hardware. We discuss how to apply technology and equipment, but only ever in the wider context of training, education, and concepts.

The likes of Ken and I spend most of our time thinking how to train troops to do things better than we do now. It's what we (and others) do. If you don't believe me, we have some 3,000 posts demonstrating it.

And dear Ken and William, I would appreciate it that you do not to lift words out of a sentence to react on. The whole is more than the sum of its parts.

Not my intention. If a few of the parts are poorly described, or misleading, the sum/whole will suffer.

[Steve Blair]

I take Wilf's point to be that attempting to predict the future is a risky affair. While resources will most likely be an issue, the driving force behind conflicts for resources will in all probability remain political. I don't think many regular posters here look at conflicts as being all hardware. If you look around, you'll find many discussions relating to the role of diplomats in small wars, the interaction of COIN forces with native populations, and other considerations that are pretty divorced from hardware. Granted, the hardware discussions tend to attract a good deal of attention, but in each thread you'll find almost as many posts arguing against a hardware-centric approach to the conduct of small wars.

Conflict has always cycled between major wars (Napoleonic, Rome-Carthage, WW2, take your pick) and smaller scale conflicts (Indian Wars, many of Great Britain's Imperial operations, and so on). What we seem to have lost is the ability to distinguish between these cycles and select the policy tools that are best suited for the situation.

[Ken White]

Let us go back to rethink the way we can train ourselves and our troops better than we do now.

No one is disagreeing with that. What we're awaiting is your providing some fresh thinking. Thus far, as Van said; "This reads like a "best practices" approach to Small Wars (COIN, low intensity conflict, SASO, pick your buzzword). You are trying to assemble the concepts that have worked in Latin America in the 1930s, Malaysia in the 1950s, Viet Nam in the 1960s-70s, the hords of Middle Eastern expats that are employed by the U.S. Army National Training Centers right now, etc? If so, you've put together a good framework.". To cap that, you even provide a link to the US army Combined Arms Center for backup of your position even though you offered several criticisms of US practices.

You did make this valid statement:

"For the last part. The only thing I like to stress is that we have to get a broader view at conflicts, the "hardware" aproach is just a (minor) part of conflicts."

I can't speak for others but I do not question that. My guess is that most here would agree. Thus my comment above; ""Seems to me that the object should be to get the Politicians educated so that they do not have to commit armed forces to three block wars because sensible diplomacy and aid applied by well educated and trained civilian specialists in their fields obviate the need for or desirability of a war. War brings in folks who are specialists in their field and that field is the conversion of urban blocks to rural terrain...""

And dear Ken and William, I would appreciate it that you do not to lift words out of a sentence to react on.

The whole is more than the sum of its parts.

I would be happy to comment on anything new that is the sum of any parts. Thus far, you have provided nothing new that I have seen and no sum.

Ready for some constructive and additional coments.

I though I had supplied some constructive comment which apparently you missed. Let me sum up my comments:

You so far as I can tell offer nothing new or innovative, instead say we need to incorporate best practices identified by many over the years -- and which are already being applied. No one has disagreed with that, many merely pointed out that is being done.

You propose to retrain military forces for a stabilization role. My experience and observation over a good many years and involving troops from many nations tells me this is an acceptable plan if there is no alternative; if there is any way to preclude such a military commitment, it should be pursued because military forces NEVER do a good job at stability operations; there are better ways.

My view is that the problems cited in that last statement will not change regardless of training UNLESS you completely move the force away from combat operations; I doubt this is a good idea.

Stabilization of problematic nations will without be required. Identification and evaluation of such a problem should be followed by rapid and adequate application of civilian efforts to preclude the necessity of a military deployment.

Two comments to add to all that; rapid and timely civilian intervention has been precluded and deterred by several factors. It worked for Colonies; it works less well in a post-colonial world where sensitivities to 'help' are a major problem that does not change the fact that civil is better and a military effort can create as many problems as it solves. Secondly, Europeans live in smaller, more homogeneous nations with strong central governments and have a colonial history and thus are more adept at providing such aid than are Americans. We know that and we accept it. We cannot for several reasons adopt European practices in totality. Size and breadth of necessary view being but two.

That's my summation, If I'm wrong in my assessment of your proposals, please tell me precisely what is wrong and I'll adjust.

[jmm99]

for the past two days. I have a question:

Are the OP and additions thereto intended to provide any guidance to civilians who are interested in the non-military aspects of stability operations (nation building) ?

If so, the OP etc. have failed to reach this member of that audience. I have no idea of exactly what is being proposed or why.

Since the proposals are unclear to me, I cannot assess whether they are aimed at force structures, training, intra-agency co-ordination, inter-agency co-ordination, or something else.

Where does the OP etc. fit into something like James Dobbins' construct in The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building (p.27):

Setting Priorities

The prime objective of any nation-building operation is to make violent societies peaceful, not to make poor ones prosperous, or authoritarian ones democratic. Economic development and political reform are important instruments for effecting this transformation, but will not themselves ensure it. Rather, such efforts need to be pursued within a broader framework, the aim of which is to redirect the competition for wealth and power, which takes place within any society, from violent into peaceful channels.

The first-order priorities for any nation-building mission are public security and humanitarian assistance. If the most basic human needs for safety, food, and shelter are not being met, any money spent on political or economic development is likely to be wasted. Accordingly, this guidebook is organized around a proposed hierarchy of nationbuilding tasks, which may be prioritized as follows:

Security: peacekeeping, law enforcement, rule of law, and security sector reform

Humanitarian relief: return of refugees and response to potential epidemics, hunger, and lack of shelter

Governance: resuming public services and restoring public administration

Economic stabilization: establishing a stable currency and providing a legal and regulatory framework in which local and international commerce can resume

Democratization: building political parties, free press, civil society, and a legal and constitutional framework for elections

Development: fostering economic growth, poverty reduction, and infrastructure improvements.

This is not to suggest that the above activities should necessarily be initiated sequentially. If adequate funding is available, they can and should proceed in tandem. But if higher-order priorities are not adequately resourced, investment in lower-order ones is likely to be wasted.

Feel free to treat me as a three-year old in response - consise and definite statements are helpful to us infants.

-----------------
PS: Ken, you mean for 34 years I've been saddled with the boxed set of Bob Asprey's Shadows, when I could've been using an abridged edition ? And referring to that work, is it true that you introduced the gladius to the Legions in one of your training sessions ?

[Coined]

We agree on most parts.

I do not want to (re)train troops for stabilization ops.
I suggest to train troops in a broader context as I have written a few times before. I you read the last part of my contribution you will notice that.

“If you only do what you know you can do- you never do very much.”

“Whatever course you decide upon, there is always someone to tell you that you are wrong. There are always difficulties arising which tempt you to believe that your critics are right. To map out a course of action and follow it to an end requires courage.”

[davidbfpo]

I too am finding this thread hard to follow.

A couple of points I'd make:

1) Where is there a suitable environment for such urban area training, complete with Third World conditions and a living supportive population? I can only quickly think of Morocco, only as 'Blackhawk Down' was filmed there. Mmm, would Puerto Rico, Costa Rica and such small places oblige?

2) It took a long time for NATO armies in Germany, before the end of the 'Cold War', to acknowledge urban operations (Berlin excluded) and build small training villages. Venues that could be adapted for pre-Ulster deployment.

3) Is training without soldiers en masse an acceptable alternative? Sounds almost like the "war rides" staff colleges pursue.

4) Are lessons truly shared and learnt about small wars, e.g. UK intervention in Sierra Leone (rural not urban I concede)? Is there a NATO facility that does this?

davidbfpo

[jenniferro10]

...it became painfully clear that all of us really are talking about the same thing with different words (as people much smarter than me have already pointed out). So, I'll offer this, in plain English:

1. Our terminology changes as our understanding of a problem becomes more refined. A great example is Jennifer Chandler's discussion of our military's fractured, incomplete definition and understanding of what culture is. This thesis was written in 2005. I think we can all point out several examples of the changing terminology (for the better and for the worse) since then. What's the problem with that? IMHO, evolution is a good thing. Change for change's sake is not.

2. Other than terminology/semantics, we've discussed the future of war and the possible role of our military in it. So far we have not discussed the corrolary implicit in the points of every person that's replied so far (at least, the ones that weren't pickin on people): how do we capture cultural information from the soldiers' experience, make it useful (operational) for the immediate future and in the decisionmaking going on way above that guy's head and for parallel operations of other branches and teams, and also feed it back into the training system?

[davidbfpo]

Jenniferro10,

Welcome to the SWC and an impressive first post too! Just had a quick look at the linked document, in particular the templates advocated. They appear to be what some police officers inherently acquire with time, plus now appear regularly in training material and what in the UK are called 'Community Impact Assessments'.

Perhaps some US "brothers in blue" will recognise the similarities?

I acknowledge there is a big difference between police based in the area and the arrival of the foriegn military in an operational area.

davidbfpo

[MikeF]

...it became painfully clear that all of us really are talking about the same thing with different words (as people much smarter than me have already pointed out). So, I'll offer this, in plain English:

1. Our terminology changes as our understanding of a problem becomes more refined. A great example is Jennifer Chandler's discussion of our military's fractured, incomplete definition and understanding of what culture is. This thesis was written in 2005. I think we can all point out several examples of the changing terminology (for the better and for the worse) since then. What's the problem with that? IMHO, evolution is a good thing. Change for change's sake is not.

2. Other than terminology/semantics, we've discussed the future of war and the possible role of our military in it. So far we have not discussed the corrolary implicit in the points of every person that's replied so far (at least, the ones that weren't pickin on people): how do we capture cultural information from the soldiers' experience, make it useful (operational) for the immediate future and in the decisionmaking going on way above that guy's head and for parallel operations of other branches and teams, and also feed it back into the training system?

The reason the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marines bicker amongst themselves is that they don't speak the same language. For instance, Take the simple phrase "secure the building".

The Army will post guards around the place.

The Navy will turn out the lights and lock the doors.

The Marines will kill everybody inside and set up a headquarters.

The Air Force will take out a 5 year lease with an option to buy.

v/r

Mike

[davidbfpo]

As if on cue, a UK MoD "spin" story on a new training facility in the Uk for Afghaanistan: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...n-Norfolk.html

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

.

2. Other than terminology/semantics, we've discussed the future of war and the possible role of our military in it.

I submit we have not discussed this. THIS IS the problem. We have a significant community who wish to paint a picture of future conflict that fits their desire to innovate and complicate. Central to this is their to change the military to fit their image of the future.

If armies did not do something in the past, it is extremely unlikely we need to do it today or even in the future.

how do we capture cultural information from the soldiers' experience, make it useful (operational) for the immediate future and in the decisionmaking going on way above that guy's head and for parallel operations of other branches and teams, and also feed it back into the training system?

If this means simple and effective education, I agree. You can teach any English speaking army how to interact with the Bedouin, in 1 day! That is, how not to unintentionally offend them. In 99% of cases, nothing more is needed.

Capturing operational lessons from conflict is pretty simple and their are at least 2 good examples of best practice, with a proven track record, so their is no need for anyone to invent anything new.

[Ken White]

...In 99% of cases, nothing more is needed.

Capturing operational lessons from conflict is pretty simple and their are at least 2 good examples of best practice, with a proven track record, so their is no need for anyone to invent anything new.

With an American cynical caveat to an optimistic British figure -- I'd say 90%. There will always be 10% who can muck up anything...

[Hacksaw]

COINed...

I'm neither the brightest nor dimmest bulb on the tree...

I've been trying hard to grasp what it is you are trying to communicate...

It seems you are dealing from a point of ignorance with regard to how (how the US) we train...

Not to mention most of your plaintive requests to "read" what you've said is not persuassive, just.... annoying.... trust me I'm right just doesn't go very far in this group of serious minded professionals (trust me its a tough love sort of lesson)...

So... a suggestion... just read the responses... allow for the fact that the collective operational experience of 100s of years just might be right and you wrong (or at least poorly communicated)

I'd hazzard a guess that you are in violent agreement with most who have advised you to tighten the shot group on your proposed... I don't know what idea, concept, construct... not sure what to call it...

Really take a step back from your ideas, disconnect your ego from said ideas, and reload...

Live well and row

[Ken White]

I do not want to (re)train troops for stabilization ops.
I suggest to train troops in a broader context as I have written a few times before. I you read the last part of my contribution you will note that.

My mis statement, I did understand that, but I also thought you were advocating significantly more training in that broader context than is now the case. As others said; that context -- not fully as you have stated but nearly so -- is now being used by most NATO nations. The US is certainly doing so...

Thus my slip to 'more.'

“If you only do what you know you can do- you never do very much.”

That sort of quote is cute but of little significance and distracts from your posts (as do some of my attempts at humor distract from mine). In that particular case, as stated, most NATO Armies and the US in particular are already doing what you suggest -- so how does that quote apply?

“Whatever course you decide upon, there is always someone to tell you that you are wrong. There are always difficulties arising which tempt you to believe that your critics are right. To map out a course of action and follow it to an end requires courage.”

Comment above applies. No one has said you were wrong in your focus, only that much of it in application is being done -- or not done for good reasons (Though you may not agree the reasons are good and that's understandable and acceptable to all).

Since most western, certainly most NATO Armies and the US are using variations of what you say you want, no one is telling you that you are wrong with respect to the training issue. Everyone has agreed that some form of your suggestions is desirable. Thus we have another quote that does not apply.

So much for training on which we seem to agree -- except that you say you wish it done and I say it IS being done -- and my understanding of your proposals. Could I draw your attention to my two other possibly constructive points above:

- Regardless of degree of training, military forces do not do a good job in stability operations and their use should be avoided.

- Problematic nations should first be assisted to the maximum possible extent by civilian efforts. I'll add to that should the security situation be dire or deteriorate, then military force can be used as necessary -- but the direction of effort and the primary stabilization work should all be civilian. Soldiers do not and will not make good nation builders...

[jmm99]

from jen..10
2. Other than terminology/semantics, we've discussed the future of war and the possible role of our military in it. So far we have not discussed the corrolary implicit in the points of every person that's replied so far (at least, the ones that weren't pickin on people): how do we capture cultural information from the soldiers' experience, make it useful (operational) for the immediate future and in the decisionmaking going on way above that guy's head and for parallel operations of other branches and teams, and also feed it back into the training system?

this is what is being discussed - although to this perhaps dim-witted legal type, it cannot be gleaned by him from the OP etc. It can be gleaned by him from MAJ Chandler's article.

[jmm99]

from Ken
- Regardless of degree of training, military forces do not do a good job in stability operations and their use should be avoided.

- Problematic nations should first be assisted to the maximum possible extent by civilian efforts. I'll add to that should the security situation be dire or deteriorate, then military force can be used as necessary -- but the direction of effort and the primary stabilization work should all be civilian. Soldiers do not and will not make good nation builders...

and so it be.

Not surprising when we consider the first of Dobbins' priorities (link in my post on p.2 of thread):

Security: peacekeeping, law enforcement, rule of law, and security sector reform

of which only "peacekeeping" is a military function (peace enforcement in a forced entry situation requires much more military input - Dobbins gives 10x as something of a norm). The remaining security functions are primarily "blue coat" and "black robe" things - although a gendarmerie-type force well might be required in a rougher environment. In any event, they are aspects of criminal law enforcement within a criminal justice system.

Dobbins' remaining five priorities are neither military nor criminal justice functions: Humanitarian relief; Governance; Economic stabilization; Democratization; and Development. In legal terms, these are all civil law sectors in a normally functioning nation - e.g., in the US and UK, civil law matters dwarf criminal law matters.

This is not to say that soldiers should be oblivious to these civilian considerations. They may well become involved in situations (e.g., in Vietnam, as Ken has pointed out in the past) where one district has HIC, another district virtually no conflict, and a third has LIC - with not many klicks separating the districts.

Another consideration (US) is that the normal legal structure established by Congress (having to do with appropriations and turf protection) gives the civilian component primacy. When in a stability operation the military is ordered to step in having primacy in fact, the result is kludgey.

My perception - very much civilian-driven.